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# THE MOTIVATIONAL BASIS OF STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTING

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The extraordinary discrepancy in the popular vote for President Eisenhower and the vote for Republican Congressmen in the 1956 election dramatized a privilege which the American electorate exercises almost uniquely in the democratic world, the right of voters to split their ballots between the candidates of opposing political parties.

The fact of ballot splitting in American elections is of course a commonplace but it has not been widely studied and it is not well understood. The aggregative statistics from the 1956 election make it apparent that millions of voters must have chosen President Eisenhower and a Democratic congressman but they do not tell us how many voters split their ballots in the opposite direction or how many voted for president but not for Congressman, and they give us only the vaguest indications of what was in the voters' minds when they crossed party lines in marking their ballots.

A national sample survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in October and November of 1956 now makes possible a detailed analysis of the straight and split ballot voters.[1] A sample of 1772 adults, chosen by strict probability methods from all the adults living in private households in the United States, was interviewed just prior to the 1956 Presidential election and again just subsequent to it. Over 200 separate items of information were obtained from each of these individuals, including, from those who voted in the November election, a statement of their vote for president, senator, congressman, and state and local offices. These data provide the basis for the analysis presented in this article.[2]

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[1] The study from which these data are drawn is being carried out under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. A full report of the study will become available at a later date. Statements of the sample design and sampling errors and copies of the questionnaires may be obtained from the Survey Research Center upon request.

## I. THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKETS

A voter who does not wish to vote a straight ticket in a presidential election may split his vote in a variety of ways, ways which have quite different political implications. We shall divide the ballot-splitters into the following five categories, based on certain assumptions about the motivations of voters using these different patterns of ballot-splitting:

1. Those who vote a straight ticket except for President.
2. Those who vote a straight ticket except for congressman or senator.
3. Those who vote a straight ticket at the national level (president, senator and congressman) but a straight ticket for the opposite party at the state and local level.
4. Those who vote a straight ticket at the national level but split their ticket at the state and local level.
5. Those who split their ticket both at the national and local levels.

When we divide the voters according to these different ballot patterns, considering Eisenhower and Stevenson voters in the North and South separately, we find the distribution presented in Table 1. Data from our study of the 1952 presidential election are also included for purposes of comparison.[3] Without attempting a full discussion of the contents of this table we may comment on the following conclusions which can be drawn from it:

1. A very sizeable segment of the American electorate crosses party lines when it votes in presidential elections, something on the order of one-third of the voters in 1952 and two-fifths in 1956. The most common splitting pattern is a straight vote for national candidates and a split among the state and local candidates. However, a significant number of voters split at both levels. Splitting an otherwise straight ticket in favor of a national candidate of the opposite party is less common.
2. Voters in the North and South differ greatly in the way they have marked their ballots in the last two presidential elections. Eisen-

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[2] At the time this analysis was undertaken we had in hand an unpublished manuscript entitled "The Split-Ticket Voter in 1952," written by Professor Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., of the Department of Political Science of Washington State College, and based on data collected by the Survey Research Center in its 1952 study. We wish to acknowledge Professor Ogden's generosity in making this manuscript available to us.

[3] See Campbell, A., Gurin, G., and Miller, W. E., *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co., 1954).

hower and Stevenson voters in the North show a generally similar pattern, although Eisenhower voters were somewhat more likely to split their ticket in both years, especially in 1956. Ticket splitting at the national level was not entirely a matter of voting for Eisenhower and a Democratic congressman; one out of every ten Stevenson voters in the North split for a Republican congressman or senator. The Eisenhower voters in 1956 also include a small but significant number who voted an otherwise Democratic ticket, a type of splitting which was almost non-existent in the Stevenson column. In the South, however, the Eisenhower and Stevenson voters were profoundly different. If a Southern voter chose Stevenson in either 1952 or 1956 he almost certainly voted a straight Democratic ticket. If he voted for Eisenhower, he was quite unlikely to follow through with a straight Republican ticket. In both years a third or so of the Eisenhower voters in the South voted a straight Democratic ticket except for the president.

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTING IN THE 1952 AND 1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: NORTH AND SOUTH[1]

| | North | | | | South | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Voted for Eisenhower | | Voted for Stevenson | | Voted for Eisenhower | | Voted for Stevenson | | Total[2] | |
| | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 | 1952 | 1956 |
| Voted straight ticket | 66% | 56% | 70% | 68% | 17% | 34% | 95% | 96% | 66% | 61% |
| Voted straight except for President | 1 | 6 | *[3] | * | 39 | 31 | —[4] | — | 4 | 6 |
| Voted straight except for senator or congressman | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Voted straight at national level, straight for opposite party at state and local level | * | * | * | * | — | 6 | 1 | — | * | 1 |
| Voted straight at national level, split at state and local level | 23 | 20 | 18 | 21 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 17 |
| Voted split ticket at both levels | 8 | 15 | 8 | 8 | 36 | 21 | — | — | 9 | 12 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Number of cases | 522 | 575 | 335 | 356 | 72 | 118 | 77 | 121 | 1,006 | 1,189 |

[1] For our purposes the South consists of all the states east of New Mexico and south of the Ohio River, including West Virginia and Maryland. The North consists of all the remaining states.

[2] This table includes only those voters in our samples who reported a vote for president, congressman or senator, and state and local candidates. Excluded are 15 per cent of the 1952 voters and 8 per cent of the 1956 voters who either did not vote for one or more offices on the ballot or did not give us full information about their vote.

[3] The asterisk is used in these tables to denote frequencies of less than one per cent.

[4] The dash is used in these tables to denote a zero frequency.

3. A significant shift occurred both in the North and in the South from 1952 to 1956 in the extent to which Eisenhower voters also voted for Republican candidates for Congress. Interestingly

enough, the trends are in opposite directions in the two areas. In the North the proportion of Eisenhower voters who voted a straight Republican ticket at the national level declined from 89 per cent in 1952 to 76 per cent in 1956, a difference accounted for in large part by otherwise Democratic voters who crossed party lines only at the presidential level. In the South the shift was in the other direction and was much more substantial. Where only 21 per cent of the Eisenhower voters in that area in 1952 reported supporting Republican candidates for Congress, in 1956 46 per cent did so. Especially interesting is the fact that a third of the Southern Eisenhower voters reported voting a completely straight Republican ticket in 1956, double the number who so reported in our 1952 survey. The implications of these data for the future of the Republican party in the South invite speculation.

4. The total effect of these changes in the splitting of the national ticket by Eisenhower voters was to increase the margin by which President Eisenhower led his Republican compatriots in 1956 as compared to 1952. The Southern contribution to the Eisenhower vote is relatively small and the increase in the Southern vote for Republican candidates for Congress was more than offset by the decrease in the North.

To complete this introductory description of the distribution of ballot splitting we may divide our sample into the familiar social, economic and geographic categories to find in which sections of the electorate the different types of ticket splitting are most prevalent. The data which result are too voluminous for detailed comment but they may be summarized in the following general statements.[4]

1. Although there are differences of some size between certain of the socio-economic groups in the North in the proportions who vote a straight ticket, in general the data give the impression of greater similarity than difference. One does not get the impression from studying Tables II and III that a satisfactory understanding of why some people vote a straight ticket and some split can be arrived at from a knowledge of socio-economic position.
2. The one variable which seems to have clear implications for straight

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[4] Because the voting patterns in the North and the South differ so profoundly the subsequent analysis in this article considers only the Northern portion of the sample. The restricted size of the Southern sample precludes a parallel presentation of those data. Tables II through VII include those voters who either did not vote a complete ticket or did not give us full information about their vote. For a discussion of uncompleted ballots, based on aggregative election data, see V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1952), pp. 654–57.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTERS WITHIN DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS: EISENHOWER VOTERS IN THE NORTH

| | Straight ticket | Straight except for President | Straight except for sen. *or cong.* | Straight nat'l., straight for other *party* locally | Straight national, split *locally* | Split at both levels | Voted incomplete *ticket* | Not ascertained | Total | Number of cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Men | 47% | 5 | 4 | 1 | 19 | 17 | 2 | 5 | 100% | 278 |
| Women | 56% | 6 | 2 | * | 18 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 100% | 340 |
| Under 34 | 45% | 8 | 4 | — | 22 | 15 | 2 | 4 | 100% | 160 |
| 35–44 | 50% | 8 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 15 | 3 | 8 | 100% | 160 |
| 45–54 | 60% | 2 | 3 | — | 21 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 100% | 122 |
| 55–64 | 56% | 4 | 2 | — | 15 | 15 | 4 | 4 | 100% | 104 |
| 65 or older | 57% | 6 | 3 | — | 19 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 100% | 72 |
| Protestant | 56% | 4 | 3 | — | 20 | 11 | 2 | 4 | 100% | 441 |
| Catholic | 44% | 13 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 19 | 4 | 4 | 100% | 157 |
| Grade school | 59% | 4 | 3 | — | 11 | 11 | 5 | 7 | 100% | 153 |
| High school | 50% | 9 | 2 | * | 20 | 14 | 2 | 3 | 100% | 306 |
| College | 50% | 2 | 3 | * | 24 | 15 | 2 | 4 | 100% | 157 |
| Professional | 52% | 3 | 5 | 1 | 24 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 100% | 87 |
| Business and managers | 52% | 3 | 3 | — | 21 | 12 | 1 | 8 | 100% | 102 |
| White collar | 53% | 9 | 1 | — | 16 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 100% | 64 |
| Skilled and semi-skilled | 55% | 6 | 1 | * | 13 | 17 | 4 | 4 | 100% | 167 |
| Unskilled | 48% | 15 | 6 | — | 17 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 100% | 52 |
| Farm operators | 43% | 4 | 2 | — | 26 | 19 | — | 6 | 100% | 53 |
| Retired | 63% | 3 | — | — | 19 | 10 | 5 | — | 100% | 38 |
| Union member | 55% | 3 | 3 | — | 8 | 22 | — | 9 | 100% | 74 |
| Union family; not a member | 57% | 12 | 1 | — | 11 | 12 | 3 | 4 | 100% | 74 |
| Non-union family | 52% | 5 | 3 | — | 21 | 12 | 3 | 4 | 100% | 468 |
| Metropolitan centers | 50% | 14 | 5 | — | 8 | 11 | 6 | 6 | 100% | 80 |
| Metropolitan suburbs | 62% | 7 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 12 | 2 | 3 | 100% | 122 |
| Urban over 50,000 | 55% | 3 | 3 | — | 20 | 15 | 1 | 3 | 100% | 94 |
| 50,000 to 2,500 | 50% | 4 | 1 | 1 | 28 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 100% | 137 |
| Under 2,500 | 49% | — | — | — | 23 | 17 | 2 | 9 | 100% | 47 |
| Rural | 48% | 6 | 4 | — | 20 | 15 | 2 | 5 | 100% | 138 |

ticket voting is place of residence. Among Stevenson voters in the North the metropolitan areas were marked with a high incidence of straight ticket voting. The metropolitan suburbs were the point of highest straight ticket voting among Northern Eisenhower voters. The rural and semi-rural areas had the lowest proportions of straight tickets among voters for either candidate. It is also apparent that splitting at the state and local level is much less common in the metropolitan areas than it is outside these areas.

We may observe in passing that these data document a generally recognized aspect of American politics. The impersonal quality of metropolitan politics and the relative strength of the metropolitan party organizations, particularly that of the Democratic party,

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION OF STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTERS WITHIN DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS: STEVENSON VOTERS IN THE NORTH

|  | Straight ticket | Straight except for President | Straight except for sen. or cong. | Straight nat'l., straight for other party locally | Straight national, split locally | Split at both levels | Voted incomplete ticket | Not ascertained | Total | Number of cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Men | 60% | — | 3 | 1 | 22 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 100% | 186 |
| Women | 68% | * | 2 | — | 17 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 100% | 190 |
| Under 34 | 67% | — | 2 | — | 17 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 100% | 99 |
| 35–44 | 64% | — | 2 | — | 19 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 100% | 110 |
| 45–54 | 60% | 1 | 5 | 1 | 22 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 100% | 73 |
| 55–64 | 63% | — | 2 | 2 | 20 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 100% | 46 |
| 65 or older | 66% | — | — | — | 23 | 9 | 2 | — | 100% | 47 |
| Protestant | 57% | — | 3 | 1 | 22 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 100% | 190 |
| Catholic | 72% | 1 | 1 | — | 17 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 100% | 132 |
| Grade school | 69% | 1 | 2 | — | 17 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 100% | 97 |
| High school | 62% | — | 2 | * | 22 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 100% | 218 |
| College | 62% | — | 5 | 2 | 19 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 100% | 58 |
| Professional | 62% | — | 4 | 4 | 17 | 4 | — | 9 | 100% | 24 |
| Business and managers | 58% | — | 6 | — | 32 | 2 | 2 | — | 100% | 47 |
| White collar | 78% | — | — | — | 11 | 8 | 3 | — | 100% | 36 |
| Skilled and semi-skilled | 68% | — | 2 | — | 14 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 100% | 142 |
| Unskilled | 69% | 2 | — | 2 | 18 | 2 | 7 | — | 100% | 45 |
| Farm operators | 42% | — | 3 | — | 32 | 13 | — | 10 | 100% | 31 |
| Retired | 70% | — | — | — | 16 | 7 | 7 | — | 100% | 30 |
| Union member | 65% | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 11 | 6 | 1 | 100% | 91 |
| Union family; not a member | 77% | — | 3 | — | 13 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 100% | 68 |
| Non-union family | 60% | — | 3 | * | 24 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 100% | 216 |
| Metropolitan centers | 80% | — | 3 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 100% | 95 |
| Metropolitan suburbs | 75% | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 100% | 72 |
| Urban over 50,000 | 61% | — | 2 | — | 29 | 6 | 2 | — | 100% | 49 |
| 50,000 to 2,500 | 50% | — | 5 | — | 30 | 13 | 2 | — | 100% | 60 |
| Under 2,500 | 48% | — | — | — | 30 | 7 | 11 | 4 | 100% | 27 |
| Rural | 52% | — | — | — | 27 | 12 | 2 | 7 | 100% | 73 |

could be expected to predispose toward straight ticket voting. In the less highly populated areas, where the chances are much greater that a voter may have some personal contact with the candidates or some specific information about them, it is not surprising that ticket crossing at the state and local level is relatively high.

3. One further point of interest in these tables is the not inconsiderable group of people who voted a straight Democratic ticket except for the President. In Table II we find such people disproportionately represented among Catholics, in households where the head of the household is an unskilled worker, among members of union families who are not themselves union members, and in the metropolitan centers. We know that these population groups were among

the strongest supporters of Governor Stevenson in 1956 and we see in Table III that they were among the most heavily disposed toward a straight Democratic ticket. We cannot undertake a detailed analysis of these people in this article but it may be observed that they appear to epitomize the conflict between party loyalty and candidate appeal which tormented a great many Democrats at the time of the 1956 election.

## II. THE MOTIVATIONAL BASIS OF THE STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET

Any attempt to explain why the voter marks a straight or split ballot must take account of the physical characteristics of the election ballot. Disregarding the minor parties, the ballot consists of a series of paired choices, each member of each pair identified as belonging to one of two classes of members, Republicans or Democrats. The voter may choose from each pair either on the basis of the personal qualities of the individual candidates or on the basis of their party labels or both. In 26 of the 48 states the ballot permits him to resolve the entire complicated series of decisions by the simple procedure of marking a party circle or pulling a party lever. There are a number of variations on this straight ticket procedure in the other states. Some states divide the presidential vote from the rest of the ballot, some divide the ballot into presidential, congressional, and local sections, some group the candidates by office rather than by party but identify the party of each candidate.[5] All states, however, provide some means by which the voter can with relatively little effort vote a straight party ticket. The result is that when the voter enters the polling booth he must first decide whether or not to vote a party ticket, by using the party circle or party lever if such is provided or by marking each candidate who carries his party label. If he approaches the ballot without the specific intention of voting a party ticket, he must then choose each candidate individually. Instead of a single decision, he must now make several. The result may be a straight ticket vote but it is much more likely to be one of the splitting patterns we have described.

Whatever relationships we find between the political motivations of the voters and the way they mark their ballots, it is clear that the form of the ballot itself has an influence on the proportion of straight and split tickets cast. This becomes evident when we divide our sample into those voting in states with the single choice type of straight ticket voting and those in which a straight ticket requires more than one mark on the ballot. Of the Eisenhower voters in the single choice states, 59 per cent voted a straight ticket; in the other states it was 48 per cent. Of the Stevenson voters in the single choice states, 69 per cent voted a straight ticket; 60 per cent voted a straight ticket in the multiple choice states. Since the distributions of party identifiers in the two types of states do not differ we must conclude that the sheer ease of voting a straight ticket facilitates this type of voting.[6] This fact becomes an important consideration in our subsequent discussion.

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[5] *The Book of The States, 1954–55,* ed. Frank Smothers (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1954). Ballot Forms Table, page 82.

We turn now to the political motives of the voters and the ways they relate to the use of the straight or split ticket. We present below three explanations of the straight or split ticket vote, drawn partly from political folklore and partly from earlier research findings, and subject each to such tests as the data of our study make possible.

1. The straight ticket is the product of indifference and lack of concern with political affairs. Since marking the party circle, pulling the party lever, or otherwise voting a party ticket requires the least effort on the part of the voter, it is most attractive to the voter who is least willing to make a discriminating effort in the selection of candidates. The split ticket, conversely, is the mark of the motivated voter, the voter with sufficient interest to distinguish among the candidates and to take the trouble to choose among them.
2. The straight ticket is the expression of high political motivation. The motivated voter is more likely to organize his ballot in a highly structured pattern. His motivation may derive from an interest in parties, candidates, or issues or any combination of these. Since the party label on the ballot makes it possible for him to shape his vote in support of his motivation, he is likely to be a straight-ticket voter. In contrast, the indifferent, unmotivated voter, feeling no need to organize his ballot toward any general political objective, makes his selections among candidates on a capricious, quasi-random basis. In doing so he is very likely to split his ballot.
3. The straight ticket is the mark of the party-oriented voter. Whether his general interest in politics is high or low, his party attachment governs his voting behavior; he goes down the line for his

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[6] We may also note that the single choice type of ticket appeared to hold Democratic identifiers more securely to their presidential nominee than did the multiple choice ballot. In the single choice states, 91 per cent of the "strong" Democrats voted for Stevenson, nine per cent for Eisenhower; in the multiple choice states, the percentages were 86 and 14. "Weak" Democrats gave Stevenson 70 per cent of their votes in the single choice states, 30 per cent to Eisenhower, and in the multiple choice states, 64 and 36 per cent. The votes of Republican identifiers in the two types of states did not differ.

party. Ballot splitting is found either where party identification is weak or absent or where there is conflict between party identification and other political motives.

*The Straight Ticket as an Indifferent Vote.* The supposition that the straight ballot bespeaks a casual, disinterested vote has a considerable currency in this country. The popularity of the concept of "voting for the man," which we have observed in our earlier studies, carries with it the implication that a straight ticket voter is likely to be an uninformed, indifferent person who takes the easy way out in the voting booth.

The data we have already seen in Tables II and III suggest that this explanation of straight ticket voting must be quite inadequate. We do not find there, for example, any significant tendency for the higher educational and occupational groups to split their tickets as this theory would lead us to expect. Such differences as we find among educational and occupational groups are small and inconsistent.

Looking more directly at the factor of indifference, we may divide our respondents into those who said they "cared a great deal" whether

TABLE IV. RELATION OF STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF VOTING: NORTH

"We would like to know how strongly you felt about the importance of voting in this election. Would you say you cared a great deal whether or not you voted, cared somewhat, or didn't care too much this time?"

| | Voted for Eisenhower | | Voted for Stevenson | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cared great deal | Cared somewhat or not too much | Cared great deal | Cared somewhat or not too much |
| Voted straight ticket | 54% | 40% | 66% | 53% |
| Voted straight except for President | 5 | 11 | * | — |
| Voted straight except for senator or congressman | 3 | — | 2 | 4 |
| Voted straight at national level, straight for opposite party at state and local level | * | 1 | * | — |
| Voted straight at national level, split at state and local level | 19 | 14 | 20 | 22 |
| Voted split at both levels | 12 | 21 | 8 | 5 |
| Voted incomplete ticket | 2 | 4 | 2 | 11 |
| Not ascertained | 5 | 9 | 2 | 5 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Number of cases | 543 | 75 | 319 | 57 |

or not they voted in the 1956 presidential election and those who were less concerned about voting. This distribution is heavily loaded at the "cared a great deal" end, but we find that those voters who seemed to attach relatively little importance to whether or not they voted were not therefore more likely to be straight ticket voters (Table IV). They were, in fact, more likely to split their ballot than were the voters who felt more strongly about the importance of voting.[7]

*The Straight Ticket as a Motivated Vote.* Paradoxically, it appears from Table IV that, while some people may vote a straight ticket because they are *not* highly motivated politically, others vote a straight ticket for the very reason that they *are* so motivated. In order to test this latter proposition more adequately than our single question on the felt importance of voting makes possible, we need to draw from our data a measure of the major political motivations which influence the vote. In our study of the 1952 elections we postulated three types of political motives which we were able to show accounted for a substantial part of the total variance in voting for President. These three factors related respectively to parties, candidates, and issues; they were defined in the following terms:

> *Party identification.* We refer by this term to the sense of personal attachment which the individual citizen feels toward the political party of his choice. We equate strong identification with high significance of the party as an influential standard. In the course of the pre-election interview we asked each respondent, "Do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" If he identified himself as a Republican or a Democrat, he was asked, "Would you call yourself a strong (Republican or Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican or Democrat)?" These questions permit a division of the sample into those strongly identified with one party or the other and those not so identified.
>
> *Candidate partisanship.* This variable is defined as the structuring of political events in terms of a personal attraction to the major personalities involved, in this case the presidential candidates of the two parties. The extent to which our respondents reacted to the personal qualifications of the two presidential candidates and the relative attractiveness of one over the other was assessed from a series of open-ended questions asked in the pre-election interview.

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[7] This finding is not changed when the voters of single choice and multiple choice states are compared. There is more straight ticket voting in the single choice states but those voters who "cared a great deal" whether or not they voted were more likely to vote a straight ticket than those who did not in both groups of states.

The scoring of the responses to these questions divided the respondents into those who reacted preferentially to the personal qualities of one candidate or the other and those who did not.

*Issue partisanship.* This term refers to concern with issues of governmental policy and association of one or the other party or presidential candidate with these issues in a favorable or unfavorable way. The same series of open-ended questions from which the candidate orientation scores were taken was also used in this case. The extent to which the respondents referred to partisan issues and the degree to which they expressed preference for one party's issue positions as compared with the other's are summarized in this measure.

We know from our earlier studies that while these three measures are intercorrelated, each of them is also independently correlated with vote preference. Disregarding differences in the relative importance which might be attached to each, we can devise a rough measure of the strength of political motivation by a simple addition of the number of motives which actually support each individual's vote. That is, we can give an Eisenhower voter for whom we have a Republican score on party identification, candidate partisanship, and issue partisanship a total motivational score of three. A Stevenson voter with Democratic scores on party identification and issue partisanship but a neutral or Republican score on candidate partisanship will have a score of two. A voter whose scores are all neutral or in opposition to his vote receives a score of zero. When we divide our 1956 sample into subgroups according to how many active motives each voter reported and how many of these supported his vote, we find the frequencies of straight ticket voting presented in Table V. This table presents the data separately for the single choice and the multiple choice states. If we consider for the moment only the "Summary" row at the bottom of the two halves of the table, we see that there is a sharp increase in straight ticket voting as the number of vote-supporting motives increases.

We must conclude from Table V that there is a type of straight ticket voting that cannot be explained as expressing a low degree of political involvement. Motivated straight ticket voting appears to reflect an intention on the part of the voter to accomplish his political purpose as fully as possible. Such a voter does not scatter his choices casually; he has a political direction in mind and he implements it through the choice of one party or the other on the ballot. The more highly motivated he is toward this political objective, the less willing he is to dilute his vote by crossing party lines.

We also see from Table V that, whatever the motivational conditions may be, the simplicity of the single choice ballot facilitates straight ticket voting. Significantly, this is particularly marked among those voters who by our measurements have no active political motivation. These relatively unmotivated people are notably more likely to vote a straight ticket if they can do so by making a single mark on the ballot than if the voting procedure is more complicated.

One additional comment regarding Table V is in order. We see that in the single choice states, 45 per cent of those voters who reported no supporting motivation for their vote voted a straight ticket; in the multiple choice states the comparable figure was 27 per cent. We are not surprised to find a small number of apparently unmotivated people in our sample of voters; our three-factor theory of political motivation does not include all of the influences that might bring a person to the polls. It is among these people, however, that we would expect the factor of least effort to be most effective, and the fact that less than half of them actually vote a straight ticket requires some explanation.

If we assume that a straight ticket vote by an indifferent, politically unmotivated voter is an expression of his wish to remove himself from the voting situation with the least possible effort, we must conclude that

TABLE V. RELATION OF STRAIGHT TICKET VOTING TO NUMBER OF MOTIVES SUPPORTING THE VOTE FOR PRESIDENT: NORTH

(Entries denote proportions voting a straight ticket)

| Number of Active Motives | Number of Supporting Motives | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | None | One | Two | Three |
| A. Voters in Single-Choice States | | | | |
| Three | *[1] | * | 64 | 77 |
| Two | * | 39 | 66 | |
| One | * | 54 | | |
| None | * | | | |
| Summary | 45 | 49 | 65 | 77 |
| Number of cases | 38 | 108 | 179 | 122 |
| B. Voters in Multiple-Choice States | | | | |
| Three | * | 35 | 50 | 65 |
| Two | * | 30 | 54 | |
| One | 35 | 40 | | |
| None | * | | | |
| Summary | 27 | 36 | 53 | 65 |
| Number of cases | 51 | 138 | 196 | 162 |

[1] Number of cases too small for computation of percentages.

if he passes up the opportunity to mark a party ticket, using whatever mechanism for voting a straight ticket his ballot provides him, he must be activated by some interest that leads him to choose among the individual candidates. Our data do not tell us what such interests might be but it is not difficult to propose several alternatives. He may, for example, be picking out names that some friend or political worker asked him to vote for. He may be screening the candidates' names for their apparent national origins, supporting those that belong to his own group. He may have some personal acquaintance with one or two of the minor candidates that leads him to look for their positions on the ballot. Once such a voter begins choosing among the individual offices he is very likely to cross party lines. Not being controlled by any principle of selection that would confine him to one party or the other, he is subject to random influences arising from the familiarity of the candidates' names, their position on the ballot (especially if the candidates are grouped by office), their designation as incumbents, or other similar considerations. In other words, his split ballot may be the result of quite superficial considerations and require little more investment of mental effort than the straight ballot alternative taken by the other members of this group of unmotivated voters.

*The Straight Ticket as a Party Oriented Vote.* Table V makes it clear that the presence of one or more of the three political motives in support of the presidential vote increases the likelihood of a straight ticket vote. It does not tell us which, if any, of these three motives is strongest in bringing about this result.

There are both rational and empirical reasons to expect that party identification would prove to be the key factor in the explanation of the motivated straight ticket. A straight ticket is after all a straight party ticket, not a candidate ticket or an issue ticket. The party labels of the candidates are specifically identified on the ballot. The voting situation is calculated to stimulate whatever sense of party attachment the voter may have. Moreover, we know from our previous studies that party identification plays a considerably stronger role than candidate or issue factors in determining which presidential nominee the voter chooses. It would be surprising if this were not also reflected in the tendency to vote a straight ticket.

We see in Table VI how strongly this expectation is borne out. Party identification quite clearly has meaning not only for the presidential vote but for the rest of the ticket as well. Voters identified as Democrats may, for a variety of reasons, vote Republican for President, but the basic nature of their partisan allegiance comes through in their votes for other offices. Straight ticket voting is very high among strong party

TABLE VI. RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO STRAIGHT AND SPLIT TICKET VOTING: NORTH

| | Voted for Eisenhower | | | | | Voted for Stevenson | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Strong Rep. | Weak Rep. | Independent | Weak Dem. | Strong Dem. | Strong Rep. | Weak Rep. | Independent | Weak Dem. | Strong Dem. |
| A. Among Voters in Single Choice States | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voted straight ticket | 76 | 70 | 46 | 22 | * | * | * | 53 | 70 | 78 |
| Voted straight ticket except for President | — | — | 3 | 26 | * | — | — | — | 2 | — |
| Voted straight except for senator or congressman | 2 | 1 | 5 | 4 | — | — | * | — | — | 1 |
| Voted straight at national level, straight for opposite party at state and local level | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Voted straight at national level, split at state and local level | 13 | 18 | 23 | 13 | — | — | * | 20 | 22 | 14 |
| Voted split ticket at both levels | 5 | 5 | 13 | 31 | * | — | * | 15 | 2 | 4 |
| Voted incomplete ticket | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | — | — | — | 9 | 2 | 2 |
| Not ascertained | — | 3 | 7 | — | — | — | — | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | * | * | * | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Cases | 82 | 67 | 91 | 23 | 8 | 1 | 6 | 34 | 54 | 81 |
| B. Among Voters in Multiple Choice States | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voted straight ticket | 79 | 56 | 27 | 13 | * | — | * | 40 | 55 | 75 |
| Voted straight except for President | — | 1 | 6 | 31 | * | — | — | — | — | — |
| Voted straight except for senator or congressman | 1 | 1 | 5 | — | * | — | — | 7 | 4 | 1 |
| Voted straight at national level, straight for opposite party at state and local level | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | * | — | — | 1 |
| Voted straight at national level, split at state and local level | 12 | 24 | 25 | 15 | * | — | * | 30 | 25 | 13 |
| Voted split ticket at both levels | 3 | 8 | 28 | 31 | * | — | * | 18 | 9 | 5 |
| Voted incomplete ticket | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | — | — | — | — | 3 | 5 |
| Not ascertained | 4 | 5 | 8 | 5 | * | — | — | 5 | 4 | — |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | ** | ** | ** | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Cases | 103 | 88 | 101 | 39 | 16 | 0 | 7 | 40 | 68 | 85 |

Note: Asterisk denotes number of cases too small for computation of percentages. Dash denotes zero frequency.

identifiers supporting their party's presidential nominee and such splitting as they do is largely at the local level. Even those Democrats who deserted Mr. Stevenson showed considerable reluctance to go along with the Republican party on the rest of the ticket. Less than one in five of this group voted a straight Republican ticket while over a quarter supported all of the Democratic candidates except the presidential nominee.

The Independent voters provide a useful test of what happens when party attachment is not present. As their name implies, the Independents appear to be relatively free of party discipline, with a high level of splitting, particularly at the national level. One may reasonably wonder why so many Independents vote a straight ticket. They may be indifferent voters of the kind we have described. They may be using their straight ticket vote to support an issue position or a candidate preference they may have. And some, no doubt, are not as independent of the parties as they like to represent themselves. The lifetime party follower who calls himself an Independent is not an unfamiliar phenomenon.

Table VI also draws attention to the fact that the impact of the form of the ballot on straight and split ticket voting varies with the motivation of the voter. Given the thesis that a high level of partisan motivation leads to straight ticket voting, we might well predict that other factors will have their greatest influence on such voting in the absence of partisan motivations. This is, indeed, the case. For the extreme party identifiers (Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats), the ballot form has no discernible effect on whether or not they vote a straight ticket. Strong Republicans using multiple choice ballots still vote a straight ticket just as frequently as do Strong Republicans who can cast a party vote with a single "X" or by pulling a single party lever; the same is true of Strong Democrats. Among weak identifiers, Independents, and among identifiers whose presidential vote is in conflict with their party identification, the form of the ballot plays a progressively more and more important role in facilitating or inhibiting straight ticket voting. The data from Table VI may be summarized in the following manner:

For voters in single choice states,
- 77% of the strong identifiers vote a straight ticket
- 70% of the weak identifiers vote a straight ticket
- 48% of the Independents vote a straight ticket
- 24% of the weak identifiers whose presidential vote conflicts with their party identification vote a straight ticket.

For voters in multiple choice states,
- 77% of the strong identifiers vote a straight ticket
- 55% of the weak identifiers vote a straight ticket

30% of the Independents vote a straight ticket
15% of the weak identifiers whose presidential vote conflicts with their party identification vote a straight ticket.

*Other Motives and Ticket Splitting.* The relative contribution of candidate partisanship and issue partisanship to the determination of the type of ballot cast can be estimated by bringing these two variables and party identification into a single table. Table VII presents the proportions of straight ticket voters found under each possible combination of the three motivational variables. Despite the limitations of the sample which make some of the cells of the table too small for comment, it is apparent that party identification not only plays the striking rôle demonstrated earlier in Table VI, but that it is relatively more important to an understanding of split ticket voting than either of the other factors.

TABLE VII. RELATION OF STRAIGHT TICKET VOTING TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION, ISSUE PARTISANSHIP AND CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP: NORTH

| | Issue Partisanship Supports Vote for President | | | Issue Partisanship Neutral | | | Issue Partisanship Conflicts with Vote for President | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Candidate Partisanship | | | Candidate Partisanship | | | Candidate Partisanship | | |
| | Supports | Neutral | Conflicts | Supports | Neutral | Conflicts | Supports | Neutral | Conflicts |
| Party Identification: | | | | | | | | | |
| Supports vote for President | 74[1] | 73 | 76 | 70 | 59 | 53 | 69 | * | 47 |
| Neutral (Independent) | 40 | 36 | *[2] | 38 | 43 | 33 | 27 | * | * |
| Conflicts with vote for President | 18 | * | * | 20 | * | * | * | * | * |

[1] Entry is the percentage of the group who voted a straight ticket.
[2] Number of cases too small for computation of percentages.

Although the data are not altogether consistent, the candidate and issue factors both appear to have an independent influence on the tendency to vote a straight ticket. Neither of them is as strong as the party factor, but they are both visible.

The reader will also observe from both Table V and Table VII that when the political motives we have been discussing come into conflict, split ticket voting tends to increase. Table V, which summarizes the interaction of the three motivational variables, demonstrates clearly that the presence of a conflicting motive is associated with a lower proportion of straight ticket voting than is found when an equal number of supporting motives are present without conflict. Table VII shows the same data with the individual motives specifically identified. These tables confirm and extend similar data we reported from our 1952 study.

They demonstrate the independent influence of the party, candidate and issue variables and the dynamic character of their interaction.

*Straight Tickets and Coattails.* The phenomenon of coattail riding is one aspect of the way a voter marks his ballot which has had longstanding interest for students of politics. The coattail influence of the presidential candidate on votes cast for the remainder of his ticket appears to be a direct expression of the factor we have called candidate partisanship. The political component which each presidential candidate contributes most uniquely to an election campaign is his own personality. The party affiliation which he must bear and the stands on issues which he must take are, to a very large extent, characteristics which he had in common with a relatively wide circle of other potential candidates, and, more pertinently, which he *has* in common with other candidates on his ticket. The presidential candidate and his running mates will prosper and suffer alike because of the voters' reactions to the symbols of party which they bear and commitments to issues which they espouse. Because party and issue have an existence apart from the candidates affiliated with them, the characteristics of political affiliation and policy commitment are not likely to be the fabrics from which the presidential coattails are tailored. The coattails come into being, rather, because the personal appeal, the magnetism of the presidential candidate, can be translated into the sort of allegiance which commands the voter to do his bidding and give support to his cohorts who follow him on the ballot.

As one of us has pointed out elsewhere,[8] it is sometimes argued that if a presidential candidate runs substantially ahead of the congressional nominees of his own party the very distance by which he surpasses them demonstrates his failure to carry them with him. If he should win and they should lose, the failure is especially evident. Conversely, however, it can be argued that if he attracts exactly the same proportion of the vote as they do he is obviously no more popular than they and again there has been no coattail influence. It is clearly very difficult to estimate accurately the extent to which a presidential nominee influences the vote for his fellow candidates, if all one has to go on is the aggregative election returns.

Our survey data permit us to approach this problem from a new vantage point. We do not have all the information that would be necessary for a full answer to the coattail question but by dividing the voters into party identification groups and examining the way they cast their ballots we can at least identify the most obvious points at which coattail influence was or was not present in 1956. Looking back to Table VI we see that a considerable number of people who normally think of themselves as Democrats voted for Mr. Eisenhower. It is evident that a large part of this defection resulted from a personal attraction to the candidate rather than from party or issue considerations. Most of these Democrats supported some or most of the Democratic candidates on the ballot, but almost a third of them voted for a Republican congressman. They either voted a straight Republican ticket or a straight Republican ticket at the national level only. In either case it seems that their vote for President influenced their vote for congressman. Since these people made up six per cent of the total vote for Republican congressmen in the North it must be concluded that a visible coattail effect was present. The number of Republicans who voted for Stevenson was very small in 1956 but if we give him all the credit for such defections as did occur among Republican identifiers it is clear that his ability to carry Republican votes for Democratic congressmen could not have been more than two per cent of their total vote in the Northern states.

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[8] Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 19 (Winter 1955–56), pp. 353–68.

There are undoubtedly other coattail effects which we cannot easily assess. The ability of a presidential candidate to hold the members of his own party in line is an important aspect of his influence on the vote. His success in winning the votes of the Independent voters to his ticket may be more significant than the defectors he may attract from the other party. Without attempting to evaluate these effects exactly, we would conclude from the data we have seen that even though a Presidential candidate runs far ahead of his fellow partisans for congressional office, they may owe him a greater debt than the election returns imply on the surface.

## III. DISCUSSION

We believe that the motivational basis of straight and split ballot voting can be understood in terms of three underlying generalizations:

1. In the presence of specific goal-directed motivation, behavior tends to be organized toward the achievement of the goal, and the stronger the motivation the less the deviation from the goal.
2. Conflict between motives reduces the strength of goal-directed motivation and produces ambiguities in behavior.
3. In the absence of specific goal-directed motivation, behavior tends to be governed by a principle of least effort.

Our motivational analysis has depended largely on our three political variables, party identification, candidate partisanship, and issue partisanship. All these variables are clearly related to the two-party nature of American politics and we have assumed, in accordance with the general principle of motivational strength, that when they combine in a mutually supportive manner they increase the pressure toward full support of one of the parties. Our data have shown that straight ticket voting is lowest among voters for whom none of these motives is present and highest among those whose party, candidate, and issue motives all impel them to support the same party. Deviations across party lines are least common among those voters who identify with their party, prefer its presidential candidate, and approve its issue positions.

However, this statement does not fully account for the variations we find in straight and split ballot voting. The fact that the American ballot system permits the voter to choose an entire party slate with a single decision, and in a large proportion of the cases with a single movement of a pencil or voting machine lever, introduces an additional factor into the explanation of the vote. If the voter were compelled to go through the individual positions on the ballot, making independent decisions on each one separately, we would expect the unmotivated voter to be very unlikely to vote a straight ticket. Not being guided by any general political motive according to which he could organize the entire ticket he would presumably be influenced by a variety of unrelated considerations that would take him haphazardly from one side of the ballot to the other. The fact is, however, that we find a substantial number of straight tickets among voters who seem to have no partisan commitment to either parties, candidates, or issues. To explain their presence in our data we must invoke a second motivational principle, the tendency toward least effort. We conclude that in the absence of relevant political motivation, these people are voting a straight ticket because the peculiarities of the voting system make a straight ticket vote the easiest way for them to complete the task of voting. The more the ballot form facilitates the marking of a straight ticket, the more likely they are to choose this alternative.

We must also take account of the fact of conflict between political motives. We find that the factor we have called party identification exercises a strong controlling influence on the way a voter marks his ballot, but when his candidate preference and issue partisanship conflict with his sense of party attachment he tends to try to satisfy both components of the conflict by supporting candidates from both parties. His conflicted motivation reduces the pressure toward a party-oriented vote and opens the way to a divided ballot.

We may summarize this discussion by proposing a four-fold classification based on the three motivational principles we have considered. We do not believe a more parsimonious explanation of straight and split ticket voting will accommodate the data we have presented. The four voting types which emerge from our analysis are the following:

1. *The indifferent straight ticket.* This voter has little concern with the outcome of the election and no strong feelings regarding parties, candidates or issues. In the absence of any impulse to do otherwise, he casts the vote which requires the least effort from him, a straight ticket.
2. *The indifferent split ticket.* This voter's basic political motivation is also weak but he enters the voting booth with some superficial interest in a particular local candidate, the request of a friend, or some last-minute influence that leads him to bypass the straight party vote in order to pick out some particular candidate. Once into the individual offices, his choices are largely governed by considerations which are not party-oriented and which result in his crossing party lines.
3. *The motivated straight ticket.* This is a politically involved voter. He holds partisan views regarding either parties, candidates, or issues, or all three, and he uses his vote to implement his political orientation. The more strongly motivated he is, the less he is willing to weaken his vote by splitting his ticket between the two parties.
4. *The motivated split ticket.* This voter is also politically involved but his political motives are in conflict. He may prefer the candidate or policies of one party but feel a personal allegiance to the other, with the result that he cannot fully satisfy his political motives by voting a straight ticket. His split ticket is a compromise solution to his conflict.

As a final note it may be appropriate to remind the reader that the data we have been considering refer specifically to the 1956 election. The concepts with which we have been concerned, however, are not peculiar to any particular election situation. We would expect them to apply with equal validity in any presidential election in this country and we are confident that subsequent research will demonstrate this to be the case.

# THE MORSE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT CONTROVERSY: A STUDY IN SENATE NORMS[1]

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The Senate of the United States, like other institutionalized groups, operates in accordance with a complex of norms for members' behavior which are understood by few outsiders and perhaps not completely by all senators. Formal written rules governing the behavior of members take into account the division of functions between the two major parties and the operation of the Senate's institutionalized sub-groups, the committees. These are supplemented by unwritten rules that are often more consequential. Members have generally-accepted notions of the way the Senate as a body ought to perform its public business and regulate its internal affairs, and the way members ought to behave toward the Senate and toward each other.[2]

Senatorial behavior would be difficult enough to study if this were all, but it is not. For one thing, the norms are by no means undifferentiated for the entire membership. Within the Senate a number of identifiable official and unofficial "statuses" (or "positions") besides that of United States Senator can be distinguished, each carrying with it a "role" in the form of the behavior expected by the Senate and the public of the person occupying that status. The leadership positions in the two parties and the committee chairmanships come immediately to mind as examples of official statuses. The status of "elder statesman" occupied at one time by, say, Senators Walter George and Alben Barkley may be suggested as an example of the unofficial kind. Furthermore, even senators who occupy no specialized statuses must accommodate themselves to the demands of many groups. Some of these are sub-groups of the Senate itself: the senatorial party, with its formal and informal structure; the committees; friendship groups; and groups of sectional, ideological, and interest allies. Many are outside the Senate: the national party, with its need to make a record and capture the presidency; the constituency, sometimes conceived broadly as all the people in a state and sometimes more narrowly as the groups that supported the senator; interest groups broader than a state, perhaps sectional or national in their scope. The demands these groups make on a particular member often conflict, and they must moreover be reconciled with the ambitions, philosophy, and personality of the member himself. The "reference group" for the substance of the specific behavior may then be exclusively the one in which the senator is physically participating, the Senate, or it may be one which is psychologically important to him, even though he may not be a formal member of the group. The Senate itself will be the reference group for the style of the behavior and the form in which he interacts with other senators and the symbols and agencies of the Senate.[3]

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[1] This study was made possible by funds granted by The Fund for the Advancement of Education. That Corporation is not, of course, responsible for any of the statements made or views expressed here.

[2] "A possible objection to the word *norm* itself is that we may easily confuse two different things: norm A, a statement of what people ought to do in a particular situation, and norm B, a statistical, or quasi-statistical, average of what they actually do in that situation. Sometimes the two coincide, but more often they do not." George Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), p. 124. The term is used here, as Professor Homans uses it, in the first sense, as the behavior expected of members of a group by the members themselves, a departure from which in practice is followed by some punishment, such as a decline in the member's social standing in the group.

These are commonplace observations; the existence and power of norms for behavior are apparent to anyone who reads about the Senate in the daily newspaper. When the "liberal" senators mass their forces in a vain effort to change the closure rule it is plain that the written rules, including the one that makes a change so difficult, have crucial importance, as does the unwritten convention that the Senate is a "continuing" body. There is even some general awareness of the more subtle working of the norms regulating the conduct of members toward each other; this is implied in the fairly common reference to the Senate as an "exclusive club." The generally more subterranean operation of norms of this kind comes to the surface when a sanction is applied—when virtual ostracism was imposed on Huey Long, or when a public rebuff is administered to an overly aggressive junior member. The sanction may be covert, as in the Senate's displeasure with Senator Case of South Dakota in 1956 for embarrassing his colleagues by revealing publicly the offer of a campaign contribution by a lobbyist interested in natural gas legislation. This apparently exceeded their annoyance with the lobbyist who embarrassed Senator Case. Much less frequently it is overt, as in the official censure of Senator McCarthy, who, more than one competent observer has suggested, was disciplined finally for continued flouting of the "club rules" rather than for his aggressions on persons outside the Senate which were considered by many of his critics to be more grievous departures from proper conduct.[4]

Incidents of this kind do not carry us far; they substantiate the existence of the norms without telling us much about their content. Learning more about them is not easy. The written rules and official interpretations of them, when they are observed, present no great problem. The norms that are not explicit, the "oughts" that are shared by Senators because they are members of the "club," are another matter; perhaps only those members who are in the process of acquiring them understand them at the self-conscious level. They offer quite difficult problems to the non-member student. The kind of participant observation that has revealed the norms of some other groups is neither entirely adequate for, nor permitted by, a group as complex and secretive as the Senate. Perhaps a good beginning for a study of norms would be a series of political autobiographies such as no retired senator so far has seemed willing or able to write. At the present, political scientists and journalists are left to make inferences about these "oughts" from observations of how senators, as a group, "normally" behave with respect to each other, and, more clearly, from critical instances in which the Senate formally or informally applies sanctions against proscribed behavior, or is in an obvious conflict-of-norm situation among its members.

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[3] See Eugene L. and Ruth E. Hartley, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (New York, 1952), pp. 456–81.

[4] See William S. White, "The 'Club' that is the U. S. Senate," *New York Times Magazine*, November 7, 1954, and *Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate* (New York, 1957); and Richard Rovere, *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years* (New York, 1956), pp. 217–29.

Political scientists have made some studies of the relative effectiveness of competing claims on political representatives over time, in regard to categories of issues.[5] But the fact that a senator votes more frequently with his party than with a sectional group does not necessarily mean that he puts party allegiance first; it may only mean that the sectional group makes fewer demands on him. Again, it tells us nothing about the kind of situation in which the senator will put the claim of one ahead of the other.

This study rests on two assumptions. The first is that particular conflict situations may furnish clues about the norms that affect behavior and their relative strength among different members of the group. The situation chosen for analysis here is the controversy in the Senate over the assignment of Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon to standing committees after he had bolted the Republican party in the presidential election of 1952. The bare facts of the controversy will be stated, followed by analysis of the relative strength of behavioral norms involved in the contest. The second assumption is that it should be possible to make valid, if crude, inferences about norms for behavior from the printed record which is available to everyone. After all, much of Senate behavior that counts is *public* behavior; whatever their private motives, senators must live with their public records. Accordingly, the study was made, and tentative conclusions reached, wholly from the printed record. After that, persons were interviewed in Washington who had first-hand participant knowledge of the controversy. If the second assumption were correct, no basic alterations should then have been necessary; and that proved to be the case. Some refinements were made, but the conclusions (which are wholly the author's own) did not have to be altered as a result of the interviews.

## I. WHAT HAPPENED TO MORSE

Wayne Morse was an early supporter of Eisenhower, but a progressive estrangement from the candidate and his campaign declarations was climaxed by Morse's announcing for Stevenson in the middle of October and resigning from the Republican party a few days later.[6] The break was complete: Morse campaigned for Stevenson and later declined the invitation of the Republican

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[5] See, e.g., George L. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1950), and Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951). See also David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 50, pp. 1023–45 (December 1956).

[6] *The New York Times*, October 19, 1952, p. 1, col. 7; October 25, 1952, p. 1, col. 4. For Morse's account of his break with the party, see *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, pp. 3752–60 (April 24, 1953); and *U. S. News & World Report*, Nov. 19, 1954.

Senate conference to attend its first session. He asked not to be assigned committee seats by the Republicans, now the majority party in the Senate, saying that he would seek his posts as an Independent from the Senate itself. The Republicans accordingly filled their list with party members; the two vacant seats not filled by either party when committee appointments were considered by the Senate on January 13, 1953 were on the District of Columbia and Public Works committees. (By law, a Senator must be given a seat on at least two standing committees.) Morse wanted to retain his old assignments to the Armed Services and Labor and Public Welfare committees. A suggestion that unanimous consent be given for Morse and an additional Republican member to be added to each of these committees met the objection of the minority leader. Morse then nominated himself for the Armed Services committee. A written ballot was taken and Morse lost, 81–7. Morse next introduced a resolution which would add himself and one majority member to each of the committees to which he had belonged, for the duration of the 83rd Congress, and asked and received permission from the Senate to postpone his appointment to committees until the resolution could be acted upon by the appropriate committee and the Senate.[7]

The wait was a long one. The Committee on Rules and Administration unanimously reported the resolution adversely in mid-April, but the Senate did not debate it until May 25. The resolution was defeated 56–19, whereupon the Senate elected Morse to the vacancies on the Public Works and the District of Columbia committees.[8]

The third vote on Morse's committee assignments came in January, 1954, a full year after the beginning of the 83rd Congress. A resolution changing the committee structure gave Morse's friends an opportunity to offer an amendment which would return Morse to the committees he had served on during the 82nd for the remainder of the 83rd Congress, enlarging them by one member each and reducing by the same number the committees he would leave. Thus it would not be necessary, as it would have been a year earlier when the ballot was taken, to strike anyone from a committee list; but (on the assumption Morse would vote with the Democrats) four committees thereafter would not be controlled by either party. On this proposal Morse mustered his largest vote, but nevertheless lost 59–26.[9]

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[7] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, pp. 327–52 (January 13, 1953). The vote is at pp. 346–49. All page references herein are to the bound volumes, not the daily edition.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 3053 (April 14, 1953); p. 5224 (May 20, 1953); pp. 5421–44 (May 25, 1953). The vote is at p. 5444. See also Sen. Repts. No. 142 and No. 304, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.

[9] Deaths in the Senate had changed the party ratio to 48–47–1 in favor of the Democrats, but the votes of Morse and the Vice President kept the Republicans in organizational control. The resolution was S. Res. 180, sponsored by the leadership of both parties and reported favorably by the Rules Committee. It provided for the enlargement of two committees (Post Office and Civil Service, and Public Works) from 11 to 13 members. It also established a sliding-scale ratio of majority members who were to be allowed assignment to three (instead of two) committee seats, to minority members accorded the same privilege, a move designed to preserve a one-member margin for the majority party

The bare summary of events gives no indication of the vigor with which Morse fought for his old committee seats. He charged the Republicans with engaging in "terrorism" to enforce conformity, and demanded rights in regard to committee assignments based on eight years seniority in the Senate. The Senate had ample opportunity to become familiar with the argument supporting his case; Morse repeated it frequently in 1953 from January until the end of May in his reports of the "committee of the whole of the Independent party" on Friday afternoons. Morse's argument rested upon the Constitution of the United States and the formal and informal rules of the Senate. Article V of the Constitution states, among other things, that "no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." To Morse, this meant that "to deny any fraction of the normal rights of a Senator, not in his own capacity but as a representative of a State, is to compromise . . . [that] basic guaranty." And what are the "normal rights of a Senator"?—under the Legislative Reorganization Act, to seats on two standing committees, and under a long-standing rule of the Senate, to be appointed to them by ballot by the Senate itself. Furthermore, not just any two committees would do; as Haynes put it: "Once placed upon a congenial committee, a Senator is likely to retain that assignment as long as he remains in the Senate, or until he requests to be excused from further service thereon."[10] Not since 1871, said Morse, had the Senate departed from this practice. If the Senate were in fact a continuing body (and Morse agreed with the majority that it was) its committees likewise had an unbroken life; the parent body need only fill vacancies and assign new members. It was true that Republicans who bolted the presidential candidate in 1924 had lost intra-committee *rank* in the next session of Congress, but Morse was not concerned about that. He believed that committee rank properly should be determined by party seniority, and as the freshman Independent he was prepared to go to the bottom of the list. But committee *assignments*, he argued, depended upon seniority in the Senate, and his colleagues could not deny him his rightful place on his old committees without placing in jeopardy their own rights under the seniority system. Morse therefore declined to request appointment by the conference of either party, insisting that the whole Senate should elect him to committees in accordance with his rights as a Senator.

The Republican leadership denied any wish to discipline Morse. What they wanted was to control the Senate. As Taft pointed out, the Republican margin was paper-thin; with Morse an Independent the Senate division stood at 48–47–1. There were fifteen standing committees. The Legislative Reorganization Act allowed 11 majority members and no minority members to serve on three committees. The Republicans had sought to amend the rule to allow 18 majority and three minority members to hold three seats each. The Democrats

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on each committee. The Morse amendment, introduced by Anderson, was sponsored by 12 Democrats and Langer. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 100, pp. 97, 120–21 (January 11, 1954); pp. 218–28 (January 13, 1954). The vote is at p. 228.

[10] Quoted from George H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 294.

had scaled down the ratio to 14–3, leaving the majority's margin the same as before. Thus the Republicans could control only 13 committees; Morse and the Democrats would control the other two. The majority therefore had chosen to lose control of the two least important committees. Case explained that the Republicans had taken Morse at his word and had not assigned Republican seats to him; they had filled Republican requests for committee assignments until only two were left, on Public Works and District of Columbia (Morse contemptuously dismissed this as the "garbage can disposal principle" in committee assignments). If the Democrats had consented to the 15 member margin, it was implied, Morse could have had his old seats.

Lyndon Johnson, the minority leader, thought that Morse was not the responsibility of the minority. In the division of committee assignments between the parties, the Republicans had been given two seats each for 49 members, including Morse. Johnson had expressed the hope that Morse could retain the seats he wanted, but he would not interfere with the majority's assignments. He made clear his intention to vote for the Republican and the Democratic nominees; to break the party lists would invite the majority to meddle with the minority and elect all the committees.

Johnson's determination to respect the other party's committee list was reciprocated by the Republicans. When the resolution adding Morse and a Republican to two committees was debated in May, Johnson opposed it, saying that he was "willing to share the junior Senator from Oregon 50–50 with the majority party, but I am not willing to have the Senate say it will add 4 seats to 2 committees and completely disregard the 47 members who make up the minority party." Knowland, acting for the majority leader, agreed that the minority did not have to accept a change in ratio disadvantageous to them, and the Republicans voted almost solidly against the resolution.

The rebuttal of Morse's arguments was shared by both sides. It was contended that no more was guaranteed the States by the equal suffrage provision in the Constitution than that each should have two Senators. Morse's distinction between the Senate and the majority conference was deemed to be formal only; actually a majority had the right to appoint all committees, and in practice this meant the majority party. Members tended to follow the party leadership simply because that was a practicable way to organize the Senate. The Legislative Reorganization Act, they said, really was designed to reduce the committee load of the Senators, not to guarantee anything new to them. As for that, Morse could have had two committee seats in January, and by election of the Senate, if he had not asked for a postponement. His opponents would agree that he had a right to two seats; what they denied was that he had a right to say which two. There was no mention of seniority in the Constitution nor in the Legislative Reorganization Act; consideration of seniority was a convention of the Senate. Moreover, as Senator George (himself the ranking member of the Senate in seniority) put it, "prior seniority is purely a political matter . . . essentially a matter of party determination, regulation and control." It was party seniority therefore which determined not only rank on committees, but assignment to committees as well.

## II. THE APPEAL TO PRECEDENT

The one respect in which little effort was made to rebut Morse on the floor was in his oft-repeated contention that removing him from committees against his will violated the precedents of the Senate. This is curious behavior on the part of a body which ascribes so much importance to precedents. It is useful to an institutionalized group like the Senate to preserve at least the illusion of consistent behavior; it is impressive to the layman, and it makes possible the settling of many problems through appeal to the authority of usage. Precedents that are generally followed are useful to the student of senatorial behavior: they help to identify the working rules of the group, and behavior which violates them is worth investigation.

According to Morse, only one Senator had ever been removed from a committee without regard to his seniority. That was Sumner, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who lost his seat in 1871 because of his opposition to Grant's determination to occupy Santo Domingo. In the only modern instance of such party discipline, the Republicans placed Ladd (who had been chairman of Public Lands), Brookhart, and Frazier at the bottom of their committees in 1925, to punish them for campaigning for LaFollette. But they were not removed from their committees, Morse asserted; that was the point he wanted to make. And against this example of discipline he could and did cite numerous instances when bolting went unpunished. Moreover, when two Farmer-Laborites were elected from Minnesota in 1923 several committees had been enlarged to avoid reducing the ratios of the major parties, as Morse now suggested be done in his case. Thus it seemed to him that the action against him followed an isolated and unhappy precedent, and ignored established practices of the Senate.

We shall not be concerned with the 19th century here. But 1925 is another matter; one member of the Senate today was sitting then, and the party strife which the Republicans sought by Draconian measures to end is by no means ancient history. First we shall look briefly at what happened in 1925; then we shall seek out the party bolters in subsequent presidential campaigns to see what happened to their committee positions. It must be recognized, of course, that there are many degrees of party defection and numerous ingenious modes of effecting it. Morse himself distinguished between "bolting"—campaigning for the other party's candidate, which he thought properly should be preceded by resignation from one's old party—and "taking a walk," a matter of campaigning for neither but voting for the opposition's candidate, which he thought does not call for resignation. There are other ways, of course. The politician may "go fishing" (not vote), vote but remain noncommital, avow party loyalty while studiously ignoring the candidate, damn with faint praise, or stage a "sitdown" (announce for the candidate but not help him). The infinite variations on this single theme are worth a study of their own, but we shall be concerned here only with outright bolting—the overt act which cannot be recalled nor misunderstood.

The objects of party discipline in 1925 were bolters. George W. Norris and

Hiram Johnson left little doubt that they were for LaFollette, but they did not openly support him; in the formal sense, they remained within the party fold. Ladd, Brookhart, and Frazier, on the other hand, were bolters, whose break with their party's candidate was overt.[11] The Republican conference voted therefore not to invite the three rebels nor LaFollette to the party conference, nor to place them on committees to fill Republican vacancies. Moreover, each of the four was placed at the bottom of the committees on which he served, below the lowest-ranking Democrat. In a word, the Republican conference treated them like independents. But these bolters, unlike Morse, were not willing to consider themselves independents. Brookhart stated flatly: . . . "I did not leave the Republican party. I am a better Republican than is the Senator from Indiana [Watson, chairman of the Committee on Committees] today." They were stoutly supported by Norris and Borah, who raised the old, troubling question: what is a Republican? The Democrats did not know, but they thought it was a problem for the Republicans. Pat Harrison requested and received permission for Senators to vote "present" ("I do not want to enter into the family row over there . . . ") on the motion to return Ladd to his chairmanship, and 26 Senators did so vote. Ladd was replaced by Stanfield, a "regular" Republican from Oregon;[12] LaFollette was dropped from the chairmanship of the Interstate Commerce Committee and Watson took his place. But the action of the Committee on Committees went further than demoting the bolters. In a move that today would scarcely seem like chastisement, but obviously ran counter to his preference, Frazier was transferred from Indian Affairs, whose business he understood, to Banking and Currency, whose business he did not. The reason given was forthright. With LaFollette also on the committee, the progressives and the Democrats together would control it; and since LaFollette ranked him, Frazier had to go. The Democrats had been unwilling to increase the committee size to let them both stay. So Morse was mistaken: the action of 1925 provided a precedent for just what was done to him in 1953. But what of the intervening years?

## III. OTHERS WHO BOLTED

No presidential campaign in this period has lacked bolters. The disciplinary action of 1925 did not prevent bolting even in 1928. Trouble for the Republicans came once more from midwestern progressives. Norris left his irksome position on the sidelines and actively supported Smith, as did John J. Blaine of Wisconsin.[13] Both sides wooed Robert LaFollette, Jr., his Democratic opponent obligingly dropping out of the senatorial race and Curtis, Hoover's running mate, speaking out for LaFollette in Wisconsin. But LaFollette contented himself with denouncing the Republican platform as "reactionary," praising some of Smith's views, and calling for the election of progressives to Congress.[14] The Democratic rebels were both southerners, but there the resemblance ended. Tom Heflin of Alabama was always a problem to the party, and his campaign against Smith was characteristic of him; he abused Catholics and attacked Tammany Hall in meetings patrolled by his "rangers" (klansmen).[15] Simmons of North Carolina, who called his party's campaign "two-faced and hypocritical," was the senior Democrat on the Finance Committee and had been a regular party leader in his state for a quarter of a century. His single act of rebellion was provoked by Smith's opposition to Prohibition.[16]

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[11] Kenneth C. MacKay, *The Progressive Movement of 1924* (New York, 1947), p. 195; Alfred Lief, *Democracy's Norris: The Biography of a Lonely Crusade* (New York, 1939), pp. 268–70; George W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal* (New York, 1945), pp. 286–87.

[12] The debate is found in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 67, pp. 15–16, 41–67 (March 9, 1925). The vote is at p. 63. Harrison missed a nice point: if the Republican conference was correct, the bolters were *not* Republicans and the question of their chairmanships and committee assignments was not a "family row" but the business of the Senate—as Morse made it in 1953 by staying out of the party and away from the conference.

[13] *The New York Times*, October 25, 1928, p. 1, col. 7 (Norris); October 16, 1928, p. 15, col. 1; and October 21, 1928, p. 21, col. 3 (Blaine).

The Democratic ranks held in 1932, but not so the Republican. Hiram Johnson declared he would not "taint" his record by supporting Hoover, and campaigned for Roosevelt in California.[17] LaFollette still thought progressive congressmen were the country's best hope, but supported the Democratic candidate because Hoover was "wrong on every issue" and had "a 100% reactionary record."[18] Norris's response to Roosevelt was more positive. Declaring that "what this country needs is another Roosevelt in the White House," he served as chairman of a non-partisan National Progressive League for Roosevelt and stumped for him around the country.[19] Bronson Cutting, a progressive Republican from New Mexico, acknowledged his mistake in ever supporting Hoover and called for universal support for the President's opponent.[20]

By 1936 LaFollette, like Norris, was for Roosevelt as well as against his opponent. In addition to speaking for Roosevelt, LaFollette helped arrange the withdrawal of Minnesota Democratic nominees for governor, senator, and one congressional seat, in favor of the Farmer-Labor candidates, thus effecting a coalition of the two parties.[21] Subsequently, Henrik Shipstead (Farmer-Labor senator from Minnesota) announced for Roosevelt, the first presidential candidate he had supported in twelve years.[22] Norris made a clean break with his party, not only campaigning for the New Deal incumbent in the White House, but also winning his Senate seat as an Independent over nominees of both major parties.[23] Gerald P. Nye said he would stay out of the presidential campaign as a courtesy to Lemke, the North Dakota congressman running as a minor party nominee, but Nye did make two speeches for Norris.[24] The other North Dakota senator, Frazier (who had been disciplined for bolting in 1924), supported Lemke.[25] Two other Republican senators, Couzens of Michigan and Norbeck of South Dakota, bolted their party's nominee, but both were dead before the next Congress convened. No Democratic senator openly left the party fold. Even Rush Holt of West Virginia, who keynoted the first convention of Father Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice, and who also had lunch with Landon, in the end was silent as to whom he would support.[26]

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[14] *Ibid.*, October 9, 1928, p. 2, col. 3; October 10, 1928, p. 2, col. 4; July 8, 1928, p. 2, col. 5; October 27, 1928, p. 9, col. 1.

[15] *Ibid.*, July 5, 1928, p. 21, col. 4; July 3, 1928, p. 6, col. 2.

[16] *Ibid.*, October 13, 1928, p. 5, col. 3; October 22, 1928, p. 1, col. 4; October 26, 1928, p. 2, col. 2.

[17] *Ibid.*, October 15, 1932, p. 9, col. 1; October 29, 1932, p. 1, col. 7.

[18] *Ibid.*, October 20, 1932, p. 15, col. 2.

[19] *Ibid.*, September 26, 1932, p. 1, col. 7; September 29, 1932, p. 1, col. 6.

[20] *Ibid.*, October 27, 1932, p. 12, col. 5.

[21] *Ibid.*, September 29, 1936, p. 23, col. 3; October 4, 1936, p. 1, col. 6.

[22] *Ibid.*, October 19, 1936, p. 2, col. 4.

[23] *Ibid.*, September 18, 1936, p. 9, col. 1.

Despite the third term issue in 1940, outright bolting was rare. Burke of Nebraska endorsed Willkie and later joined the Republican party, while Holt sponsored an anti-third term resolution in the Senate; but both had lost in the Democratic primaries in their states. On the other hand, Norris and LaFollette continued their championship of Roosevelt. The Wisconsin senator, in the face of a fight for reelection, announced his position on the eve of the platform conventions of his state's three parties.[27] Norris again headed a non-partisan group for Roosevelt and campaigned actively for him in Nebraska and the West.[28]

Each party suffered the defection of one senator in 1944. Joseph Ball of Minnesota, after hearing Roosevelt's speech to the Foreign Policy Association, announced that he would support the President for a fourth term.[29] The Democratic bolter was O'Daniel of Texas, who was a frequent supporter of Republican policy in the Senate.[30]

What is striking about the election of 1948, in which Truman won despite rebellion from both wings of the Democratic party, is the lack of widespread overt disloyalty in the Senate. Glenn Taylor of Idaho was Wallace's running mate, and at least two southerners—Ellender of Louisiana and Eastland of Mississippi—seem to have campaigned for the States' Rights ticket;[31] but what confronted Truman in the South apparently was the kind of hostility of which senators are masters, which makes itself plain without committing the irrevocable act.

Party defection in 1952 came in a variety of shades. Morse's was the most complete, ending, as it did, in resignation from his party. Price Daniel of Texas was as forthright in supporting the opposition's candidate, but felt no compulsion, apparently, to leave the Democratic party.[32] Two other Democrats performed equivocal but effective maneuvers within their own states. Harry Byrd, without endorsing the Republican slate, announced that he would not endorse

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[24] *Ibid.*, October 2, 1936, p. 9, col. 6.

[25] *Ibid.*, October 4, 1936, p. 1, col. 6.

[26] *Ibid.*, August 11, 1936, p. 8, col. 2; August 15, 1936, p. 1, col. 4; September 17, 1936, p. 9, col. 1.

[27] *Ibid.*, October 1, 1940, p. 15, cols. 7–8.

[28] *Ibid.*, October 21, 1940, p. 8, col. 5.

[29] *Ibid.*, October 23, 1944, p. 1, col. 1; October 24, 1944, p. 15, col. 1.

[30] *Ibid.*, October 22, 1944, p. 38, col. 3; November 3, 1944, p. 18, col. 8.

[31] *Ibid.*, November 19, 1948, p. 21, col. 1; November 25, 1948, p. 30, col. 5.

[32] *Ibid.*, October 16, 1952, p. 14, col. 3.

Stevenson, in a speech which doubtless was understood in Virginia.[33] Pat McCarran exchanged mutally uncomplimentary remarks with Stevenson without bothering to oppose him, but in Nevada his organization supported the Republican Malone for reelection to the Senate against the young Democrat who had dared to beat McCarran's man in the primary.[34]

## IV. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE BOLTERS

In the record of the twenty year period from 1929 through 1949, which covers assignments to committees of the 71st through the 81st Congresses, there is nothing that remotely resembles punishment of senatorial bolters through loss of seats or rank on committees.

Bolters were treated like other senators when their parties—whether in the majority or not—assigned them to committees. Norris retained his chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee in the 71st and 72nd Congresses, after supporting Smith in 1928. Heflin and Simmons kept their places after opposing him. Bronson Cutting was dropped from the Foreign Relations Committee in 1933, but that was because the Republican quota was reduced from 13 to eight. All those who retained their seats ranked Cutting. Bolters seem to have received normal promotions to better committees. For instance, Robert LaFollette, Jr., went from Post Office and Post Roads to Foreign Relations in 1929. Bolters were regularly advanced in rank on their committees. Not even leaving the party (as Morse did in 1952) hurt them. The 77th Congress in 1941 furnishes an example with two rebels, Norris the Independent and LaFollette the Progressive, listed as the ranking minority members of every committee that either of them served on except one (LaFollette on Foreign Relations). Between them they held the ranking minority position on seven of the Senate's 33 committees.

Except in the case of Morse, the committee assignments in the 83rd Congress reveal no hint of punitive intent. Daniel of Texas was appointed to the Interior Committee, a choice spot for a solon from an oil-producing state. It need hardly be added that no inconvenience was suffered by Byrd or McCarran.

The contemporary record seems clearly to support the proposition that the Senate norm is that a senator who bolts his party's presidential nominee shall not be punished by loss of what is perhaps his most important senatorial perquisite, his regular place in the committee structure. Any departure from that norm must be regarded as unusual behavior of genuine significance. Why were party bolters punished in 1925 and 1953, and not in the years between?

## V. WHY SOME BOLTERS ARE PUNISHED

Some of the variables which might be supposed to have affected the behavior of the Senate appear to have had no influence. Among them are:

(1) *Degree of defection.* Brookhart was demoted on all his committees for little more than criticizing the Republican vice-presidential candidate,

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[33] *Ibid.*, October 18, 1952, p. 1, col. 5.

[34] *Ibid.*, October 25, 1952, p. 11, col. 4; October 28, 1952, p. 1, col. 8; October 29, 1952, p. 33, col. 5.

an action that usually is overlooked. Morse campaigned actively for the opposing party's candidate, but so did several bolters who were not punished. Robert LaFollette, Sr., took the field himself against his party's candidate and was punished; his running-mate on the Progressive ticket, Senator Wheeler, was not.

(2) *Degree of estrangement* (formality, conclusiveness of break). The 1924 rebels stayed in the party and were disciplined; Norris and the young LaFollette, like Morse, left the party but were not penalized.

(3) *Frequency of defections.* The 1924 bolters were old troublemakers, but so were Norris, young LaFollette, and Heflin. Morse, on the other hand, left the party fold only once.

(4) *Strength and importance of the bolters.* The four senators who were disciplined in 1925 represented a stubborn and not inconsequential wing of the party, with a long tradition. Morse did not. Among the senators not disciplined, Norris and the junior LaFollette were formidable individuals. Ball and O'Daniel, to mention only two, were not.

The variable which does prove out is the *ideological division* of the committee to which the bolter belonged. Thus where such a committee is not divided along lines of interest group ideology, or where it is divided but the majority group has a workable margin, it is not necessary to penalize an insurgent member. On the other hand, where the dissident element holds the balance of power, the defection furnishes a pretext for securing effective control of the committee for the majority.

That is what happened in 1925. The Republican party was split between east and west; the east had the White House but the west had the seniority in Congress. With the party ratio in the Senate 55–40–1 the Republican margin looked better than it was. Five Republicans (LaFollette, Brookhart, Ladd, Frazier, and Norris) and the Farmer-Labor member (Shipstead) would vote with the progressive Democrats and at least five other Republicans (Borah, Johnson, McMasters, Howell, and Schall) were generally undependable.[35] A year earlier a coalition of Democrats and insurgent Republicans had made Smith, a Democrat from South Carolina, the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee. In this political climate, the Republican leaders in the Senate were determined not to lose control of any committee, however unimportant, if they could help it. The bolt of 1924 gave the leadership an opportunity to gain ground. LaFollette and Ladd were relieved of their chairmanships of otherwise manageable committees. Frazier was shifted from Indian Affairs, where he and LaFollette could team up with progressive Democrats to control it, to Banking and Currency, where his vote was not needed. The party leaders' strategy was explained bluntly by Reed of Pennsylvania, who said that an effort had been made to effect a similar change on Manufactures (which he thought had "gone to the devil" the last two years) where LaFollette and Brookhart held the balance, but it had failed.[36] The bolters were allowed to keep their other committee assignments, with loss of rank, because they did not endanger conservative Republican control of those committees.

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[35] "Purging the Republican Ranks," *Literary Digest*, Vol. 84, pp. 7–8 (March 21, 1925). See also George Creel, "What Do These Senators Want?", *Collier's*, Vol. 71, pp. 9–10 (March 10, 1923), and "Non-existent Republican Majority," *Outlook*, Vol. 142, p. 350 (March 10, 1926).

In 1953, one of Morse's assignments as a Republican presented no problem of control. Though not free from group conflict, the Armed Services Committee was not divided into two camps either by partisanship or by interest group ideology. Control of the committee did not turn on any one member's vote. This was freely admitted in the debate. Morse pointed out that the Armed Services watchdog subcommittee chaired by Lyndon Johnson (successor to the Truman-Mead subcommittee) had submitted 41 reports, all of them unanimous.[37] There was a rumor at one stage that Morse would be reassigned to the Armed Services Committee, but not to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee; but Morse, by declining the invitation to the Republican conference and announcing that he would seek his seats from the Senate, made it easy to drop him from both committees without precipitating a fight along lines of interest group ideology or raising an intra-party punishment issue. The question put was the "rights" of a senator *qua* senator.

The Labor and Public Welfare Committee presented a quite different case. At the beginning of the 84th Congress it was the most sharply divided committee, along both party and interest group lines, in the Senate. The split extended even to the professional staff, who did not work for the whole committee but were divided between the majority and the minority.[38]

The character of the Committee split could be demonstrated by ranging all Senators at the beginning of the 83rd Congress along a "liberal-conservative" continuum to find where the Committee members would fall. For the purposes of this study that was done by preparing a table which ranked members of the Senate according to the percentage of times each cast a "liberal" (or "progressive") vote over a six-year period on a series of issues selected by *The CIO News*. Eighty senators were ranked; the other sixteen were new and so had no voting record for this period. Similar computations were made for votes selected by two other organs of "liberal" opinion, the AFL Labor's League for Political Education, and *The New Republic*. Correlations with the percentages based on the votes selected by *The CIO News* were so high, however, that only the latter were used in the table. In addition to correlating closely with the other two, the selection made by *The CIO News* covers more roll-call votes spread more evenly over the six years.[39] A senator who voted "liberal" at least half the time on the issues so chosen will be referred to here as "liberal." It is not argued that a ranking of senators according to this criterion measures the "liberalism" of senators in a philosophical sense. What *is* assumed is that it gives a fair approximation of the relative acceptability of senators to the urban-labor interests who were loyal to the New Deal-Fair Deal and who would be extremely concerned about the work of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Presently, data from the table will be used to mark the people who eventually supported Morse in his fight to regain his committee seats, and to raise the question why they did not vote for him at first. At this point it may be used to show the split on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

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[36] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 67, p. 67 (March 9, 1925).

[37] *Ibid.*, Vol. 99, pp. 342–43 (January 13, 1953).

[38] George B. Galloway, *Congressional Reorganization Revisited* (College Park, Md., 1956), p. 6. Morse, Douglas, and Humphrey, in arguing for Morse's resolution in May, all admitted there was a "philosophical division" on the committee, which would not be affected if a conservative Republican were added along with Morse.

As the 83rd Congress convened, the four Republican holdover members on the 13-member committee ranged from the moderate liberalism of Tobey and Ives through the moderate conservatism of Smith (of New Jersey) to the strong conservatism of Taft. The five Democrats (Lehman, Douglas, Neely, Murray, and Hill), on the other hand, were all of a piece; they could be counted on to support the "liberal" side 90 per cent or more of the time. And the new Democratic appointee, John Kennedy, was their kind; in his six-year tenure as a member of the House of Representatives, Kennedy's voting record was substantially like theirs.[40] The new Republican appointees (Goldwater, Purtell, and Griswold) could be counted on to strengthen the conservatives, but *two* of them would not be enough. With the Democrats voting as a bloc, the best they could get was a tie. Morse, with his voting record like the Democrats', would decide the outcome. When it is remembered that the Republicans in 1953 controlled both White House and Congress for the first time in twenty years, and that both parties had promised to revise the Taft-Hartley act, it is clear why the Republicans were reluctant to allow Morse to occupy the "swing position" that Ives accused him of wanting.[41] As it turned out, the partisan division on the committee, even with a dependable Republican margin of one vote, was so sharp that the committee accomplished little in the 83rd Congress.

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[39] Sixty-nine votes selected by *The CIO News* are found in the issues of August 11, 1947; July 19, 1948; January 2, 1950; August 14, 1950; December 17, 1951; and August 18, 1952. Duplications were eliminated. Thirty votes selected by Labor's League for Political Education may be found in their booklet, *Voting Records of Senators and Representatives, 1947 Through 1952.* Sixty votes selected by *The New Republic* are shown in the issues of September 27, 1948, pp. 28–30; November 14, 1949, pp. 24–25; October 9, 1950, pp. 14–15; and September 22, 1952, pp. 16–17.

[40] In a similar selection of votes in the House of Representatives, Kennedy voted "right" 93 per cent of the time on 30 votes in *The CIO News*, and 100 per cent "right" on 20 votes in the AFL's tabulation and 12 votes in *The New Republic.*

[41] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, pp. 343–44 (January 13, 1953). A note of caution, however, should be added. The Committee on Rules and Administration recommended in January of 1953 (S. Res. 1) that nine committees, including Labor and Public Welfare, be increased by two members, and six others be reduced by two; as amended and passed (S. Res. 18), Labor and Public Welfare remained the same size. (*Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, p. 233, 279–81, January 7 and 9, 1953). In May 1954 two lesser committees were increased by two members each (see n. 9, above), but the motion to enlarge Labor and Public Welfare again was defeated. Failure to increase the committee's size, which would have strengthened Morse's claim to a seat, strongly supports the argument that there was indeed an element of punishment in the majority's attitude.

## VI. THE CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES

Morse's support, first and last, came from the liberal Democrats. The CIO selection of roll calls shows 33 senators who cast "liberal" votes at least half the time. Twenty-seven of these were Democrats, one (Morse) an Independent, and two (Langer and Tobey) relatively independent Republicans. Three (Aiken, Ives, Smith) were more regular Republicans—and none of them ever voted for Morse. In January of 1953 Morse got his own vote, five liberal Democrats, and Tobey. In May he was supported by 19 of the 27 liberal Democrats. Among the eight who did not support him were Lyndon Johnson, the leader; Clements, the whip; Kerr and Hennings, members of the Policy Committee; and Smathers, close to the leadership group though not formally a member of it. Others who supported him were Tobey, Langer (paired for), and Cordon, his Oregon colleague. A year later he added the votes of Hennings, in the leadership group, and two other liberal Democrats, plus a handful of others not easily explained.[42]

It is evident that the Republicans generally, and the conservative Democrats, suffered no very strong cross-pressures in casting their votes. It was the liberal Democrats who were torn between the line adopted by the party leaders and their loyalty to a friend and ally. This may be inferred from their voting behavior, and it is supported by persons who shared their experience. This was especially true in the case of a group of about a score of them who met regularly in a biweekly informal meeting (their administrative assistants meeting on alternate weeks) for program planning. They were Morse's friends, and they received support from the same kinds of groups that helped him. It was because Morse shared their convictions that he left the Republican party. It was their aid that Morse could and did expect. It was they who failed him the first time, in Morse's view, but who eventually rallied to him handsomely. What explains this contradictory behavior?

It is not the last two votes that need explaining, but the first; there is no reason to believe that Morse's friends were not sympathetic with him in January, as they were later. But Morse could hardly have posed the issue that first time in a less palatable way—a way which was only partially of his own choosing. He did not himself know very early what the Republicans planned to do about his committee assignments. Then after announcing that he would seek appointment directly from the Senate, Morse stood aloof from his friends, neither asking nor receiving their counsel or support. Through a tactical error Morse failed to give the Senate the customary notice at least one day in advance of his resolution to increase the size of two committees to include himself and an additional Republican, so that the resolution had to go to committee. As a consequence he had to nominate himself, request a written ballot (a maneuver that took his friends by surprise), and ask that his supporters strike from the ballot a party-nominated member, Republican or Democrat.

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[42] Jackson (D. Wash.) also voted for Morse in May 1953 and January 1954; he was a freshman senator. A similar selection of votes cast in the House of Representatives showed that in his six years in the House Jackson's percentage on a total of 61 votes selected by *The CIO News* was 92, on a total of 26 votes selected by the AFL's LLPE was 100, and on a total of 59 selected by *The New Republic* was 97.

This is what most of Morse's friends declined to do—to interfere with the committee selections of the other party. The position of the Democratic party leadership never changed; it opposed Morse every time. Nevertheless three members of the Policy Committee voted for Morse the second time, despite a Policy Committee decision to make it a party issue, and four the third. But to vote for him in January 1953 involved more than going counter to the leadership of their party.[43] It would also violate a *Senate* norm of long standing and general acceptance. The principle had been stated by Henry Cabot Lodge in 1919 when the Democrats had tried to reduce the Republican margin on four committees. Said Lodge: "We feel that the makeup of your committees is your business and your responsibility, and that the makeup of our committees is our business and our responsibility. That is the ordinary rule of courtesy and good manners which I have never before seen violated in the Senate."[44] The Democrats accepted his statement of the rule and voted for his list intact. This was the rule which prevented the majority party from making all the committee selections, as it had the power to do; and this rule proved stronger than the ties of friendship and interest group ideology which bound liberal Democrats to Morse in 1953.

Heavy pressures bore upon the liberal Democrats between January and May of 1953, and not the least of them from Morse himself. It is hard to convey a sense of the bitterness with which Morse attacked the liberal Democrats and their party leader.[45] His heavy defeat had placed him in an untenable position; "even the liberal Democrats have deserted him" taunted the Oregon newspapers, and Morse's harsh cry of pain filled the chamber. His position improved in the spring of 1953; labor rallied to his support, and his filibuster against the Tidelands bill won prestige for him with many liberal groups. Yet no better reason for the behavior of his friends comes to mind than the one they insistently gave themselves: a vote for Morse in January 1953 required that a committee member chosen by the opposing party be struck; four months and again a year later, it did not.

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[43] The authority of the leadership in January 1953 was strengthened by two other actions in regard to committees. First, Lyndon Johnson went against ancient usage in the Senate by insisting that each freshman Democratic senator be given one good committee place. It is significant that Jackson was the only freshman Democrat ever to vote for Morse and that he did not do so the first time. Second, the enlargement of the more important committees made possible some attractive transfers. Eight Democrats who did not vote for Morse in January 1953 but ultimately did so, were beneficiaries of transfers to better committees.

[44] Quoted in Haynes, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 290.

[45] See, e.g., the colloquy on March 6, 1953, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, pp. 1679–86. Morse said he had refused the apologies of the liberal Democrats and he threatened to campaign against them in 1954.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

From this study some tentative conclusions regarding norms for behavior in the Senate may be suggested as hypotheses for further testing:

(1) Bolting the party ticket in a presidential election is not usually punished in the Senate by loss of rank or membership on committees. Senators who bolt are most likely to be deprived of committee rank or membership when the deprivation will affect a close ideological division on one or more committees in a way that is favorable to the majority. Paradoxically, discipline is most likely to be applied when it is least likely to be effective—*i.e.*, when a close division of power gives the disciplined member maximum leverage. Thus the two examples of punishment did not seriously hurt the victims. The bolters disciplined in 1925 regained their committee rank in the next congress. Wayne Morse received better committee assignments from the Democrats in 1955, just before he joined their party, than he had lost two years earlier. Discipline has not seriously inhibited bolting; the 1924 bolters repeated their offense and there have been party defections in every presidential election since 1924.

(2) The response of senators under cross-pressures of claims of friendship or ideological allegiance, on the one hand, and loyalty to the party leadership on the other, will depend on the structuring of the situation:

(a) The requirements of party regularity are generally binding on questions pertaining to the organization of the Senate, which include the working arrangement that each party will accept without question the committee list of the other. This norm is generally stronger than the claims of friendship or ideological allegiance. Senators who supported the proposal to add Morse and a Republican to two committees apparently believed they had not violated this norm when their vote would not deprive any senator of his regular committee assignment nor the majority party of its control of a committee, even though their vote was opposed by their party leaders.

(b) Unless other interests can be exploited to reenforce an appeal to party loyalty, it will probably prove weaker than strongly pressed claims of friendship or ideological allegiance. This may be true even with members of formal party leadership groups. The apparent weakness of the appeal to party loyalty may be deceptive, however; when the outcome is not in doubt it may not be strongly pressed.

# THE LOST WORLD OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

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Like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, the study of American city government is faced with desiccation upon a sea of plenty. While the literature of municipal government continues to grow, fed by bureaus of government research and the teaching concerns of political scientists, there is very little in this literature that is of substance sufficient to rise above the level of specialized reporting and into the general stream of political science. Indeed, if the pages of this Review be taken as an index of the research concerns of our discipline, then *municipal government* would seem to be a stagnated area of political science, for not one article on this subject has appeared in this journal for over six years.[1]

It is not, however, the purpose of this essay to analyze the shortcomings of the literature of muncipal government. These failings have been commented upon by several critics, and they can be simply summarized by noting that in conceptual construction and in execution, most of the research in this field falls short of the minimal requirements for a systematic political science: for the literature of municipal government is studded with an array of facts that have been gathered with little regard for the construction of general theories; and, at the same time, it is beset with theories that have been advanced without ever being checked against available empirical data.[2] That, in essence, is the case against the literature of muncipal government; and it is the purpose of this essay, not to re-try the case, but to offer one explanation for this alleged state of affairs by way of a close examination of the leading textbooks in the field.[3]

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[1] One possible exception might be an article that dealt with the independent voter in a Massachusetts city. The reported research was not, however, upon the politics of that city *per se:* the city was merely a convenient focus for the study of a problem in national politics.

During the past decade, the review has carried seven other articles dealing with city government and politics. One of these clarified a legal term (the village in New Hampshire); a second set down the reminiscences of a candidate for town council. Two articles examined parties in New York City with special emphasis on PR. A fifth article was concerned with the impact of the urban electorate upon the allocation of votes in the Electoral College; another article had as its focus the voting behavior of nationality groups in four cities. The seventh article was concerned with gross changes in the voting behavior of a small town, from 1924 to 1948, as revealed by ballots cast in two elections.

[2] See Allen Richards, "Local Government Research: A Partial Evaluation," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 14, pp. 271–277 (Autumn, 1954).

[3] A note on method: The concern of this essay is with the "modal characteristics" of a body of literature; not with its specific contributors. Consequently, none of the generalizations affirmed here applies with equal force to any specific text; moreover, the multiplicity of texts within this field should make it apparent that texts vary in the degree to which they are vulnerable to the criticisms here advanced. Thus, a book such as Charles R. Adrian, *Governing Urban America* (New York, 1955) is highly conscious of the problems raised here and meets many of them with marked success. Again, a book such as Harold

Briefly put, what is contended here is that the textbooks constitute the wellsprings of any stream of political science, for they serve not only to summarize the current state of the literature, but also to orient and guide the work of future contributors to it. A body of literature depends on its sources, and when these sources serve notice that basic problems have been solved, that principles of correct action have been discovered, then the need for further research seems to pass away, and the activities of students in the field are diverted into the making of plans and strategies for putting those "principles" into play. In short, it may be that the textbooks of municipal government constitute not so much wellsprings as barriers to the production of systematic research, and any reconstruction of this field must therefore begin with an examination of its basic texts.

## I

Perhaps the simplest approach to the textbooks in city government is by way of their component parts. With a regularity that makes the comparing reader seek the existence of some master-mold, the textbook organizes itself around the following concerns: first, detailed descriptions of legal relationships and organs of government; second, a description of urban political processes; third, a body of administrative theory; fourth, a series of recommendations for governmental reform; and fifth, a greater or lesser description of urban administrative processes. The relative number of pages devoted by each text to any of these components varies, of course, from text to text; but no matter what the length of treatment, the book's center of intellectual gravity is located within its treatment of administrative theory. That (to change the metaphor) is the linchpin for the wheel of endeavor; and, accordingly, it is worthy of first examination.

But, before moving to this body of administrative theory, one further set of preliminary observations needs to be made; and they concern what, for want of a better term, might be described as the *vintage* qualities of the municipal government text. Where textbooks in other fields of political science have undergone marked changes in scope and content in the past thirty years, the texts in city government have displayed a remarkable constancy. So much so, that if earlier texts such as Goodnow and Maxey were to be dressed in new dust-jackets they would be nearly indistinguishable from today's publications.[4]

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Zink, *Government of Cities in the United States* (New York, 1948) especially in its treatment of politics makes a significant departure from the general mode. In similar fashion, other books differ in one or more respects, both in the treatment given specific problems, and in the level of sophistication that attends this treatment. In general, however, the similarities of the texts are great enough to warrant a summary presentation that seeks (only) for central characteristics.

Given the concern of this essay for a *body* of literature, no attempt will be made to deal with the problem of "mean deviation," that is, the degree to which any single text approaches, or diverges from, the characterization made here. And, because this essay seeks only for modal characteristics, it is unnecessary to inject an *ad hominem* element into the discussion by identifying the sources of specific textbook quotations: Such quotations are offered only to illustrate; certainly not to indict.

[4] Frank J. Goodnow, *Municipal Government* (New York, 1909); Chester C. Maxey, *An Outline of Municipal Government* (New York, 1924).

Now, if the texts in city government were merely a descriptive endeavor, then this constancy would hardly be worth commenting upon, especially if the institutions being described had themselves undergone little change over recent decades. But, as has already been noted, the textbook in urban government is more than an enterprise in description. It is also a prescription, a proposal for reform that finds its justification, first, in a judgment pronounced upon the behavior of the urban electorate, and second, in a body of administrative theory that has been so elaborated that it has been made to yield up "principles" to guide the governmental operation. And it is here that vintage qualities shade into irony: for this view of the urban political process and this body of administrative theory are not indigenous to the textbook in city government. They were originally borrowed from other areas of political science, and while these other areas have put forth new views of politics and administration, the original views continue to live on, unchanged, in the textbooks of city government.

In short, what has happened here is that the urban political process being described in today's city government text is a picture seen through the eyes of Graham Wallas, Lincoln Steffens and James Bryce, rather than a view that might come from contemporaries such as Lubell, Riesman, Hunter, Key or Truman.[5] And as for the administrative theory, that too is a throwback to the 1910's (and earlier); for it represents an intellectual world that no longer exists. It is an administrative theory that has been torn down by the writers on administration because (at least a decade ago) it was exposed as being incompatible with the realities of the administrative process. Thus, the textbooks in municipal government present a curious display. They have constructed an intellectual edifice that rests upon foundations that are long destroyed. But despite the friability of the foundations, the structure stands intact.

## II

Because the city government text is built upon a theory borrowed from the literature of public administration, any examination of this theory must be conducted within the margins of that latter body of writings. As a result, some fairly well marked trails must be crossed, including one that many regard as the staging ground for contemporary administrative thought: the once widely held view that the making of public policy, *i.e.*, politics, is a process separable and distinct—logically, chronologically and institutionally—from administration, *i.e.*, the carrying of this policy into effect.[6]

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[5] Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (London, 1908); Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York, 1904); James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London, 1888). Bryce's view that American cities were the "one conspicuous failure of the United States" seems to have had a chromosomatic impact upon subsequent texts in city government. *Cf.* Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952); David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950); Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953); V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 2d ed. (New York, 1947); and *American State Politics* (New York, 1956); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951).

This second grouping is given merely to suggest the rich lode of constructs and conceptual schemes that more recent writings have opened up for the student of urban government: Lubell, the journalist, concerned with attitudinal sets carried through time; Riesman, the mass-observer, concerned with the socio-psychological matrix of urban life; Hunter, the sociologist, attempting to apply the inferences of sociometrics to urban power structures and elites; V. O. Key, Jr., the political scientist, concerned with the anatomy of power and the use of statistical inferences; and Truman, also a political scientist, concerned with the group basis of politics.

While this distinction between administration and politics can be traced at least as far back as 1900 and the writings of Frank Goodnow, there is reason to believe that Goodnow himself may have set it up solely for the purpose of creating an analytic construct, an intellectual tool for exploring two significant, interrelated aspects of the governmental process.[7] At the imitative hands of those who followed him, however, this construct was forced through a mill of reification, eventually to emerge as a view that administration *is* a process distinct from the making of public policy. And from here, construct passed over, first into normative theory and then into causal theory: for if these entities *were* distinct parts of the governmental process, then (it was argued) they *ought* to be institutionally isolated, one from the other; and *if* administration were separated out from politics, *then* there would follow felicitous consequences for government—a maximal return upon whatever resources were expended in making the wheels of government go 'round.

This idea of maximal return was, of course, administration's celebrated concept of efficiency which, as Robert Dahl notes, ran like a red thread through the writings on administration for at least four decades, until the mid 1940's.[8] This concept of efficiency, like the notion that administration is separable from politics, was based upon a premise extremely important to the whole of administrative thought: namely, that values and normative judgments, while lying at the heart of policy-making, can be eliminated from the administrative act. That, in baldest form, was the basis for the distinction between administration and politics, and it was also the basis for a belief that efficiency could serve as the measuring stick for administrative action: for it was held that the products of administration could be reduced to quantifiable units, and upon the basis of these an objective (as distinguished from a valuational) measure of the administrative act could be devised.

So grounded, administrative writing produced a body of principles whose refinement into maxims ("Boards must give way to control by the single executive"; "No executive should attempt to supervise more than four or five persons") set in motion a critical examination that was eventually to overhaul the whole of administrative thought.[9] This attack upon the "principles" of administration came from several sources: from those who demanded to see tangible and visible results from governmental reforms made in accordance with these administrative maxims; from those who searched for quantifiable units upon which to develop a universal and objective measure for efficiency; and from those whose studies of decision-making led them to conclude that value judgments are a concomitant of every governmental act, including the administrative.[10]

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[6] All who refer to the development of administrative theory must acknowledge their debt to Dwight Waldo, especially to his *Administrative State* (New York, 1948). See also his "Development of the Theory of Democratic Administration," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 81–103 (March, 1952).

[7] Frank J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York, 1900). See also the comments of V. O. Key, Jr., "Politics and Administration," *The Future of Government in the United States*, ed. Leonard White (Chicago, 1942), pp. 145–163.

[8] Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Administration: Three Problems," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 1–11 (Winter, 1947).

By 1940 the earlier principles of administration (now regarded as dogma) were in full rout, and administrative theory (with a concern for things such as function and dysfunction, group analysis and influence) moved in new directions. It is not, however, the purpose of this essay to examine these directions, but rather to make a simple point: that the administrative theory that entered the city government text in 1920 did not adapt itself to subsequent changes in this theory, but persists unchanged. Administrative dogma, based upon the premise of a value-free administrative process, sank—in the literature of administration—beneath the waters of empirical investigation. But in the literature of city government, the dogma still exists, an ice-age inhabitant of a lost Atlantis.

Now, to understand the role played by administrative theory in the city government text, it is also necessary to understand something of the way in which it is brought into play, that is, the way in which it has come to serve as the focal point of the textual enterprise. Ironically enough, while the theory posits the idea of a value-free administrative process, the theory itself is made significant to the text only by a commitment to two important, but half-hidden, value judgments. One of these concerns the nature of the urban electorate; the other involves the function and purpose of municipal government.

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[9] One of the high-water marks in the development of this body of administrative principles was the publication of Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, eds., *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York, 1937). In an essay titled "Organization as a Technical Problem," Urwick wrote (p. 49): " . . . there are principles . . . which should govern arrangements for human association of any kind. These principles can be studied . . . irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise . . . or any constitutional, political, or social theory underlying its creation." As an example of these principles, Urwick then went on to say (p. 52): "Students of administration have long recognized that, in practice, no human brain should attempt to supervise directly more than . . . six other individuals whose work is interrelated."

[10] The most trenchant demand for evidence of results from reforms built upon these administrative principles came from Charles S. Hyneman, "Administrative Reorganization: An Adventure into Science and Theology," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 1, pp. 62–75 (Feb. 1939). Other demands came from J. Mark Jacobson, "Evaluating State Administrative Structure," this REVIEW, Vol. 22, pp. 928–935 (Nov. 1928); and William H. Edwards, "Has State Reorganization Succeeded," *State Government*, Vol. 11, pp. 183–184 (Oct. 1938).

Among those who turned away from the idea of a value-free efficiency were several scholars who did so only after first attempting to search out this efficiency-in-itself. For a careful analysis of this concept and a defense of its utility for certain instrumental purposes, see Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert Simon, *Measuring Municipal Activities* (Chicago, 1938), and Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1949).

On the relationship between the factual and valuational elements in the administrative act, see *ibid.*, ch. 3.

Taking the latter first, it is no exaggeration to say that the text in municipal government has turned its back upon a great range of functions performed by the city in order to elevate the administrative function to a position of first importance. A city, after all, is a many-sided phenomenon. It is an institution that carries forward the cultural attainments of society. It is a matrix that throws its inhabitants into a series of significant social relationships. It is a frame of political reference that furnishes its citizens with first-hand experiences with the governmental process. It is an organization of power and influences felt within and outside its borders. And, it is also a machine that provides certain services for those within its boundaries.[11] The city government text, however, sees the city only in its service role, and in doing so implies: first, that providing services is *the* function of the city; second, that the administration of these services is, and should be, the major task of the city's government; and third, that the test for "good" government is the provision of these services at the least possible cost. This idea of least possible cost, of course, involves the concept of efficiency; and at this point we see value judgment *within* value judgment, for not only is it asserted that the furnishing of services should be the major task of city government, but also that, in testing the performance of that government upon a rack of "output over input," the sole criterion for input should be financial and not any of the other things that men also see as having utility and value. Thus, in the language of one textbook:

> The city is an organization or institution devoted to service. It is created and maintained for the purpose of performing functions and delivering services which are essential to make living in the modern city more tolerable and more agreeable. If it does these things at a reasonable cost to the taxpayers it has served its purpose and fulfilled its mission. The goal is to deliver the essential or desired services at the minimum cost.[12]

The second of the value judgments that serve to bring administrative dogma into play also involves the presentation of a single facet of a many-sided phenomenon. Here the phenomenon is urban political behavior and the characterization made of this behavior is redolent of Hamilton's metaphor of the people as a great beast. What the city government text sees as most characteristic of the urban elector is that he is "befogged and confused" and incapable of rendering intelligent judgment upon important questions. ("The complexity of questions . . . is so great that it is asking too much to expect the citizen to vote intelligently.") He prefers the "appeals of emotions rather than issues" and sends into office "incompetents and numbskulls." He has a penchant for electing the dishonest politician instead of the "virtuous civic leader" and thus, if the text be read carefully, it will be seen to fly the gonfalons of some latter-day Federalist Party: the people are to reign but not to rule directly. For their own good, they are not to be entrusted with complete control over the instruments of government. Separation of powers and check and balance are once again the orders of the day; and they are to be achieved by separating the policy-making functions of government from the administrative. The former are to be restricted and placed with the representatives of the people and the latter are to be enlarged and lodged with the "policy-neutral administrative expert."[13]

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[11] Representative of those who see the city in its many roles is Lewis Mumford. See his *Culture of Cities* (New York, 1938); *City Development* (New York, 1945); *From the Ground Up* (New York, 1956).

More significant, however, for systematic research are the writings of the urban sociologists, especially those of the "Chicago school." See for example the prospectus drawn up in 1925 by Robert E. Park, "Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment," reprinted in Paul Hatt and Albert Reiss, *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe, 1951), pp. 2–32.

[12] See note 3, above.

That in blueprint is the grand design of the city government text; and once the case is made for separating policy-makers from administrators, the proposals for specific reforms now fall into place like a company of well-trained guardsmen.

First, to secure expertise in the ranks of the administrators, their offices must be made both appointive and permanent. They must be protected from the corrupting influence of office-seeking and placed, whenever possible, upon the civil service rolls. ("The ballot should be shortened until it includes only those officers who determine municipal policy. And the only persons on the municipal payroll whose primary duty is indisputably the formulation of policy are the members of the local legislative body. . . .")

Second, to promote efficiency in the governmental operation, boards must give way to the single-headed agency; and lines of authority must be clearly drawn. A scalar organization must be established with ultimate power coming to rest in as few hands as possible, ideally in the hands of a single administrator. ("Modern administration calls for the integration of control over administration in a single executive. . . .")

Third, and once again in the interest of efficiency, those who supervise administration must be given responsibility for preparing and supervising the city's budget; for only in this way can fiscal outlay be made to reflect the facts and needs of administrative life. ("Final responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, and wisdom of the budget plan should be centered in the chief executive.")

And finally, city government's basic forms must be altered to accord with the theories of proper administrative management. The city council is to be remade, both procedurally and substantively. Its enabling charter is to be rewritten so as to confine the council to policy activities, and to make impossible "council meddling" with administration. Moreover, to improve the quality of the council's policy functions, better men are to be brought into the council and its size is to be adjusted to the needs of proper debate and deliberation. To these ends, the textbooks generally agree that representation by wards must give way to city-wide elections. This, it is proclaimed, will reduce the influence of bossism and send a "higher type of man" to the council. (" . . . election by wards is apt to produce an inferior type of councilman"; "election at large helps to attract better men to run for office. . . .") And in addition, it is agreed that small councils are preferable to larger ones, with at least one text claiming to have discovered fairly precisely the proper size for a city council: "Twenty or twenty-five councilmen may be more satisfactory for the largest communities."[14]

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[13] Separation of powers by means of an independently elected executive, however, is eschewed by the text in an effort to overturn ideological obstacles to the coming of the city manager.

As to the office of mayor, there is complete agreement that the weak mayor who shares executive power with independently elected boards and administrators must give way to the strong mayor, a chief executive fashioned upon the templates of the national government's President. But weak or strong, the mayor is, after all, an *elected* administrator and having sprung from politics' dirty soil, he cannot be expected to be endowed with proper administrative qualities. As one text puts it: "Courage is not usually the stuff out of which mayors are made." And again: "Every mayor must decide whether to emphasize the technical or popular aspects of his office. He must be either a good administrator or a good fellow. He cannot be both." Thus, the textbooks prefer a form of government other than mayor-council, and they view the commission form of government with both regard and misgivings. The commission form has one great virtue. By offering an alternative to the mayor-council form of government, it has helped turn American cities away from that form. But in the last analysis, the commission form is a weak form, for "Commission government achieves merger of policy-formation and policy-execution in the same group of officers. This is wrong in principle, a fundamental error in design." And thus, the textbook comes at last to the form of government that epitomizes proper administrative theory, the city manager form of government. In this form there is encapsulated all that is proper for city goverment, and in a representative outpouring of praise, one textbook writes: "The council-manager plan of municipal government is the best plan yet devised."

This, then, is the list of reforms being urged upon our cities, and in offering up this list, the city government text has come to serve as attending physician to the local bodies politic. The doctor's medicine is strong. But strong medicine is not necessarily good medicine; and it may be that the physician's formulary contains as yet no penicillin.

## III

Although administration is the pivot of the city government text, the faults that lie with these books are not confined to this pivot nor to its supposed dichotomy between policy and administration. From a critical point of view, the administrative phases of these books are no more than a surface manifestation of a deeper fault: the lack of concern for the standards of proof that comprise scientific analysis. Lacking a concern for this analysis, these texts therefore suffer from an inadequacy of presentation that embraces much that is touched upon, from the pivotal center out to the perimeter of the textual enterprise.

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[14] As will be discussed in the following section, the empirical evidence for these generalizations is nowhere laid out for inspection.

It is, of course, beyond the possibilities of this essay to examine all that is dealt with in these books; but it is possible to carry further the thrust of criticism by examining, under four headings, the most conspicuous of the textbooks' analytic failures: first, the failure of these texts to integrate their materials with the general body of political science literature. This is the shortcoming of *insularity*, and because of it these books offer up conclusions and remedies that are at variance with the general findings of political science. Second, the failure of these texts to weigh and evaluate (and even lay out openly) the evidence that is used to support their pronouncements and conclusions. This is the breakdown of *standards of proof* and because of it much that is contained in these texts is scientifically suspect. Third, the failure to pursue statements and commitments to logical ends. This is the breakdown of the *logical imperative* and because of it these texts are able to conceal, perhaps even from themselves, their elitist commitments within a democratic cloak. And finally, the failure of these books to appreciate the complexity of any important political activity. This is the shortcoming of *one-dimensional analysis*, and because of it these textbooks proceed to problem-examination by showing concern for only a single factor in a multi-factoral situation.

Under the heading of insularity, the most conspicuous case, of course, is the maintenance of the policy-administration dichotomy in the face of its abandonment by the rest of political science literature. Insularity does not stop here, however, but follows the development of the text's administrative line, shielding from refutation many of the key corollaries that flow from this basic dichotomy. Among those corollaries, protected from the leverage of the general writings of political science, are those that involve the pursuit of the merit system, proposals for budget management, and proposed reformation of the city's political process.

In one sense, all of these proposals stem from the fact that the city government text is still fighting the Tweed Ring of the 1870's. To secure government against patronage and pork-barreling, the merit system and the executive budget are urged, without reservation, upon the cities. This can be done, of course, since the textbooks view budget-making as no more than a mechanical process for relating income to outlay, while the civil servant is seen as being no more than a hollow vessel into whom the values of his masters can be poured. In the general stream of political science writing, of course, these views have been both challenged and rejected: for the budget stands revealed as government's most potent instrument of policy, while the civil servant's role in policymaking has led many to conclude that the lines of civil service reform have already been extended beyond the bounds of democratic responsibility.[15]

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[15] On the relationship between budget-making and policy, see Herbert Simon, cited in note 10 above, ch. 9; V. O. Key, Jr., "The Lack of Budgetary Theory," this REVIEW, Vol.

It is in the realm of political reform, however, that the text has its greatest say; and here, in an effort to smash bossism, the cities are to be thrust into the embrace of the direct primary and the independent (of national affiliation) local party. (". . . there is an evil effect in having municipal campaigns conducted along national party lines.") But while the city government text states its advocacy of the direct primary, political scientists in other fields question the efficacy of this reform, some going so far as to state that the primary may have an effect opposite to that proclaimed in the city government text. By robbing the parties of an opportunity for centralized "answerability" and by helping to send the minority (e.g. "watchdog") party into decline, the primary may actually work to increase the power of the political machine.[16] And, as regards the creation of local political parties, here the time schedule of the municipal government book is truly out of joint, for these books ignore what may be the central political phenomenon of our time: the growth of Presidential power and the intimate relation of urban political parties to that power.[17] To urge our cities to cut themselves off from the vital center of our political life is unrealistic, to say the least; but probably no more reflective of insularity than the proposal of one text which, after separating those officials who are to be elected from those who are to be appointed, says: "Members of the judiciary are not policy-determining officers and therefore they should not be elected"![18]

These proposals for reform, however, are made suspect by more than insularity. They can also be criticized by way of the evidence that supports them, and here (as might be expected in the seamlessness of systematic analysis) insularity shades over into the category of proper evidence and consequent standards of proof.

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34, pp. 1137–1144 (Dec. 1940); Harvey C. Mansfield, "Fiscal Accountability," in Fritz Morstein Marx, ed., *Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946), ch. 25.

On the problem of the merit system and democratic responsibility, see Charles S. Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York, 1950), especially, ch. 15; The American Assembly, *The Federal Government Service* (New York, 1954), especially the essays by Herbert Kaufman, Herman M. Somers, and Harvey C. Mansfield.

[16] To state the textbooks' position within the context of this essay, they are still carrying forward the dictum of Frank Goodnow who wrote that the direct primary will deliver over to the people the "same control over nominations that they now have over elections." Goodnow, cited note 7 above, p. 248.

For some second thoughts on the primary, see V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics*, cited note 5 above, chs. 4, 5, 6; and Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York, 1956), pp. 281–286; V. O. Key, Jr., "The Direct Primary and Party Structure: A Study of State Legislative Nominations," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 1–26 (March, 1954).

[17] On the relationship between presidential and urban politics, see Key, *American State Politics*, cited above, ch. 2; Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920," this REVIEW, Vol. 43, pp. 1189–1206 (Dec. 1949); Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, cited note 5 above, chs. 3, 4, 5.

[18] The literature treating judicial activism is extensive. Two exceedingly useful items are Fred V. Cahill, *Judicial Legislation* (New York, 1952), and Jack W. Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (New York, 1955).

From one point of view, a proposal for political reform is more than a call to action; it is also the sounding of a body of causal theory that posits a series of relationships between political institutions and the general political process. To demonstrate these relationships (*e.g.*, to prove the theory) is at best an exceedingly difficult process; and, given the social scientist's inability to quantify certain data or subject them to reasonable control, there is a great range of causal theory that may lie forever out of the range of scientific demonstration. Even the simplest causal theory requires, for tentative demonstration, a wealth of carefully controlled observation; and unfortunately, the study of city government—lacking, for example, its first comparative study of the American city council—has yet to amass much of this necessary knowledge.[19] Thus, it is a fair question to ask whether the city government text has *any* causal theory that it may set before its readers as being "proven." But rather than hazard an answer here, it would be more useful to examine the evidentiary techniques that are used to create the keystone in the textual arch: the proposition that manager government is the best form of city government.

Bluntly put, this proposition in most of the textbooks is simply an *ipse dixit* proclamation. Those books, however, that seek to prove the validity of the proposition rely chiefly upon two very shaky pieces of evidence. The first relates to the number of cities that have tried the manager plan and then abandoned it; and the second consists of citing Stone, Price and Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States*.[20] Now, whatever the real merits of this form of government, they can hardly be adduced from these pieces of evidence. The fact of abandonment is open to too many conflicting interpretations to be conclusive;[21] and the aforementioned book is hardly any more so. The Stone book, in fact, states in its introduction that its authors were unable to formulate any standards or tests of managerial achievement and therefore confines itself to a cataloging of the procedural and structural changes that accompanied the introduction of the manager form in each of the cities listed.[22] Reduced to its logical dimensions, this means simply that the manager form has introduced into certain cities the manager form of government. The textbooks in city government, however, have seized upon this catalogued tautology and offer it as evidence of the merits of the manager plan. In doing so, the bareness of the evidentiary cupboard stands revealed.

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[19] It is somewhat presumptuous to offer bibliographic references for what is axiomatic to scientific investigation. The following, however, examine in detail the propositions that are merely encapsulated here. Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley, 1951); Ernest Greenwood, *Experimental Sociology* (New York, 1945); Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *Logic and the Scientific Method* (New York, 1934), chs. 6–16; William Goode and Paul Hatt, *Methods in Social Research* (New York, 1952); V. O. Key, Jr., *A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists* (New York, 1954).

[20] Harold Stone, Don K. Price and Kathryn Stone, *City Manager Government in the U.S.* (Chicago, 1940).

[21] See Arthur Bromage, *Manager Plan Abandonments* (New York, 1940), revised, 1949.

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. vi–viii. For a prospectus for an empirical examination of city manager government, see Social Science Research Council, Inter-University Seminar, "Research in Political Behavior," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 1003–1045 (Dec. 1952).

To turn now to the problem of logical consistency within these texts, it might be noted that they are very much of a logical whole, except at the juncture where democratic theory is to be spliced to the administrative line. Without exception, these books begin upon a note of devotion to the democratic ideal, and, going on to place city government within that ideal, most of them note that cities are vital to democracy; first because democracy can reach its fullest development within the relatively limited geographic confines of the city, and second, because the concrete experiences of city government constitute a training ground for a responsible citizenry.

But no sooner are these commitments to democracy launched, than they sink immediately from sight; and the text turns its attention to constructing a world of municipal government in which the expert is supreme. It may be that the city is the ideal area for democracy's fruition, but the text puts the ideal to rout by making much of "the shame of the cities" and their irrational inhabitants who are hardly fit for self rule. The training ground of democracy is rapidly surrounded by the barbed wire of expertise, and the citizen is kept from participating in the experiences of city government by being reminded that: "After all, there are only two ways of paving a street or enforcing quarantine regulations—a right and a wrong way . . . ," and the right way, of course, is known only to the expert. There is no suggestion here that the real issue may not be right *versus* wrong street paving, but rather the democratic issue of where the streets are to be paved; for the implication is that the matter of *what* the city is to do has long ago been settled and that the real problem is simply the expert's problem of how. Legislative policy-making is to give way to a broad delegation of powers to an administrative, professional elite; and, even in those relatively few instances where training of citizens is to go forward through genuine policy debate, the textbook hardly rejoices over this debate but prefers to cluck sympathetically over the plight of the administrative expert "who finds his plans blocked by a stupid and obstinate majority in the [city] council."[23]

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[23] The textbooks offer little evidence that they have thought through the problem of the expert and his proper role in democratic government. Moreover, they appear to be unaffected by the attempts that others have made to deal with this problem. See, for example, John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, 1927); Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950). See also the spate of administrative writings that treat this problem asymptotically in an attempt to clarify the problem of political controls over bureaucratic structures: Charles S. Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York, 1950), especially chs. 2–4; Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1946), ch. 19, and "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," *Public Policy, 1940*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich and E. S. Mason (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 3–24; Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 1 (Summer, 1941), pp. 335–350; Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *ibid.*, Vol. 9 (Autumn, 1949), pp. 257–264; Paul Appleby, *Morality and Administration* (Baton Rouge, 1949).

This concern for the stupidity of the majority, however, may be more revealing of the value-orientation of the text than of the actual state of city affairs; and it is at this juncture of value and "fact" that a final criticism can be made. A textbook, after all, is more than a purveyor of information. It is also an enterprise in analysis that is to serve its readers as a model for emulation in the setting out of data, in the weighing of evidence, in control over values, and in the total process of problem solving. The textual model is open to a degree of challenge in all of these areas, but especially in the area in which the texts attempt to grapple with any of the more complex problems that confront our cities.

Briefly put, what these texts do is solve a problem by building a maximizing model. In less charitable terms, they first seize upon the goal to be reached and then stake out the methods best calculated to reach that goal, without ever stopping to justify that goal, or to indicate to their readers what other goals will be stepped over in the process.

On the problems raised up, say, by suburban cities, the goal generally sought is a lowering of the total costs of government, and the technique most often recommended is that of annexation. No consideration is shown the cost-opportunities involved in seeking this goal and no attempt is made to justify this preference for lowered governmental costs as over and against other things that men might value, such as corporate identity or the greater opportunities for citizen training that might exist in small town affairs.

Thus, problem solving for these texts consists of seizing upon a single dimension of a complicated situation and then dealing only with that dimension. This, however, is not problem solving but shadow play. For in the world of real politics, problems have many dimensions; and when confronted with decision-making in that world, most men do deal with these many dimensions: they consider cost opportunities and sacrifice of values; they eat their cake and keep at least a portion of it by compromising and by supporting half-way measures. As the economist would put it, they prefer to maximize at the margins, and in doing so, they preserve a sizable portion of what might be sacrificed if the reform were thoroughgoing and total.[24] Thus, the textbook offers little by way of guidance for problem solving in the world of real politics. But to say this, however, is not enough, for there is always the danger that students may take the books' analytic methods seriously and attempt to emulate them in the arena of practical politics. Disillusion is sure to dog the emulator, and that, in the last say, may be the real case against these texts.

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[24] See the discussion of marginal maximization and social reform in Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Social Welfare* (New York, 1953), ch. 3. See also the use of this principle of marginal maximization in the analyses of the Chicago Home Rule Commission as it dealt with questions of the size and method of election for the Chicago city council. Chicago Home Rule Commission, *Modernizing a City Government* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 31–75.

## IV

To return to the theme upon which this essay opened, the question may now be fairly put: what kind of text will serve to correct the deficiencies of the present text, and, at the same time, will liberate scholarly energies for research in the field of city government? The answer is, perhaps, too simple to be of value, for the recast textbook must be one that weighs its evidence fairly, exposes the gaps in its own knowledge, and suggests areas in which fruitful research is to be done.

But, if present administrative theory is to be eliminated from the recast text, the problem arises as to what shall constitute the inner framework, the interlacing that holds the enterprise together and gives it form. Without this matrix, the text may be reduced to the description of legal relationships that for so many years characterized the textbooks on American national government; and here, the problem grows infinitely more difficult.

It may be, of course, that the conceptual framework that will mold the city government text cannot be determined in advance of a decision as to what shall be the field's developmental form. A continued concern for the city's administrative activities may utilize some such framework as *decision making*, while a concern for the city as a creator of public policy may involve a scaffolding such as the *group basis* of politics. Ideally, the conceptual framework should be an "open" one that permits development along several lines simultaneously; and it may be that the materials for this framework are already at hand.

In part, these materials would come from the literature of political science, and in part from the writings of the sociologists. And the justification for their use would lie in the fact that they are tied to two of the most significant elements in the study of city government. The first of these elements is the comparative, and it is grounded in the fact that the study of American city government (embracing some 16,000 separate governments) is in essence an exercise in comparative politics. The second of these elements is the sociological, and it is made important by the fact that the "irreducible, stable element" within each city and common to all cities, is its complex network of *interpersonal* relations. ("The city is people.")

To utilize these elements, there might be required a two-phase organization of the city government text. The first phase would borrow from the literature of comparative government, for it would be concerned with a central goal of that discipline: the forging of some dependable causal theory concerning the relationships between such variables as institutions, procedures, forms of government, and patterns of political behavior.[25] In attempting to lay out this theory, the

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[25] For a statement of the concerns of comparative government, see Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (New York, 1955); Social Science Research Council, Inter-University Research Seminar, "Research in Comparative Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 641–675 (Sept. 1953).

To suggest a comparative method for the study of city government is not to minimize the difficulties that abound in the use of this method. As V. O. Key notes, in speaking of text could operate upon three levels of presentation. First, it could do a meticulous job of stating what is already known about these relationships as they apply to American cities. Second, it could join city government to the main streams of political science by acknowledging some of the more significant studies in politics and indicating their *inferential* importance for city government. And third, the text could open the way to future research by indicating the kinds of information that are still very much missing from the reservoir of knowledge in this area. Thus, to illustrate by example, as it dealt with legislative operations within the city, the text could examine some of the studies made of the legislative operation on the state and national levels and then attempt to draw inferences from these studies for city government. Equally important, the text could also indicate the importance and need for parallel and replicative studies of the city council.[26] Or, to take an example from the realm of politics, as the text dealt with patterns of political power within the city, it might lay out some of the elements that are generally said to constitute a political organization; and, going on to discuss the importance of the precinct worker, the text might then note that of the four generally available studies of this "vital cog" the one study that is perhaps most informative was made some twenty-five years ago and dealt only with a non-random (*e.g.*, non-representative) sample of precinct workers in only one city.[27]

The second phase of textual organization, too, would involve the use of causal theory. Here, however, the emphasis would be upon an extended examination of patterns of political behavior. The relationship between these patterns and governmental forms might again be noted, but the central concern would be with *explanations* of urban political behavior. And to this purpose, the text would be able to draw upon an already developed body of literature, that of urban social-psychology.[28]

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the use of this method for the study of American states: "Even in the comparative analysis of American states, which should hold constant a great many factors that would complicate comparisons among nations, it is extraordinarily difficult to know when significant variables have been identified." "The Direct Primary and Party Structure," cited in note 16 above, pp. 21–22, footnote 21.

[26] To take an example within the example, Stephen Bailey's studies of Congressional lawmaking seem rich in inference for the city council. See his *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1950), and Stephen Bailey and Howard Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York, 1952). See also the role-perception framework as used by Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 340–365 (June, 1954).

[27] Sonya Forthal, *Cogwheels of Democracy* (New York, 1948), reissue. Other studies dealing with the precinct captain are: Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago, 1937), ch. 3; David Kurtzman, *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1935); William Mosher, "Party Government Control at the Grass Roots," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 15–18 (Jan. 1935).

[28] Some items representative of this literature are: Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941); and *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955); Sebastian De Grazia, *The Political Community: A Study in Anomie* (Chicago, 1948); Robert C. Angell, *The Moral Integration of American Cities* (Chicago, 1951); William F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, 1943); W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community*

In attempting to categorize the effects of urban life upon the individual personality, this literature has created a body of concepts that are abstracted from a central feature of urban life: the aloneness, and lack of a sense of mastery over one's environment that spring from the routine and impersonalization of city life. These concepts (such as alienation, disorientation, group-dependence) have already done much to illuminate urban political behavior; and in the focus of a city government text, they are especially useful for their explanations of such vital aspects of urban politics as apathy toward the routine of government, the manipulative powers of the political machine, the urban dweller's willingness to experiment freely with the forms of his government, and his affinity for the colorful political leader.

Thus, if the textbook carefully explores the relationships between institutions and politics, it might be possible to employ these concepts so as to make all of urban government revolve around a single theorem: that urban politics is the product of the disorientation of urban man. This single proposition, if properly used, might serve as a substitute for the organizing framework provided by administrative theory in today's texts; and quite possibly, it will be with this substitution that a revitalized study of American city government can begin.

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(New Haven, 1941); Julie Meyer, "The Stranger and the City," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56, pp. 476–483 (March, 1951); Phillip Selznick, "Institutional Vulnerability in Mass Society," *ibid.*, Vol. 56, pp. 320–331 (Jan. 1951); Morris Axelrod, "Urban Structure and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 13–18 (Feb., 1956); Scott Greer, "Urbanism Reconsidered," *ibid.*, pp. 19–25; and Paul Hatt and Albert Reiss, *Reader in Urban Sociology*, cited in note 11, above.

# "THE PUBLIC INTEREST" IN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING: THEOREM, THEOSOPHY, OR THEORY?*

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Textbooks in public administration customarily conclude with a section on administrative responsibility. The charitable inference is that this location betokens the saving of the best till last, rather than the appendage of an afterthought. Herbert Kaufman might explain it as the preoccupation of the past generation of political scientists with the legitimation of the efficient exercise of administrative power to subserve the goals of the social state, with a consequent sublimation of the emerging problem of the control of large, professionalized bureaucracies.[1] However that may be, it does seem clear that, with the exception of administrative decisions which adversely affect "civil liberties," most political scientists have been content to let lawyers and defenders of the free enterprise system worry about the restraint of administrative action.

The textbooks posit an array of external restraints upon administrative decision-making: appropriate roles are assigned to legislatures, chief executives, courts, political parties, non-party groups, and to the popular sovereigns themselves. Perhaps of even greater significance, at least in quantitative terms, are the internal restraints which bureaucracies impose upon themselves, through patterns of organization and rules of procedure. The histology of the public administration case studies demonstrates, however, that administrative decisions are mosaics of the particularistic choices of discrete human beings. If the bureaucrat is exposed to the babel of many voices, speaking different tongues to convey various messages, how can he know which among competing alternatives he *ought* to choose? If, by means of one set of words or another, an overriding obligation to an administrative quest of the public interest is postulated, how does this affect administrative choice?

A theory of "the public interest" in administrative decision-making ought, one supposes, to describe a relationship between a concept of the public interest and official behavior in such terms that it might be possible to collect data for the purpose of attempting to validate hypotheses concerning the relationship. If extant theory does not lend itself to such uses, it is difficult to comprehend the justification for teaching students of public administration that subservience to the public interest is a relevant norm of administrative responsibility.

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[1] Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration," this REVIEW, Vol. 50, pp. 1057–1073 (December, 1956).

In this paper, I wish to direct attention to what contemporary theory—by which I mean, in general, that of the past twenty-five years—has to say about how administrative officials can and do give recognition to the "public interest" in making their choices. Although the focus thus will be upon concepts of the public interest, this cannot be disassociated from more generalized theories of official decision-making. I have found particularly useful, in my attempt to develop a conceptual scheme for dealing systematically with the administrative theorists who have written on this subject, an article by Dean Leys.[2] In this article, Dean Leys took issue with the orthodox theory of administrative discretion which had then dominated thinking in the field of administrative law for the preceding half-century—and which, indeed, continues to hold sway in the writings of lawyers and political scientists alike. The godfather of orthodoxy was Ernst Freund, who taught that the solution to the problem of the official endowed with discretionary powers was to increase the *definiteness* of legal standards (in this context, primarily statutes and administrative rules). The essence of Leys' critique is that Freund had oversimplified the problem by dealing with only one aspect of it. Leys himself would distinguish

> three classes of discretionary powers:
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> (1) technical discretion, which is freedom in prescribing the rule but not the criterion or end of action;
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> (2) discretion in prescribing the rule of action and also in clarifying a *vague* criterion—this is the authorization of social planning;
>
> (3) discretion in prescribing the rule of action where the criterion of action is *ambiguous* because it is in dispute—this amounts to an instruction to the official to use his ingenuity in political mediation.[3]

I have adapted Leys' basic system of classification in the following way. I shall divide contemporary theorists of administrative decision-making into three groups:

I. Proponents of Administrative Rationalism. These are positivists. For them, the goals of administration are given. The decision-making process is a value-neutral technical process; the authority of the administrator is the authority of expertise. The public interest is found in the rationalization of the decisional process so that it will automatically result in the carrying out of the Public Will. Human discretion is minimized or eliminated by defining it out of the decisional situation; responsibility lies in autonomic behavior. Science is the *deus ex machina*.

II. Advocates of Administrative Platonism. The social engineers are idealists. They view the legislature as an inadequate, incompetent source of public policy. They would maximize (or, at the very least, expand) the scope of administrative autonomy and discretion, thus placing the Executive in the heart of the policy-making process. This necessitates a highly moral official world, personified in the image of the Good Administrator. The public interest is created by the imaginative manipulation of not-too-stubborn facts (including other persons, in and out of government) by administrative Philosopher Kings.

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[2] Wayne A. R. Leys, "Ethics and Administrative Discretion," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 3, p. 10 (1943).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

III. Administrative Realists. This group is composed of skeptics and sophisticates, who have put behind them childish myths which postulate any independent substantive content for such notions as "the public will" and "the public interest." The mechanist faction of this school assumes the irrelevancy of the administrator's individuality, at least in a statistical sense and over the long haul. The administrator is a mere catalyst by means of which conflict among special interests is transmuted into the public interest, which is found in the satisfactory (*i.e.*, peaceful) adjustment of these conflicting interests. There is also a psychological deviation which sublimates aggregates of individuals in favor of emphasis upon the conflict among the multitude of stimuli perceived within the mind of the official. For the psychological realists, the public interest is served by the self-awareness of the administrator, who plays his role self-consciously and recognizes the full implications of his choices. There are also process theorists, who find the public interest in the proper structuring of the decisional process, but, unlike the positivists, do not exclude non-rational elements from that process.

## I. ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALISM

The scientific management movement clearly has been a major influence upon the growth of American public administration theory.[4] Although these scientists developed quite elaborate theories of administrative decision-making, they produced no articulate theory of the public interest. This is hardly to be wondered at, since they indulged in the assumption that the adoption of their proposals necessarily would produce the best possible results; they did not think it necessary to offer scientific proof that it would be in the public interest to have the best results. The general position of the scientists is well represented by Luther Gulick, who stated the fundamental credo in his essay on "Science, Values and Public Administration."[5] A decade was to pass before the implications for a theory of administrative decision-making of the dichotomy between "ought" and "is" (as Gulick put it, " 'should' is a word political scientists should not use in scientific discussion!") were made explicit by Herbert Simon:

> The theory of administration is concerned with how an organization should be constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work efficiently. A fundamental principle of administration, which follows almost immediately from the rational character of "good" administration, is that among several alternatives involving the same expenditure the one should always be selected which leads to the greatest accomplishment of administrative objectives; and among several alternatives that lead to the same accomplishment the one should be selected which involves the least expenditure. Since this "principle of efficiency" is characteristic of any activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of certain ends with the use of scarce means, it is as characteristic of economic theory as it is of administrative theory. The "administrative man" takes his place along-

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[4] See Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (N. Y., 1948), ch. 3.

[5] Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (ed.), *Papers on the Science of Administration* (N. Y.: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), especially p. 192.

> side the classical [and equally mythical?] "economic man." . . . Perhaps the simplest method of approach is to consider the single member of the administrative organization, and ask what the limits are to the quantity and quality of his output. These limits include (a) limits on his ability to *perform*, and (b) limits on his ability to *make correct decisions*. To the extent that these limits are removed, the administrative organization approaches its goal of high efficiency. Two persons, given the same skills, the same objectives and values, the same knowledge and information, can rationally decide only upon the same course of action. . . .
>
> [T]he criterion which the administrator applies to factual problems is one of efficiency. The resources, the input, at the disposal of the administrator are strictly limited. It is not his function to establish a utopia. It is his function to maximize the attainment of the governmental objectives (assuming they have been agreed upon), by the efficient employment of the limited resources that are available to him. . . . Once the system of values which is to govern an administrative choice has been specified, there is one and only one "best" decision, and this decision is determined by the organizational values and situation, and not by the personal motives of the member of the organization who makes the decision. Within the area of discretion, once an individual has decided, on the basis of his personal motives, to recognize the organizational objectives, his further behavior is determined not by personal motives, but by the demands of efficiency. . . . The need for an administrative theory resides in the fact that there *are* practical limits to human rationality, and that these limits are not static, but depend upon the organizational environment in which the individual's decision takes place. The task of administration is so to design this environment that the individual will approach as close as practicable to rationality (judged in terms of the organization's goals) in his decisions.[6]

It has been said that the working out of Shakespeare's plots required the intervention of fools; it would appear that the administrative ideal postulated by these administrative positivists is automation. Simon's "administrative man" turns out to be a robot.

## II. ADMINISTRATIVE PLATONISM

This is the realm of benevolent bureaucrats, who are the Guardians of the democratic state.[7] It is also the area of administrative discretion applying a vague criterion, where Ernst Freund (as the spokesman for what has become traditional delegation-of-legislative-power thinking) coincides with Dean Leys.[8] In the words of the latter:

> Legislative power is delegated in a few fields where the legislature and the public find themselves unable to define either the rule or the criterion of action. These are the subjects on which most of those in the community do not know even the results which they desire. For a time, at least, the administrator may be free not only to choose the means but also the end of action.[9]

Since somebody obviously must define the public interest in the context of particular administrative decisions, and since the "political branches of the government" (that is, the Presidency and the Congress) have done so in an incomplete and unsatisfactory way, the problem becomes one of divining the public will. At this point we must notice a schism among the Platonists, some of whom find a solution in the integration of politics and administration, and others of whom urge the opposite course of a politically autonomous and neutral civil service, somewhat after the presumed fashion of the British Administrative Class. Let us look first at the integration theorists.

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[6] Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (N.Y., 1947), pp. 38–39, 186–187, 204, 240–241.

[7] Waldo, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

[8] Dean Leys has insisted that any coincidence between his concept of discretion and Freud's must be entirely coincidental. (Letter to the writer, February 27, 1956).

[9] Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

In a well known and frequently cited essay, Merle Fainsod has stated the case for creative administrative manipulation:

> The growth of administrative discretion has emphasized the creative role which regulatory agencies can play in defining the scope and direction of public policy. In theory at least, and frequently in practice, they are capable of recognizing some interests as more "public" or more "general" than other interests and of adapting, fusing, and directing group pressures toward such a recognition. In the process of exercising their discretionary power, regulatory agencies are often in a position to create some pressures and to extinguish others, to stir dormant parties in interest into activity and to anesthetize others, to mobilize groups to come to their support and to penalize opposition. Investigation may deflate pretensions and reveal divisions and minorities within groups which are spoken for as units. The impact of the articulate may be softened by the gentle ministrations of discreet inquiry. The manipulative power of regulatory agencies may be utilized to maintain an existing equilibrium of interests; it can be used to tilt the scale and create a new equilibrium. Within limits, the strategic discretion vested in regulatory agencies can become a real creative force in determining the substance of public policy. . . . The conclusion which suggests itself is that the degree of manipulative power which commissions can achieve in defining public policy is in large part dependent upon the strength and clarity of the communal purpose which initiates and sustains them. . . .
>
> When the purposes which various interest groups proclaim are in partial conflict, there may still be sufficient common ground to permit regulatory authorities to perform their task of adjustment. The skill with which they build on shared purpose will determine the degree of manipulative power which they can acquire. Where common purpose is in process of emerging and consensus begins to be widely shared, the manipulative power of regulatory authorities can be exercised with growing confidence. In emergent areas of community they may count on a swelling reservoir of public support. There are other areas where "the notion destined to prevail" is still far from clear. Crystallization of common purpose has not yet taken place. Regulators are still groping in the dark—confined by circumstance to tentative and hesitant efforts to gauge pressures and movements, risking action if they are bold, standing pat if they are timid. Here are the frontiers of control where an articulate common impulse has not yet emerged from the subsoil of human aspirations, where a new law is an adventure, and administrative agencies experiment at their peril. Daring leadership may arouse hitherto inarticulate desires and carve out a new pattern of public interest. But it may also meet the inertia and hostility which invite repudiation.[10]

Fainsod took pains to distinguish his position from that of Arthur F. Bentley, whom I shall discuss below and whose theory Fainsod criticized on the grounds that it was too mechanistic and that it postulated too negative and passive a role for the administrative bureaucracy:

> In so far as institutional arrangements exist which allow free play for shifts in the balance of forces, the pattern which emerges is essentially a dynamic or moving equilib-

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[10] Merle Fainsod, "Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process," in Carl J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason (ed.), *Public Policy I* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 320–321, 322.

rium. At any given moment, public policy is the resultant of a parallelogram of operative forces; the substance of public policy is the resultant of the balance of power shifts. Government institutions thus tend to be transformed into mere pawns in a struggle for supremacy. Deprived of independent creative force, the purposes which they serve simply mirror the changing fortunes of battle. The energizing pressures of particularistic interests claim the center of the stage. The idea of public interest becomes a fiction used to describe an amalgam which is shaped and reshaped in the furnace of their conflicts.[11]

Dwight Waldo has suggested that this is a distinction without a difference, remarking somewhat acidulously that:

> The fact that regulatory bodies may have more prime force in making policy decisions than some have supposed (which [Fainsod] concludes) is significant from an ethical viewpoint only if their force is different in quality from other forces; otherwise, public policy will still be only "the resultant of a parallelogram of operative forces."[12]

Although Fainsod appeared to recognize that his administrative manipulators would need to relate their creative insights to some source or sources of power that would be willing to foster their creations,[13] he failed to explain how the administrator communed with his sources. Another decade was to pass before Emmette Redford took up the cudgels ("Fainsod's conclusions carry conviction")[14] and attempted to provide a natural law[15] justification and source of inspiration for creative administrators. According to Redford,

> the central need is a publicly-oriented or publicly-conditioned expertness. The words require explanation and the concept of public purpose is admittedly vague; nevertheless, the idea here presented has a sufficient core of clarity and captures the heart of administrative purpose in policy development.
>
> By publicly-conditioned expertness we mean a capacity for finding solutions in government action which accord with the thread of unity in the community ideal and the possibilities for effect on the economic organism. There are at a given period certain unities in community purpose. . . . For the administrator these purposes may be expressed in preambles of statutes, in statutory standards like the "public interest" and "public convenience and necessity," or may be derived by implication from statutes as a whole and the legislative and historical background of these. All the administrator's efforts should be oriented toward such public purposes. Their translation from vague expression into substantive action is the motive which conditions his search for solution.
>
> This translation requires expert consideration of the possibilities for change in the operation of the economic organism. This organism is a complex of technologies, institutional framework, and behavior patterns. Within this complex the administrator finds points of resistance and of pliability. *Expert analysis consists in the discovery of the areas of pliability and the means of manipulating these. The maximization of this ability and its*

"thread of unity
in the community
ideal."

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[12] Waldo, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[13] Cf. Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 9, p. 260 (1949).

[14] Emmette S. Redford, *Administration of National Economic Control* (N. Y., 1952), p. 229.

[15] Wolfgang Friedmann, *Legal Theory* (London, 1953), 3rd ed., p. 71: "Natural law terminology . . . may disguise the fundamental affinity between all those modern legal theories which, in opposition to positivism, stress the need of legal ideals. . . . Pound's 'social engineering' . . . and a host of others are natural law ideals in the modern relativist and evolutionary sense, whether they choose to adopt the term or not."

*conscious utilization for the community ideal provide the best attainable measure of the public interest.*

On a narrow plane, publicly-conditioned expertness is the ability to resist the pressure for a decision in favor of a particular party or interest which is contrary to the statement of the public interest which delimits and prescribes the area of expert decision. But the concept we are urging has a broader significance. In the broad sense in which we have described it above, *publicly-conditioned expertness consists in finding ways to make the economic organism yield to community purpose.*[16]

Redford shrinks from the full implications of his thesis, however, for he hastens to add the qualification that:

> The ideals of democratic government also demand that the administrator shall not try to take the full responsibility for the manipulation of interests. His directives set the vague line of division between his responsibility and that of his political superiors. If he has integrity and is loyal to the ideal of democratic government, he will recognize that, beyond a certain point of reasonable adjustment to practicalities, the responsibility for restricting a public program through concession to the interests should rest with the top political, not subordinate administrative, organs. Anything more than this is "administrative absolutism" in a negative form and destroys the integrity of administration by asking too much of it. Also, if the administrator understands the meaning of democratic government he will reach to the political superstructure for a guide on community purpose.[17]

But what of the administrator who does not become "publicly-conditioned," who lacks integrity and loyalty to democratic ideals, the dedicated zealot, or the opportunist whose primary concern is personal power and pelf? Redford's answer seems to be that such a person does not qualify as a creative, intelligent administrator, and he has no business to be in the federal civil service.

In a paper delivered subsequently at a panel session of a convention of the American Political Science Association, Redford restated the argument of his book. This paper, incidentally, is the most extended discussion of the concept of public interest in administrative decision-making that I have run across, with the possible exception of a chapter in the Pfiffner and Presthus textbook. Redford again suggests that administrative decisions are based on "common interests and ideals" and "the necessities arising from circumstances" as well as "on the adjustment of the separate interests"; and "the conditioning of the administrator to look for common and enduring interests is an essential safeguard for the public interest."[18] He ventures another attempt at defining the public interest, although his statement again is in normative rather than in operational terms:

> [The public interest] *may be defined as the best response to a situation in terms of all the interests and of the concepts of value which are generally accepted in our society.*[19]

He lays down various admonitions to safeguard the public interest by organizational and procedural reforms, but seems to place primary reliance upon filling the top administrative jobs with "experts in social engineering," his phrase for the manipulators. Among the structural reforms is Executive integration which, in his view, "has a moral purpose."

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[16] Redford, *op. cit.*, pp. 229–230. Italics in the original.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[18] Emmette S. Redford, "The Protection of the Public Interest with Special Reference to Administrative Regulation," this REVIEW Vol. 48, pp. 1107, 1108 (1954).

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 1108.

Dean Paul Appleby infuses even more moral fervor into his discussion of this question than does Redford. In Appleby's hands, the concepts of public will and public interest take on an unmistakably metaphysical glow:

> The public will is flexible and ever subject to change, learning by its own action and by its own experience, so shot through with discretion that it cannot be predicted as though automatic. It is subject to influence by leaders but is capable of discarding leaders. It is energized just as everyman is, by trial and error that is its own, capable of highly enlightened self-interest, capable of devoted altruism, prone to error and given to profiting from and correcting its own mistakes. It is not inherently and invariably right; perhaps it is never right except in its own time and terms. It is not the sum total of all the private wills. It is not even the total of all the private wills after cancelling out the pluses and minuses of those wills. It is not distilled in a simple, definite, mechanical way, easy to see and easy to weigh in some merely mechanical weighing machine. It is not to be expressed in terms of some near absolute that leaves no questions to be answered; rather, it is eternally inquisitive. It becomes definite only as a majority will, and since there are many possible majorities, it does not uniformly derive from a particular majority and is not something fixed. It is often expressed only as consent and at times only as a veto. In many instances it is a thing not developed at all, withheld, even nonexistent. . . . The public will, then, is a force, largely potential, definite only as majorities form, but always subject to influence of members and leaders. Its capacity to be, more than its being, is the crux of democratic reality. This capacity penetrates the reality of American government.
>
> The public interest is a related phrase of similar character. . . . [T]he public interest is never merely the sum of all private interests nor the sum remaining after canceling out their various pluses and minuses. It is not wholly separate from private interests, and it derives from citizens with many private interests; but it is something distinctive that arises within, among, apart from, and above private interests, focusing in government some of the most elevated aspiration and deepest devotion of which human beings are capable.[20]

Unlike the conditioned expertise of Redford's manipulators, however, the administrator's role in Appleby's view is an intensely political one:

> [G]enerally there are real public interests not readily brought into contrast with acute and strong private interests, and almost throughout the area of public administration officials must struggle with the problem of how much, how far, and in what way to insist upon these public interests. The inner moral satisfaction of responsible administrators turns on the degree to which they have been able to inject consideration of the public interest in the face of a natural inclination of spokesmen for private interests to see those interests as the undiluted public interest.
>
> Neither the simple reconciliation of private interests nor their reconciliation modified by considerations of public interest is in the end a technical performance, no matter how many technical factors may figure in it. It is a political function, involving essentially the weighing of forces and the subjective identification of the narrow area within which these forces may be balanced and the exercising of discretion concerning the point within that area at which acceptability and public interest may be effectively and properly maximized.[21]

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[20] Paul H. Appleby, *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government* (Baton Rouge, 1950), pp. 34–35.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

This emphasis upon the political function of bureaucracy is a major theme in all of Appleby's writing, and would place him among the equilibrium theorists (to be discussed below) but for Appleby's invocation of what Bentley would call "spooks" and "ghosts" as a contrivance for giving content to the "plus factors" of the public interest.

Like Fainsod and Redford as well as several of the Administrative Realists, Appleby suggests a principle of the bureaucracy as a countervailing force, with the administrator in the role of champion of the unorganized, the inarticulate, the underprivileged, "consumers," and other underdogs. This is a strange identification for one whose orientation is so enthusiastically political, absent a better theory of relationship between the administrator and his wards than the notion that the bureaucracy will tend to reflect the representative character of the Presidency. Unless one has a theory which can explain, in operational terms, how and why bureaucracy *must* (not "should") represent the inarticulate interests of inchoate masses, reliance must be placed—as it so largely is—upon teleology:

> In all program fields the problem is basically the same, varying widely in content according to variations in size and nature of publics affected. Where the program is a high-priority majority program—a relative rarity outside of war and prosecution of gross crime—the moral administrative effort should be to seek flexible dilutions of the majority insistence with a factor of empathy for minorities and individuals. Much more commonly, a program has clear and strong majority character, but the particular majority effectively forms only on dramatic occasions, whereas in contrast the minority especially impinged upon is large and disproportionately effective. In such situations the moral responsibility is to push persistently in support of the somewhat inchoate majority. Very commonly a program has only majority assent, benefits of the program accruing chiefly to some special public. In this case the responsibility of the administrator will vary according to the effectiveness of the beneficiary public. His obligation will be generally to temper the program with considerations of other public interests. The larger the dimensions of the program and the more powerful the beneficiary public, the heavier this obligation should rest on him. The weaker and less privileged the clientele, the greater should be the administrator's concern to realize the full dimensions of the majority assent.[22]

Dean Appleby also takes issue with the psychological realists, who argue that an administrator necessarily projects as his concept of the public interest the image of his own personal, individual attitude structure and value system. The Dean warns specifically against this sort of behavior, when he urges that "there must be care not to confuse one's professional viewpoint, functional preoccupation, or personal prejudices with the public interest."

In effect, Fainsod, Redford, and Appleby tell us that the public interest would be realized if bureaucrats abjured administrative delinquency and obeyed the exhortations of these moralists, which may be paraphrased as:

"Be clever!"
"Be wise!"
"Be good!"

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

Above and beyond the Administrative Engineers are the exponents of Guild Idealism, of whom I shall discuss two leading spokesmen, Carl Friedrich and Nathan Grundstein. Although Friedrich recognizes "that administrative officials participate continuously and significantly in [the] process of evolving policy," which is defined as the close linking of politics and administration, his basic argument is that political direction and control of administration is necessarily incomplete and inadequate. It must be supplemented by the "new imperative" of "functional responsibility." By the latter, Professor Friedrich means professionalism. "The will of the people" is a myth, and

> a modern administrator is in many cases dealing with problems so novel and complex that they call for the highest creative ability. This need for creative solutions effectively focuses attention upon the need for action. The pious formulas about the will of the people are all very well, but when it comes to these issues of social maladjustment the popular will has little content, except the desire to see such maladjustments removed.[23]

Consequently, although the responsible administrator is one who shows a "proper regard for existing preferences in the community, and more particularly its prevailing majority," he must also be "responsive to these two dominant factors: technical knowledge and popular sentiment."[24] "Whether we call it 'objective' or 'functional' or 'technical,' " Friedrich writes,

> the fact remains that throughout the length and breadth of our technical civilization there is arising a type of responsibility on the part of the permanent administrator, the man who is called upon to seek and find the creative solutions for our crying technical needs, which cannot be effectively enforced except by fellow-technicians who are capable of judging his policy in terms of the scientific knowledge bearing upon it.[25]

As for "popular sentiment," Friedrich seems to have had in mind such devices as the straw votes used by the Department of Agriculture in conjunction with marketing controls; and apparently he would not shrink from the official electioneering which has played such a conspicuous role in the marketing referenda:

> [A]dministrative officials have begun to tap independent sources of insight into the views and reactions of the general public which are increasingly important in guidng them towards the making of public policy in a responsible fashion . . . it is the function of the administrator to make *every conceivable effort* toward the enforcement of the law which he is called upon to administer. . . . Instead of administering according to precedent, the responsible administrator today works according to anticipation.[26]

Here we have another bit of advice for administrators who would advance the public interest: "Be zealous!"

From his premises of professional and direct popular responsibility, Friedrich arrives at the conclusion that "instead of subserviency to *arbitrary will* we require responsiveness to commonly felt needs and wants."[27] For this sacrilege to the official theory of parliamentary government, Friedrich has been severely taken to task by Herman Finer, (at least, then) an English majoritarian who insisted upon official subservience to the public will, as expressed by the legislature and political parties:

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[23] Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,' in Friedrich and Mason (ed.), *Public Policy I* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 12.

[24] *Idem.*

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17. Italics supplied.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 20. Italics supplied.

> Who would define the public interest—who could define it? Only the public, I believe, or its deputies. . . . I shall again insist upon the subservience [of the permanent civil service] for I still am of the belief with Rousseau that the people can be unwise but cannot be wrong.[28]

Finer's rigid monotheistic conception of the public will and public interest places him, at least for purposes of our present frame of reference, among the Administrative Rationalists, where, indeed, all absolute majoritarians repose.[29]

The natural law foundation of the position of the Administrative Platonists is most clearly evident in the writing of Nathan Grundstein, whose essay on this subject originally was prepared (like Redford's) for delivery at an A.P.S.A. convention. Grundstein's *bête noire* is Appleby, to whom he consistently refers as "contemporary administrative theory," and whose book had just been published at the time. For Appleby's thesis that "the path to the fullest realization of the public interest is in a union of politics and administration," Grundstein would substitute their divorce, leaving the administrator to find his criteria for decision in "civilization ideals" and to rely upon the still, small voice of conscience for his accountability to society:

> Administration has the problem of protecting its craft, which centers on the creation and operation of an effective hierarchy and the enlightened application of science to social problems, from the perversions of politics (both the politics of party and the politics of group interests). . . .
>
> In the quest of administrative theory for an alliance with a disciplined, hierarchically organized, centrally controlled political power—in short, for a political organization with which an administrative organization can do business on terms that will stick—theory jeopardizes the craft of administration by exposing it to an irresistible pressure from without. Its asserted ideals will become meaningless in the face of the unchallengeable authority of the leaders of the disciplined majority party in power, whose handmaid administration must become. The fact is that professional administration needs and wants room for the exercise of its craft, and this requires a core of independence from politics. Essentially, this is the meaningful nub of Goodnow's separation of politics and administration, and modern administration theory cannot get away from it lest the craft of administration be imperiled. . . .
>
> In craft there is a foundation for conscience, and a conscience, as a self-limitation on the exercise of power, is the first step towards a morality for administration. . . . Contemporary administrative theory places administration squarely in the middle of the intense conflicts of material interests in society. It talks of morality, but in reality it sees only

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[28] Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 3, pp. 347, 339 (1941). See also his "Better Government Personnel," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 51, p. 569 (1936).

[29] For further illumination on this issue, consult: Herbert McClosky, "The Fallacy of Absolute Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 11, p. 637 (1949), and Willmoore Kendall, "Prolegomena to any Future Work on Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, p. 694 (1950).

> conflicting group interests, and the search is for some advantage for administration in this situation. . . .
>
> To the extent that administration becomes a craft, it will have to have ideals. To protect its ideals and to further its craft, it must have an area of autonomy from law and from politics. Administration will best serve society when it sticks firmly by its craft and its ideals and by so doing supplies a yardstick by which to measure how far law and politics fall short of civilized social ideals.[30]

For Appleby's "Be good!", Grundstein would substitute: "Be God!"

## III. ADMINISTRATIVE REALISM

For Arthur Fisher Bentley, the public interest and the general welfare were "mind-stuff," appropriately discussed by writers of fiction who spun phantasies, but with no place in the reality which it was the business of the social scientist to explore. As Richard W. Taylor puts it, "The ghosts of 'national interest' and 'general welfare' are unfrocked; these phrases come to have no more authority over inquiry than a divested priest has over the faithful."[31] The essence of Bentley's theory is distilled, in his own words, in the statement that:

> As for political questions under any society in which we are called upon to study them, we shall never find a group interest of the society as a whole. We shall always find that the political interests and activities of any given group—and there are no political phenomena except group phenomena—are directed against other activities of men, who appear in other groups, political or other. The phenomena of political life which we study will always divide the society in which they occur, along lines that are very real, though of varying degrees of definiteness. The society itself is nothing other than the complex of the groups that compose it.[32]

As applied to administrative decision-making, this meant for Bentley that discretion (in the subjective sense of an attribute of the administrator) was an illusion. What was *really* happening was that the field within which the interest groups concerned might maneuver in their attempts to maximize their influence over the administrator was contracted or expanded. The administrator's decision, in actuality, was an expression of the action necessary to bring about a new equilibrium among the groups whose interests were in conflict:

> It is so with every public official in every function. Perhaps he has little discretion and we can easily watch the pressures operating through him. Perhaps he has great discretion, and we have difficulty to keep ourselves from being led astray by his prominence as a technical process. But in either case we must push the analysis down to the groups represented and in either case we shall on the test find that our fullest and richest statement of the law is in terms of the group activity tending to spread itself, with allowance for the differences of technique in the governing organ through which it functions.[33]

The implications of Bentley's views on the public interest were spelled out, much more clearly than Bentley himself had done, by his disciple, David B. Truman. Truman describes the administrator's mediatory role in precise accord with Dean Leys' third category of "discretion as ambiguity":

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[30] Nathan D. Grundstein, "Law and the Morality of Administration," *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 282, 286, 293, 303, 310 (1953).

[31] Richard W. Taylor, "Arthur F. Bentley's Political Science," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, p. 215 (1952).

[32] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Bloomington, Ind., 1949), p. 222. [This book was originally published in 1908.]

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

> The administrator's position in controlling the access of competing interest groups is made the more difficult if the terms of his mandate from the legislature are highly ambiguous. . . . Where compromise in the legislative stage is the alternative to temporary failure and where the imperative to compromise is accepted by some participants as a means of avoiding the open frustration of expectations widely held in the community, the terms of legislative settlement are almost bound to be ambiguous. Such compromises are in the nature of postponement. The administrator is called upon to resolve the difficulties that were too thorny for the legislature to solve, and he must do so in the face of the very forces that were acting in the legislature, though their relative strength may have changed. Note that it is not the ambiguities in the law that make difficult the question of what groups shall have privileged access to an administrator. Almost all legislative declarations are ambiguous in part. It is rather the causes of the ambiguity that make the difference. If the administrator holds out for an interpretation of these controverted ambiguous provisions that is not in itself a compromise, he invites the affected groups either to denounce his 'dictatorial' methods and his 'unscrupulous assumption of powers not granted to him' or to expose his 'sell-out' of the 'public interest.'[34]

Truman's restatement of the Bentlian view of the public interest is that:

> Many . . . assume explicitly or implicitly that there is an interest of the nation as a whole, universally and invariably held and standing apart from and superior to those of the various groups included within it . . . such an assertion flies in the face of all that we know of the behavior of men in a complex society. Were it in fact true, not only the interest group but even the political party should properly be viewed as an abnormality. . . . Assertion of an inclusive 'national' or 'public interest' is an effective device in many . . . situations. . . . In themselves, these claims are part of the data of politics. However, they do not describe any actual or possible political situation within a complex modern nation. In developing a group interpretation of politics, therefore, we do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because one does not exist.[35]

Oddly enough, it is Dean Appleby who, in his second book, has suggested what—taken out of the context of his other writings—appears to be a more mechanistic definition of the public interest than that entertained by the Bentlians. The formula is: Special interests$^n$ = Public interest. In Appleby's own words, administration

> is the eighth political process. It is a popular process in which vast numbers of citizens participate, in which assemblages of citizens comprise power units contending with each other, in which various governmental organizations are themselves functional representatives of special interests of many citizens, and in which these organizations themselves contend mightily with each other in the course of working out a consensus that translates many special interests into some workable approximation of public interest. This process is as essential to the evolvement of governmental action as public debate, and closely akin to it.[36]

Among the problems left unresolved by the Bentlians, however, is that of precisely how and why the bureaucracy may be assumed to fulfill the representative function of articulating the inchoate, unexpressed, and unrealized wants and interests of the public-at-large. In my opinion this is one of the weakest points in the Bentlian theory. Both the master and his followers rely upon "a vague but fervent transcendentalism"[37] in their attempts to infuse "unorganized groups" into the administrative decisional process. Here is an example of this "soul-stuff":

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[34] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (N.Y., 1951), p. 443.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.
[36] Paul Appleby, *Policy and Administration* (University, Alabama, 1949), pp. 43–44.

> The strength of the broad general interests supporting the 'rules of the game' varies, and the claims based upon them change from time to time as do the strength and the claims of other political interest groups. These persistent interests are not invariably dominant, and, although they are widely shared at any given point in time, they are not held universally throughout the society. These notions of fair play are represented largely by unorganized or potential groups; the generality of their acceptance is such that their claims do not require organized expression except when these notions are flagrantly violated or when they are in process of alteration. In a sense one may think of the principal governmental leaders—legislative, executive, and judicial—as the leaders of these unorganized groups. Part of the official's task is the regular representation of these potential groups in the actions of government. If officials fail to do this adequately, alternative leaders in or outside the government may attempt to organize a following and seek adequate expression of the interest either through the established processes or through violence. [Citing Bentley.] wo!
>
> The broad general interests, whether organized or not, must have a measure of access to the determinations of an administrative agency. The survival of an administrative activity is as certainly dependent upon the adjustment of these as of the more narrowly supported interests that confront an agency in organized form. It does not follow that an administrator in making a decision consciously thinks of himself as a guardian of the constitutional understandings of the American people. Depending upon the nature of his position, he may or may not do so. The influence of these largely unorganized interests is normally of a more unconscious character, however. As Paul Appleby has said in describing the preparation of the budget in the closed hearings at the Bureau of the Budget: 'It is not made in a public arena, but the public is somehow well represented. This is one of the most mystifying of governmental phenomena.'[38]

I submit that these references to "mysticism," "phenomena," and Dean Appleby are neither accidental nor an adequate substitute for a theory of interaction of "unorganized groups" stated in operational terms. The theory in its present form is susceptible of neither verification nor disproof, although it is entirely possible that other observers or participants might experience revelations similar to the budget hearing to which the Dean testified. This may be administrative realism, but it leaves the public interest in the form of a spirit, which students of administration may, of course, worship in spirit and in truth. It offers little to the scientists who are left to grub around down here on earth.

The most concrete role that Truman postulated for "potential groups"—that they might fall into line behind a leader of the loyal opposition, or possibly even support a revolution—this generalized notion has been related more specifically to administrative decision-making by Harold Stein. His point is illustrated in many of the C.P.A.C. and I.C.P. public administration case studies. In Stein's hands, this "survival theory" conceives of the public interest as a range of values within which administrative choice can roam: the extent to which the administrator exceeds these limits is an index of the probability that (in an unspecified but potentially menacing way) other forces and factors in the environment will liquidate him. This is something akin to taboo breaking, and the automatic punishment that Nature visits upon those who break her laws. Democracy moves in mysterious ways, its wonders to perform:

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[37] The phrase is borrowed from the late Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in *Douglas* v. *City of Jeannette,* 319 U. S. 157, 179 (1944).

[38] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 448–449.

> The other aspect of survival [i.e., other than tactics]—values—is also basic to the whole concept. For politics involves ethics and benefits and power; it is the resolution of the contending forces in society. In this light we see the administrator as an agent of society making choices that affect the well-being of society. With the increasing scope of government activity, the range of administrative discretion is enormously broadened. Pre-determined answers become increasingly less appropriate, and self-explanatory and self-executing standards more and more elusive. The administrator must rely on his own system of values—his feeling for what is right—his judgment of what to emphasize, or what to play down—his sense of justice and fair play. The fundamental safeguard against an administrator's arbitrary and unethical conduct is the fact that public administration, especially in a democracy, circumscribes the range of values which the administrator can observe. For the making of value judgments by the administrator is part and parcel of the whole system; every act of political response that can be weighed in terms of its significance for survival has value connotations as well. In our society and particularly in our national government, it is doubtful that any administrator can long survive, no matter how adroit a manipulator, if his decisions reflect values that are sharply at variance with the general standards of society or the goals which society seeks.[39]

But let us get back to the reality of pressure groups. Probably the best known study of the relationship between pressure groups and administrative decision-making is that of Pendleton Herring. Herring seems to have developed his hypotheses and frame of reference for this study in ignorance, or at least in independence, of Bentley's work, since he neither cites nor otherwise acknowledges Bentley. Herring's book is based upon a series of case studies of so-called regulatory agencies. His work has the virtue, for present purposes, of evincing intellectual concern with the problem of the administrator confronted with a maelstrom of group pressures and feeling both a legal and an ethical obligation to reconcile them in accordance with the public interest. This is in fairly sharp contradistinction from the bland optimism with which Bentley and Truman contemplate the impact of the group struggle upon public policy. Although he arrives at similar conclusions, Herring at least worries a bit in the process:

> Under democracy the public interest is based not upon the welfare of one class but upon a compounding of many group interests. We assume the possibility of achieving a balance of forces, social and economic. . . .
>
> This increase in administrative discretion, while making possible the more understanding application of rules to concrete situations, nevertheless places a heavy duty on the administrator. The words of the statute delimit his scope, but within the margin of his discretion he must write his interpretation of state purpose. . . . What criteria are to guide him? The *public interest* is the standard that guides the administrator in executing the

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[39] Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development* (N. Y., 1952), pp. xvi–xvii.

> law. This is the verbal symbol designed to introduce unity, order, and objectivity into administration.
>
> This concept is to the bureaucracy what the 'due process' clause is to the judiciary. Its abstract meaning is vague but its application has far-reaching effects. The radio commissioners were to execute the law in the 'public interest, convenience or necessity.' The trade commissioners are to apply the law when they deem such action 'to the interest of the public.' Congress has frequently authorized boards and quasi-judicial commissions to determine the public interest.
>
> Although it is clear that the official must balance the interests of the conflicting groups before him, by what standards is he to weigh their demands? To hold out the *public interest* as a criterion is to offer an imponderable. Its value is psychological and does not extend beyond the significance that each responsible civil servant must find in the phrase for himself. Acting in accordance with this subjective conception and bounded by his statutory competence, the bureaucrat selects from the special interests before him a combination to which he gives official sanction. Thus inescapably in practice the concept of public interest is given substance by its identification with the interests of certain groups. . . . [T]he public interest can be realized only through promoting certain special interests. . . .
>
> The task of government in a democracy, we assume, is the adjustment of warring economic and social forces. The public interest is the standard that supposedly determines the degree to which the government lends its forces to one side or the other. Without this standard for judgment between contenders, the scales would simply be weighted in favor of victory for the strongest.[40]

What "standard of judgment"? By his own repeated testimony, Herring has assumed the role of an oath-helper for Thrasymachus. Waldo is of the same view, noting that Herring's

> evidence strongly supports the 'resultant-of-forces' hypothesis. In practice the 'public interest' is given meaning only by the pulling and hauling of private interests—mitigated occasionally by the personal views of the Good Society held by some regulatory commissioners. Admirable as these analyses are, Herring advances us little in the search for a substantive content for the 'public interest.'[41]

Although several of the pressure groups theorists so far considered have spoken of "balance" and "equilibrium," the first to attempt a concise statement of an equilibrium theory was Avery Leiserson. And implicit in Leiserson's theory is an operational definition of the public interests: an administrator best serves the public interest when his action creates or restores an equilibrium among all of the affected group interests, or if this is not possible, when the disequilibrium following his act is minimized. Quite to the contrary of the "countervailing force" role postulated for bureaucracy by the advocates of administrative engineering, equilibrium theory posits an essentially negative, conservative task:

> Is there any objective test of such a capacity [the facility for judgment in which the administrative expert's policies and decisions are guided by the test of optimum satisfaction on the part of the groups affected by his administrative acts]? Hypothetically, we shall formulate this test as the acceptance of administrative decisions and policies by the group interests affected or concerned by them. . . . In other words, the political formula or agreement, expressed in legislative enactment, is a suspension of overt political conflict between

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[40] E. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (N. Y., 1936), pp. vii, 8, 23–24, 259, 377.

[41] *Op. cit.*, p. 13, and also p. 93.

> group interests—a period in which administrators are given the opportunity to devise policies, under and within the law, which influential parties to the political conflict for the most part accept as a working *modus operandi.* These policies are exposed to public (multigroup) scrutiny and may be said to have become accepted if the affected groups no longer agitate before the legislature to obtain amendments or repeal of the law.[42]

Dean Leys seems to express the same idea when he says that "The problem is to relate an immediate and pressing interest to a mass of other interests in such a way that the immediate interest somehow 'fits into the picture.' "[43] For the administrator who functions as a charismatic leader of the unorganized public, group equilibrium theory would substitute the democratic administrative politician. The latter image seems to be the one which is in closer accord with common experience.

While equilibrium theorists focus upon the dynamic environment confronting the administrator, psychological realism focuses upon the administrator himself, as a discrete human being rather than as a statistical mean. This suggests, as an initial insight, that "legitimacy," from the point of view of the individual, is a subjective rather than an objective phenomenon:

> To the extent that democracy means to an administrator the formal processes of courts, legislatures, and hierarchy, his democratic beliefs make him responsive to these processes *even beyond* their power to hold him formally accountable. To the extent that the administrator has some conception of a popular will, a general interest, or natural rights that goes beyond the formal political processes, his democratic beliefs may actually make him less responsive and more resistive to judicial, legislative, and hierarchical accountability. Each policy that is imposed on the administrator will be interpreted and executed by him in terms of *his* conceptions of legitimacy.[44]

Let us assume that our administrator is honest, intelligent, and courageous. Does he face the same basic problem, irrespective of whether he conceives his role as being that of Simon's rational robot, Fainsod's creative manipulator, or Leiserson's bureaucratic centerboard?

> . . . in a country where democratic values prevail, most persons who are placed in public administrative positions will feel that in their decisions they *ought* to be responsive to democratic values. They may actively seek out such values as bases for their decisions, quite apart from the power of the legislature, the courts, or their hierarchical superiors to enforce particular values upon them. The difficulty is that even if an administrator most sincerely wishes to obey 'the people's will,' he will have a most troublesome time discovering just what that will is; and where he will find it will depend on his own particular notions of democracy—i.e., his own particular values. . . .
>
> Of course, when one looks in a mirror, one sees one's own image. Responsiveness to public interest, so defined, is responsiveness to one's own values and attitudes toward social problems. Nevertheless, this responsiveness provides a major channel through which values that are commonly or broadly held through our society (or those parts of society from which particular groups of administrators are drawn) enter into administrative decision.[45]

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[42] Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation* (Chicago, 1942), p. 14.

[43] Wayne A. R. Leys, *Ethics for Policy Decisions* (N. Y., 1952), p. 68.

[44] Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson, *Public Administration* (N. Y.: Knopf, 1950), pp. 551–552. Italics supplied.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 548–549, 551. The same view is expressed by Pfiffner and Presthus, *Public*

Here, it seems to me, is the first idea we have examined that points to a means of bridging the gap between the inchoate interest of unorganized people and its administrative articulation. There are three steps to the theory: (1) each individual administrator will define the public interest in his decisions in terms of his own value system; (2) the public interest as so defined will include, in each instance and in variable degrees, "positive" policy norms, other environmental pressures, and "internal" pressures which are projections of the administrator's beliefs and attitudes; and (3) to the extent that the bureaucracy is itself a cross-section of society, it necessarily will reflect, in the aggregate, values that are deeply felt and widely shared within a given culture. It has been argued by some, in fact, that the federal civil service—even under present personnel administration policies—when coupled to the political sensitivity of the Presidency, constitutes a "representative bureaucracy" that much more adequately and accurately reflects the interests and values of the American culture than the Congress can or does.[46] It was probably inevitable, however, that even those who might be prepared to agree that the bureaucracy, as a kind of random sample of society, would have to be representative of it, would not be content to rest with this passive state of affairs. Why not try to structure the situation? Would not a "scientific" sample be better than a random one? (The representative character of the federal bureaucracy taken as a whole, for instance, might not be valid for any single agency, or smaller administrative unit.) And if personal values are so important, why not try to condition them?

The "process theorists," as I shall call them, have turned their attention to these problems. Apart from the activities of a few professional guilds, of which the International City Managers' Association is perhaps the best-known example, the most serious and thoughtful attempt to promote codes of ethics as a generally useable and potentially significant administrative technique has come from Phillip Monypenny. As he has emphasized, a code of ethics cannot be relied upon as a device for ensuring the preference of one alternative over another in situations where choice must roam among competing criteria; "Its value," he says, "is in assuring the faithful execution of settled policy."[47] Nevertheless, an examination of his draft code, and in particular that section of it which is titled "THE PUBLIC INTEREST," makes it clear that Monypenny's proposals go considerably beyond the induction of rational choice, in

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*Administration* (N. Y., 1953), p. 530, who say that "his feeling for the public interest is an emotive force, bound up with the administrator's personal code of values, which will often, in turn, reflect the dominant egalitarian values of our society. The public interest, in this sense, is a democratic ideal which exerts a varying degree of influence on official behavior."

[46] Norton E. Long, "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, p. 809 (1952).

[47] Phillip Monypenny, "A Code of Ethics for Public Administration," *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 21, p. 429 (1953). He has also said that a code would be "useful in reducing to systematic statement the highest standards of perception and devotion which are active within an agency and securing their general adoption." "A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 13, p. 187 (1953).

the Simon sense. On this point, Monypenny is in effect defining the minimum of procedural due process which is postulated as the right of all who have a stake in the administrator's decision:

[A PROJECTED STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS]

D

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1. It would be presumptuous of a public servant to follow his own conception of the public interest in opposition to or in deviance from the policy of the agency and of the administration in which he serves. But lacking any other guide in law, regulation, order, or instruction, and required to act, he should follow the public interest as he understands it rather than his personal convenience or any private aim or goal.[48]

Admittedly, there is nothing novel in this exhortation. This is essentially what Cardozo advises judges to do.[49]

2. The primary determination of the public interest for public servants is by the action of his political and hierarchic superiors, acting through the conventional channels, by legislation, and court decisions where applicable. However there will be areas of discretion still, and in the use of these the public servant will be exposed to a relatively small group of persons immediately affected by a proposed action. The public servant must accept their right to speak and even to be consulted, must consider the consequences which they present. But he must remember that there are others unorganized and not directly represented, and as far as he can perceive the consequences to them, he must be their representative also in considering this discretionary action. This will not result in uniformity of action since the frame of reference of the actor will determine his view of the consequences, but it may correct a little the selective effect of direct representation before the agency.

Again, on its face we might dismiss this statement as moralism, except that Monypenny has taken pains to point out that "Conformance to an ethical code is a matter of social relationships rather than of individual morality. It is not," he continues, "a matter of personal conversion."[50] He expects that the code will be enforced directly by group sanctions (such as being cut out of the office grapevine) and indirectly by official sanctions (such as being denied preference for a merit increase in salary). The effect of this would be to enforce conformance to the (characteristically) many group norms respecting the identification of public interest within the area of the group's expertise, even though these attitudes were never reduced to written form, to say nothing of being issued as official regulations. This would happen to some extent anyhow, but a code would help to clarify the fact situations to which the group sanctions should be applied.

3. No problem is ever entrusted completely to a single administrative organ. In acting on any problem the public servant must consider what effect his action will have on the responsibilities of others and if possible consult with them prior to action. His own action must in the end be consonant with his agency's policy, even though it be adverse to policies of other agencies where it is impossible to harmonize them.

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 441

[49] Benjamin N. Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (New Haven. 1921), pp. 66–67, 174–175.

[50] Monypenny, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

> 4. A public servant should be always open to representations from those interested in a situation which is before him if discussion will not prejudice the position of other parties to the proceeding. As far as possible those affected should be informed of pending transactions and time set aside to meet with them so that the public servant is not exposed only to the most aggressive members of his clientele to the exclusion of others. Such meetings between a public servant and those interested in the action should as far as possible take place during ordinary working hours, in the ordinary working quarters which are appropriate, and with ordinary publicity and office records of the event.

These final two paragraphs seem to take us much closer to the concept of "administrative due process" which Norton Long has advocated. The difference appears to be that Monypenny's concern is with the relationship between the individual and the primary group of which he is a part; while Norton Long's published remarks on this point are in much more generalized form, and seem to relate to the rational structuring of expertise, power bases and transmission belts, ambassadors of special interests, *et cetera,* into a kind of administrative UNIVAC which, once properly wired up and plugged in, will turn out responsible decisions on questions of public policy which are fed into the machine:

> The will of the people is always expressed by some of the people. It is process rather than substance. . . . The structuring of organization must be concerned with the reflection of values and their implementation. . . . Adequate organization would require that every major question have an institutional protagonist, the securing of every important piece of factual information be an assigned responsibility, and every important point of view have a spokesman built into the proposal-formulating process.
>
> The nature of the policy to be formulated implies the theoretical, factual, and value premises necessary for its rational and responsible development. The institutional structure can then be considered in terms of personnel possessed of values, drives, and skills so structured as organizationally to simulate a reasoned inquiry . . . organization must be structured for variety of points of view so that significant values in the community are necessarily considered in the formulation of policy proposals.
>
> . . . An organization in its routines and its personnel—their training and values, professional and political—can be so structured as to maximize the likelihood that decisions will be made as a result of full consideration of the relevant facts, hypotheses, and values involved. One might well strive for the acceptance of a 'minimum administrative due process'. . . .[51]

Our experience to date with attempts to build in particular points of view does not appear to have been an unmitigated success. On the one hand, experiments with devices for articulating the voice of the partially organized or unorganized, such as the office of "consumers' counsel" or "public counsel," demonstrate the dilemma of the administrator who is forced to lead from weakness.[52] Norton Long himself has pointed forcefully to the necessity for effective administration to be supported by adequate sources of real power.[53] On the other hand, the building in of some organized interests tends to give those included a preferential advantage over those organized interests that are not given organizational representation; and rarely is it possible to include all groups with a legitimate interest. This is not to say that it is futile even to attempt to rationalize the administrative decision-making process, in particular instances and in specific agencies, toward the goal of greater "administrative due process." But it is necessary to be clear that the model administrative machine that Long has suggested is an "ideal," as Long himself has recognized.

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[51] Norton E. Long, "Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 14, pp. 25, 24, 30, 26 (1954).

[52] See, for instance, Kathryn Smul Arnow [Committee on Public Administration Cases], *The Consumers' Counsel and the National Bituminous Coal Commission, 1937–1938* (C.P.A.C., rev. 1950).

[53] Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 9, p. 260 (1949).

So the process theorists (like other Administrative Realists) define the public interest, not as an essence, but as the resultant of the interaction of complex forces. The process theorists differ significantly from the neo-Bentlians and the psychological realists, however. For the neo-Bentlians, the critical struggle is taking place among forces outside the agency, and the administrator is the pawn for whom the gods (=groups) contend. For the psychological realists, the forces are found in the constellation of values of the administrator, and the critical struggle takes place within his mind. For the process theorists, the agency itself is the battleground, the administrator is a soldier of fortune, and the war games should be so planned that all contenders have a fair (but not necessarily equal) chance to enter the lists.

## IV. CONCLUSION

I think it is by now apparent that American writers in the field of public administration have evolved neither a unified nor a consistent theory to describe how the public interest *is* defined in administrative decision-making. Neither have they constructed theoretical models with the degree of precision and specificity which is necessary if such models are to be used as description of, or as a guide to, the actual behavior of real people. In large measure, this reflects the fact that different writers make varying assumptions about the nature of administrative discretion. Such assumptions predetermine not only the role attributed to the administrator; they also establish the writer's focus upon a field within which (in his view) interaction of the forces affecting decision takes place. These forces, which might well be called the sources of the public interest for any given writer, may be postulated as external to both the agency and the administrator; they may be internal to the agency but external to the administrator; they may be external to the agency but internal to the administrator; or they may be considered to be internal to both the agency and to the administrator.

The question is not which concept of administrative discretion is correct, for they are all correct to the extent that most administrative agencies are responsible for a multiplicity of programs whose accomplishment relies upon a variety of decisional processes and the making of all three types of decisions. The question, rather, is which perspective, or which combination of perspectives, is most likely to prove to be useful in guiding the labors of teachers, researchers, and practitioners in the field of public administration.

The theoretical apparatus of the Administrative Positivists, however elegant it otherwise may be, is limited precisely by the Administrative Rationalists' insistence that a science of administrative behavior cannot be concerned with political choice; as a consequence, they can discuss the decisions of mailmen but not those of budget analysts. The model constructed by the positivists is a sausage machine, into one end of which is poured the public will and out of the other end of which drop neat little segments of the public interest, each wrapped in its own natural casing.

The Administrative Platonists assume an opposite, but equally extreme position. Their theoretical statements about the public interest manifest a deep concern for the inculcation of the "right" values in administrators who will, in turn, play a leading role in the proliferation of these values, acting as the vanguard of the army of democracy. The problem they evoke is an old one—how to keep the tyrants benevolent. And the dilemma which they pose is as old as the master's: if we are to bring our J.M.A.'s out of the cave, and train them as a special ruling class, can this be done within the framework of a democratic educational system? The proper education and selection of administrators, part of whose job will be to keep in touch with the infinite, would seem to be a necessary precondition to the establishment of the Platonic administrative state, but the natural law men have not as yet explicitly stated such propositions. They have described the public interest as a thing of substance, independent of the decisional process and absolute in its terms. They advise the public official to excogitate the true essence of the public interest by means of a mental act of extrasensory perception. This does not necessarily imply communion with the public will, because (it is frequently assumed) no will may yet have been formulated regarding the relevant issues. The public interest becomes whatever the administrator thinks it ought to be.

Unless the Platonists are prepared to advocate the "brain-washing" of candidates for administrative employment to assure the establishment of a single party line among administrators, the practical utility of their theory would seem to be quite limited unless, in the alternative, they can explain how men with differing value orientations are to commune with the infinite and come up with common answers.

The Administrative Realists have defined the problem of the administrator in terms of the political process rather than in terms of administrative efficiency or natural law. The principal difficulty of their theory lies in its generality, for they describe wondrous engines (including the human mind) into which are poured all sorts of miscellaneous ingredients which, after a decent period of agitation, are spewed forth from time to time, each bearing a union label which reads: "Made in the Public Interest in the U.S.A." But their hero is neither the Charlie Chaplin of *Modern Times* nor Prometheus unbound; he is the administrative counterpart of the politician described by Herring in *The Politics of Democracy*. The statements of the administrative due process theorists do suggest the possibility of the construction of more detailed models of the structure of specific decisional processes in particular agencies with identifiable functions to perform. Such models (whether as descriptions of existing agencies, or as blueprints for reorganized or new agencies) would lend themselves, at least in principle, to empirical verification. Moreover, Leiserson has suggested a pragmatic test of the extent to which a specific decision, or set of decisions, have been "Made in the Public Interest."

If we assume that the peaceful adjustment of conflicting interests is not only the consummate art of the politician, but that it is also the fundamental task of all policy processes in a democratic polity, then a model of administrative due process would be empirically verified if, in practice, the decisions actually made resulted in the maximal accommodation of the affected interests, in comparison with the relative capacities of alternative structures for making the same decisions, and measured by a reciprocally minimal recourse to other centers for public policy change (i.e., the legislature, the chief executive, courts, etc.) I would not wish to underrate the great difficulties to be overcome in doing what I have suggested. There would be technical problems in the construction of realistic models, and there would be practical problems in inducing political support for the translation into actuality of any models that went beyond the description of existing agencies and processes. Indeed, as research on the Inter-University Case Program public administration cases has demonstrated, there are difficult problems in inducing sufficient political support to make possible the realistic description of existing or historical processes. But I submit that this is a step forward along the long road that needs to be travelled if we ever are to have a political *science*, and if theory in political science is to have a significant impact upon practice and rise above the level of dilettanteism.

# GERMAN PARTY FINANCE: THE CDU

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The topic of party finance is a subject about which not a word appears in any of the official reports and party conference records issued by the Christian Democratic Union in the course of the decade during which it has become established as West Germany's governing party. Like their colleagues in most middle class parties the world over, the leaders of the CDU apparently believe that silence is golden when it comes to answering Socialist taunts on this score. They are content to let the Socialists remain the only German party to publish reasonably full accounts of their sources of income, which, as the SPD does not fail to point out when attacking the "hidden masters" of the government parties, are predominantly derived from membership dues.[1] The parties of the "Bonn coalition," on the other hand, have been extremely distrustful of both publicity and legislation affecting this sector. In 1952 the first Adenanuer cabinet felt called upon to reject a draft Parties Law prepared by officials in the Interior Ministry, and since then the government has presented no bill to translate the Basic Law's Article 21, which regulates the parties' position, into the required legislation.[2] Thus the constitutional provision that "parties must give public reckoning over the sources of their means" remains in practice a dead letter. Not that the sources of the non-Socialist parties' funds are really kept successfully secret, for every politically informed German knows roughly how the system works. But party officials still believe it best not to acknowledge their sources publicly. "The German Michel just wouldn't understand about those things," as a CDU functionary put it.

Lacking official information, political scientists writing about the German party system have restricted themselves to informed guesses, or to gestures of resignation. Kirchheimer hazards at least some analysis when he writes that for conservative mass parties as a rule, "the insufficient amounts of membership dues income make possible at most the financing of their organization, but do not suffice for campaign purposes."[3] Hielscher, however, in an article discussing reform legislation, remarks not very helpfully that apart from the SPD's "reasonably complete and truthful figures," "the financing of political parties is in general known only to the party treasurer."[4] And von der Heydte, though sketching the outline of the informal finance channels, declares that:

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[1] For a discussion of SPD party finances see Klaus Schuetz, "Die Sozialdemokratie im Nachkriegsdeutschland," in *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik* (Berlin, 1955), pp. 121 ff. Schuetz notes that there also exists a certain "lack of clarity" as to the sources of funds which the SPD executive's statements attribute to "special contributions," "collections," etc.

[2] Former Interior Minister Robert Lehr confirmed to the author that the cabinet at the time rejected further consideration of the Parties law, which it considered too difficult and potentially dangerous. On this point see also Guenther Rabus, "Die Innere Ordnung der politischen Parteien," *Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Tuebingen, 1952), p. 163. On February 21, 1957, an FDP spokesman in the Bundestag expressed "regret that the Parties Law has still not been brought about. We know that drafts of this law have been lying in the Ministry of Interior for six years." The CDU spokesman retorted that the Minister of the Interior had appointed a special commission to prepare material for presentation. This commission was due to make its report in April, 1957.

> The sponsors of political parties are immune from any sort of exact scientific examination. Even though not protected by legal norms, the secrets which surround especially these sources which grant a party material help, are no easier to penetrate than the constitutionally protected secret ballot.[5]

Is the picture however quite so impenetrable? No doubt there are difficulties, but with some effort it is possible to extract reliable information which will give some idea both of the methods and proportions involved. This article seeks therefore to add some light, both through the modest presentation of some known quantities and through a sampling of relationships. The information has been gathered mainly from the archives of a half-dozen CDU Land parties, within the framework of a larger study of the CDU as a whole. It is utilized so as to attempt to show how the various levels of the party organization finance themselves, what their means of finance are, and to determine in some measure their reliance on each other, as well as their dependence on, and attitudes toward, financing from non-party sources.

## I. ORGANIZATION AND INCOME SOURCES

First, what kind of an organization does a party like the CDU have to maintain, and what magnitude of funds are required for this purpose? Since the CDU is federally organized the bulk of its organizational strength rests with the Land parties, which usually, but not in all cases, correspond with present Land boundaries.[6] The Federal office in Bonn really began to function only in 1952, and still has only limited control over the organization. Its staff of all sorts, including those of its various publications, numbers about 100. The two largest Land organizations, those of Rhineland and Westphalia employ about the same number each within their respective territories. The other thirteen Land parties account for probably about another 200 paid workers between them, making a total of something in the neighbourhood of 500 party employees on all levels of the party organization. Outside of Bonn the bulk of the organization is concentrated on the Kreis or county level. A well-organized party like Rhineland's usually has three-quarters of its 40 counties looked after by full-time party agents, but the weaker Land parties are much less adequately staffed. Thus Hessen has only twelve permanent county agents to look after 48 counties, plus a total staff of thirteen at its Land headquarters in Frankfurt. Small Land parties, like those of Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, may employ as few as six full-time workers on all levels.

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[3] Otto Kirchheimer, "Parteistruktur und Massendemokratie in Europa," *Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts*, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Tuebingen, 1953), p. 319.

[4] Erwin Hielscher, "Die Finanzierung des politischen Parteien," *Politische Studien*, August 1955 (Munich), p. 6.

[5] Friedrich August von der Heydte and Karl Sacherl, *Soziologie der deutschen Parteien* (Munich, 1955), p. 166.

[6] So there are sixteen CDU Land parties even though (including the Saar and West Berlin but excluding Bavaria) the CDU is organized in only ten Laender. As a rule the provincial parties founded before the official creation of the new Laender maintained their independent status. Thus Land Northrhine-Westphalia has two separate CDU Land parties, one for Westphalia and one for Rhineland. Similarly Lower Saxony has three CDU Land parties, one each for Hannover, Brunswick and Oldenburg. Wuerttemberg-Baden, finally, has four CDU Land parties, one each for South-Baden, North-Baden, North-Wuerttemberg and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern.

Thus the financing of even a modest office is by no means an easy matter for many CDU Kreis parties. Although the CDU is composed of 387 such county parties (not including the Bavarian CSU organization which is not covered in this survey), the staff of party agents who can reasonably be classified as permanent and full-time almost surely does not exceed 200; most of the others do with a part-time worker or share an office and agent with a neighboring Kreis. The immediate difficulty is that most county parties could not operate economically even under optimum conditions; they simply do not have enough dues-paying members to support a party office. If the party's approximately 200,000 members[7] were evenly distributed there would be an average of only some 500 members per Kreis. But many county parties are smaller than that, dues collection is difficult and the goal of DM 1 per member per month is rarely achieved. Of the 853 members enrolled in Karlsruhe in July, 1952, some 392 paid dues of DM 1 apiece, 174 paid only 50 pfennig and 287 paid nothing at all. The resulting income barely covered the agent's salary. But as membership and dues income go, Karlsruhe is considerably above average. Many rural counties have as few as thirty or forty members. Even in the well-organized Rhineland the rural Catholic counties did not match their reliable vote contributions with solid coin. There the 280 members in Kreis Erkelenz, for instance, came up with a monthly average of barely DM 100 in the course of 1954, while the 1,200 members in the predominantly Protestant Oberbergischer Kreis raised an average monthly sum of only DM 75. The urban membership is more easily reachable. In Aachen-Stadt the average monthly dues income for the first nine months of 1954 was DM 800 from 1,200 members, in Duesseldorf, DM 2,000 from 2,700 members, and in Cologne DM 4,400 from 5,200 members.[8] In Munich, by contrast, the SPD, with 6,000 members, collects DM 8,000 a month.

All in all the dues income in Rhineland comes to an average annual total of about DM 300,000. Twenty per cent of this goes to the Land office, and the remainder does not nearly suffice to maintain the county offices. The annual cost of these vary from DM 10,000 for a small office to DM 50,000 for the large urban ones. These figures do not include special campaign expenditures. Salaries for county agents in the Rhineland vary from DM 500 to DM 1,000 a month, and are thus considerably above the average elsewhere. Then there are rent, telephone bills, car maintenance, printing and all the other incidentals to be paid for. Where does the rest of the money come from?

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[7] Dr. Bruno Heck, the CDU's Federal Agent, made the first public announcement of the Federal party's membership figures at the 1956 party convention at Stuttgart. In contrast to considerably higher estimates previously accepted by German political scientists, Heck said that CDU membership in April, 1954, had been 215,000 and that it had then risen to 245,000 by January, 1956. For an examination of the CDU's membership structure see the writer's article in a forthcoming issue of the *Revue Française de Science Politique*.

[8] Cited from "Bericht des Landesgeschaeftsfuehrers der CDU des Rheinlandes ueber das 3. Quartel 1954," mimeographed, Archive CDU Rhineland, Cologne.

A large secondary source is of course contributions to the Kreis parties from members and non-members. During the first three months of 1954 these amounted to DM 56,000 for the CDU Rhineland, nearly three quarters as much as the dues income of DM 78,000. In the next two three-month periods they increased to DM 160,000 per quarter, but these funds were largely used up in the campaign of that year and provided relatively little reserve for future operations. They were largely made up of smaller donations. The large donors give directly to the Land party, or, through business channels, to the Sponsors' associations, of which more presently. Thus for the Kreis parties, contributions go only part way toward bridging the gap between the income from membership dues and the expenditure necessary for the maintenance of party organization.

Under these circumstances the Kreis parties usually apply for relief to their elected representatives. German parliamentarians are paid fairly well, and it is generally expected that they should make sizable contributions to their parties. The well-to-do ones often do so in generous fashion. Thus in 1951 Professor Edouard Wahl, the law professor serving Heidelberg in the Bundestag, was subsidizing his CDU Kreis party treasury to the tune of DM 200 a month (Bundestag deputies, with a base salary of DM 600 a month, generally earn from DM 1,000 a month up, depending on their attendance at plenary and committee sessions). Other parliamentarians are less accommodating, and there is constant dispute over what their contribution rates should be. In 1951 the Conference of CDU Land Agents regretted "the lack of uniform participation by the elected representatives in the financing of the party." They proposed that the Federal party should collect from all Bundestag deputies a straight 10% of their salaries, and wanted the leadership to "recommend" that elected representatives on the lower levels do likewise.[9] Nothing came of the proposals however. At the moment only one Land party, Westphalia, which runs its organization centrally and is the direct employer of the county agents, collects a standard amount from all its elected representatives (Mandatstraeger).

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[9] Cited from "Ergebniss der Konferenz der Landesgeschaeftsfuehrer vom 17.1. 1951 in Koenigswinter," mimeographed, Archive Federal CDU, Bonn. More forceful methods were employed in a Schleswig-Holstein Kreis, whose practices were recommended for adaptation in "Deutscher Wahlblock Rundschreiben Nr. 11, 2 Juni 1950," Archive CDU Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel: "It was made clear to the Buergermeisters and Landraete in a friendly fashion that they had been elected to these positions as the trusted representatives of their party, and that they had a special duty to fulfill in the present difficult situation. Those who did not want to recognize this were informed that a negative position on their part might have unhappy consequences."

Its Bundestag deputies pay DM 100 a month and its Landtag deputies (whose salaries may average about DM 600 a month), pay DM 50 directly to the party. In addition, and here a small element of state subsidy enters into the scene, varying amounts of money which the Land government pays to the CDU Landtag group (Fraktion) are on occasion handed on to the Land party for campaign purposes. The principle of state subsidy of political parties, which has been advocated within the CDU by certain groups from Northrhine-Westphalia and by trade union representatives, has however failed of positive acceptance.[10]

The three main sources of income mentioned above however, still do not suffice to maintain the local party organization, in the community and the Kreis. Since each Land handles its own finances no aggregate figures are available, but it is possible to make some judicious guesses. The total receipts of CDU membership dues have been estimated by von der Heydte at "not quite DM 1 million annually",[11] a figure which seems reasonable in view of the fact that the Rhineland CDU, with about one-quarter of total membership, collects about DM 300,000 annually. Except for Rhineland and Westphalia, the Land parties do not make even a symbolic gesture of trying to claim the share of the dues which the statutes entitle them to, so that practically all the dues income remains on the local and county level. Judging by the relationship in Rhineland, regular (*i.e.* non-campaign) contributions to the Kreis level, together with the "dues" of elected representatives and other incidental income, may be gauged as approaching another million. The total annual income of all CDU county parties, available for organization, is thus very probably somewhere in the neighbourhood of DM 2 million.

Their expenditures are however considerably higher than that. The minimum cost of running a Kreis office has been officially declared to be DM 10,000 a year[12] but it is more difficult to set an average or even to say for sure how many of the CDU Kreis agents really work full-time. At any rate it is evident that a minimum of 150 full-time county offices, and another 100–150 part-time ones must cost at least DM 3–4 million to maintain on an efficient basis. This means that fairly considerable amounts of money must flow down to the Kreis level from above; and they do. Even Rhineland has to finance its relatively well-off Kreis parties at a non-election year net rate (*i.e.*, after paying back in redistributed form its share of their party dues) of about DM 150,000 a year. At election time the Kreis parties are often in yet a better position to demand support. Thus the Husum Kreis party wrote to the Schleswig-Holstein Land office in June, 1950, protesting that its subsidy was to be reduced from DM 3,000 to DM 1,000. "This situation," it noted, "can only lead to the Kreis campaign office closing down all work one week before election day."[13]

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[10] The principle of state subsidy of political parties was endorsed by the 1955 convention of the "Sozialausschuesse" representing the Christian Democratic trade unionists, and also in an article in the right-wing Catholic *Rheinischer Merkur* (Cologne, 22 April 1955). Among its many critics have been the jurists and political scientists on the Electoral Law Commission, whose report noted that the idea was "difficult to reconcile with the political function of parties in the state." *Grundlagen eines deutschen Wahlrechts: Bericht des vom Bundesministerium des Innern eingesetzten Wahlrechtskommission* (Bonn, 1955), p. 72.

[11] Von der Heydte, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[12] In his post-1953 election report, Federal Agent Heck noted that the personnel and material costs of Kreis agents offices would have to be budgeted at a very minimum of DM 800 per month, "a financing which will generally not be possible from membership dues." He also stressed that the hitherto widely prevailing Kreis agents' salaries of DM 400 monthly did not suffice to attract "qualified personnel." See "Die Bundestagswahlen vom 6. September 1953," mimeographed, December, 1953, Archive Federal CDU, Bonn.

## II. PARTY FINANCE: THE EARLY YEARS

Where then do the Land parties get their money? Their sources, as well as their intra-party function, have considerably altered in the course of the years. Hardly a single CDU Land party has escaped at least one serious financial crisis in the years after the currency reform. In the inflation before the summer of 1948, party finance was almost child's play. In 1946 dues and contributions income of the Rhineland Kreis parties totalled over 1 million Reichmark, or better than double the later Deutschmark totals. In addition, Dr. Robert Pferdmenges had no difficulty in raising the funds necessary to set the Land party there on its feet, and even a weaker Land party like Hessen easily raised RM 270,000 in 1947 to maintain a staff of thirty at its Frankfurt office. Then, as money regained its value after the currency reform, the parties found it more than disproportionately harder to get. In the first month of hard money the total income of the CDU Hesse was DM 356. On July 17, 1948, the Hessen executive met in emergency session to hear its chairman, Dr. Werner Hilpert, demand a drastic reorganization and a tapping of all possible resources to keep the reduced and more efficient organization going. For the long term he proposed an attempt to triple membership to the point where dues would come close to supporting the party. "In regard to membership," he said, "we must rise to at least 60,000. Then we will remain independent of industry unions and farmers' associations. If we achieve this membership basis we are saved. If we don't get it, nothing will save us." He also hoped to build up the party's monthly press income so as to cover half the expenses of the central office. For the short term he proposed an emergency tax of 60 pfennig per member, and he himself undertook a special fund approach "to people who stand close to the CDU and were put in jobs by it." "I signed all the letters personally" he told his colleagues. "The results will be in in three weeks' time."[14]

Four weeks later, on August 14, 1948, the Hessen Land executive met to hear the outcome of the short-term effort. The emergency tax, estimated to bring in an optimum DM 12,000, had produced DM 50 in all. Hilpert's personal letters had brought promises of DM 600, and DM 370 cash. His long-term program was to prove no more auspicious. By 1954 the CDU Hessen periodical had ceased publication after varying periods of issuance, most of them in the red.

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[13] Letter Kreis Husum to Land Office, 26 June 1950, Archive CDU Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel, Folio D V.

[14] Cited from "Protokolle der Landesleitung," meetings of 17 July and 14 August 1948, Archive CDU Hessen, Frankfurt, Folio "Landesleitung II."

The membership, after an initial decline from the 1948 figure of 21,000, later levelled out at something under 14,000.

Many of the other CDU Land organizations were, and continued to be, in similar if not worse straits. The tide-over loans, made by the Land governments to parties and other institutions to help them adjust in the immediate post-currency reform period, were often never paid back. The North Baden organization had to ask for repeated deferrals on its debt of DM 9,000, until finally the Landtag finance committee in Stuttgart agreed to write off all debts outstanding from all the parties. North Baden's adventures in journalism were even more catastrophic than Hessen's. By 1951 the journal had collapsed and Dr. Gurk, the Party chairman and municipal treasurer of Karlsruhe, was engaged in a bitter defensive action against the secretary of the Journalists' association, who threatened to bring him to court if he did not immediately pay up the fees due to one of the association's members for one-and-a-half years' writings. After receiving a particularly threatening ultimatum he promised payment on the installment plan, and expostulated that, after all, his official position, if not the credit rating of the party, gave some guarantee that the journalist's claims would be met.

Though it soon became clear that most of the party journals could never hope to become profitable ventures on their circulation, some Land headquarters continued to believe that advertisements, even in not very widely read journals, would still be the most efficacious way of getting contributions from businessmen. Thus Lower Saxony's CDU *Rundschreiben* urged party functionaries to press the following considerations: "Since it cannot be expected that factory-owners, directors and merchants, etc. will pay contributions for the party out of their own pockets, a way must be found to make these payments deductible from taxes. A contribution to the CDU cannot be deducted from taxes . . . the means of advertisement (in the party journal) is the only presently existing possibility for booking contributions to the party as expenses."[15] But even this astute analysis could make only limited headway in a period of capital shortage and economic readjustment. Three months later, in March 1950, the Lower Saxony CDU paper had to reduce its advertisement rates by 40 percent.

Nevertheless, in a time of decreasing party membership when independent support was scarce, the party's financial hopes clearly lay in those elements of its backing who were not only most happy about its sponsorship of the Erhard "free economy" policy, but to whom this very policy gave control over most of what liquid capital there was. Carl Schroeter, the brash chairman of the Schleswig-Holstein CDU, told his colleagues at an inter-zonal meeting in January, 1949, that the sources were there all right, and that all that was needed was the proper technique for tapping them. "The money is lying in the streets," he declared. "All one needs to do is pick it up. We in Schleswig-Holstein are well-financed. We are the only ones to have met our obligations to the zonal bureau. . . . And I say that as the representative of the Land which has the least industry of all." How did Schroeter accomplish this feat? "You must move into the business organizations. In Schleswig-Holstein, whether it is the Chamber of Commerce, the Artisans' Chamber, the farmers' organizations or the house- and land-owners' association, there are enrolled members of the CDU sitting in decisive places."[16]

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[15] "Niedersachsen CDU Rundschreiben," 5 December 1949, mimeographed, Archive CDU Lower Saxony, Hannover.

There were, however, two good reasons why the simple means of political financing so employed in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, and in cruder and much more questionable ways there and elsewhere, could not be expected to provide a permanent foundation for the party exchequer. One was that the Land finance ministries, even those that were in CDU hands, could not be expected to remain forever blind to the dubious tax-deduction practices so widely engaged in. In May, 1949, Dr. Walter Strauss, a high official in the Economic Council and later Staatssekretaer in the Federal Justice Ministry, told his CDU colleagues that "the finance question is complicated through the problem of writing off." Industry representatives had told him that there was a definite readiness to give for the coming Federal election campaign, but that many "small and medium-sized enterprises did not think they could give anything because they could not, under the present tax laws, see any way of writing donations off in a correct way."[17] Five months later, after the election campaign, Dr. Georg Strickrodt, the CDU Finance Minister of Lower Saxony, returned to the same subject in another meeting of CDU leaders from the British zone. "I can tell you," he said, "that I, as Finance Minister, have had to declare myself totally unavailable for all party finance questions, because I just did not want to know about the tax side of it. This must be changed. There are definitely ways of bringing a certain amount of order into these matters."[18] Yet how could order be brought about so long as the industrialists and businessmen insisted on declaring their party contributions as tax exempt, and so long as the parties were not legally recognized as eleemosynary institutions?

## III. SPONSORS' ASSOCIATIONS

The second reason was that the businessmen, for their part, were unhappy that Herr Schroeter and his colleagues should be able to tap their funds as easily as all that. Until then the better organized parties were at an advantage in seeking contributions from the various economic interest groups, which were only just again building up their industry councils and trade associations. Why should not the business groups band together so as to present a united front to all parties, thus increasing their own bargaining powers and forcing the parties to account more closely both for their expenditures and for the purposes for which funds were used? Furthermore, if political campaign funds were raised directly through the trade associations, businessmen would not have to strain their consciences in listing them for tax write-offs, for such association levies are traditionally recognized as normal business expenditures.

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[16] Cited from "Protokoll der Landesvorsitzenden Konferenz," meeting of January 8–9, 1949, Archive Federal CDU, Bonn, Folio "Landesvorsitzenden."

[17] Cited from "Protokoll des Wahlrechts und Propaganda Ausschusses," meeting of 19 May 1949 (private), Archive Doerpinghaus, Roisdorf/Rhein, Folio 24.

[18] Cited from "Protokoll des CDU Britisch-Zonen Ausschusses," meeting of 14 October, 1949, Archive Doerpinghaus, Folio 22.

The conclusion that the business groups' political spending should be channeled through special agencies whose apparently independent status made them less easily vulnerable as distributors of tax-exempt largesse, led, in the course of 1952, to the establishment of the so-called Sponsors' associations (Foerdererverbaende), which have since played an ever increasing role in the finance plans of the middle-class parties. Even before their founding, business and industrial associations had developed certain schemes for raising central election funds for the pro-Erhard parties,[19] and the means by which these operations were carried out have been plentifully documented in a campaign booklet issued by the SPD in the course of the 1953 elections.[20] But the schemes were not concerted until 1952, when Sponsors' associations were set up in all the West German Laender, ostensibly as independent organizations furthering the public weal, really as offices staffed by the various Land affiliates of the Federation of German Industry which were given the task of distributing the "political levies" collected in one way or another by the various trade and industrial associations.

One of the primary demands of the Sponsors' representatives, insisted on from the beginning, was that their money should not be used to finance election campaigns in which the bourgeois parties fought one another. In areas where such parties competed, influence was brought to bear to encourage the tightest possible coalition agreements among CDU, FDP and DP, if possible with a pre-campaign sharing of the constituencies. This demand, which happened to coincide to a certain extent with what were then the aims of Chancellor Adenauer and his political lieutenants in Bonn, was expressed by a Federation of German Industry newsletter as early as August, 1952: "Politics is expensive, democracies are the most expensive. Parties need money. A shade more church-bound or more liberal position is not decisive for the solution of the central question of our century. The differences between the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the DP must be evened out within one parliamentary group (Fraktion), but not in the campaign."[21] This demand that the CDU and FDP forget their cultural and Weltanschauung differences to join forces for an impassioned campaign on behalf of the free economy ran into considerable difficulties in South Germany, where Catholics and Liberals have deep-seated historical differences. But even in north Germany, where the position of many CDU Protestants differs from that of FDP "Kulturprotestanten" by only shades of emphasis, the formula of party alliance or possibly even amalgamation did not prove easy of realization.

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[19] Thus the Rhineland Land agent, Dr. Schreiber, reported to the Land Executive in June, 1950: "Against the will of all Kreis parties and of the Land executive there have again been business collections for the parties' election funds. Connected with this collection drive of the business community (Wirtschaft), was the attempt to influence both the party's policy and its selection of candidates. There is also the fact that Business puts at our disposal only a fraction of the money collected." Later, in March, 1951, he reported that "There is a tendency within the Federation of German Industry to have a large political fund constantly at its disposal, but to make available to the parties, especially the CDU, only the means needed to meet current expenses." Cited from "Bericht des Landesgeschaeftsfuehrers der CDU Rheinland," reports of June, 1950 and March, 1951, mimeographed, Archive CDU Rhineland, Cologne.

[20] See *Unternehmermillionen kaufen politische Macht! Finanzierung und Korrumpierung der Regierungsparteien durch die Managerschicht der Wirtschaft*, Herausgegeben vom Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Bonn, 1953). The material reprinted in this booklet is generally recognized to be genuine, though its presentation is naturally tailored to propagandistic purposes. See von der Heydte, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

## IV. SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN: A CASE HISTORY

In Schleswig-Holstein, where the anti-SPD impetus had drawn the parties together to the point where, after the 1950 Land election campaign, they had almost fused themselves into a unified right-wing party, the injunction of the Sponsors' associations should have been more acceptable than elsewhere. The CDU Minister-President, Friedrich Wilhelm Luebke, who had succeeded Schroeter as Land chairman, presided over a broad anti-SPD coalition, and, hardy ex-sea captain that he was, had seen his government through two troubled years despite scandals, refugee split-offs and neo-Nazi agitation. He was therefore in a relatively good position to talk terms with the Sponsors' association leaders, and by the beginning of November, 1952, he and his aides had reached an understanding through which the Land Sponsors agreed to fulfill the CDU's request for a minimum of DM 150,000 for the campaign in return for a CDU promise to concentrate party efforts strictly against the SPD. The Minister-President soon received an inkling of the efficient methods which the Sponsors hoped to apply. The day after their conversation he was asked to give "confirmation in writing" of his previous day's assurances.

The conditions of the agreement were spelled out yet further at a meeting on November 28, 1952, at which, in the presence of Federal CDU Treasurer Ernst Bach, the Land leaders reiterated their promise not to fight the other bourgeois parties. The written agreement also included passages guaranteeing that the Sponsors' funds would be used for campaign and not for organizational purposes, and a vaguely worded clause bearing on the Sponsors' association prerogatives in the naming of party candidates.[22] The Sponsors, in turn, agreed that the CDU, as by far the largest party, should receive two-thirds of all funds raised. Disagreements arose, however, when the ink was hardly dry. On December 10, the CDU Land secretary wrote to the Sponsors' executive secretary to complain that although the agreement had entailed a payment of DM 150,000 over the ten pre-election months, the check received for November had in fact been only for "the usual DM 3,000." The smaller parties were unhappier yet about their modest allocations, but even more chagrined when, in January, seven former DP and FDP Landtag deputies went over to the CDU. These developments caused mutual recriminations between the party leaders, and led the Sponsors' secretary to protest to the CDU that its attacks on theDP violated the spirit of the campaign agreement.

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[21] *Unternehmerbrief*, 7 August 1952.

[22] The exact formulation of this clause: "Die Parteien erklaeren sich bereit einige Ihrer vorgesehenen Spitzenkandidaten dem Verein bekanntzugeben, wobei der Verein das Recht haben soll von diesen Namen Gebrauch zu machen." The extremely guarded phrasing of this sentence indicates the party leaders' attempt not to make any explicit commitments and to maintain the appearance of reserving to themselves final decision on the placement of candidates. Cited from minutes of meeting of 28 November 1952, Folio "1953 Wahl," Archive CDU Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel. Other citations in this section also refer to material in this folder.

The greatest difficulty however arose over the setting up of the candidate lists. Schleswig-Holstein was due to elect twenty-four Bundestag deputies, fourteen by plurality vote in single-member constituencies, ten by proportional representation (after deduction of a party's directly-won seats) from Land-wide party lists. The Sponsors demanded that the three parties divide the fourteen constituencies among their candidates, and tried earnestly to bring about agreement. However, their final compromise proposal, that of an 8–3–2 split with one "independent," proved acceptable to none of the party negotiators. The sponsors had not much better luck with a list of nineteen endorsed candidates which they had presented to the parties in February. By July, as the adoption process was drawing to a close, the CDU had nominated a few of the Sponsor-endorsed candidates, but these were mainly artisans and farmer leaders who had powerful backing in their own right. The best that the CDU would do for the Sponsors' favorite candidate, Dr. Wilhelm Jentzsch, a leader of the industry associations, was to give him seventh place on its Land list. The Sponsors noted "regret that there are so many farmers among the CDU candidates" and toward the end of the bargaining Jentzsch was finally adopted by the FDP for first place on its Land list, becoming in fact the only FDP nominee who was to succeed in getting into the Bundestag from Schleswig-Holstein. As for the CDU, its leaders preferred to rely on the favorable political trade winds and their solid alliance with the farmers and artisans associations. Toward the end of the campaign they all but ruptured relations with the Sponsors. In a report dated August 15, 1953, the CDU Land Secretary declared that "the demands of the Sponsors' association for the adoption of candidates without regard to their previous political position, and the blackmailing way in which these demands were presented have created . . . an impossible situation. . . . We can no longer give in to the Sponsors' association's political demands!"

Fights such as this one also took place in other Laender, although in the more industrialized areas the Sponsors' control of more impressive funds probably increased their general bargaining power. In Hessen, the Sponsors' association actually dissolved itself temporarily as an aftermath of the bitter feeling engendered among the adherents of the various parties. In the Rhineland no such untoward breakup took place. But a year later, after the 1954 Landtag elections, the Rhineland agent, Dr. Schreiber, reviewed the relationship with something short of enthusiasm: "Before the founding of the Sponsors' associations we in the Rhineland always managed to finance ourselves adequately and in good time. For the Bundestag elections the Sponsors' associations did not disappoint us in providing assistance on the basis of arrangements which were acceptable to us. This time, however [in 1954], whether because of, or despite, the Sponsors' associations, the election funds were neither adequate nor available at the necessary time. If in future the Sponsors' associations continue to fail to meet their commitments at the times arranged, we on our part can not hold to our promise to forego holding our own collections."[23]

## V. FINANCE ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL

With the solid establishment of the Sponsors' associations after 1952–3, the CDU organizations on both the Land and Federal level became increasingly dependent on outside support even during non-campaign years. Since the Land parties now had almost no independent sources of income, they became dependent on the Sponsors and the Federal party in order to raise the DM 2–3 million needed annually in order to finance the operations of their own Land offices and to subsidize their weaker Kreise. The Federal party in turn had to meet increased financial responsibilities. Originally the 1950 Federal party statutes had provided that the Federal party organization was to be financed through contributions by the Land parties. In practice this provision had always been a dead letter (it was dropped in 1956), and the Federal party leaders found that they had to raise not only the money needed to meet the DM 1 million annual budget of the Federal office, but also funds with which to sustain the lower echelons of the party organization in the Laender. Here again a good part of the bill was met directly by the Sponsors' associations, who normally pay about DM 2–3 million to the Land and Federal organizations. But this still left a gap of several millions in the over-all party budget.

To satisfy its financial requirements the party thus has had to retain an uncertain status in the publishing business. By issuing newsletters and magazines to which businessmen could subscribe and give advertising contracts, it provided a relatively painless way for its supporters to give direct funds over and above their contributions to the Sponsor groups. These publications include a monthly CDU magazine, newsletters for which artisans and small businessmen pay relatively modest subscription prices, and, most important, a weekly Economic Review (*Wirtschaftsbild*) which sells at the relatively high subscription price of DM 50 per month. The proceeds from the sales of these publications are split up between the Federal party, which is the publisher, and the Land parties, which act as subscription and advertising agents. The weaker Land parties get indirect Federal subsidies by being granted especially favorable commission terms. As a fund-raising scheme the *Wirtschaftsbild* actually preceded the formation of the Federal CDU, having been originated by an astute secretary of the CDU/CSU Inter-zonal office in Frankfurt in 1949.

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[23] "Bericht des Landesgeschaeftsfuehrers ueber die Landtagswahl vom 27 Juni 1954," mimeographed, Archive CDU Rhineland, Cologne.

After 1950 it was published in Bonn, with the CDU Federal Treasurer, Ernst Bach, and the Federal Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, listed as co-publishers.[24]

The publication soon became popular among large firms which considered it good public relations to order in large quantities for the edification of their staff. At present the service has over 1,000 subscribers who in this way contribute more than DM 1.5 million annually to the party coffers. Among the subscribers is the Volkswagen organization which pays DM 60,000 annually for 100 copies of the news-letter. The Socialists have asked whether it is appropriate for a State-controlled enterprise to support the party in power in this way, and they have also challenged those sections of the tax laws which allow private industry to give tax-deductible contributions both to the Sponsors' associations and to the political parties.

Originally, from 1952 to 1954, the Sponsors' associations achieved their favorable tax status by claiming that they were set up to do public relations work for the free market economy. This made contributions to them tax-deductible under Federal tax laws. The Land finance ministries were not always so easily convinced that contributions to the campaign chest of the bourgeois parties constituted educational work. As a result of further negotiations the Sponsor groups and the Land Finance ministries usually arrived at compromises which allowed the Sponsors to give only up to 50% of their funds directly to the parties. With the more solid majority enjoyed by the coalition parties in the second Bundestag, the party managers were able to find sufficient support to change those provisions of the Federal tax laws which had been making life difficult for both parties and Sponsors. In November, 1954 the Bundestag added contributions for "political purposes" (Staatspolitische Zwecke) to the categories of charitable, educational and professional expenditures which were recognized as deductible for income tax returns. The change was accepted by a vote of 192 to 180, the slim majority being explained by the fact that not only the Socialists, but also large numbers of CDU trade unionists and FDP deputies, voted against the measure.[25] However, with the change enacted, the raising of political money became much easier. Starting in January 1955, gifts (a) directly to established political parties, (b) to parties through "juridical persons," and (c) to politically active groups and associations approved by the Bundesrat, have been deductible for Federal income-tax purposes up to a generous limit.

The change in the tax laws has not, however, led to any marked increase in direct contributions to the party treasuries. CDU officials interviewed at tax-return time in 1956 indicated that very few large-scale donors had requested the donation receipts which would have permitted write-offs. It is rather the Sponsors' associations, who, by adapting their statutes so as to make them conform to the new text of the law, seem to have profited most. Since most business concerns prefer to deal through intermediaries in their relations with the parties, the Sponsors have become yet more firmly entrenched on the German party scene. This development worries many even in the CDU, but, lacking alternative solutions, these groups have had to maintain an uneasy silence.

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[24] A certain amount of unfavorable publicity was cast on CDU finance operations in the summer of 1956 as the result of a court action between a dismissed CDU accountant and the CDU Federal Treasurer. These revelations provided material for, among others, a full-length article in *Der Spiegel*, 5 September 1956.

[25] The controversy over the adoption of the amendment is mirrored only fleetingly in the minutes of the committee and of the plenary session, where the discussion was limited to a single Socialist speech. See *Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen Bundestages*, II Wahlperiode, 16 November 1954, pp. 2683, 2732.

The position of the Socialists is of course less restrained. It is questionable whether the Socialists and the trade unions have really done their utmost to combat the rise of the Sponsor system. It is especially curious, for instance, that although the Codetermination laws (Mitbestimmungsrecht) give the trade unions extensive representation in the management of industry, no known case has arisen of a trade union board member publicly challenging management's decision to contribute to the Sponsors' association. However, with the beginning of the 1957 Bundestag campaign, the Socialists have repeatedly raised the issues of tax deductions for political purposes and of industrial support for the bourgeois parties. In January, 1957, an SPD spokesman in the Bundestag challenged the manner in which the Federal Finance minister encouraged the Volkswagen works, which he controls, to give indirect subsidies to the CDU.[26] Several weeks later the SPD again raised the question of party finances by introducing a bill which aimed at repealing the tax amendment of November, 1954. The Socialist move was obviously intended for election propaganda purposes and added little to the information already known.[27]

## VI. FINANCES IN THE CAMPAIGN

Although the costs of German election campaigns hardly seem exorbitant to American eyes, especially since commercial television has not been an element, the amounts required have been fairly high in terms of limited party resources. A municipal contest like the 1951 mayoralty campaign in Karlsruhe cost the CDU DM 28,000. Raising this sum from inside the party would have required that each local member contribute an average of DM 35 apiece, an altogether unattainable sum. The Schleswig-Holstein Landtag campaign in 1950 cost the CDU DM 250,000, and this sum was also largely raised from the business organizations. In the larger, well organized Land parties the party itself makes a more significant contribution. Thus the Rhineland half of the 1954 North-rhine-Westphalia Landtag campaign cost the CDU DM 700,000, of which the Kreis organizations managed to raise at least DM 300,000, leaving the Land party to raise the remainder from the Sponsors' associations.

The sharply contested Federal elections are proportionately dearer. One element of the CDU's campaign in the 1953 campaign was to plaster many thousands of the Federal Republic's billboards with portraits of Adenauer. Space rental for this item alone amounted to DM 400,000. Then, in the final weeks of the campaign, the party sent out two shipments of fifteen million campaign letters, from Adenauer and Erhard to all households in the country. Postage costs for this project amounted to almost DM 1 million. In view of such large-scale propaganda efforts it seems likely that the total campaign costs of the party itself amounted to something in the neighborhood of DM 10 million (to cite one of the more conservative published estimates). Most of this cost was borne by the Sponsors' associations, which are said to have distributed a total of DM 12 million in the course of the campaign, close to three-quarters of which went to the CDU.[28]

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[26] *Ibid.*, 10 January 1957, pp. 10123 ff.

[27] *Ibid.*, 21 February 1957, pp. 10984 ff.

In addition to supplying funds to the parties through the Land and Federal Sponsor organizations, business firms and organizations also undertook independent public relations campaigns which assisted the government parties indirectly. Most noticeable in this respect was an organization calling itself "Die Waage: Gemeinschaft zur Foerderung des Sozialen Ausgleichs." This group, headed by Fritz Greiss, head of Glanzstoff-Courtaulds, a company largely controlled by British and Dutch capital, raised its funds not through the regular trade and industry association channels, but directly from large firms particularly interested in supporting Erhard's Free Economy program. The Waage's charter set it the task of "acquainting the public with the economic and social problems of the day," and disavowed "aims of a party political nature." Nevertheless, a brochure issued on behalf of the organization after the elections claimed that its campaign had been of considerable assistance to the government parties.[29] The Waage's publicity campaign centered around two amiable stock-characters, Otto and Fritz, who casually informed the German electorate about just what had brought about the "miracle." As part of its program the Waage inserted 8,500 separate newspaper advertisements which appeared in 300 million German newspaper copies in the course of the campaign. In addition it rented 27,000 billboards and ran advertising films in 60 percent of all German movie theatres.[30] The total cost of this campaign has been estimated at DM 5 million.

For the 1957 campaign the Sponsor organizations, the Waage, and the business supporters of the non-Socialist parties will undoubtedly again play a considerable role. This year, however, distribution of political money is more complex, due mainly to the erratic course of the Free Democrats. In 1953 the Sponsors had supported all the Bonn coalition parties with the understanding that their campaign would be directed against the Socialists. Now that the Free Democrats have broken out of the Adenauer coalition, the Sponsors are faced with the prospect of having their funds used to finance a bitter campaign between rival non-Socialist parties. In the altercations between Adenauer and the FDP rebels, the leadership of the Federation of German Industry, which controls Sponsor money on the Federal level, has stood very close to the Chancellor. When the FDP first left the coalition early in 1956, Sponsor funds were cut off from the Federal FDP party as well as from the more openly anti-Adenauer FDP Land parties. The payments were resumed on a limited scale after several months, but the relations between Sponsors and parties continued unsettled. The FDP has pointed out that the Sponsors were organized not to help support a particular party or government, but all groups supporting Erhard's economic policy. It claims in this respect not only to have pushed Erhard's nomination in the Frankfurt Economic Council in 1948 at a time when the CDU was still cool towards him, but also that its withdrawal from the Adenauer coalition has not lessened its fervor for liberal economic principles.

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[28] For a balanced journalistic estimate and description see the article series in the *Westdeutsche Allgemeine*, Essen, 19–24 July 1956.

[29] H. F. J. Kropff, *Die Erste Public Relations Campagne in Deutschland: Erfolgreiches Beispiel der Anwendung von Prinzipien, Methoden und Mitteln der Wirtschaftswerbung zur Ausbreitung nationaler, sozialer und kulturellen Ideen,* (Frankfurt, 1954).

[30] *Die Waage: Ein Bericht ueber die Taetigkeit in den Jahren, 1952–4* (Cologne, 1955).

At the same time the attitude of German industrial leaders towards Erhard's latter-day economic policy has also undergone a change. Thus the Federal Economics Minister's present plans for anti-cartel legislation and the extension of free trade are being most vehemently criticized not by the Socialists, who have gone far toward recognizing liberal economic principles, but by certain trade associations and industrial groups whose views are echoed by the Federation of German Industry. Other sections of industry, however, remain loyal to Erhard's program. This group includes particularly the firms supporting the Waage, many of whom are at least partly controlled by foreign capital. This split in the ranks of industrial leaders is likely to have repercussions on direct and indirect party financing, with one group of backers seeking to focus support for Erhard, while another places more emphasis on the Chancellor and his over-all political aims. Since both Erhard and Adenauer belong to the CDU, the party exchequer can hope to profit from these divergencies for the time being.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

Though a mass party with some 200,000 members, the CDU is unable to finance even its relatively modest party organization through funds raised from within the party itself. Membership dues probably amount to not much more than one-fifth of the money needed for this purpose. Further contributions are solicited by the party from its elected representatives, other individuals, and firms who subscribe to its newsletters. These funds cover probably another two-fifths of the expenses incurred in the maintenance of the party organization. The remainder is provided by Sponsors' associations which raise their funds through the various trade and industry associations. During non-campaign years the CDU's expenditure on all levels of the party organization amounts to about DM 5–7 million, a sum about equal to that raised by the SPD largely from membership dues within its own organization.

Due to the CDU's federal structure, the sources and distribution of the party's political funds vary. Membership dues and small-scale contributions usually stay entirely on the local and Kreis level. Only a few Land parties get a nominal share of the money collected by the local parties, and even this share is paid back to the Kreis level to support weak local parties. The Land parties now have few independent financial sources, and are largely dependent on aid from the Federal party and the Sponsors' Associations. The Federal party has a variety of fund-raising schemes which bring in an income from industry and businessmen, but it too needs money from the Sponsors' associations in order to sustain the party organization. Thus, in contrast to the theory underlying its federal organization, political money in the CDU flows from the national to the local level, and not up from the grass roots.

The relations between the CDU and the Sponsor groups have also not been uniform. In some Laender the CDU has at times ruptured relations with the Sponsors when the latter sought influence disproportionate to their financial contribution. On the whole, however, favorable tax legislation, the improved organization of German business and the reluctance of businessmen to give directly to party treasuries have caused the Sponsor organizations to strengthen their position. Basically the Sponsor organizations have remained firm in their support of Chancellor Adenauer's policies in both domestic and foreign policy, although their enthusiasm for the Minister of Economics, Erhard, has partly waned. Both differences within industry on the question of economic policy and the break-up of the original anti-Socialist Adenauer coalition have put relations between Sponsors and parties in a state of flux which will probably make the working out of a long overdue Parties law politically that much more difficult.

# JUDICIAL REVIEW AND POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA

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In a recent issue of this REVIEW[1] John P. Roche developed an explanation of the motivation behind the exercise of self-restraint by the United States judiciary. He related the scope available for the exercise of judicial power to the working of the American party system, *i.e.*, to the extent to which the Court found itself faced by "cohesive majorities." Almost in passing he drew a comparison between the British and the American position. "No cohesive majority, such as normally exists in Britain," he said, "would permit a politically irresponsible judiciary to usurp decision-making functions, but, for complex social and institutional reasons, there are few issues in the United States on which cohesive majorities exist."[2] The purpose of this essay is to test that thesis, and the concept of cohesive majorities, in the setting of Australian politics and judicial review.

Australia has a party system very different from that of the United States and more closely related in the respects which Mr. Roche probably had in mind—tight discipline, ideological basis—to the British party system. At the same time its system of judicial review operates on a federal system drawn upon lines similar to that of the United States, a system of judicial review which has in recent years shown a degree of vigour and active power in respect of federal legislation not paralleled by the U. S. Supreme Court since the early days of the New Deal. Comparisons are risky because the High Court frames its decisions in terms of strict law and precedent, disavowing any general authority to act on grounds of public policy. It is not commonly regarded as a third arm of government, in a policy-making sense; rather it has sought a role aloof from political exigencies and public opinion.

The Australian High Court has nevertheless wielded its power in the post-war years to invalidate Commonwealth legislation of great political importance: statutes to establish a government monopoly of commercial air transport,[3] to nationalize the commercial banks,[4] and to dissolve the Communist Party.[5] The first two pieces of legislation were enacted under a Labour government and the third under a Liberal-Country Party coalition government. The policies they implied were the subject of much bitter party struggle, and the Court clearly took a most courageous stand on all three issues. How courageous and how different from the American situation may be seen if we dwell for a moment upon the party structure of Australia.[6]

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[1] J. P. Roche, "Judicial Self-Restraint," this REVIEW, Sept. 1955, pp. 762–72.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 771.

[3] Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, 71 C.L.R. 29 (1945).

[4] Bank of N.S.W. v. The Commonwealth, 76 C.L.R. 1 (1948).

[5] Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (1951).

[6] Professor Louise Overacker has summed up the difference between American and Australian parties in this way: "Parties in the United States are extremely soft-shelled

Australian parties share characteristics of both British and American parties, resembling the former in their ideological and class basis, and their tight discipline in the working of a cabinet system of government; and resembling the latter in their federal structure and the consequent "particularism" of state units which can set federal and state organizations at loggerheads. In the Commonwealth Parliament the parties operate in a manner akin to British practice and quite foreign to that of the United States. Cohesive parliamentary majorities do in fact exist, and voting by party is the rule and not the exception. To quote Professor Overacker, "Today's parliamentary battles, especially at the Commonwealth level, are between two closely knit, tightly disciplined armies, and once the party meetings have decided upon their respective positions the outcome is certain."[7]

There is thus an apparent contrast between the active defiance by the Australian High Court of a well-disciplined parliamentary majority, and the United States Supreme Court faced with no really coherent Congressional party majorities. Mr. Roche's "cohesive majorities" do not explain the Australian situation *at a parliamentary level.* However, in Australia we have, to help to explain this difference, the evidence supplied by the results of the Constitution Alteration Referenda, which provide a link between the operation of judicial review and the wishes of that elusive entity "public opinion." For although cohesive *parliamentary* majorities exist, cohesive *electoral* majorities do not.

An Australian has written that "it is safe to assert that the formation and influence of public opinion on the Australian Constitution is one of the most confused, baffling, but intriguing puzzles in the whole range of our politics."[8] Whatever their real meaning in terms of public opinion, the referenda in Australia at least show, first, that some people who are prepared to vote for a particular party ticket in a federal election will desert that party when it suggests an alteration of the Constitution, and second, that whether consciously or not, in doing so these people have upheld the judiciary in its attacks upon the constitutionality of legislation.

To take the first point, it is clear that people who vote Labour at elections will not necessarily accept Labour-sponsored constitutional amendments, and the same is true of the anti-Labour party supporters and proposals submitted by anti-Labour parties. Twelve referenda have been held in Australia in an attempt to alter the Constitution, including a total of 24 separate proposals.[9] Of these 24 proposals over three-quarters sought to alter the balance of power

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mollusks—if, indeed, they have any shell at all. In contrast, Australian parties, and particularly the Australian Labor Party, have developed shells as hard as any mollusks in the political zoo." *The Australian Party System*, p. 1.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

[8] R. S. Parker, "The People and the Constitution," chapter VI in the symposium "Federalism in Australia," Australian Institute of Political Science, 1949, pp. 135–89. Professor Parker presents in an appendix an extremely useful set of tables analysing the results of constitutional referenda.

[9] At a single referendum a number of different questions may be put to the electorate.

in favour of the Commonwealth.[10] Only four were accepted by the electorate, and only one of these overtly[11] increased Commonwealth power—the 1946 social services proposal. With the exception of this one and the Communist Party referendum of 1951 the major demands for increased Commonwealth power have been sought by, and refused to, both Labour and non-Labour governments.[12] More striking still, referenda are usually held on the same day as a Commonwealth general election, and a party may be returned to office by the electorate only to find that its request for increased power in order to carry its program into effect has been simultaneously denied in the referendum.[13]

The reasons for this ambivalence on the part of the Australian electorate are not clear. The complex voting patterns of the referenda have been attributed by Professor Parker to ignorance, apathy, and the effect of transient issues of state politics on referenda, and only on rare occasions to the considered interests of the electors.[14] He concludes that "the intrinsic merits of the constitutional issues, whether from the point of view of State rights or of Commonwealth expediency, seem to play a very small part indeed in the people's attitudes."[15] On the other hand Professor P. H. Partridge argues[16] that voters at referenda whilst not voting on the issue of Commonwealth v. States' rights are voting against the specific policy implied in the request for increased power. Thus the defeat of the 1951 referendum proposal asking for power to deal with the Communist Party implied no position of the electorate on the question of federalism but merely the rejection of a policy. The states had not exercised this power, there was no real element of transfer involved, the power was simply a latent power in the states. A vote against the referendum proposal is not, therefore, a vote for state power, but simply a vote against the policy implied. This argument, though valid for the 1951 referendum, does not fit the facts concerning all referenda. In one glaringly important area no such theory is possible. In several referenda since 1911 proposals have been made for the transfer of comprehensive power over labour conditions to the Commonwealth government, and on each occasion they have been rejected. Now the industrial power is no latent power in the states. They have intricate and important legislation on industrial conditions running parallel to Commonwealth legislation, and the "No" votes on such proposals could hardly be called votes against a policy which in fact is implemented with equal vigour by states and Commonwealth alike. A similar situation exists concerning proposals to give the Commonwealth power to legislate a uniform company law: all states have comprehensive company law.

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[10] Parker, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[11] The successful 1928 referendum on the Financial Agreement certainly strengthened the Commonwealth but it was presented as a technical matter concerning the assumption of State debts.

[12] Parker, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[13] J. B. D. Miller, Australian Government and Politics, p. 134.

[14] Parker, *op. cit.*, p. 166–67.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[16] "The Politics of Federalism," in "Federalism: An Australian Jubilee Study," ed. G. Sawer, p. 186.

It would probably be wrong, therefore, to attribute the apparent conservatism of Australian voters to any single cause. It is, however, on the evidence, difficult to avoid the conclusion that at least some of the referenda results, and particularly those concerning important movements of power, whether latent or active, to the Commonwealth, imply a vote for the *status quo*, not necessarily a vote for federalism, any more than at each election the British people vote for democracy, but a vote for things to remain as they are, in the hands of (relatively inactive) state governments. And the *status quo* is largely what the judiciary has been saying over the years. Indeed a number of referenda have been straightforward requests by the Commonwealth government, backed by its parliamentary majority, inviting the electorate to overturn decisions of the High Court. Thus for example, the 1911 referendum submitted by a Labour government asking for increased power over labour conditions, over trade and commerce, over monopolies, and over corporations generally was an invitation to overturn a string of High Court decisions[17] excluding state railways from the operation of the Commonwealth Arbitration Act,[18] invalidating a Commonwealth attempt to control industrial conditions indirectly through the taxation power,[19] excluding intrastate corporations from the Commonwealth power over corporations and their monopolistic practices,[20] and invalidating the attempt to set up a "common rule" for labour conditions under the Arbitration Act.[21] The referendum was defeated and so have similar proposals been defeated in referenda since that date.[22] The 1951 referendum on the Communist Party was a direct challenge to the decision of the High Court invalidating the attempt to dissolve the Party, and this challenge also failed.

In only one case has the electorate clearly reversed a High Court decision on Commonwealth powers—the social services amendment of 1946 which was prompted by the apparent threat to the Commonwealth social services represented by the invalidation shortly before of the pharmaceutical benefits scheme. The 1937 referendum proposal on marketing is something of a special case. The High Court had upheld,[23] in 1935, Commonwealth legislation purporting to organize the marketing of dried fruits, but on appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the Judicial Committee held[24] that the exercise of this power was invalid in that it conflicted with Sec. 92 of the Constitution. In the ensuing referendum the proposal by a non-labour government to give the Commonwealth the power to organize marketing was decisively defeated, whilst on the same occasion a proposal concerning Commonwealth power over aviation, also the result of a High Court decision, was only narrowly defeated.[25] It might therefore be argued that the electorate on this occasion overruled the High Court in sustaining the decision of the Judicial Committee. It should be emphasized that the relationship between law and politics is reciprocal. The judiciary may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by political factors, but public opinion also will be influenced by the decision of a respected judiciary. At any rate, the Judicial Committee is not a body easily susceptible of influence by Australian public opinion. Certainly in the referendum of 1946 there was an overall majority recorded in favour of increased Commonwealth power over marketing although the proposal failed to carry a majority of States.

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[17] See Sir W. Harrison Moore, "The Constitution and its Working," chapter XVI in the "Cambridge History of the British Empire," vol. VII, part I, p. 477.

[18] Railways Servants' Case, 4 C.L.R. 488 (1906)

[19] Commonwealth v. Barger, 6 C.L.R. 41 (1908).

[20] Huddart Parker v. Moorehead, 8 C.L.R. 330 (1909).

[21] Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow and Co., 11 C.L.R. 311 (1910).

[22] It should be noted that the effects of some of these earlier decisions have been modified by the High Court itself in later judgements.

[23] James v. The Commonwealth, 52 C.L.R. 570 (1935).

[24] James v. The Commonwealth, 55 C.L.R. 1 (1936); (1936) A.C. 578.

It can be said, therefore, that whatever the rights and wrongs of the voting over individual referendum proposals there is a considerable fluidity in electoral and referendum majorities in Australia. Each of the major political parties in Australia, as in the United Kingdom, has a hard core of supporters who vote by party labels whatever the issue. But this hard core is not sufficient to carry an election or a referendum, and in order to do this the support of the floating vote must be obtained. It is clear, for example, that the Labour Party which is officially unificationist gets the support of the floating vote at times at elections, but at referenda the floating vote deserts it when it asks for increased Commonwealth powers. The Labour Party would seem to gain the electoral support of the "petty bourgeoisie," such as small shopkeepers, who, however, when the prospect of nationalization is raised, desert the Party at the referendum.[26] Thus the electorate seems at times to favour the *general approach* of the Labour Party to the problems of government, without endorsing particular points in its program. The electorate in fact gives a "general mandate"[27] to the party of its choice, and nothing more. It is not inconceivable that a part of the electorate is prepared to vote for Labour at the elections only because it knows that the Party would not be able to implement the more extreme portions of its program without a referendum.

The Australian experience suggests, therefore, an important qualification of Mr. Roche's conception of cohesive majorities. There is a clear distinction in Australia between cohesive parliamentary majorities, strictly disciplined and presenting a solid front to the High Court, and non-cohesive electoral majorities, which will coalesce in one way for a general election but will reform in a different way, for whatever reason, when it comes to a Constitution Alteration Referendum. The Court must look beyond the well-ordered ranks of the parliamentary majorities to the shifting sands of Australian public opinion if it reckons on political support for the effective exercise of its judicial function. Certainly it has been extremely successful in this exercise.

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[25] To succeed a referendum proposal must receive an affirmative vote by a majority of the electorate voting and a majority of the electors voting in each of a majority of the States. In 1937 the marketing proposal received an overall vote of only 36% of those voting and had not a single majority in any State, whilst the aviation proposal received 54% of the total votes cast and was only defeated because it received majorities in only 2 of the 6 States. See Parker op. cit., p. 174.

[26] See F. W. Eggleston, "Reflections of an Australian Liberal," p. 50.

[27] "It is fair to say that in Australia few convincing specific mandates are given at elections on the basis of policy points. In effect what is given is a general mandate to a party. . . . " L. F. Crisp, "The Parliamentary Government of Australia," p. 47.

One might suggest, therefore, three different types of institutional structure in these terms:

A. A lack of cohesive legislative majorities, reflecting a lack of cohesive electoral majorities in the country at large—The United States.
B. Cohesive legislative majorities which do not, on certain fundamental questions, reflect equally cohesive electoral majorities—Australia.
C. Cohesive legislative majorities apparently reflecting clear-cut electoral majorities—The United Kingdom.

The difference between the Australian and the British position is particularly interesting. In Britain where no formal distinction is made between fundamental law and day-to-day legislation, the sort of shifting majorities which appear in Australia in a way to suggest that parliamentary opinion is not infrequently out of step with public opinion as expressed in the referenda, cannot easily be shown to have occurred. Yet fundamental changes to British political institutions are not frequently attempted. The effective legal power of the British Parliament, unparalleled in either the United States or Australia, may set in motion *within* the political parties those checks which in the other countries are externally applied through judicial review. The responsibility involved in fundamental change is fairly and squarely settled upon the shoulders of a small group of ministers. Electoral opinion may well be divided in the United Kingdom in much the same way as in Australia with majorities which would desert a party at the next election if it were to embark upon too revolutionary a course; and with responsibility clearly seen and retribution likely, a large body of the members of the House of Commons may restrain the more extreme members of their party. The institutional arrangements in Australia to some degree relieve the Commonwealth Parliament of such onerous political self-restraint and allow members, therefore, to make dramatic and ineffectual moves safe in the knowledge that a democratically irresponsible, though politically wise, judiciary will bear the weight of decision-making.

# THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY: A STUDY OF AN ELITE

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At its national congress, September 15 to 27, 1956, the Chinese Communist Party, among other items of business, elected a new group of leaders officially known as the Eighth Central Committee. For some time to come this group of men and women will have a highly influential role in the affairs of their party and of the Chinese nation. What they say and do may also affect the course of world events.

What kind of people are they? What are their social and educational backgrounds? How long have they been in the Communist movement? By what roads have they been able to reach the summit of their party hierarchy? What kinds of influence can they exert in the various fields of national affairs? To what extent did their election to the central committee represent a "status mobility" within the party? Answers to these and similar questions should illuminate some broader questions: (1) whether the Chinese Communist Party is really led by the working class as the Communists themselves have claimed; (2) what are the typical features of the Chinese Communist leadership; (3) how the characteristics of that leadership have been conditioned by those of Chinese society; and (4) what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist leadership? This paper is addressed to these questions.

Before commencing the study, a word or two must be said about the sources of the biographical data. The Chinese Communists have never published anything on the personal histories of their leaders except Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Tê and a few others. What they have revealed about their relatively lesser known leaders is limited to the posts held by those people since 1949 in the party, government, and mass organizations. For other information, we have necessarily relied here upon publications compiled or written by non-Communists or pro-Communists in Hong Kong and Japan. These are listed in the margin.[1] A comparison of these publications shows no major discrepancies in their information, and it is believed they are generally reliable. However, their information is by no means complete. To supplement them the writer has in some instances also drawn upon data collected fragmentally from other miscellaneous sources. Whenever reliable data on a given subject are not obtainable, a note will be made accordingly in the analysis below.

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[1] (1) Chou-mo Pao-shê, compiler, *Hsin-Chung-kuo Jên-wu Chih* [*Eminent Persons in the New China*] (Hong Kong, 1950); (2) Ta-kung Book Company, compiler, *Jên-min Nien-chien, 1950* [*People's Yearbook, 1950*] (Hong Kong, 1950); (3) Max Perleberg, *Who's Who in Modern China* (Hong Kong, 1954); (4) Ken'ichi Hatano, *Mô Taku-tô Chûgoku no kôsei* [*Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Red Stars*] (Tokyo, 1946); (5) Asahi Shimbun-sha, Tôa-bu, *Chûgoku kyôsan-tô* [*The Chinese Communist Party*] (Tokyo, 1946); and (6) Foreign Ministry of Japan, compiler, *Gendai Chûgoku Chôsen jimmeiroku* [*Who's Who in Modern China and Korea*] (Tokyo, 1953).

## I. A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MEMBERSHIP

Looking at its membership list, the first impression we get is that the size of the newly elected Eighth Central Committee is more than twice as large as that of the Seventh Central Committee elected eleven years earlier by the Seventh National Congress of the party held in Yenan in 1945. The total membership of the Seventh Central Committee was 44. The Eighth Central Committee consists of 97 members, including all the 44 full members and 20 of the 24 alternate members of the Seventh Central Committee,[2] a remarkable showing of continuity in view of the span of turbulent years since the previous election. A total of 33 members of the newly elected Eighth Central Committee had not served as either full or alternate members on the Seventh Central Committee. This big increase in the committee's membership was apparently made for the purpose of giving recognition to some of those who had accumulated greater party seniority and had rendered more meritorious services to the party from 1945 on. The wholesale retention of the full members of the Seventh Central Committee may be regarded, in the first place, as a display of party harmony. This was especially noticeable in the reelection of Li Li-san and Ch'ên Shao-yü, who had been at serious odds with the ruling faction of Mao Tse-tung from 1953 on, and whose memberships on the Seventh Central Committee were, in fact, in suspension when the recent party congress was convened. In the second place, it seems to reflect a trend: once a leader reaches the top of the party hierarchy, he is likely to perpetuate that status unless he commits so-called "anti-party activities," as Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih are alleged to have done in 1954 in their unsuccessful attempt to seek for themselves more power in the party hierarchy.

From the standpoint of the party, this trend has its good and bad features. It means leadership stability, but it also implies an unusual degree of rigid position stratification in a revolutionary movement newly come to power.

Another observation, evident from the same membership list, is the extremely small percentage of female members. Of the 97, only three are women. One of these is Ts'ai Ch'ang. Ts'ai was a full member of the Seventh Central Committee and is concurrently holding, among other posts, the chairmanships of the Department of Women's Affairs of the party and of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. Another woman member of the Eighth Central Committee is Têng Ying-ch'ao. Wife of Premier Chou En-lai, Têng was originally elected in 1945 an alternate member of the Seventh Central Committee and

[2] Of the other four alternate members of the Seventh Central Committee, three were reelected and the fourth is the only one of the whole group who failed to get any central party post this time. The victim is Tsêng Ching-ping, currently serving as chairman of the Fukien Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Since the 73 alternate members of the Eighth Central Committee have only a consultative voice in the party leadership, they will not be included in this study.

became a full member after the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. Prior to her reelection to the Eighth Central Committee, she had been serving on various posts of importance including membership on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The third woman member is Ch'en Shao-min. Like Têng Ying-ch'ao, Ch'ên was also first elected an alternate member of the Seventh Central Committee and later became a full member. Being the President of the All-China Union of Textile Workers and a member of the powerful Secretariat of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Ch'ên is probably the most influential Communist woman in the workers' movement on mainland China.

*Age.* Table I shows that the ages of 43 members of the Eighth Central Committee range between fifty and sixty; that the ages of another 12 members range between sixty-one and eighty, and that the ages of still another 42 members range between forty-four and fifty. A majority (56.6 percent) of the members of the Eighth Central Committee are over fifty years of age.

TABLE I. AGE COMPOSITION OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

| Age Range | No. of Members |
|---|---|
| 44–50 | 42 |
| 51–55 | 23 |
| 56–60 | 20 |
| 61–65 | 6 |
| 66–70 | 3 |
| 74 | 1 |
| 78–80 | 2 |

A closer look at the data reveals that those who are over fifty years of age comprise 33 of the 44 persons who had previously served as full members of the Seventh Central Committee and 22 of the 53 without that experience. Thus, as might be expected, the new members include more persons under fifty, whereas the carry-overs are dominated by an older group. The average age of the total committee membership is 53, within a range from 44 to 80.

Altogether, the data on ages suggest several inferences. (1) Members of the Eighth Central Committee were generally born early enough to be able to play an active part in the Communist movement in China at its early stage, *i.e.*, in the 1920's. (2) Most of the committee are mature enough to have seasoned judgment, yet are not so old as to have lost their vitality and aggressiveness. (3) The party, having been in existence for 30 years and at the helm for 7 years, is no longer an organization in which a young man or woman can rise to a position of top leadership. During the 1920's, by contrast, many men and women below the age of thirty were elected to the successive central committees of the party, and even in 1945 the average age of the Seventh Central Committee was only 46.8.[3]

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[3] Robert C. North, *Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford, California, 1952), p. 52.

*Geographic Origins.* Table II shows the geographic origins of the committee members. The first striking fact here is that, comparatively speaking, the interior regions of China proper are over-represented on the committee, and the coastal regions under-represented. The interior regions, with 55.2 percent of mainland China's total population, contribute 68.9 percent of the committee's membership. The coastal regions, with 35.5 percent of the total population, have only 21.6 percent of the committee's membership. This contrast would not disappear even if we assume that the six members whose birthplaces cannot be identified were all born in the coastal regions; giving them the full benefit of that doubt the coastal regions' share of the committee's total membership would be no more than 27.7 percent—still 7.8 percent short of equal representation. This geographic distribution of the Communist leadership is markedly different from that of the Kuomintang elite, which has drawn its members more extensively from the coastal regions, particularly from the provinces near Hong Kong and Shanghai.[4]

Table II also shows that, among the individual regions, the middle Yangtze basin is the only one with a share of the committee membership definitely larger than its share of the total population. Disregarding the six members whose birthplaces cannot be identified, this region, comprising the provinces of Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupei, Hunan, and Szechwan, still contributes 53.6 percent, a clear-cut majority, of the total membership of the committee, though it has only 31.3 percent of mainland China's total population.

This disparity may be explained in part by the fact that the middle Yangtze basin provided the Communist Party with its principal military and political bases prior to the Long March. In this region the party recuited during those early years the largest number of its political organizers and military commanders.

Hunan, one of the five provinces in this region, is over-represented on the Committee to an even greater extent than the middle Yangtze basin as a whole. With only 7.5 percent of mainland China's total population, the province provides more than one-fourth of the total membership of the central committee. Hunan's unusually disproportionate share must be ascribed to a special reason: it is the home of Mao Tze-tung. Like Chiang Kai-shek, who is responsible for the development of a powerful Chekiang faction in Kuomintang politics, Mao Tze-tung has fostered a strong Hunan faction within the Communist ranks.

The overwhelming hinterland background and the over-representation of the middle Yangtze basin in general and of Hunan province in particular repeat in the newly elected Eighth Central Committee a striking pattern in its predecessor, the Seventh Central Committee.[5]

*Social Class of Family.* The family backgrounds of 81 of the 97 members of the Eighth Central Committee are known to us. Twenty-eight came from landlords' families, 23 from prosperous peasant families, 10 from well-to-do merchants' families, 7 from workers' families, 5 from officials' families, 4 from

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

TABLE II. GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| Region and Province | No. of Members | Percentage of Total Membership | Percentage of Total Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coastal Regions: | | % | % |
| Kwangtung | 4 | 4.1 | 5.9 |
| Fukien | 4 | 4.1 | 2.2 |
| Chekiang | 1 | 1.0 | 3.9 |
| Kiangsu* | 5 | 5.2 | 8.1 |
| Shantung | 3 | 3.1 | 8.3 |
| Hopei* | 4 | 4.1 | 7.1 |
| Sub-total | 21 | 21.6 | 35.5 |
| The Middle Yangtze Basin: | | | |
| Anhwei | 4 | 4.1 | 5.1 |
| Kiangsi | 3 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| Hupei | 9 | 9.3 | 4.9 |
| Hunan | 27 | 27.8 | 7.5 |
| Szechwan | 9 | 9.3 | 11.0 |
| Sub-total | 52 | 53.6 | 31.3 |
| The Southwest Interior | | | |
| Kwangsi | 1 | 1.0 | 3.3 |
| Yunnan | 0 | 0 | 3.0 |
| Kweichow | 0 | 0 | 2.5 |
| Sub-total | 1 | 1.0 | 8.8 |
| The North & Northwest Interior | | | |
| Shansi | 6 | 6.1 | 2.4 |
| Honan | 4 | 4.1 | 7.5 |
| Shensi | 4 | 4.1 | 2.7 |
| Kansu | 0 | 0 | 2.2 |
| Chinghai | 0 | 0 | 0.3 |
| Sub-total | 14 | 14.3 | 15.1 |
| Manchuria | 2 | 2.1 | 8.0 |
| Inner Mongolia | 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Sinkiang | 0 | 0 | 0.8 |
| Tibet | 0 | 0 | 0.2 |
| Unidentified | 6 | 6.1 | — |

* The population of Shanghai is included in that of Kiangsu Province. The population of Hopei Province includes inhabitants living under the jurisdictions of the Provincial Government of Hupei and the Municipal Governments of Peking and Tientsin.

teachers' families, and another 4 from poor peasants' families. This distribution clearly suggests that the present Chinese Communist leadership instead of having a strong proletarian or poor peasant background, has drawn heavily from the upper-middle and middle strata of Chinese society. Robert C. North came to a similar conclusion about the family backgrounds of the Chinese Communist leadership in the past.[6]

*Education.* Table III shows that all but nine of the 79 members of the Committee whose education can be traced received a formal education. Of these 70, no fewer than 39 attended universities and colleges abroad; the remainder received their highest training in Chinese universities, military academies, middle or normal schools.

TABLE III. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| Educational Institution | No. of Members Attended |
|---|---|
| Foreign Universities & Colleges | 39 |
| Chinese Universities | 7 |
| Chinese Military Academies | 7 |
| Chinese Normal Schools | 10 |
| Chinese Middle Schools | 7 |
| No Formal Education | 9 |
| Educational Backgrounds Unknown | 18 |

In sharp contrast to the Kuomintang elite, more of whom were trained in the United States, Japan, and Great Britain, an overwhelming majority of the foreign educated Communist leaders were schooled in the Soviet Union. French training, however, also accounts for an impressive portion of the foreign training among the Communist leaders.[7] Only a sprinkling of them studied in Japan and the United States. None had any study in England. Moreover, the seven who studied in Japan subsequently received further education in France and the Soviet Union, and the two who once attended universities in the United States also went to Russia at later dates.

According to our data, practically all of those who went to Russia for education were sponsored by the Russian and Chinese Communist parties. The major fields of their studies were Communist theory, organizational techniques, and military science.

Most of the 11 persons who studied in France did so immediately after World War I under the worker-student plan. Influenced by Communist propaganda then conducted in France by the Third International, these people, among others, first formed a Young Communist Youth Corps in Paris and then reorganized it as a branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Premier Chou En-lai was one of them. Some of these young Communists later proceeded to Russia from France and underwent intensive training on Communism there before they returned to China.

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

*Occupations Prior to Joining the Party.* As the preceding account suggests, a considerable number of the Eighth Central Committee members joined the party while they were still students. Of the 80 members whose occupations at the time they joined the party can be identified, 50 were attending schools in China or abroad, 11 were in the armed forces, five were government employees, four were school teachers, another four were workers, three were writers, one was a newspaper reporter, another was a university professor, and still another was a seaman. The fact that most of the present Communist leaders joined the party as students seems highly significant. In the first place, it helps to explain why so many of them came from rather comfortable families. During recent decades, students in China were generally most conscious of their country's social stagnation and political chaos. They also faced the bleak prospect of unemployment upon graduation. Roads to officialdom were virtually blocked to those who had no special connections with the men in power, as nepotism and favoritism had replaced the age-old competitive examination system in civil service recruitment. At the same time, modern factories and commercial firms were limited in number, providing career outlets for only a very small portion of the students specializing in technology and commerce. Coupled with disappointment over the repeated failures of those who sought piecemeal reforms, this lack of opportunity made youths in school highly receptive to radical doctrines. It is therefore not surprising that many of them were readily attracted into the Communist ranks and that eventually some of them came into top leadership roles.

TABLE IV. FOREIGN EDUCATION OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| Country | No. of Members |
|---|---|
| Soviet Union | 31 |
| France | 11 |
| Japan | 7 |
| Germany | 2 |
| United States | 2 |

Note: Some persons studied in more than one country.

Equally important is the fact that those committee members who were in an employed status when they joined the party were not contented men either. With a few exceptions, the positions they held at the time of their incursion into revolutionary politics were by no means stable and satisfying. For example, Mao Tse-tung was a poorly paid assistant at the National Peking University Library when he was first impressed by the Communist ideology. At the time of his joining the Communist Party, he was a school teacher in Hunan. Ch'ên

Po-ta, now an alternate member of the Politburo and one of the foremost theoreticians of the party, was serving as a clerk at the headquarters of a Kuomintang army when he took his membership card from the Communist Party. Frustration or inability to establish a successful private career characterized most of the present Communist leaders at the time of their party affiliation.

*Dates of Affiliation with the Party.* In what years did their affiliation with the party take place? Table V shows that, of the 75 committee members whose dates of affiliation can be located, 73 joined prior to 1930. The fragmentary information available on the biographies of another 22 members of the committee strongly suggests that their admissions to the party also took place no later than 1930 and in some cases may have dated back to 1927 or earlier. We may say then that practically all the present leaders of the party were in the party during the first ten years of its existence. The inference follows that there is little or no opportunity for access to top party positions without a long record of activity in the Communist movement. Indeed, the longer one has labored for the party, the better is the opportunity for recognition. This is evidenced by the fact that while those who joined the party during the period 1928–1930 account for less than one-third of the total committee membership, more than two-thirds of the membership joined the party in or before 1927—the year in which the Chinese Communist Party ceased to be a political ally of the Kuomintang and began its activities of military insurrection, which eventually led to its seizure of power in 1949.

TABLE V. DATE OF AFFILIATION WITH THE PARTY

| Year of Affiliation | No. of Members |
|---|---|
| 1921 | 4 |
| 1922 | 10 |
| 1923 | 2 |
| 1924 | 4 |
| 1925 | 12 |
| 1926 | 12 |
| 1927 | 20 |
| 1928 | 3 |
| 1929 | 5 |
| 1930 | 1 |
| 1931–1934 | 2 |
| Probably prior to 1930 | 22 |

The longevity of party membership that apparently is an indispensable qualification for elevation to the ruling body may testify to a member's devotion and loyalty. It may also help to show a member's real ability in coping with diversified and complicated situations. But it may have the effect, too, of discouraging brilliant and ambitious people in the party who have every qualification for leadership except seniority.

The long record of revolutionary activity of the committee members is impressive, however. Seventy of the 97 members played some role under the guidance or inspiration of the Chinese Communist Party during the Northern Expedition in 1926–1927, jointly launched by the Kuomintang and the Communists. Another early experience generally shared by the present Communist leaders was participation in the Long March and in the guerilla warfare prior to the march. Our data show that 82 committee members participated in guerilla warfare in the various Soviet districts during all or part of the period between 1927 and 1935, and that 73 of these subsequently took part in the Long March. Of the remaining nine, who participated in the guerilla warfare prior to the Long March but did not go on the march itself, five were left behind by the party to continue guerilla warfare in the Kiangsi-Fukien-Kwangtung border region, and the other four were already in North Shensi—the destination of the march—when the march started.

The careers of most of the 15 men who neither participated in the early guerilla warfare nor took part in the Long March were also associated with hardship and hazard, and their activities then were by no means less important to the party. For example, seven of these 15 served long terms of imprisonment after being arrested by the Kuomintang regime for their underground activities. Another four did not participate in the early guerilla warfare and the Long March because they were in the Soviet Union during most of the period, either serving as Chinese representatives to the Third International or performing other duties on behalf of the international Communist movement.

*Principal Work in the Party.* What kinds of activities have made up the long party records of the present 97 Communist leaders? What career patterns tend to lead to top authority? An analysis of our data, which are admittedly incomplete on this score, reveals that at least 37 committee members have spent the most part of their party life as senior political commissars in the Communist armies, top agents of the party to exercise political control over the units to which they are attached. Another 27 members have served principally as military commanders. The remainder of the group includes 19 party organizers, eight financial and economic administrators, and six propagandists and educators.

It is quite clear that those who had control over the armed forces and party organizations have had the easiest access to top leadership of the party, a natural consequence of the kind of revolutionary struggles that the party has waged in the past. Since military rebellion and mass manipulation have been the main forms of the struggle, specialists in these arts have had an advantageous position. Throughout Chinese history, as a matter of fact, revolutionary groups which seized power through military rebellion and mass insurrection were always led by specialists in military and organizational affairs. While specialists in persuasion and other activities were not excluded from such groups, their role was usually secondary and they never dominated their groups. For example, the men who helped Emperor Kao in founding the Han Dynasty more than two thousand years ago were mostly militarists and political organizers. The same has been true of the Kuomintang elite, though financiers have also had a substantial rôle there.

*Current Positions.* Positions currently held by members of the Eighth Central Committee are perhaps most indicative of their political influence, and of the extent to which the Communist Party is using interlocking leadership as a device for maintaining its hegemony over the various governmental agencies and mass organizations.

So far as is known, the 97 members now hold a total of 585 official positions in the party, government and mass organizations. As Table VI shows, all but one of them occupy at least one other post each besides committee membership. The only exception is Ch'ên Shao-yü. One member holds as many as 25 posts, and the average is nearly six each for the 97 members. Classifying the posts into seven fields, namely, legislative, executive, military, judicial, party, mass organization, and educational, we find the following distribution: 12 members hold posts in five fields; 25 members hold posts in four fields; 44 members hold posts in three fields; 14 members hold posts in two fields; and two members hold posts in one field.

TABLE VI. DISTRIBUTION OF POSTS CURRENTLY HELD BY THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| No. of Posts | No. of Members |
|---|---|
| 25 | 1 |
| 15 | 1 |
| 14 | 1 |
| 13 | 1 |
| 11 | 2 |
| 10 | 1 |
| 9 | 8 |
| 8 | 3 |
| 7 | 13 |
| 6 | 14 |
| 5 | 22 |
| 4 | 18 |
| 3 | 10 |
| 2 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 |

This overlapping of personnel makes it possible for the 97 Communist leaders to assume ultimate control over all major activities affecting the national life. The effect will be more clearly seen if we look at the kinds of posts held by these leaders in the various fields. First, the following party posts are held by members of the Eighth Central Committee: the chairmanship and four vice-chairmanships of the central committee; the secretary-general and one deputy secretary-general of the central committee; 17 memberships in the Politburo; six memberships on the Standing Committee of the Politburo; six alternate memberships in the Politburo; seven memberships and three alternate memberships in the Central Secretariat; nine memberships, one secretary and four deputy-secretaries of the Central Control Committee; eight directorships and six deputy-directorships of the functional departments of the central committee; one directorship of the general office of the central committee; one secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee; one secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee; one secretary of the Inner Mongolia regional committee; and seven secretaries of the provincial committees of Kwangtung, Hopei, Szechwan, Anhwei, Yunnan, Shantung, and Heilungkiang.

Posts held in the executive branch of the government include: one chairmanship and one vice-chairmanship of the People's Republic of China; one chairmanship of the Supreme State Conference; one premiership, 12 vice-premierships, and one secretary-general of the State Council; eight directorships and three deputy directorships of the Administrative Offices of the State Council; 20 ministers and chairmen and nine vice-ministers and vice-chairmen of the ministries and commissions of the State Council; one chairmanship on the Committee on Scientific Planning; one supervisor of the Bank of Communications; one commander and one political commissar of the national police; one chief of the Police Department of Peking; three governorships of Hopei, Honan, and Kwangtung; three memberships on the provincial people's councils of Hupei, Szechwan, and Yunnan; two ambassadorships, one to the Soviet Union and the other to Yugoslavia; and one chairmanship in the People's Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Posts held in the armed forces include: one chairmanship, 11 vice-chairmanships, and 20 memberships on the National Defense Council; one Chief-of-Staff; three Deputy Chiefs-of-Staff; one Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; one Commander-in-Chief and one political commissar of the Navy; three directorships in the Departments of Military Training, Military Cadres, and Military Supervision; one directorship and one deputy directorship in the Political Department; one commander and one political commissar of the Inner Mongolia military district; five political commissars of the provincial military districts of Hopei, Anhwei, Kwangtung, Yunnan, and Szechwan; two commanders of the Hupe and Mukden military districts; and one commander of the Railway Police Corps.

Posts held in the educational field (except Ministers of Education and Higher Education) include: one chancellorship of the People's Revolutionary University; one vice-chancellorship of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism; one vice-president of the Academia Sinica; two memberships on the Academic Council of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Academia Sinica; one president of the Police School; one president of the College of Fine Arts, and one president of the College of Nationalities.

Posts held in the legislative field include: one chairmanship, four vice-chairmanships, one secretary-general and 26 memberships on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress; one chairmanship and one membership on the Committee on Nationalities of the National People's Congress; one chairmanship and one membership on the Committee on the Budget of the

National People's Congress; and 73 memberships in the National People's Congress itself.

Posts held in the judicial field include one president of the Supreme People's Court and one Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

Finally, 58 of the 97 members of the Eighth Central Committee also hold 158 key posts in 20 major mass organizations. In 11 of these organizations, key posts held by members of the Eighth Central Committee include, among others, the chairmanships. For example, Chou En-lai is the Chairman of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and Lai Jo-yü is the Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

## II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The principal findings of this study can be summarized as follows:

1. The Eighth Central Committee consists of men and women mature enough to have seasoned judgment and yet not so old as to have lost imagination and vigor.

2. Contrary to the Communist assertion that the party is led by the working class, the top leaders were mostly born to middle or upper-middle class families; only a handful of them can claim a proletarian or poor peasant origin.

3. Because of their middle class background, a great majority of these leaders are fairly well-educated, and nearly half of them are definitely known to be returned students from foreign countries. Among these, no less than 31 were schooled in the Soviet Union. Thus, the kind of Communism that these people understand is the Bolshevik version and their spiritual ties with the Soviet Union must be strong. Conversely, the Communist leaders' understanding and appreciation of the Anglo-American culture and social systems must be either extremely limited or completely vicarious, since only two of them studied very briefly in the United States and none of them ever attended school in England. This fact must be taken into consideration in any speculation on future developments of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations.

4. Most of the Communist leaders joined the party prior to the beginning of its military insurrection in 1927. Their conversion to Communism seems to have been largely prompted by frustration in private careers and discontent with the social and political conditions of the country.

5. All of these leaders have long records of party activity; they suffered hardships and made sacrifices for the party cause. The party now is under the control and guidance of dedicated and time-tested Communists. But one wonders whether the complete exclusion from the top leadership of any people who joined the party in later years means that a rigid seniority rule has developed which might unduly restrict the party's ability to accommodate brilliant new converts.

6. It is abundantly clear that those who had control over the armed forces and party organizations during the years of revolution have enjoyed the easiest access to top positions in the party. This is in line with the Chinese tradition.

7. Unlike the Kuomintang elite which has drawn its members more heavily from the coastal regions, the Communist leaders have a strong hinterland background. Among the hinterland regions, the middle Yangtze basin is definitely over-represented in the Communist leadership. More significant is the fact that Hunan—one of the five provinces in the middle Yangtze basin and the home of Mao Tse-tung—has such a disproportionate representation that its native sons account for almost one-third of the total membership of the Eighth Central Committee. This strong Hunan faction indicates that the Chinese Communists' professed anti-sectarianism has not prevented China's age-old provincialism from creeping into their politics. It is too soon to say whether this strong Hunan element may turn out to be a point on which national discontent might focus.

8. Despite the Communist emphasis upon the equality of sexes, only a sprinkling of women are found in the top leadership of the party.

9. While the wholesale reelection to the Eighth Central Committee of the members of the Seventh Central Committee means leadership stability and party harmony, it also implies a degree of rigidity.

10. The Central Committee is an organizational device for governing mainland China today through an interlocking directorate. By holding multiple strategic positions in the party, the armed forces, the various branches of government, and the mass organizations, its 97 members have effective control over all aspects of the national life.

# THE LIMITS OF POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATION OF *KING LEAR*, ACT I, SCENE 1

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The data for political studies are most commonly drawn from history, either in accounts of lives, events and institutions, or in the writings of earlier systematic students. But to probe the meaning and relationships of ultimate ends like justice and truth, no actual happenings are needed; imaginative fiction and drama can supply the food for thought. Why then should we not as reasonably and profitably look for lessons in political wisdom in the works of our greatest poet? In this essay I have sought to find and expound such a lesson in Shakespeare's tragedy, *King Lear*.

## I

According to that profound student of Shakespeare, Abraham Lincoln, the most difficult task of statesmanship is that of providing, not for the foundation, but for the perpetuation, of political institutions.[1] If the political institutions are the best, to perpetuate them is not only the most difficult, but also the greatest of all the tasks of the statesman.

It is generally agreed that Shakespeare regarded monarchy as the best form of government. It is not generally realized, however, that Lear is the greatest of Shakespeare's kings. For the moment, I submit only this evidence: the supreme object of monarchical policy in the English histories is the unification and pacification of England. Only Henry V even approaches success in this, but in view of his questionable title to the throne, he is compelled to create a dubious national unity by means of an unjust foreign war. Yet the first scene in *King Lear* shows the old monarch at the head of a united Britain (not merely England), and at peace not only with all domestic factions, but with the outside world as well. France and Burgundy, who represent this world, are suitors for the hand of Lear's youngest daughter. Never in the histories does Shakespeare represent his native land at such a peak of prestige and political excellence: in *King Lear* alone do we find actualized the consummation devoutly wished by all other good Shakespearian kings.

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[1] See "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions." Address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838. Compare Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Bk. I, Ch. X, where it is said that, not the founders of republics and monarchies deserve the greatest praise, but the founders of religions. One might paraphrase Machiavelli by saying that the founders of religions are the true founders of civil society: Numa, rather than Romulus, is the founder of Rome. Another expression of the same thought, which is classical as well as Machiavellian, is that to found a state is an act of human virtue, but to perpetuate it requires divine assistance. It is the thesis of this essay that Lear's incomprehension of this truth was his tragic flaw. It might not be irrelevant to add that Lincoln acted the role of high priest in the Civil War, a conflict which he interpreted, in his two most famous utterances, as a divine affliction, designed to transform a merely political union into a sacramental one.

If Lear is, in fact, Shakespeare's greatest king, and if it is true that to perpetuate such a rule is an even greater task than to establish it, then the opening of *King Lear* shows us the old king confronted with the supreme problem of his great career: the problem of providing for the succession to his throne. The action whereby he provides for this succession should, therefore, be his greatest action. Since it would be the greatest action of the greatest king, and since monarchy is the best form of government, such an action would be Shakespeare's presentation of the consummation of the political art, of political virtue, and therewith of political life altogether. But such a presentation could imply even more than this: for if Shakespeare, as a Renaissance classicist, regarded man as a political animal, it is possible that he regarded the fulfillment of man's highest political function as identical with the fulfillment of his highest human function. It is not improbable then that the stage is set, at the opening of *King Lear*, for Shakespeare's presentation of the ultimate in human existence.

## II

The foregoing will, no doubt, strike many as paradoxical. That *King Lear* contains the fullest demonstration of Shakespeare's creative powers, and that these somehow represent the ultimate in man's humanity, is a proposition that would be widely concurred in. Yet I believe that this latter proposition is consistent with, if not identical with, the former ones. For if Shakespeare undertook the fullest revelation of his powers in *King Lear*, then it is entirely probable that the story of the play was selected as the most suitable vehicle for this revelation. In other words, the question as to why we find in *King Lear* the fullest revelation of Shakespeare's genius may be identical with the question, why does Shakespeare reveal himself to us most fully in a play in which his greatest king is confronted with the task of perpetuating the perfect political regime?

Although many critics have opined that *King Lear* is Shakespeare's greatest work, few call it their favorite play,[2] and few fail to remark adversely concerning many of its dramatic properties. I will here quote some remarks of Coleridge, who expresses, in somewhat exaggerated form perhaps, assumptions which have characterized a great deal of the critical literature dealing with the play in the 19th and 20th centuries. Although Coleridge has been attacked on many grounds by more recent critics, I do not believe that these particular assumptions have been sufficiently challenged. As will readily appear, they imply a general conception as to the meaning of the play, a meaning which is, in our judgment, inconsistent with the high estimate in which the play is otherwise held. According to Coleridge, one can "Omit the first scene in *Lear*, and everything will remain"; the first scene is a "nursery tale," "prefixed as the *porch* of the edifice, not laid as its foundation."[3] In *King Lear*, says Coleridge, "the interest and situations . . . are derived from a gross improbability."[4] This is but an application of Coleridge's principle that, in a Shakespearian play, the interest does not derive from, indeed is independent of, interest in plot and story. "Shakespeare did not take the trouble of inventing stories. It was enough for him to select from those that had been invented or recorded such as had one or other, or both, of two recommendations, namely, suitableness to his purposes, and second, their being already parts of popular tradition. . . ."[5] Coleridge thus implies that it was less trouble for Shakespeare to take over tales already told, than to invent new ones. Yet, since Coleridge admits that Shakespeare had a purpose in writing a play distinct from that of evoking response to the familiar, his choosing only from the available stock of traditional materials must have imposed greater restrictions upon him than if he had felt free to go outside that stock. There certainly is no assurance that Shakespeare was saving himself trouble because he did not invent stories. That he was neither lazy nor indifferent in his attitude towards his stories is obvious from the fact that he frequently and freely altered his source materials. There is, certainly, no *a priori* reason for assuming that the adaptation of plot and story to Shakespeare's purpose in writing a play were not as deliberate and extensive as in his handling of any other of his materials.

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[2] *Cf.* A. C. Bradley, *Shakespearian Tragedy*, p. 243.

[3] *Coleridge's Shakespearian Criticism*, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor (Cambridge 1930), Vol. I, p. 55, n. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

From the view that the story of *King Lear* is an absurd fairy tale, Coleridge infers that none of the action initiated by Lear in Scene *i* is to be taken seriously. Yet Coleridge does not fail to observe one fact inconsistent with this general thesis: "It was not without forethought, and it is not without its due significance, that the triple division is stated here (I, *i*, 1–6) as already determined and in all its particulars, previously to the trial of professions, as the relative rewards of which the daughters were to be made to consider their several portions."[6] A. C. Bradley, commenting on this observation, says that the love-test is a "mere form, devised as a childish scheme to gratify his love of absolute power and his hunger for assurances of devotion." Yet neither Coleridge nor Bradley has reflected on the possibility that, if the love-test, the trick whereby Lear makes it appear that he is "dividing his kingdom among his daughters in proportion to the strength of their protestations of love"[7] is a pretense, then perhaps much more in the scene is also pretense. Coleridge and Bradley rightly assume that to make the division of the kingdom depend upon such protestations could only signify insane vanity and folly, but they also assume that Lear is doing no such thing. Why, then, do they insist that he is vain and foolish nonetheless? May not this pretense be part of a larger system of pretenses? How do we know that this alone is a pretense and nothing else? In truth, we know no such thing. Since Lear in the course of the scene does alter the division of the kingdom to fit the strength of the protestations, one may say that the previously decided division was merely tentative. If we are to maintain the view that the love-test was really intended as a sham, then we must base our view on other and stronger evidence.

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

[6] A. C. Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

It is impossible to drop Scene *i* from the play, as Coleridge suggests, for the reason given by Bradley: that "it is essential that Lear's contribution to the action of the drama . . . be remembered; not at all that we may feel that he 'deserved' what he suffered, but because otherwise his fate would appear to us at best pathetic, at worst shocking, but certainly not tragic."[8] It is then equally impossible to impute to Lear a serious intention to make the division of the kingdom depend upon his daughters' protestations, since we would thus be forced to regard him as already insane, not morally responsible, and accordingly unable to contribute in any moral or dramatic sense to the action of the play. It would seem that the only tenable hypothesis is that the love-test was, from its beginning, a pretense.

But if Lear's sanity, and with it his status as a tragic hero, depends upon the premise that the love-test is a pretense, then the whole meaning of the play, *i.e.*, the meaning of Lear's suffering, depends upon our making this hypothesis intelligible. For we do not know why he must suffer if we do not know why he adopted the pretense which was the efficient cause of that suffering.

The generally accepted explanation is that of Bradley: Lear is a foolish, vain, selfish old man, whose wits are beginning to fail. His failings are extenuated by his "long life of absolute power, in which he has been flattered to the top of his bent," and which "has produced in him that blindness to human limitations, and the presumptuous self-will, which in Greek tragedy we have so often seen stumbling against the altar of Nemesis." Yet this extenuation, besides being contradicted by internal evidence, which I shall present shortly, runs athwart the larger bias of the play. For it is widely admitted that the sufferings of Lear are the most terrible in all Shakespeare and, probably, *a fortiori*, in the whole of the world's literature. But great passion, whether it is that of Lear, of Oedipus, or of Jesus, implies greatness in the soul of the sufferer. A great passion is always, in some sense, compensation for a great error. Now, as Plato teaches in the *Republic*, great errors are the work of great souls, souls capable of either great good or great evil. A petty soul is one that can accomplish neither great good nor great evil. It seems impossible to suppose that a child, a fool, or a knave would be capable of the passion of a Lear. Is it not, then, as impossible to suppose that the error was childish, foolish, or knavish, which was, in an important way, the cause of such a passion? It is true that the action which precipitated Lear's passion was a sign of the absence of perfect wisdom. But it seems to me that no consistent view of the play as a whole is possible that does not account for Lear's unwisdom in Scene *i* as a defect such as only the very greatest soul could suffer. Bradley's explanation of Lear's failure in Scene *i* is, I think, clearly deficient, in that it is at least compatible with the view that Lear's error was the error of a petty soul.

## III

I have suggested that the stage is set at the beginning of the play for the supreme action of Lear's long and successful reign: the action whereby he provides for its perpetuation. The consciousness of critics has, I believe, been so dominated by Lear's apparent failure in this scene, that they have failed to notice his serious intention. Yet the meaning and extent of Lear's failure can be grasped with precision only in the light of his intentions. We must then try to understand exactly how Lear undertook to solve this paramount political problem. Coleridge, it will be remembered, inferred (rightly, I believe) from Gloucester's first speech that Lear's division of the kingdom was determined "in all its particulars"; but Coleridge says no more about these particulars. Bradley however observes that it "seems to have escaped the attention of Coleridge and others"[9] that Lear's original plan was not as absurd as it has been taken to be. For example, Lear never intended to live with his three daughters in turn, but with Cordelia alone. He then concludes that Lear's

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 281.

> whole original plan, though foolish and rash, was not a "hideous rashness" or incredible folly. If carried out it would have had no such consequences as followed its alteration. It would probably have led quickly to war, but not to the agony which culminated in the storm upon the heath.

Bradley calls our attention to the fact that catastrophe is the consequence, not of Lear's original plan, but of the alteration of that plan. Bradley assumes, without any attempt at proof, that Lear's original plan was also foolish and rash, although not "hideously rash." In a footnote to the latter phrase, he mentions that it is Kent who applies this epithet to the *altered* plan. Yet Bradley does not attempt the possible inference that, if Kent, within the play, was informed concerning the original plan "in all its particulars" and had not expressed any objection to it, then perhaps he had approved of it. This, in fact, is a necessary inference, if we are not to suppose that Kent, who does not even express a private doubt to his fellow-councillor Gloucester was, until the penultimate moment of his public service, a time-serving flatterer. But if the original plan had Kent's, and Gloucester's approval, it may not have been foolish at all. It may, indeed, have been a product of sound principles of statecraft.

The proposition that Kent and Gloucester approved of Lear's original plan is a necessary inference for anyone who does not reject the premise that, in general, the relationship of characters in a Shakespearian play is made to appear to flow from their entire lives, and not to start up, *de novo*, with the raising of the curtain. Lear, Kent, Gloucester, and the three daughters are supposed to have known each other, and to have lived in intimate association, for many years. Kent is the King's favorite courtier, as Cordelia is his favorite daughter. Both Kent and Cordelia are, in similar ways, mirrors of the master and father they love. Bradley's statement that Lear has been corrupted by flattery, and has a foolish craving for it, is contradicted by the fact that Lear prefers above all others the two people in the play who are represented as absolutely incapable of flattery or hypocrisy. We can no more suppose that Kent and Cordelia are blunt and plain-spoken to the King for the first time (or that he loved them for anything but their true qualities) than that they have been petty flatterers until the moment the action of the play begins. The long-standing difference between Cordelia and her sisters is stressed in her farewell to them, and they themselves emphasize their father's preference for Cordelia. Moreover, Lear's preference for Cordelia and Kent is consistent with a widely recognized principle of the soul: the principle that self-love is the basis of friendship, and that we prefer as friends those who are most like ourselves.[10] Lear's own nature is not that of a flatterer, and hence, we would expect him to prefer those who were not flatterers. Lear's political success, moreover, would be very difficult to understand, if he did not have about him those who would tell him the truth. The truth about Lear himself may be said to be "flattering," in the sense that Lear was an honest and noblehearted man, and evoked the spontaneous loyalty and devotion of such a man as Kent. There are few if any characters in Shakespeare who command such unqualified esteem as Kent; yet Kent's life is constituted by his devotion to Lear. But if Lear were not worthy of this devotion, if, that is to say, Kent's discrimination in choosing an object of devotion were questionable, however unselfish the devotion itself, our admiration for Kent would assuredly be mingled with either pity or contempt. That we do not feel the least pity or contempt for Kent is, I think, a sign of Lear's as well as of Kent's, true worth.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

If Kent knew Lear's original plan in all its particulars, he must have approved it, since he is silent concerning any defects it may have possessed, and since we know that he did not hesitate to protest in the most vehement manner when Lear departed from it. If it be objected that Kent may have disapproved the original plan, but acceded to it after he had exhausted his influence in having it rectified, there is this reply: someone as loyal and devoted as Kent would surely have been preoccupied with the danger to his master, if he had anticipated any. Yet, in the moment before the stage fills with the court, we see him and Gloucester turn lightly from state to personal matters, without any sign of apprehension concerning the former. What, then, was the original plan?

## IV

The negative view that Bradley and others have taken of the original plan has centered, as has been said, on the love-test. The love-test has already been dismissed as a pretense, as far as the original division of the kingdom is concerned. The real objection has always been to the division of the kingdom itself. It has always been thought that, since the supreme object of monarchical policy in Shakespeare is the unification of England, a British king who deliberately divides a united kingdom is committing the supreme act of monarchical folly. Yet reflection must make us cautious of accepting this view. First of all there looms the paradox of imputing the crime of dividing the kingdom to the one Shakespearian king whose ascendancy appears to have united it, a paradox enforced by Kent's apparent acquiescence. Second is the radical difference between dividing the kingdom into two, as distinct from three. The very number two is, traditionally, the number for strife; as the number three is the number for unity. Without pursuing allegorical possibilities, it is clear that a balance of power can be better preserved where there are three distinct forces, no one of which can overmatch the other two, than where there are only two forces, however evenly matched. The most important reflection, however, concerns whether, in dividing the kingdom, Lear was doing, during his lifetime, what in any event was bound to come to pass after his death. That is, how do we know that the unity achieved by Lear was not itself the result of an equipoise of forces, in unstable equilibrium, rather than a simple unity? In order to understand Lear's policy, one must analyze the problem he faced, the problem of the succession, in terms of the political realities which confronted him.

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[10] *Cf.* Plato, *Gorgias* 510 B 2 ff.; and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a33. Also, see below, note 25.

We must observe that Lear's problem is complicated by the fact that he had three daughters but no son. Yet if Lear had had a son the difficulty would not have been greatly different. Lear would still have had to gain the support of major powers in the kingdom—and abroad—for his settlement. And he had to bind them to that settlement both by pledges and self-interest in order to assure its durability. It is striking that, although Goneril and Regan have been married for some time, they have not yet received dowries.[11] All three daughters must receive their dowries simultaneously. Does this fact not indicate that Lear was thinking in terms of an overall balance of power, each part of which was needed to insure the rest? Had Lear's power been as absolute as it has seemed, why should he have hesitated so long to give the elder daughters their dowries? Lear was certainly using the dowries, and the marriages, as instruments of policy, as was the custom in royal (and not only royal) houses. Burgundy and France have "long" made their amorous sojourn at his court, and presumably it is much longer since Cornwall and Albany first made theirs. Lear has delayed as long as possible making his final disposition, both of the hands and fortunes of his daughters. What then was Lear's matrimonial policy?

First, we must note that Cornwall and Albany represent the geographical extremities of Britain. Cornwall clearly represents the south. Albany, according to Holinshed, originally was the northern part of the island, and included Scotland. In Act I, *iv*, 207 the Fool tells Lear "Thou hast pared thy wit o' both sides, and left nothing i' the middle," indicating that the two extremities (Goneril and Regan) have digested the center portion, which was to have been Cordelia's. Lear had married his two older daughters to two great lords whose estates (and hence, we may assume, whose power) lay at the opposite poles of the kingdom. Now, anyone who knows only so much of English history as is contained in Shakespeare's histories, knows that English kings found it impossible to exercise control in any region very remote from the center of the royal domains, without the support of the feudal potentates in those regions.[12] The selection of sons-in-law from the remote portions of his kingdom indicates, I believe, that Lear's unification of the kingdom was in part due to his ability to secure the adhesion of the lords of these outlying districts through marriage with the royal house. But the marriage of a daughter involves a dowry: Cornwall and Albany expected more than brides, and the possibility that a descendant might occupy the throne. What could be more natural than that they expected lands that lay in the neighborhood of their ancestral estates?

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[11] According to Perrett, *The Story of King Lear from Geoffrey of Monmouth to Shakespeare* (Berlin, 1904), p. 175, no earlier version of the play shows Goneril and Regan married previously to the love-test. This accentuates Shakespeare's emphasis on the King's policy.

[12] *Cf.* Tom Paine, *Rights of Man*, Everyman's Library ed., p. 51: "William the Conqueror and his descendants parcelled out the country in this manner, and bribed some

From this it would seem that Lear's action in dividing the kingdom was not arbitrary or foolish—it was an action predestined by the very means required to bring unity to the kingdom. Lear, it appears, delayed the division as long as possible, but he could not put it off indefinitely, any more than he could put off indefinitely his own demise.

In Lear's speech, announcing to the court the division of the kingdom into three parts, he gives two reasons for his action: first, that he wishes to shake all care and business from his age, conferring them on younger strengths; and second, "that future strife may be prevented now." There is a sense in which these two reasons may be regarded as a single one: that is, by devising a political arrangement whereby the peace of the kingdom could be assured without the adventitious factor of his personal ascendancy, Lear removed his chief present care by providing against future strife. However, if we view these two reasons more superficially, I think it would be correct to say that the second reason is the real one, and the first primarily an excuse for the latter. For it is difficult to believe that failing strength was a pressing motive for Lear's action: the old man was the most prodigious octogenarian on record, still spending his days hunting, and able, as the last act shows, to kill a man single-handed. The decisive consideration, however, is this: there is no evidence that, in the original plan, Lear intended anything resembling an abdication. On the contrary is the fact that Lear never abandoned the crown. What he divided between his sons-in-law, in the flush of his rage against Cordelia, was a coronet.[13] He himself was to retain, even in the altered plan, "The name, and all th' additions to a king." Yet, as long as Lear retained the name of king, a name which he in no way shared with a successor, his delegation of authority to his sons-in-law remained fundamentally distinguished from an abdication.[14] One may ask why Lear held

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parts of it by what they called charters to hold the other parts of it the better subjected to their will. This is the reason why so many of those charters abound in Cornwall; the people were averse to the Government established at the conquest, and the towns were garrisoned and bribed to enslave the country. All the old charters are the badges of this conquest, and it is from this source that the capriciousness of elections arises."

[13] Crowns and coronets are distinguished from each other in a number of Shakespearian texts: *cf. Henry V,* Act II, Prologue, line 11; *Tempest,* Act I, sc. *ii,* line 33; *Julius Caesar,* Act I, sc. *ii,* line 237. The crown is certainly one of the "additions to a King."

[14] Compare Lear's apparent intention to resign authority with that of Charles V, a comparison that would have occurred readily to an Elizabethan audience. Charles had his son crowned in a great state ceremony, in his own presence; and in that self-same presence had all the great peers of his numerous realms pledge their fealty to Philip. He himself then retired to a monastery, and remained virtually inaccessible to the political

a coronet in his hand at all. The answer, I believe, is that the coronet, the symbol of ducal authority, was intended for Cordelia's husband.[15] It must be remembered that the scene was intended to be one in which Cordelia received her husband and dowry. Her husband, whether Burgundy or France, would be a foreigner, whose British dukedom would be conferred along with Cordelia's hand. To sum up: Lear might have delegated much of his "business" to his sons-in-law in the original plan, but there is no sign of anything resembling an abdication. And as long as he did not abdicate he would, as King, remain the only personage capable of deciding the highest political questions. Since there is no explicit mention, anywhere in the scene, of a successor, the implication is left that Lear would retain the power of naming a successor, and this in turn indicates an intention to retain decisive power.

Lear's original plan, I think, called for precisely equal shares to go to Albany and Cornwall, husbands of the two older daughters. But Cordelia was to receive a third "more opulent" than the other two. Lear divided his kingdom into "three," but the parts are not mathematical "thirds." Cordelia was not only to be situated in the middle, but to have the richest portion of the realm. Lear, as Bradley pointed out, intended to live with Cordelia alone. Living on as king with Cordelia, with Albany and Cornwall acting as his deputies in regions which he could not control without their loyalty anyway, does it seem that Lear was giving up anything that he could in any case have kept to himself much longer? Since Cordelia's husband would be a foreigner, living in the midst of Lear's long-time retainers, it is difficult to imagine any such conflict of domestic authority arising, as a result of the original plan, as arose in the altered plan. In the altered plan, the division of Cordelia's inheritance between Goneril and Regan left Lear's original retainers a minority among those owing primary fealty to Albany and Cornwall. But in the original plan any retainers the husband of Cordelia brought with him to England would in all likelihood have remained a small minority in comparison with those who had been brought up to regard Lear as their master. And all indications within the play are that Lear evoked the strongest loyalty from those who recognized him as their legitimate master.

Concerning the marriage of Cordelia, I think the evidence is overwhelming in favor of the view that she was intended as the bride of Burgundy. First, be-

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world. Lear, on the contrary, was to remain king, the sole bearer of regal authority. And, living with Cordelia, he would remain at the center of political life. It is not merely the ancient habit of command that compels him, later in the play, to give orders to his daughters' retainers, but the evident assumption that his orders supersede all others. As we will attempt to show below, this assumption would not have been unreasonable if his *original* plan had been adhered to. In fact, Lear's altered plan ran athwart the whole feudal system, and in this respect his elder daughters had just grievance against him.

[15] This was pointed out to me by Professor R. S. Milne, of the Victoria University College, Wellington, New Zealand. Perrett, *op. cit.*, p. 153, says that it was for Cordelia. But why would a princess of the blood royal receive a Coronet now?

cause Lear offers her to Burgundy, although this is after her disinheritance.[16] Second, because Burgundy has had previous knowledge of Cordelia's dowry. But such knowledge implies at the same time that he has been privy to some, if not all, of Lear's intended scheme. Such a confidential position certainly suggests the status of an intended son-in-law. Now France and Burgundy were traditional enemies. Their presence at Lear's court suggests that Cordelia's dowry would have been an important counter in the balance of power between them.[17] Burgundy is the lesser power, as is shown by Lear's style in addressing him, and by the fact that Lear fears insulting France, but not Burgundy. Now Cordelia's marriage to France would have been a political blunder of the first magnitude, a blunder of which there is no reason to suspect the Lear who drafted the plan approved by Kent and Gloucester. For a French marriage would inevitably have given rise to the French claims to the British throne, such as actually led to the French invasion that occurs in the play. Lear would never have intended, nor would Kent have consented, that the King of France, or his descendants, inherit the throne of Britain. In such a case there would have been the possibility, at least, that Britain would become the appendage of France. Moreover, such a marriage would have heavily unbalanced the system of powers, as that system is envisaged within the horizon of the play. France, commanding the fairest part of Britain, might easily have overmatched Burgundy, thereafter to hold the remainder of Britain in his power. On the other hand, however, Cordelia's dowry, added to Burgundy, might have aided the balance of power on the continent.[18] And, conversely, Burgundy, added to Cordelia's part of Britain, would have neutralized any combination of the older sisters. A combination of the powers of Albany and Cornwall with France, against Cordelia and Burgundy, even apart from its geographical difficulty, would have been unlikely. For the victory of Goneril and Regan over Cordelia, if achieved with the aid of France, would in all likelihood leave the elder sisters at the mercy of their great ally, to be overpowered and absorbed in turn. We may, however, ask why France, who was no doubt a political reasoner, wasted his time in a vain suit at Lear's court? The answer is, I think, in the first place, that the marriage was too important for him to be absent from the scene of its negotiation. We must remember that Goneril and Regan must have had an intense interest, not only in their younger sister's dowry, but in her marriage. And the moment of Cordelia's betrothal to Burgundy would be the precise moment for France to cultivate good relations with her older sisters. There remained, however, as a remote possibility, what actually came to pass. Just as the first Queen Elizabeth could always flirt with French dukes, as a threat to Spain, so could Lear use a French marriage for Cordelia as a threat to Goneril and Regan, and their husbands, should they fail to acquiesce in the preferred treatment given Cordelia in the division of the kingdom.

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[16] Burgundy's reply to Lear's question, as to "What, in the least" Burgundy will require in dowry to take Cordelia, is ambiguous: "Most royal majesty, I crave no more than hath your Highness offered." It is not certain whether Lear has already offered Cordelia herself to be bride to Burgundy, with the dowry of which Burgundy appears to have knowledge, or whether Lear has simply informed Burgundy of the amount and kind of Cordelia's dowry.

[17] There does not seem to be any mention of Burgundy in Shakespeare's sources. He thus appears to be a Shakespearian addition, required to make possible Lear's original plan, as we are reconstructing it.

[18] To an Elizabethan audience the Burgundian alliance would represent, in principle, the Spanish alliance, since Burgundy (or Franche-Comte) was part of the empire of Charles V and Philip II. A Spanish marriage would be in line with traditional English policy, as indicated by Henry VIII's marriage to a Spanish princess, and his daughter Mary's marriage with Philip. Elizabeth, on the other hand, although she conducted a long and maddening flirtation with the Duke D'Alencon, never actually brought herself to a French marriage. Only the threat of a Franco-Spanish alliance against England could have led Elizabeth to indulge in her fabulously insincere, and equally artful, negotiations to become bride of the heir to the French throne. Elizabethan principles of power politics are clear enough. A smaller power, such as England, forms an alliance with a great, but distant power, such as Spain, to neutralize a great and near power like France. In like manner, Scotland's traditional ally was France: Scotland was to England, as England to France; or, again, France was to Scotland, as Spain to England.

Although the basic problem facing Lear was that of the succession to the throne, there is no direct reference in the text to the subject of a prospective heir. If Cordelia were married to Burgundy, however, it would seem probable that the crown was intended to pass to Cordelia and her descendants. Burgundy would be elevated in the feudal hierarchy by his marriage to a king's daughter, and his ancestral dukedom might become an appendage to the kingdom of Britain, rather than the reverse. Elements in the English tradition would seem to confirm the soundness of this view. The ascent of a foreign duke, William of Normandy, to the throne of England gave English kings claims upon the French throne, but not the reverse. Also, the marriage of Mary Tudor to Philip II was a "Burgundian" marriage. It was unhappy, and politically near-disastrous, but principally because of the difficulties flowing from the Reformation. No such religious questions are envisaged within the play's horizon. The relevant point is that Mary, although married to a foreign prince who was nominally king of England, alone exercised the powers of the sovereign. Philip was never more than the consort of the queen, even though he was heir to a throne in his own right. A Burgundian marriage, in short, would have made the succession of Cordelia to the throne a viable political arrangement. Lear's scheme of marrying Cordelia to Burgundy gave good promise of leading to a stable international system, and a peaceful acceptance of Lear's will and testament at home.

It is not clear whether Lear intended to make an announcement concerning the succession at the court we witness in Scene *i*. In our judgment he did not intend to do so. It would have been apparent to everyone, from the preferred treatment of Cordelia, that he intended the crown to pass to her. Yet the precise terms of the inheritance of the crown itself would have left some scope for diplomacy. The absence of evidence on which to decide what these terms might have been suggests that Lear himself was not yet in a position to fix them. The evidence I have cited suggests that Lear, being truly wise in the ways of politics, was not a man to force premature decisions, and that he was in no hurry to give up any more of his authority than necessary. But the announcement of the succession would have involved some further sacrifice of authority. Like any out-going office-holder, Lear's authority would be diminished the moment his successor was known. Those who would be reluctant to oppose the king openly, so long as they had hopes of influencing him in their favor, would lose some of that reluctance the moment they were certain his decision was against them. The succession of Cordelia to the throne had to be accomplished in a succession of steps, each of which required something of a pause, in order to test its firmness. The first step was to be the granting of the dowries, simultaneously with the announcement of the marriage. Why these had to be done in one step has been indicated: only in virtue of a foreign marriage, in which a foreign force would be united to Cordelia's native strength, could she defend her inheritance from her sisters. The realignment of power resulting from the dowries and the marriage would be the essential basis of the future succession. But in a feudal system, in which power depended heavily upon personal loyalties, public pledges would not be a negligible factor in guaranteeing the success of Lear's arrangements.[19] How to secure those pledges was a consideration prior to any plan to announce the succession itself. In our judgment, the love-test was, in one of its meanings, a part of Lear's deliberate system of policy. Its purpose was to supply, at least inferentially, pledges of support for the division of the kingdom which he was in process of announcing. As we shall shortly demonstrate, these pledges were demanded only from Goneril and Regan, not from Cordelia. They were, that is, demanded only from those who might have motives to repudiate his division.

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[19] The legitimacy of Lear's rule, in the feudal sense of that term, is shrouded in the mist of the antiquity which surrounds the setting of the entire play. That the contemporary Elizabethan view of primogeniture is somehow present in Lear's legendary kingdom, is indicated by Edmund's famous soliloquy in Scene *ii*, and its sequel. All that need be said at the moment is that Lear is very old himself, his rule very successful, and his personal authority apparently unchallenged. But the obscurity of the legal foundation of the monarchy accentuates the political problem of the succession. Under traditional English rules, the eldest daughter would succeed in the absence of a male heir. Lear seems to be reversing that rule, in making his youngest daughter his heir. But if Lear's rule is just (until the fatal explosion), then it must be just in an extra-legal sense, since he does not seem to be hampered—or guided—by any legal rules in deciding what is best. Lear's decision (as we believe) to make Cordelia his successor certainly seems right since she alone of the daughters appears to inherit her father's regal qualities. Lear thus seems to act in the light of the truth—the truth that Cordelia is the best qualified—instead of the conventional or legal expectation that the eldest should inherit. But a decision based upon truth will be politically wise or truthful only if it is supported by public opinion. Lear's design—according to our interpretation—to cultivate the conditions for a public opinion favorable to his settlement is tantamount then to a design to provide a legal or conventional foundation for an arrangement which, in its origin, is essentially extra-legal.

One might object, however, that public pledges without an underlying favorable distribution of power would be worthless, while if such a distribution existed the pledges would be superfluous. As suggested above, the pledges might themselves be an ingredient in the distribution of power. For example, consider such public pledges as Magna Carta. Magna Carta only affirmed what the barons present at Runnymede believed that they and the king already knew to be the law of the realm. Despite the fact that all must have believed that the king would in future violate rights which he had disregarded in the past, when he had power to do so, it must also have been believed that his solemn public pledge would lessen his future power to do so. In like manner, we may suppose it possible that the pledges of Goneril and Regan may have served to minimize the opinion, particularly among their own followers, which might have been favorable to any attempt to upset Lear's will and testament.

Certainly Lear did not have any practical doubt concerning the nature of his daughters' love for him. He had already arranged things to favor Cordelia as much as possible. Not only was the kingdom divided on the map before the start of the court scene, but Lear gave Goneril, and then Regan, their shares after each had spoken, without hearing the other. Thus Cordelia's "more opulent" third was awaiting her, as the remainder, before she spoke a word. Clearly, Lear's intention was not to weigh the speeches against the shares in any manner or sense. Yet his shrewd knowledge of his elder daughters put them in a position in which it would have been ludicrous for them to repudiate their father's judgment after their fulsome speeches of devotion.

We do not know whether Kent, Gloucester, Burgundy, or anyone else knew of the king's plan to administer the test. There was great need for secrecy. Many commentators have noted that Goneril and Regan were taken by surprise. It was absolutely necessary that they should have been. If they had had any inkling of the test they would have sought means other than protestations to increase their bargaining power.[20] They would have quickly guessed that speeches could give them no advantage, that the advantage already lay with Cordelia.[21] The least they might have done was to boycott the court. If they had done this, for however specious a reason, they could have held up the settlements. If these were made in their absence, and in the teeth of their objections, they might have challenged the legitimacy of their father's will. Thus, their power to absent themselves from the court might itself have become a bargaining counter, with which they might have exacted a forfeit. The love-test, taking them by surprise, trapped them into professions which they otherwise might never have made. Commentators have long noted the swiftness of the action in Scene *i*,[22] and in the case of the love-test have taken it as additional evidence of Lear's rashness. Yet a sufficient reason for Lear's haste would be his anxiety to have his plan consummated before Goneril and Regan could recover poise enough to object to it. Lear's very haste may be regarded as craftiness. We know that the professions were not intended to determine the shares, but Goneril and Regan could not know that. As far as Goneril knew, her fortune might depend upon the effect of her speech. Regan may have suspected that this was not the case, but with more than two-thirds of the kingdom remaining, she would take no chance. Cordelia alone of the three, seeing the remainder plainly before her on the map, knew in advance precisely what her share was to be. Cordelia alone therefore knew that her speech was not needed to establish her share. To Cordelia it must have been apparent that the test was a trick devised in her interest, and that Lear, far from demanding that she heave her heart into her mouth, was making his own protestation of love to her. In truth, Lear was not asking Cordelia to flatter him. Lear rightly counted on the hypocrisy of the elder daughters betraying them. But when he turns to Cordelia he seems rather to say, "See how I have turned their greed against them, and reserved the fairest portion for you, whose love I have never doubted."

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[20] They might have threatened Lear with a French alliance, just as Lear could threaten them with a French marriage for Cordelia.

[21] Goneril: "He always loved our sister most." I, *i*, 292.

[22] *E.g.* Coleridge, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

## V

Our analysis is now exposed to a grave objection. If Lear has, all along, judged correctly the characters of his daughters, as we have maintained, and if the love-test is meant to exploit the hypocrisy of Goneril and Regan in the interest of Cordelia's truth, why does Lear react so violently to that very truth? If his affection for Cordelia is due to the very qualities she here displays in so transcendant a manner, why then does he not place the same interpretation on her behavior that Kent does, and that we do, and tell the court that he sees in her blunt refusal to compete with her sisters the virtue that he all along wished to reward with the greatest share? Would not this have been hailed as a vindication of the old King's judgment, just as Bassanio's choice of the leaden casket vindicated the judgment of Portia's father, in *The Merchant of Venice?*

Our answer to this difficulty must be both in terms of the conscious motivation which we can ascribe to Lear, and in terms of an unconscious motivation. Before attempting this analysis of motives, however, it is desirable to restate the general thesis we have maintained concerning the play as a whole. We have said that the subject of the play is monarchy, and that it represents the supreme action of the greatest king. The first and most obvious objection to this thesis was the assertion that the king we see in action in Scene *i* is a foolish, vain old man, and not a great king at all. Our reconstruction of Lear's statecraft should make it possible now to waive that objection. But the subsequent apparent failure of that statecraft, far from refuting our claims concerning its merits, is actually necessary in order to vindicate those claims. In order that Shakespeare may make us understand what the greatest action of the greatest king is, it is necessary that he present us with an action that "fails." For if the action succeeded, we could not identify it as the greatest action. For then we could not know that the difficulty of the action was such as to require the utmost in human virtue. In determining the tensile strength of a cord, it is necessary to find the least weight that will *break* the cord, in order to find the greatest weight the cord will support. So it was necessary for Shakespeare to show us the point at which the most skillful policy of his most successful king *broke*, in order to point out, and thus define for us, the limits of kingly virtue. And if, as suggested above, Shakespeare regarded kingly virtue as the highest human virtue, he would thereby mark out for us the limits of human life, distinguishing it both from the life that is more than human and from the life that is less than human.[23]

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[23] We are here concerned primarily with the way in which Lear marks the limits of human life by transcending them in the direction of the divine in his relationship with Cordelia. A full interpretation of the play would explain fully how Goneril and Regan mark the lower limits of humanity, passing beyond them into bestiality.

Let us return now to our difficulty. In brief, it is our thesis that Lear is, on the conscious level, outraged by the injustice of Cordelia's refusal to permit the consummation of his carefully contrived plan. But the violence of his outrage is due to an unconscious sense that that very consummation, which he thinks he desired, would have violated, and forever frustrated, a passion far more profound than the passion for political success. For Lear, in striking at Cordelia, strikes also at his own handiwork. To understand the violence of Lear's eruption, we must understand the unconscious necessity he was under to destroy that political edifice which it had been his life's work to construct.

Starting from Lear's conscious motivation, we can answer the objection we have posed by observing that Lear certainly did not want the love-test to *appear* as a trick. To have done so would have run counter to a host of the political considerations we have advanced. Albany and Cornwall were not to be insulted. Lear wanted the entire scene to be a public "love-feast." In this Lear was acting the role of a hypocrite, we might say, but his hypocrisy was only a concession to his sense of justice. He had devised the best plan for the kingdom, for the common good, and any compromise that he had made with truth was made for the sake of justice. Cordelia's uncompromising, intransigent truthfulness contrasted then with his own willingness to sacrifice for the common good.[24] If we remember the key part that Cordelia was to play in the entire plan, we can begin to understand the sense of outrage, even betrayal, that the old man must have felt.

Although the mere fact of Lear's rage can be accounted for by this surface explanation, its violence, and its tragic consequences, are intelligible only if we relate what occurred on the surface to what occurred beneath it. What occurred beneath the surface may be summarized by saying that, when Cordelia jarred her father by her unexpected response, she not only upset his political plan, but his personal plan, which was to express his love of Cordelia. We must grasp the nature of Lear's need to express this love, if we are to understand the passion loosed when that need was frustrated.

Let us turn again to the love-test, a dramatic device brilliantly adapted to Shakespeare's multiple purpose in Scene *i*. Its function on the level of mere policy has been sketched. Lear asks his daughters to tell him how much they love him. In effect, he commands their love. Yet, in a sense, love cannot be commanded, only professions of love can be. By the love-test Shakespeare establishes one precise limit of Lear's power to command and, thereby, one limit of kingly power and virtue. But Lear asks his daughters to tell him how much they love him that he may proportion his bounty to their merit. He thus proclaims a kingly desire to proceed upon the rules of distributive justice, while also implying that love for himself is a proper test of merit in others. This latter implication is not mere vanity, if Lear is the great ruler we have said he is. For the daughter who loves him most will in all likelihood be the most meritorious, since she will most nearly resemble her father.[25] Yet in proclaiming his desire to make a just distribution, Lear tacitly admits the necessity he is under to know the truth concerning his daughters' love for him. But what the love-test discloses is the impossibility that Lear can ever have such knowledge as long as he remains upon his throne. For if it is true that love cannot be commanded, then he who possesses the power to command professions of love must be at a particular disadvantage in distinguishing genuine from spurious manifestations of love. Because Lear could, as king, command professions of love, it was impossible for him ever to be certain that an expression of love for himself, whether by Cordelia or another, was not in fact a response to his power of command.[26] Lear thought Cordelia loved him most, because he saw in her the reflection of his own kingliness. But if imitation is the sincerest kind of flattery, how could Lear ever distinguish the imitation of flattery from that generated by his virtue in the souls of those who really loved him? Cordelia's defiance in the love-test only brought into the open the king's essential impotence, for it is not impossible to ascribe to Cordelia a very shrewd selfishness in Scene *i*. Consider the consequences of her boldness: she was the intended bride of the "waterish" Burgundy; but, losing her dowry she loses a poor lover and gains a superior one, France. Not only does France exhibit a nobility of character that makes him seem worthy of his bride, but he is a king in his own right and, as we quickly learn, one who has no intention of abandoning his bride's claims.[27] Accordingly, Cordelia's course could be interpreted, not only as a sacrifice of public interest to private happiness, but as a clever scheme to become queen of France and England, thus defeating Lear's just policy, which is national and patriotic. Goneril and Regan were shallow hypocrites, but how could Lear know that Cordelia was not a clever one?

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[24] We must also give due weight to Lear's genuine paternal attachment to Goneril and Regan. It has been our thesis from the beginning that Lear was a political realist, and estimated his daughters' merits without sentimentality. This does not mean however that he wished to think ill of any of them, or that he had any inkling of the depths of baseness of Goneril and Regan. Lear's outburst against Cordelia was undoubtedly motivated, to some extent, by an instinctive awareness that Cordelia was tearing a veil that covered all their relationships, a veil on which were painted some pleasing illusions, illusions to which he was deeply attached even when not quite believing in them.

Lear, we have said, implies that love of himself is a test of merit in others. To assume the validity of such a test is, we might say, of the essence of monarchy. Love of justice, in a monarchy, is thought to be identical, in essence, with love of the monarch, because he is thought to incorporate justice.[28] Lear, we have said is a great king. Now a great king must have great power, for without such power he would not be obeyed, and if he were not obeyed he would not be a great king. Lear then must have great power or, what comes to the same thing, the illusion of great power.[29] The root of Lear's power is the conviction, in the heart both of king and subjects, that he is justice incarnate. Yet the absoluteness of Lear's power, founded upon this conviction, shuts him off from the very knowledge upon which that justice would have to be based if it were what it seems to be. For a spontaneous show of love cannot be distinguished from a clever imitation, except by a god who can search men's hearts. Humanly speaking, the power to discern disinterested motives, however limited in the best case, exists in inverse ratio to the power to command.[30] In proclaiming love of himself as the principle of distributive justice Lear in fact proclaimed, as the basis of his justice, a god-like knowledge. Lear, we might say, is compelled by the nature of his situation to pretend to a perfection he does not possess in order to actualize a perfection he does possess.

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[25] The tacit premise of this assertion is that we tend to resemble what we love. *Cf.* Plato, *Gorgias* 510 B 2 ff. The principle is as follows: when we love someone, we praise what he praises, and blame what he blames. But character is formed by responding to praise and blame, as a shoe is shaped upon its last.

[26] Compare the loveless plight of the tyrant in Xenophon's *Hiero*, and the interpretation thereof in Leo Strauss's *On Tyranny* (New York, 1948).

[27] We must not be blinded, by France's beautiful speech accepting Cordelia, to the prudential considerations which supported his action. To France, a claim upon Cordelia's dowry, not to mention a claim upon the British throne, was worth a good deal, whether acknowledged by Lear or not. France had forces to make good his claims, which Burgundy did not have. Hence France could affect a generosity which Burgundy could not afford. Note that France parted from Lear "in choler," which is hardly the state of mind of a successful lover, who owes the success of his suit to the very temper of the old king which he now resents.

But what meaning are we to ascribe to the expression "perfection he does possess"? Lear, we have said, is a great ruler. The unity and amity of the kingdom, although seen for the most part retrospectively, and through the attachment to him of all the "good" characters, are witness to this. Yet, granting Lear this superiority, we can still say that Lear never had more than an opinion of his own justice.[31] If we were to assume that such a regime is the best of which human life admits, we would, nonetheless, have to say that the best is, in a decisive sense, an illusion.[32] We would be further driven to conclude that Lear's greatness as a king is an illusion. Lear's supposed knowledge of his daughters' love of him, which was to have been the basis of his greatest and ostensibly most just political action, is of the essence of the illusion.

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[28] This does not mean that, in a monarchy, one cannot obey the monarch, and love justice, without loving the monarch. One might regard the monarch's commands as just because they happen to conform to a non-monarchical standard. Or, one might recognize the monarchical principle as the highest one, while holding the existing incumbent to be deficient in the qualities of a monarch. The second condition is not a genuine exception. because the regime would then not be monarchical in an unqualified sense. The fact that all actual monarchies may be nominal rather than real does not affect the argument. If, however, we consider the essence of monarchy, I believe the necessity for the statement in the text will appear. Monarchy is a political regime, consisting of a true king and true subjects. The true king is such by his pre-eminence in what his monarchical subjects recognize as virtue, as the true subjects are so by their obedience to the pre-eminent virtue of their ruler. But one cannot recognize virtue without loving it. Thus the necessary and sufficient condition of the obedience of a *monarchical* subject is the love of the personage who embodies the ruling virtue. It is this kind of obedience alone which makes the regime essentially monarchical, and distinguishes it from other kinds of regimes.

[29] As long as his subjects believe he has power, this belief is sufficient to produce the obedience which constitutes that self-same power.

[30] Compare Lear with the good Duke Vincentio in *Measure for Measure*. The Duke, in order to discover the truth about his subjects' characters, pretends to go on a long journey, delegating authority to some of those he wishes to test. He then returns disguised as a friar, and becomes the confessor and spiritual adviser of several of the principals. This course is not open to Lear for, among other things, he is king of a pre-Christian Britain. Another such comparison would be with Prospero in the *Tempest*. Prospero however has Ariel, and Ariel's power to produce illusions (according to Prospero's directions) makes the malefactors helpless to conceal their motives from the man who controls their access to reality. Neither Prospero nor Vincentio, however, although apparently exempted from Lear's "human" limitation, of being unable to search men's hearts for their motives, is regal in the sense that Lear is. Both love "the life removed," and "the liberal arts"; neither is a truly political man. Neither in fact is a success as a ruler, because both neglect the duties of office for something they care for more.

Now the crux of the situation consists in this: that the illusion which is the basis of Lear's policy, although adequate for all the purposes of political life, becomes intolerable at the decisive moment in the love-test. The old king has need of genuine love. The entire scene, we must remember, is due to his mortality, to the fact that he must provide for a successor. The very insufficiency which necessitates a succession, necessitates love. A god could be loved without loving, but a man cannot. If Lear possessed the perfection which, as king, he pretends to, he would be capable of being loved without loving. But Lear lacks such perfection. His need of love is radical. In pretending to the attributes of divinity, a pretence necessary to the operation of his seemingly most just rule, Lear has had to deny the claims of his humanity. As king, he has denied humanity, to serve humanity.[33] Cordelia, however, by her action, destroys the possibility of consummating that self-denial.

We must now analyse the precise impact that Cordelia's refusal had upon her father, and attempt to comprehend the interaction of his conscious and unconscious motivation. At the moment Lear rejects Cordelia, calls her stranger, and dowers her with his curse, she has in fact become a stranger to him. For Lear, in attempting to carry out the well-contrived pretense or deception of the love-test, had not hesitated to compromise with truth, albeit for the sake of justice. Cordelia, in refusing to make any such compromise, showed herself in her intransigence unlike her father. But it is this appearance of unlikeness, rather than the appearance of disobedience, that made a mockery of his plan. For the plan was founded on the assumption of such a likeness. But Lear's assumption that Cordelia loved him, and that she was like him, involved even more than the question of whether he was sound in his intention to make her his successor. For Lear had seen what he thought was the image of his own soul in Cordelia. His passion for Cordelia was his self-love transfigured: in his identification with her he saw his monarchy perpetuated beyond the grave. His faith in the truth of that image caused him to place faith in the bearer of the image. But bewildered by the sudden strangeness of the bearer, Lear could no longer recognize the image, and with this he lost the sheet anchor of what had hitherto been his existence. A colloquy in *Julius Caesar* may help to clarify what is here intended:

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[31] Lear's later sense of the limitations of his former justice is shown in the famous lines upon the heath:

> Take physic, pomp.
> Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
> That thou mayst shake the superflux to them
> And show the Heavens more just.
> III, *iv*, 33–36.

[32] The best is an illusion, because the virtue upon which it is founded is an illusion. The tacit premise, of course, is that virtue is knowledge, but that Lear, deficient in the self-knowledge which the action of the tragedy alone could remove, did not achieve genuine knowledge, and hence virtue, until after he had ceased ruling. If the regime was constituted by the virtue of the ruler, ruling not only his subjects' actions, but their hearts, then the regime too was, in this sense, an illusion.

[33] Compare *The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth*, III, *i*, 4–31, the speech ending "Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown," but especially Henry the Fifth's speech, in the play of that name, IV, *i*, 246–301:

> What infinite heartsease
> Must kings neglect that private men enjoy!
> And what have kings that privates have not too,
> Save ceremony, save general ceremony?

That is, kings are paid with an illusory good, that their subjects may enjoy a real one.

Cassius: Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?

Brutus: No, Cassius, for the eye sees not itself
But by reflection, by some other things.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cassius: Therefore, good Brutus, be prepared to hear.
And since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by reflection, I your glass
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which you yet know not of.
[Julius Caesar, Act I, *ii*, 51–69]

Lear's alienation from Cordelia involved his alienation from the basis of such self-knowledge as he believed himself to possess. He became alienated not only from her, but from himself, and from the world within which he had seen himself in his own mind's eye.[34] Lear's original, conventional kingliness was in-

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[34] The connection between Lear's image of the world in which he is king, and his image of the world in which he is no longer king, is indicated in many ways, including the following. In Lear's curse, disinheriting Cordelia, as in his oath affirming the banishment of Kent, Lear thinks of the order of the universe as the work of living gods, who are concerned with justice and injustice in the same sense that he is concerned with them. When cursing Cordelia he calls the light, the darkness, and "the orbs" from whose operation we both exist and cease to be, to witness his disclaimer of "paternal care, propinquity and property of blood." But if it is the operation of the divine order that is the cause both of our existence and nonexistence, Lear's belief that he could disclaim a connection determined by that order must mean that Lear believed that Cordelia, in offending her father, had offended that divine order; and in breaking links that connected her with her father in the local moral order, had broken the links connecting him with her in the supramundane cosmic order. Similarly, Lear confirms the banishment of Kent with an oath "By Jupiter." The reference is to the king of the Olympian gods, Homer's father of gods and men, who is invoked as the substance of what is shadowy in Lear's authority.

If we now turn from Scene *i* to the great passion upon the heath, we observe that Lear's consciousness of himself as a member of the imagined world he has until then intrinsic to the world implied by the image of himself which he saw reflected in Cordelia. The strange image which Cordelia now reflected separated Lear from this world, the world in which he had been king. He could not continue as king, as his original plan required, when he no longer had a basis for faith in that world. Yet some part of the passion of the outburst against Cordelia, like that against his other daughters later in the play, is due to his attachment to that lost world, an attachment not to be overcome lightly or in a moment. For his attachment to justice was at the root of his attachment to that world, and the tragedy of *King Lear* lies in the necessity of Lear to abandon even his attachment to justice, when the claims of love and truth are brought to bear in all their uncompromising imperiousness.

The deeper meaning of the love-test was foreshadowed when we observed that Cordelia, alone of the three sisters, knew in advance of her speech what her share of the kingdom was to be. Cordelia, we said, knew that her father, far from demanding a profession of love from her, was making a profession of love to her. In the test Lear becomes the lover and Cordelia the beloved. But the relation of beloved to lover is that of cause to effect, of superior to inferior. When Lear, responding to Cordelia's "Nothing," tells her that nothing comes of nothing, he expresses the axiom upon which all understanding of causality is founded. He tells her that there is no effect without a cause. He implies that she cannot cause him to be bountiful without obeying him. He does not know, however, that by becoming the lover, the only bounty he has to offer is his love, and that Cordelia, as beloved, can only cause his love by refusing to surrender

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habited, culminates in his tearing off his clothes. The clothes of course represent the conventions which have hitherto concealed his true self from himself. Lear's next words, after the "divesting," are in response to Kent's "How fares your Grace?" "What's he?" replies Lear, now unable or unwilling to recognize the conventional distinction implicit in the salutation. And Lear's very next words indicate how little of intentional irony there is in these lines. Gloucester is pleading with him to go in out of the storm. Lear demurs. "First let me talk with this philosopher." The person referred to is Edgar, disguised as a madman. "What is the cause of thunder?" demands Lear of the philosopher. Thus Lear, finally gone mad, as madness is understood in the world he has rejected, can no longer recognize the distinction of "grace," by which kings are kings, nor can he recognize in thunder the sign of Jupiter's authority, the authority which reinforces and guarantees the moral order represented in this world by kings. The thunderbolt, symbol of the power of Jupiter, has become a question of theoretical philosophy.

Finally, it is worth noting that Lear, alone of those present on the heath, penetrates Edgar's disguise. For Edgar is the philosopher who, at the last, provides the moral of the play. "Men must endure their going hence, even as their coming hither; ripeness is all" (V, *ii*, 9). Even this supreme insight has its irony, in that it is a truth conveyed by a son, Edgar, to his father, Gloucester. For the catastrophe of the tragedy, its only catastrophe, is the catastrophe of that moral order to which Lear and Gloucester belonged when the play began; the moral order in which kings and fathers command, the moral order which is part of a larger order or cosmos, whose hierarchy maintains and is maintained by, the kind of subordination and superordination implicit in the relationship of kings and subjects, fathers and sons. That the moral of the tragedy is expressed by Edgar, and that his father must become his pupil to grow wiser, is as much a part of the moral of the play as the moral itself.

the sovereignty which he has himself now thrust upon her. For Lear, ironically, is attempting to command Cordelia at precisely the moment, and in the very situation, in which his relation to her has been reversed, and she has become the commanding one. For when Lear turned to Cordelia to hear her profession, she had already ascended a throne. It was not the throne of Britain, but rather the invisible throne prepared by nature for those of surpassing virtue. We have noted above that Lear's choice of Cordelia as his successor was based upon a trans-legal conception of political right, in that he did not proceed upon the legal or conventional rule in accordance with which the eldest, as distinct from the best qualified, inherits. Yet we can now distinguish between the direct rule of political wisdom, which is what we may call Lear's rule before the great eruption, and natural right proper. For Lear's wise rule was still founded upon opinion, as distinct from knowledge, and to that extent represented a kind of conventional right, albeit the best kind. But we now see that Cordelia's precedence over her sisters is also a matter of natural right. But Cordelia's natural right to rule is not an element of political right. It follows not from the wisdom of her father's choice, but from her intransigence in regard to truth.[35] Cordelia's natural right, far from being an element of political right, is destructive of political right. For Lear's policy, which we have shown to be both wise and just, depends upon a small hypocrisy, a relatively slight pretense. Cordelia's nature, refusing to make the concession that policy called for, reveals, at one and the same moment, its transcendant beauty and its superiority to, if not its contempt for justice.[36]

[35] In short, Shakespeare would not accept Aristotle's formulation, that natural right is a *part* of political right, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1134 b 18 ff. For Shakespeare as for Plato the highest form of political right reflects rather than embodies pure natural right. Natural right is distinguished from political right. It is a transcendental cause of political right, rather than an element in it. *Cf.* Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, pp. 151–153.

[36] We may here venture a hypothesis concerning one of the most difficult problems in the interpretation of *King Lear*, albeit one that goes beyond the proper scope of this essay. This is the problem of the ending, the apparent wantonness of the gods in permitting the deaths of Cordelia and Lear. It has been cited as a fundamental defect of the dramatic structure that these deaths do not follow, as a result of the necessities of the action, as in the cases of Macbeth, Othello, Hamlet, Brutus, and other tragic heroes. It has been held that the poet's theme became too gigantic even for his colossal powers, and that, although dramatic fitness required the deaths of the hero and heroine, he knew no way of effecting these deaths but by chance. I believe there is another explanation.

One of the puzzles of the last scene is the apparently inexplicable delay of the dying Edmund, from line 200, where he promises to "do good," until line 245, where he finally tells of his order for the death of Cordelia. The delay might even conceivably be traced back to line 161, where Edmund appears already to show remorse. The question is, why, if Edmund's repentance is genuine, does he delay so long to tell of his order? The murder of Cordelia is the greatest of his crimes, and yet it lay within his power to stay the hand whose blow would put more guilt upon him than any he had yet struck.

The solution, I believe, is this. The deaths of Lear and Cordelia were not matters of mere dramatic fitness. They were required as retribution for the transgressions against justice that both had committed. Both had sided with France against Britain. Lear's rejection of Cordelia was a blow at his own justice as king; Cordelia's invasion with French

It was Lear's intention that Cordelia become sovereign. That intention is fulfilled within the love-test itself, but in a way that Lear did not anticipate. Nevertheless, we maintain, Cordelia does do what her father wishes her to do, but it is his unconscious wish that she fulfills. It requires the five acts of the tragedy for Lear fully to realize what that true wish was. Strangely enough, Lear, in his outburst against Cordelia, also acts in obedience to her, who is now his sovereign. For in the region beyond that of the political, to which their relationship has now been transferred, the act of obedience, the act of the true subject, is the act of love. To command love in this non-political sense, means to cause loving in the soul of another. Cordelia can be the cause of that love which Lear's great soul needs, only if Lear removes himself from, or removes from himself, every vestige of his monarchy in this world. We may summarize the ironies of Scene *i* by saying that the love-test, which at first glance appears to be a straightforward demand for protestations of love, turns out to be an elaborately contrived deception; but the supreme deception is that of the deceiver himself, who really acts, in the final analysis, albeit unwittingly, for the very purpose for which he says he is acting. Lear, acting to discover the truth about his daughters' love, does what would have been foolish as a political action if it were not a pretense; yet it is not foolish in its deeper, non-pretending meaning, because it is no longer a political action. For Lear's action, but not Lear himself, is thoroughly rational in the rejection of Cordelia. For reason could not have devised a more straightforward way than that actually taken by Lear, to divest himself of all the attributes of worldly monarchy.[37]

We have said that Cordelia's intransigent truthfulness showed her superiority, even to justice. It did indeed show that, on the level of political action, there need be no distinguishable difference between superiority to the claims of justice, and rank injustice. This paradox, far from being merely apparent, is at the core of the tragedy of *King Lear*, and lies in Shakespeare's vision of a universe in which the demands of justice are in an insoluble conflict with the demands of that truth which is, in its turn, the only unconditional motive for

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forces was not an act of public redress, it was motivated by love of her father, who was no longer the true king, because he had shown himself no longer capable of ruling. The defeat of the French forces, and the unification of the kingdom under Albany is, we must observe, a political consummation which achieves all the just purposes of Lear's original plan. The survival of Lear and/or Cordelia would throw all this once more into confusion. Above all would this be true if Cordelia lived, for it would continue the French claims, the excuse for foreign intrusion. The dying Edmund means to do some good yet. What good, in the sense of justice, could he do, better than to let the order against Cordelia's life run? It is necessary that Edmund remand the order, as a way of showing his repentance for the merely malicious action he had heretofore done, but the silent delay shows a deeper understanding of the demands of justice, the demands that Cordelia too had rejected, in favor of something celestial, just as he had rejected them in favor of something infernal.

[37] The word "divest" is used advisedly. See note 34 above. When Lear reawakens, after the "divesting" in the storm scene, he is in Cordelia's arms, wearing different clothes, clothes that he does not recognize.

justice. The proposition that truth is the motive for justice is symbolized by the fact that Lear's entire policy, his wise and just policy, has as its foundation his conviction in regard to Cordelia. Yet it was impossible for Lear's conviction to be more than a mere opinion within the framework of that policy. Cordelia, responding to Lear's unconscious demand for truth, as distinct from mere opinion, compels him to act in the most unjust manner possible, in order to discover that truth. Thus does the uncompromising quest for truth and love, which can ultimately be understood as different names for the same thing, destroy justice; even as the successful completion of Lear's original plan, while doing justice, that is, serving the common good, would forever have denied him that love and knowledge which alone could link his mighty soul with its source in eternity.

## VI

In this incomplete and inadequate analysis of a single scene of a single play, we have attempted only a few hints at the range and precision of Shakespeare's analysis of the problematic character of the ultimate in human and political existence. No argument would have been needed to convince anyone of the breadth of the poet's vision of the human scene, but I think it is indispensable to realize that there is a no less impressive intellectual precision underlying the amazing sweep. That precision is, I think, not an adventitious factor in the breadth, but its very condition. If there is a single philosophic doctrine which we may, without hesitation, ascribe to Shakespeare, it is that intellectual beauty is the condition of the existence of the beauty we apprehend with our senses. It would be an absurdity unworthy of his greatness, to suppose that, though it was given him to move us with the images of the senses, as it has perhaps been given no other man to do, he was for this reason less concerned with the intellectual beauty which was its cause. This essay is intended to suggest that the vividness of the sensual world presented to us by Shakespeare is a pallid thing, compared with that other world, which was his ultimate concern.

In conclusion, I would apply this generalization to the political problem presented at the outset: the problem of the perpetuation of the perfect regime. Human life, we might say, is set in motion by the demands of human virtue. These demands require political life. But the full demands of virtue transcend political life. In a sense, they transcend human life. Lear, who is, after all a mythical king of Britain, brought political life in the poet's own land to a peak that no actual king did. But the dynamism of Lear's soul, which drew the kingdom to this pitch, could not rest there. We said before that, according to Shakespeare, monarchy is the best form of government. This we may now qualify by saying that it is best only in a theoretical sense, and rather that the understanding of monarchy, as the indispensable condition of the understanding of political life, is the condition of such actual perfection as may fall within our human compass. For the understanding of monarchy is the condition of the understanding of the true relation of the political to the human, and of the human to the divine. Surely, such knowledge was never more needful.

# CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION: THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF PROTESTANTISM

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The purpose of this essay is to draw attention to two aspects of the political ideas of the sixteenth century Reformation which were important to the development of the Western tradition of political theory. First, like all great transformations, the Reformation stimulated the rethinking of much that had been taken for granted. In terms of political ideas, this centered around a developing crisis in the concept of order and in the Western traditions of civility. The criticism of the papacy by the early reformers had really amounted to a demand for the liberation of the individual believer from a mass of institutional controls and traditional restraints which hitherto had governed his behavior. The medieval church had been many things, and among them, a system of governance. It had sought, not always successfully, to control the conduct of its members through a definite code of discipline, to bind them to unity through emotional as well as material commitments, and to direct the whole religious endeavor through an institutionalized power structure as impressive as any the world had seen. In essence, the Church had provided a rationalized set of restraints designed to mould human behavior to accord with a certain image. To condemn it as the agent of the Antichrist was to work towards the release of human behavior from the order which had formed it. This liberating tendency was encouraged by one of the great ideas of the early reformers, the conception of the church as a fellowship bound together by the ties of faith and united in a common quest for salvation. But the *Genossenschaft*-idea lacked the complementary notion of the church as a *corpus regens*, a corporate society welded together by a viable structure of power. The inference remaining was that men could be fashioned to live in an orderly community without the serious and consistent application of force.

The second aspect of Reformation thought to be examined concerns the nature and source of political ideas. The crisis just mentioned cannot be properly understood if we take a narrow view of what is "political" in a set of ideas. Statements may be politically significant, yet not issue from a "political" theory. When the men of the Reformation put forward competing ideas of the church, they were not, so to speak, engaging in a form of immaculate conception and stating their ideas independently of common modes of thought and experience. In the act of projecting their ideal religious orders, the reformers were ineluctably led not only to draw upon the available experience concerning the political and social order, but also to use the language of political and social thought. These considerations point to the likelihood that Reformation ideas of a religious society would evoke many remainders of a political society, and, conversely, that conceptions of the political order would share many of the categories of religious thinking.

Once this is appreciated, it is possible to uncover a whole range of relevant and influential political ideas in the religious writings of the Reformation, even though these ideas were not always cast in the strict language of politics. In the case of the reformers' attack on the papacy, for example, the issue of man as an institutional being, entwined in an elaborate network of duties, privileges, and relationships, was not the less political for being formulated in a semi-political way. Again, the raging disputes over the "proper form of church government"—itself a revealing bit of common usage—can easily be made more meaningful if for "believer" we substitute "citizen," for "discipline" we substitute "power." In summary, the student of the history of political ideas does well to take seriously Hooker's phrase "the laws of ecclesiastical polity."

## I

Calvin's thought is particularly revealing of the interpenetration of political and religious modes of thought. The mixture of two is essential in understanding his crucial role in furthering the political education of Protestantism. On the religious side, his ecclesiology was a systematic elaboration of the principle that a church-society would remain incomplete and ineffective if it did not possess an institutional structure which could articulate its life. The community of believers was not enough; the additional element of power was needed to insure the coherence and solidarity of the community.

On the political side, the problem of order could be attacked only if the political community itself were regarded as worth saving. So long as men believed with Luther that government was a mighty engine of repression and that the political order was superfluous for the true Christian, so long would the political community remain in limbo.[1] To restore the discredited community was the first necessity.

While it would be extreme to conclude that Calvin presided over the "liquidation of the Reformation,"[2] there can be no denying that his emphasis on structure and organization, on controlling the impulses liberated by the Reformation, inaugurated a new phase of the movement. The individual was to be reintegrated into a double order, religious and political, and the orders themselves were to be linked in a common unity. The discontinuity between religious obligations and restraints and their political counterparts was to be repaired; Christian virtue and political virtue were to move closer together. The order that emerged was not a "theocracy," but a corporate community that was neither purely religious nor purely secular, but a compound of both.

The restorative work of Calvin was most clearly displayed in his theory of the church, for it was in this area that the anti-institutional bias of the early reformers had been most evident. In his theory the idea of the church had two aspects, the church visible and the church invisible. The latter he defined as

[1] *Works of Martin Luther*, ed. Charles M. Jacobs, 6 vols. (Philadelphia, 1915–1932), Vol. 5, p. 81, hereafter cited as *Works.*

[2] P. Imbart de la Tour, *Les origines de la Réformation,* 4 vols. (Paris, 1905–1935), Vol. 4, p. 53.

"the society of all the saints, a society spread over the whole world, and existing in all ages, yet bound together by the one doctrine, and the one Spirit of Christ. . . . "[3] The visible church, on the other hand, stood as a concession to human frailty. Since it included "many hypocrites" and many members in varying degrees of faith, its existence was attended by more tangible marks than the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments. Its location was not universal but specific; its unity was not guaranteed by grace, but required a definite and insuring structure of offices; so its concord was not spontaneous, but was the calculated product of discipline. The visible church, in short, was a kind of second-best form of church polity accommodated to the weaknesses of man's nature. At the same time, Calvin repeatedly warned that the disparities in perfection between the visible and the invisible church could never justify men in forsaking the visible form out of a desire to avoid contamination. "A departure from the church," he declared, was a "renunciation of God and Christ," "a criminal dissension."[4] Just as Aristotle had believed that every imperfect polity was capable of being improved, so Calvin believed that every visible church could be reformed by judicious measures.

The end at which such measures should aim was unity. This was the distinguishing mark of any society, visible or invisible, religious or civil. The solidarity of each type of society, however, was differently expressed. The unity of the invisible church, for example, was not the product of human art, but the result of the secret election of God which had predestined the membership for salvation. The unique destiny of the saints, however, did not detract from the fact that they lived a social life. In their communion they formed a universal society; the bonds of community came from a common love of Christ.[5]

For the visible church, too, Christ served as the central point of loyalty, the object of continual and ultimate commitment from which the unity of the whole derived. The force which conserved the society of believers was not produced from the controlling center of a Pope who acted as trustee for the *corpus Christianum.* Instead the cohesive force came from a mystical spirit working through the members who had joined with Him to form a *corpus*

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[3] "Letter from Calvin to Sadolet," *Tracts Relating to the Reformation,* trans. by Henry Beveridge, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1844), Vol. 1, p. 37.

[4] *The Institutes of the Christian Religion,* trans. by John Allen, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, n.d.), Vol. 2, pp. 281–83 (IV, i, 8–10). Hereafter this will be cited as *Inst.* and all translations, except where indicated, will be from it.

[5] "For unless we are united with all the other members under Christ our Head, we can have no hope of the future inheritance. . . . But all the elect of God are so connected with each other in Christ, that as they depend upon one head, so they grow up together as into one body, compacted together like members of the same body; being made truly one, as living by one faith, hope, and charity, through the same Divine Spirit, being called not only to the same inheritance of eternal life, but also to a participation of one God and Christ . . . the saints are united in the fellowship of Christ on this condition, that whatever benefits God confers upon them, they should mutually communicate to each other." *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 271–72 (IV, i, 2–3).

*mysticum.*[6] In the sacrament of the Last Supper the society possessed a unifying symbolism, which not only pointed towards the divine element which lay at the vital center of society, but towards the sustaining principle of love which nourished the common identity of the members. The sacramental rite signified a common good which the participants shared with and through Christ. And the common love of Christ became the actuating principle compelling the participants to share this good with their fellows: they could not love Christ without loving each other; and they could not injure each other without injuring Christ.[7]

The second primary bond which worked to unify the visible society was of a doctrinal kind. Through the constant preaching of the ministry and the arduous effort of the members to model themselves to an image of perfection, the teachings of Scripture would come to be an infusive force penetrating the most intimate areas of human conduct.

But while the preaching of the Word and the sacramental rites were sufficient to establish the existence of the invisible society, the visible society, containing as it did members in varying states of belief and unbelief, required additional aids. Unlike the invisible society, the visible lacked the unity of a common destiny, hence it had to create its unity by means of a coercive structure. Stated somewhat differently, the sacraments and the Word could provide a "social" unity for the visible church, but they could not provide the ecclesiastical government, the element of power, which was necessary for dealing with the heterogeneous nature of the members. The disparate character of the membership, some destined for salvation, others for damnation, could be moulded to unity only by a definite set of controlling institutions, an ecclesiastical polity designed to spread and enforce the Word, effect order, promote cohesion, and insure regularity in church decisions. In sum, the visible church had to be equipped with the proper instrumentalities of power.

To the extent that the visible church required institutions, laws, and governing officials it belonged to the realm of human art; and to that extent it challenged the ecclesiastical legislator to make of it *une église bien ordonnée et reglée.* While it could never achieve the perfection of the invisible society of the elect, it might aspire to a special excellence of its own. At the same time, the architect of the church did not have a perfectly free hand in executing the grand design.

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[6] *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans,* trans. by John Owen (Edinburgh, 1849), p. 458. Hereafter this will be cited as *Commentaries on Romans.* On this same point see Josef Bohatec, *Calvins Lehre vom Staat und Kirche* (Breslau, 1937), p. 271.

[7] ". . . such care as we take of our own body, we ought to exercise the same care of our brethren, who are members of our body; that as no part of our body can be in any pain without every other part feeling corresponding sensations, so we ought not to suffer our brother to be afflicted with any calamity without our sympathizing in the same." *Inst.,* Vol. 2, pp. 696–97 (IV, xvii, 38). A supplementary bond was also provided by the sacrament of baptism which initiated the member into the "society of the church." *Inst.,* Vol. 2, pp. 583, 611 (IV, xv, 1; xvi, 9).

He was limited by the injunctions of Scripture and by the reverence which ought to be accorded a divinely ordained institution. He did not create the idea of the church or its purposes. His task was to imitate, as far as the puny art of man allowed, the divine order which controlled the universe; to blend diversity into ordered harmony and individuality into a common good; to arrange the institutions and offices of the church so that the whole would function with the coherence of a living body.[8]

In drawing attention to the structure of the church, its "constitutions" and "offices," Calvin was rediscovering what the Roman Church had always practiced and the early reformers had nearly always forgotten: that a religious society, like any other society, must find support in institutions; and that institutions, in turn, were aggregates of power. Many of the reformers, in their eagerness to condemn the "worldly power" of the medieval Church, seemed to believe that there was another kind of power, "spiritual" power, which ought to be the proper mode for expressing the authority of a religious society. Luther, for example, always drew a sharp contrast between the two forms of power, "spiritual" and "secular," and emphatically denied that there were any elements common to both.[9] "Spiritual" power emerged as something *sui generis*. It was visualized as a form of suasion over the consciences of the believers. It was the kind of influence represented by the ministerial functions of preaching and discipline. The extent to which "spiritual" power was becoming "psyche-centered" was best represented by Luther's teaching on the church's power of excommunication or the ban. He insisted, first, that this power, while it could be used to banish members from the fellowship of the church and its sacraments, could not carry with it any civil disabilities or penalties.[10] Again, while the ban could exclude an individual from the "outward, bodily and visible fellowship," it could not affect "truth and righteousness [which] belong to the inner spiritual fellowship . . . they dare not be surrendered for the sake of the external fellowship, which is immeasurably inferior, nor because of the ban."[11] Thus Luther's belief in the superiority of religious truth and faith over institutional forms helped to transform the concept of "spiritual" power from what it had been in the medieval Church. It surrendered its commanding, coercive and final character and took on what Hobbes would have called a "ghostly" form.

In Calvin's case, however, the rediscovery of institutional life led to a rejection of the antithesis between the two types of power and of the assumption which underlay it. Civil government and ecclesiastical government did not symbolize distinctions of kind, but of objectives. Their natures, therefore, were more analogous than antithetical. A spiritual polity (*spiritualis politia*) bore the same necessary relation to the life of the church as the civil government to the life of civil society.[12] The governors of the church, too, must be well-versed in "the rule and law of good government," because such knowledge was essential to preserving any kind of order. Order, which Calvin defined as "a well-regulated polity, which excludes all confusion, incivility, obstinacy, clamours, and dissensions," was therefore a central objective of religious as well as civil polities.[13]

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[8] *Commentaries on Romans*, pp. 458–59.

[9] *Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 234–37; and see the Augsburg Confession (1530), Pt. II, art. VII in Philip Schiff (ed.), *The Creeds of Christendom*, 3 vols. (New York, 1877), Vol. 3, p. 58 ff.

[10] *D. Martin Luthers Werke* (Weimar Ausgabe, 1888–), Vol. 30, Pt. II, pp. 435, 462.

[11] *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 37–8, 52.

In Calvin's view, order was not a self-sustaining condition which, when once established, would continue from the momentum of its own perfection. It required a constant exercise of power. Just as the order of the universe was preserved by an active God so the human order must be supported by a steady force if its coherence was to be maintained.[14] Wherever there was order, there was power. Hence the kind of power which sustained a religious order might carry the adjective "spiritual," yet this did not transform it into a species of compulsion radically different from that present in the civil order. Spiritual power, in other words, constituted a specialized, not an etherealized, aspect of power applied to religious ends.

Admittedly Calvin frequently appeared to be arguing a sharp antithesis between secular and spiritual power; it was, he declared, "a Jewish folly" to confound the two. Spiritual government was concerned with "the inner man" and with his preparations for eternity; civil government, on the other hand, regulated "external conduct" and "the concerns of the present state."[15] Nevertheless, if Calvin's distinctions are examined more closely it becomes apparent that the difference between the two powers was not one of substance but of application. In a highly revealing passage in the *Institutes* Calvin remarked that "it was usual" to distinguish the two orders by the words "spiritual" and "temporal"; and, while this was proper enough, he preferred to call "l'une Royaume spirituel, et l'autre Civil ou politique" (*regnum spirituale, alterum regnum politicum*).[16] In avoiding the usual pejorative contrast between "spiritual" and "secular" and by declaring each of them to be a *regnum*, Calvin was pointing to the fact that the coercive element was common to both governances. The differences between them lay in their range of objects or jurisdiction.

That spiritual power did not represent a difference in kind is further supported from another direction. One of the primary motives which had led Calvin to draw the distinction in the first place had been polemical. He had sought to defend power against those who had rejected it in the one form or the other. On the one hand, some of the radical sectarians, in the name of "Christian liberty," had taught that the true believer was totally absolved from the commands of political authority. At the other extreme, and equally dangerous in Calvin's eyes, were "the flatterers of princes" who would have so magnified the power of civil magistrates as to destroy the integrity of the spiritual power. Against the one extreme Calvin asserted the value of the civil order for all men and its right to command Christians in particular; against the other he affirmed the independent power of the church and its claim over a particular jurisdiction. In short, Calvin's distinction between the two powers was intended to preserve the power of each and to refute the notion that spiritual power was merely a form of insubstantial persuasion. Moreover, when Calvin defined the spiritual government as the means whereby "the conscience is formed to piety and the service of God" and the civil government as that order which "instructs in the duties of humanity and civility," he did not mean that the spiritual government alone was concerned with conscience while the political government alone regulated "external" conduct. As we shall note later on, the civil government was concerned with conscience, but of a different kind. It had a positive duty to promote and shape a "civic conscience," or what the ancients had called "civic virtue." Conversely, the spiritual government, in discharging its functions of preaching and instruction, was also expected to help form civil manners, to correct "incivility," in short, to influence "external" conduct. The conclusion towards which all these considerations pointed was that "man contains, as it were, two worlds, capable of being governed by various rulers and various laws."[17] In both worlds, Calvin conceived man to be a creature of order, subjected to restraints and controlled by power.

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[12] Note the analogies drawn by Calvin between religious and political institutions; *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 483 ff. (IV, xi).

[13] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 477–83 (IV, x, 27–29; IV, xi, 1).

[14] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, pp. 52, 218, 220, 232 (I, ii, 1; xvi, 1–3; xvii, 1). The substance of these passages is that God is not "idle and almost asleep" but "engaged in continuous action."

[15] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 89–90, 770–71 (III, xix, 14; IV, xx, 1).

[16] *Calvani Opera*, ed. G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, 59 vols. (Braunschweig, 1863–1900), Vol. 2, pp. 622–23; Vol. 4, p. 358 (*Inst.*, III, xix, 15). These volumes form part of the *Corpus Reformatorum*, and hereafter they will be cited as *Opera*.

Calvin divided the power of the church into three aspects. The first, the power over doctrine, was limited by the injunction that "nothing ought to be admitted in the church as the Word of God, but what is contained first in the law and the prophets, and secondly in the writings of the apostles. . . ."[18] But in its relationship to the members of the Church it took on a more positive aspect. The power to preach and expound an unchanging body of truths was a method for strengthening the collective identity of the community by keeping before the members the object of their common allegiance.

Closely connected with this theme was Calvin's insistence that the interpretation of Scripture be confined strictly to the appropriate officers of the church. Here Calvin was motivated to some degree by the threat to unity present in the Reformation principle of putting the Bible in the hands of Everyman. This might lead, as Calvin well recognized, to as many private images of God as there were believers. Hence Calvin's insistence on the primacy of a uniform public truth and the centralization of its interpretation in the ministry had a social as well as religious purpose: to preserve the communal foundations of belief against the disintegrating effects of private visions.[19]

The second aspect of ecclesiastical power centered in the ability to make laws (*in legibus ferendis; ordonner loix et statuts*). In his discussion of this power

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[17] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 90 (III, xix, 15).

[18] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 422–23 (IV, viii, 8).

[19] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 74 (I, v, 11).

Calvin was at his subtlest and most legalistic. He wanted to discredit the papal use of the legislative power without discrediting the power itself. In line with the first objective he contended that the Papacy had abused the legislative power by enacting new rules of faith which had created unnecessary anxieties for believers. The popes, in other words, had trenched upon the sanctity of the individual conscience. In the course of Calvin's argument the claims of conscience came to be clothed with an almost sovereign immunity. Since Christ had been sent to free the Christian conscience from the burdens of error and superstition in order that men might more easily accept His teachings, it followed that "in matters that were left free and indifferent" no authority could legislate new barriers between the believer and the scriptural promise. "Our consciences have to do, not with men, but with God alone."[20]

Having demolished the Roman case, Calvin could only salvage the same power for his own church by modifying the dogma of conscience. For this purpose the proper starting point was not conscience but order. "In every human society some kind of government is necessary to insure the common peace and maintain concord." The nature of government required "some settled form" or procedures to expedite its transactions "decently and in order." But militating against any settled arrangement were such vagaries as the "diversity in the manners of men," the "variety in their minds," and the "repugnance in their judgments and dispositions." To overcome these anarchic forces, laws and ordinances were needed as "a kind of bonds," and once these controls had been established their existence would play a vital part in preserving the order of the church. "The removal of them would unnerve the church, deface and dissipate it entirely." Thus the legislative power, while not essential to the salvation of the believer, was fundamental to the preservation of the religious society. It was rescued by Calvin, not for the sake of the individual conscience, but for the sake of protecting the community against the strayings of the liberated conscience.[21]

The third aspect of the church's power, and "the principal one," was jurisdiction. This power was "nothing but the order provided for the preservation of spiritual polity."[22] Its scope extended from the humblest member of the congregation up to the highest political officers. Its preeminence came from the fact that it dealt with the most fundamental problem of order, namely, the discipline of the members.

> [For, if no society and no house . . . can be preserved in a proper state without discipline, this is far more necessary in the church, the state of which ought to be the most orderly of all. As the saving doctrine of Christ is the soul of the church, so discipline forms the ligaments which connect the members together, and keep each in its proper place . . . Discipline, therefore, serves as a bridle to curb and restrain the refractory, who resist

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[20] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 452 (IV, x, 5).

[21] *Inst.*, IV, x, 27. Here I have followed the translation of Henry Beveridge in his edition, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1953), Vol. 2, p. 434.

[22] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 439 (IV, xi, 1), Beveridge translation. Calvin consciously sought to widen the power of jurisdiction by tracing it back to the Jewish Sanhedrin and thereby capitalizing on the extensive authority of that body.

> the doctrine of Christ; or as a spur to stimulate the inactive; and sometimes as a father's rod with which those who have grievously fallen may be chastized in mercy, and with the gentleness of the Spirit of Christ.[23]

Calvin's emphasis upon discipline makes it obvious that he saw in it another method for controlling the liberated conscience.[24] By means of discipline the believer was to be reinserted into a context of restraints and controls; he was to be reshaped into a creature of order. This was to be accomplished by minutely regulating his external conduct and by indoctrinating him in the basic teachings of the religious society. And buttressing this comprehensive system of controls was the supreme sanction (*severissima ecclesiae vindicta*) of excommunication. In Calvin's system excommunication implied a great deal more than the mere severance of external ties. The expelled were condemned to a life without hope, a life outside the circle of fellowship:

> . . . there is no other way of entrance into life, unless we are conceived by [the church], born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and government until we are divested of this mortal flesh and "become like the angels" . . . we must continue under her instruction and discipline to the end of our lives . . . Away from her bosom there can be no hope of remission of sins or any salvation . . . It is always fatally dangerous to be separated from the church.[25]

Although Calvin denied that the power of jurisdiction was comparable in coercion to the punishing sword of the state, it is difficult to see how a power which could expel the already anxious believer from the circle of the faithful was in any way inferior to the strongest weapons at the disposal of civil rulers. The severity which marked this power was not attributable to any "Catholic" tendencies in Calvin's thought; rather it testified to his conviction that the problem of order was crucial. The solution, according to Calvin's logic, demanded the use of positive power on the part of the church in order to refashion Protestant man into a creature of order, or more accurately, to make him conform to a Christian image of civility.

The contrast between this conception of the role of the church and Luther's was not produced simply by Calvin's willingness to restore a three-term relationship of God-church-believer for the simpler notion of Luther. The real contrast took shape from Calvin's effort to recapture an older conception of the community as a school of virtue and the vital agency for the realization of individual perfection. If we compare, for example, Calvin's symbolism of the mother-church with the passages in Plato's *Crito* where Socrates declares he would rather take the hemlock than betray the *polis* which has nurtured him to dignity, a striking similarity in outlook emerges. This is not to say that

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[23] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 503–4 (IV, xii, 1).

[24] See the discussion of Pierre Mesnard, *L'Essor de la philosophie politique au XVIe siècle*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1952), p. 283 ff.

[25] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 273–74 (IV, i, 4). It is important to note that the ultimate power of excommunication was placed specifically in the hands of the higher officers of the church, that is, the pastors and the Council of Elders. The power was specifically excluded from the province of the magistrates and the congregation.

Calvin, as the representative of sixteenth century French humanism, was intent on reviving in some mimetic sense the classical conception of the community. It is only to indicate that Calvin's conception of a church-society stood as the culmination of a long intellectual process, extending back to the beginnings of Christianity, whereby the idea of the community as the custodian of virtue had been translated from a political to a religious setting. The church and not the city became the vital medium for human improvement, the symbol of human destiny: "to the end of time," wrote Augustine, "as a stranger upon the earth, suffering the persecutions of the world and receiving the consolation of God, the Church travels onwards."[26]

While Calvin retained the Christian idea of the superior virtue of religious society, he reformulated it in a way which was different from both the medieval and the Lutheran conceptions of the church. In adopting the Lutheran idea of a community-in-fellowship Calvin departed from the dominant medieval tradition; in enveloping that community within a structure of power he departed from Luther. The final result pointed at a church which was to be something more than a community and something more than a christianized *polis*. At its deepest level the church cohered as a *corpus mysticum*, but on top of this mystic foundation Calvin erected a set of institutions to articulate and enforce a distinctive way of life. The tight corporate quality of the whole recalled the ancient *polis*, yet the underlying element of mystery was a reminder of that transcendent strain utterly alien to the classical community. The church heralded the triumph of God—and here Calvin followed an old Christian belief; it pointed towards a perfection in eternity, and not within the time-space limits of the *polis*. Citizenship in the church-society did not connote participation in offices, but participation in a pilgrimage which would ultimately transcend history.

Despite the fact that Calvin placed a high value on community life and the institutions of the church, he was not insensitive to the danger that institutional means might become elevated into ultimate ends. As a safeguard against this possibility he insisted that the power of the church was limited, that the authority of Scripture was superior to that of the church, and that faith stood above both men and institutions:

> Ours is the humility, which beginning with the lowest, and paying respect to each in his degree, yields the highest honor and respect to the church in subordination, however, to Christ the church's Head; ours is the obedience, which, while it disposes us to listen to our elders and superiors, tests all obedience by the Word of God.[27]

## II

To an important degree the institutional structure which Calvin proposed for the government of the church was fashioned to overcome the difficulties encountered by the Lutherans and Anabaptists. The Lutheran church appeared increasingly vulnerable to political pressures, while the Anabaptist congregations seemed to have escaped the world only to be troubled by internal disorders. Thus the one church was plagued by political interference, the other by the confusions of congregational democracy. To meet these problems Calvin proposed that the best church polity should aim at self-sufficiency, but without divorcing itself from the life of political society; it should follow the Reformation principle of bringing the members into the active life of the church, but without entrusting them with the close supervision of affairs; it should provide for strong leadership and direction within the church, but without restoring the pope. In tracing out a solution in these terms, Calvin produced a political theory of church government.

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[26] *De Civitate Dei*, Lib. XVIII, cap. 51.

[27] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, pp. 35–6 (Ded. Epist.), 86–7 (I, vii, 1–2); Vol. 2, pp. 417–19 (IV, viii, 2–4); "Letter to Sadolet," *Tracts*, Vol. 1, p. 50.

Calvin was particularly sensitive to the charge that, under the guise of attacking the papacy, he had reintroduced a new hierarchy. He tried to counter this by arguing that a church modeled on the *Institutes* could not be hierarchical because none of its offices could claim an authority independent of Scripture. Hierarchy, in his definition, was equivalent to arbitrariness; a chiseled structure of offices was not bad in itself, as long as it did not culminate in a single, preeminent human authority. Calvin, in short, was not so much anti-hierarchical as anti-monarchical.

Of the major offices outlined by Calvin the two most important were the pastorate and the Elders (*les Anciens*). Under the Genevan system the Elders were laymen elected by the secular civic Council; together with a selected number of ministers, they formed the Consistory, the chief organ of church discipline.[28] The pastors were unquestionably the most powerful agency and the nerve-center of the whole system. They were to be nominated, in the first instance, by their fellow-ministers, and then passed on by the Council. The names which survived were then submitted to the congregation for its approval or rejection. The procedures whereby the pastors were selected provides a good illustration of the role allotted the congregation in Calvin's scheme: the membership could ratify or reject decisions; they could not formulate policy. Calvin looked upon the actions and the decisions of the church as being primarily institutional products. They were the results of prescribed procedures and of the actions of certain designated officers and agencies. Above all, these methods were the guarantee that order and regularity would prevail in church affairs; they were the alternatives to the confusion and disorder of popular control. The element in Calvin's church which most corresponded to popular participation occurred at what we could call the "social" or sacramental level. It was through the symbolism of the sacraments and the preaching of the Word, and not in the making of "political" decisions in the church, that the members enjoyed the shared intimacies of community.

These aspects of Calvin's system formed a sharp contrast to certain sectarian ideas—also hinted at by Luther on occasion—that the ministers of the church were agents of the community, hence subject to recall, and that some of the powers of the church, such as excommunication or expulsion, were to be wielded by the whole membership. For Calvin the powers of the church resided "partly" in the pastors and "partly" in the councils of the Church. But the officers of the church, even though elected by some of the members of the congregation, were not to be considered agents of the community, but instruments of the Word of God the maker of all things (*instrumento artifex*).[29]

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[28] Herbert D. Foster, "Calvin's Program for a Puritan State in Geneva," *Collected Papers of Herbert D. Foster* (privately printed, 1929), p. 64; Emile Doumergue, *Jean Calvin. Les hommes et les choses de son temps*, 7 vols. (Lausanne, 1899–1928), Vol. 5, p. 188 ff; Mesnard, *op. cit.*, p. 301 ff.

While the role of the congregation was hollowed of most of its substance, the pastorate, as the symbol of the common social purpose—"the principal bond which holds the believers together in one body"[30]—was exalted:

> Here is the supreme power (*summam potestatem*) with which the pastors of the church . . . ought to be invested: that by the Word of God they may venture to do all things with confidence; may constrain all the strength, glory, wisdom, and pride of the world to obey and submit to His majesty; supported by His power, may govern all mankind, from the highest to the lowest . . . may instruct and exhort the docile; may reprove, rebuke, and restrain the rebellious and obstinate; may bind and loose; may discharge their lightnings and thunders, if necessary; but all in the Word of God.[31]

This last phrase—"all in the Word of God"—was the crucial qualification to Calvin, for it transformed what might have been a roving mandate into a species of limited power. Despite its central position in Calvin's scheme, the pastorate was not an office possessed of unlimited possibilities. It did not belong to that tradition wherein the holders of power might freely shape the passive mass of the governed, restrained only by the malleability of the human materials. In certain aspects Calvin's conception of the role of office in an organized community veered towards the Platonic tradition of the philosopher-ruler as the objective agency for an eternal truth which he served but did not invent. In its ideal form, the office of pastor, like that of the philosopher-ruler, remained undisfigured by the personality or bias of the incumbent. A pastor who strayed beyond the objective teachings of Scripture profaned his office. The pastors were enjoined to "bring forward nothing of themselves, but speak from the mouth of the Lord" and "speak nothing beside His Word."[32] The pastor must labor, then, as a selfless demiurge, a dedicated artisan at the service of the Word. His power was not personal but institutional.[33]

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[29] In Doumergue's magisterial work on Calvin there is a spirited defense of the thesis that Calvin's theory of the church embodied a strong "representative" element. Yet Doumergue's argument is weakened by his failure to ask: what and whom do the officers of the church represent? He is content, instead, to indicate the several passages where Calvin provided for congregational approval of certain church officers. The difficulty here is that election is not the same as representation, especially when it is not accompanied by a power of recall. Hence even though Calvin declared that the ministers constituted a *corpus ecclesiae repraesentans* (*Opera*, Vol. 14, p. 681), his meaning was that the ministers represented the purposes of the church as defined by Scripture. He did not mean that the ministers represented the wills or separate interests of the members of the congregation, hence Doumergue's attempt to relate the Calvinist theory of the church to modern representative government is not convincing. See his discussion, Vol. 5, pp. 158–62.

[30] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 318–19 (IV, iii, 2); see also *ibid.*, p. 317 (IV, iii, 1).

[31] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 424 (IV, viii, 9).

Nevertheless, qualifications attached to Calvin's conception of this key office removed it at certain points from the Platonic tradition. The Platonic ruler symbolized the unbroken trinity of virtue, knowledge, and power; if perfect knowledge were perfect virtue, then these must be allied to perfect power. But Calvin's pastor was deficient in all three: the elect symbolized virtue, and there was no guarantee that the pastor *qua* pastor belonged to this group; greater knowledge of Scripture he might have, but it would have been blasphemous to assert that this represented a perfect knowledge; and while he possessed great power and influence over the congregation, he was far from having a monopoly in these matters. The pastor, in short, was a leader, not a ruler. It was the highest office possible in a community without a head, without a single human center of direction and control.

When this conception of the pastoral office is placed alongside the other elements of Calvin's ecclesiology, such as the passive role of the congregation and the repeated emphasis on institutional structure; and when these in turn are combined with his unvarying belief in the binding objectivity of Scripture, then the fundamental motivation becomes clear: to make of the Church and its officers a selfless instrument for advancing the Word. So obsessive was this master-idea that in the end the church stands as a kind of granite edifice, an inhuman monument. Its structure has been built to anticipate and counter the threat of human discretion. Wherever the human element, like some wayward and mercurial spirit, sought escape from the institutional processes in order to assert its own individuality, it was met by Calvin, lying in wait with the exacting measure of Scripture.

The obverse side to Calvin's conception of the church was that it marked the Protestant rediscovery of the institutional dimension. In developing his ideas on this subject Calvin touched upon a whole range of topics, including the nature of power, the functions of office, the bonds of community, and the role of membership. The totality of these problems constituted more than a theory of an ecclesiastical polity; it was nothing less than a comprehensive statement covering the major elements of a political theory. Here was a vision of a rightly-ordered society and its government; here, in the sacramental mysteries and in the preaching of the Word, lay a new symbolism, a new set of sustaining "myths" to cement the society together; here, in the tight discipline enforced by the church, was the shaping hand to mold the members to a common outlook and instruct them in the lessons of a common good; and here in the promise of salvation was the perfecting purpose towards which the particular wills of the members were to be bent. The central message of the whole was of man's necessary relationship to a determinate order.

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[32] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 417 (IV, viii, 2).

[33] The authority and dignity of the pastoral office, according to Calvin, belonged not "to the persons themselves, but to the ministry over which they were appointed, or to speak more correctly, to the Word, the ministration of which was committed to them." *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 424 (IV, viii, 9). American constitutional lawyers will recognize in this a forerunner of the role the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century claimed for itself when interpreting the Constitution in the exercise of its power of judicial review.

## III

The transition from Calvin's religious to his political thought was not abrupt. The same categories of analysis and modes of thought which had informed his religious writings are found in his political theory. For Calvin, political and religious thought tended to form a continuous realm of discourse. The major unifying element was the general concept of order which was a premise common to both religious and political society. This unity of outlook is worth emphasizing, because it is in sharp contrast with that of the early reformers. In the thinking of Luther and the Anabaptists the political and religious categories, far from being united by any internal connection, faced each other in a posture of dialectical tension. The hostility of many of the early reformers towards the political order created a kind of fault line between their political and religious modes of thought. When they described the nature of the church or the holy life of the believers, their words and concepts evoked a picture of a good society, united in holy fellowship and living a life of harmony. It was the imagery of minds which had glimpsed a transcendent kingdom. But when they turned to consider the kingdom of the world, the categories shifted abruptly and the imagery darkened. For language and concept were no longer dealing with the church, the vessel of God's grace, but with the state, the weapon of His awful vengeance. Love, brotherhood, and peace, those immanent forces in the life of the church, trailed off into wistful hopes when confronted with political society. As part of the kingdom of the world, political society was a realm where conflict and violence rumbled below the surface, ready at any moment to erupt into bloodshed and disorder. Political authority naturally tended to be pictured as a mighty engine of repression—"smite and smite, slay and slay" Luther had exhorted the princes during the Peasants' War—designed to enforce peace and to protect the Christian remnant from the terrors of the world. Such a government aimed not at virtue, but at keeping men from each other's throats; mankind had never really given up the Hobbesian state of nature. In this view, an extreme tension persisted between the nature of man and the requirements of order. Political society marked a condition of "fallen nature" where sinful man strained impatiently at the restraints imposed by authority and restlessly searched for the chance to break through.

Yet it is a picture with a striking incongruity between the Christian cosmology and the Christian sociology; the one positing an omnipotent God ordering all of creation towards harmony, the other painting society as a dark, disordered mass trembling on the brink of anarchy and seemingly outside the beneficent order of God. In the thought of some of the early reformers, political society could be likened to a realm where the cosmic writ did not run. But while the moral status of government had shrunk, its power had been exalted even to the extent of entrusting it with religious responsibilities.

The task Calvin undertook was to reconcile the several opposites created by the split-vision of the early reformers. He had to resolve the conflict between the Christian cosmology and its sociology; he had to reestablish the moral status of the political order, but without making it appear as a substitute for religious society; he had to soften the black-and-white contrasts between the two forms of society. The over-all method Calvin employed for bringing the two societies into some kind of congruence was to treat them both as subject to the general principle of order. Order became the common center to which the problems of the two societies, as societies, were to be referred. Political society was to be rescued from limbo by being restored to a wider, ordered frame. It was to become a part of the Christian cosmology. For Calvin the governance of God was displayed in His total command over all that occurred within His domain: "not a drop of rain falls, but at the express command of God."[34] His mastery extended also to history and society; He visited judgment on the affairs of men, punishing the wicked, elevating the just and protecting the faithful. The plenitude of His power, therefore, excluded the disruptive influence of contingency and chance. He "regulates all those commotions in the most exact order, and directs them to their proper end."[35]

As part of this divine economy, civil government could no longer be viewed as a mere agency of repression or as "a polluted thing which has nothing to do with Christian men."[36] It has been designed by God to preserve and to improve the creatures with whom He had covenanted. Government was elevated into an educative agency "by which a man is instructed in the duties of humanity and civility, which are to be observed in an intercourse with mankind."[37] But if the function of government were raised above mere repression, then evidently the nature of man must contain something beyond an irrepressible inclination towards disorder. And although Calvin stood second to none of the reformers in his low estimate of man's nature,[38] we find him, nevertheless, attaching an important qualification. The minds of all men contained "general impressions of civil probity and order"; they exhibited "an instinctive propensity to cherish and preserve society."[39]

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[34] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 223 (I, xvi, 4).

[35] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 233 (I, xvii, 1).

[36] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 771 (IV, xx, 2).

[37] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 90 (III, xix, 25).

[38] "Had we remained in the state of natural integrity such as God first created, the order of justice would not have been necessary. For each would then have carried the law in his own heart, so that no constraint would have been needed to keep us in check. Each would be his own rule and with one mind we would do what is good. Hence justice is a remedy of this human corruption. And whenever one speaks of human justice let us recognize that in it we have the mirror of our perversity, since it is by force we are led to follow equity and reason." *Opera,* Vol. 27, p. 409. See also *Opera,* Vol. 7, p. 84; Vol. 49, p. 249; Vol. 52, p. 267; and the discussion in Chenevière, *La pensée politique de Calvin* (Paris, 1937), pp. 93–94.

[39] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 294 (II, ii, 13).

By returning to the older political tradition which had pictured man as a creature destined for order, Calvin was able to recapture for his own purposes the idea of political society as the fulfillment of certain desirable tendencies in men. Political society, far from being a Procrustean bed which cut ungovernable humanity to the pattern of obedience, was now advanced to a divinely-ordained agency for man's improvement. "The authority possessed by kings and other governors over all things upon earth is not a consequence of the perverseness of men, but of the providence and holy ordinance of God."[40] Government was "equally as necessary to mankind as bread and water, light and air, and far more excellent."[41]

Concurrent with the restored status of political society and the reinvestment of man with a political nature, the ends of the political order took on a loftier dignity. The office of the magistrate aimed not merely at the preservation of life, but at "the enactment of laws to regulate a man's life among his neighbors by the rules of holiness, integrity, and sobriety."[42] Through the pursuit of these ends the political order was linked with the higher purposes of religious society. Nevertheless, this union did not obliterate the integrity or the distinctiveness of the political order. It still had a unique role to play. It outfitted men with a type of civility and discipline which could not be gained elsewhere. The charge that Calvin was intent on stamping society with a Christian image, or on purging it of its distinctively political attributes, does less than justice to his basic intent. If the matter is analyzed merely in terms of certain "higher" and "lower" values, then there can be no denying Calvin's conviction that political society ought to promote the "higher" ends of Christianity—*ad majorem Dei gloriam*. To be a good citizen was not an end in itself; one became a good citizen in order to be a better believer. Nevertheless, the ends of political society were not exhausted by its Christian mission. Government existed to promote "decency" as well as "godliness," "peace" as well as "piety," "moderation" as well as "reverence." In other words, government existed to promote values which were not necessarily Christian, even though they might be given a Christian coloration; they were values which were necessary for order and, as such, a precondition for human existence. Civil government, then, was to promote the values which sustained order; it was to *civil*-ize men, or, in Calvin's words, "to regulate our lives in a manner requisite for the society of men, to form our manners to civil justice." It followed that when the spiritual and the political jurisdictions were rightly constituted the two orders were "in no respect at variance with each other."[43]

In a striking passage condemning the sectarian animus against the political order, Calvin summarized the value of political society and underscored its vital role in the Christian economy:

> For that spiritual reign, even now upon earth, commences within us some preludes of the

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[40] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 774 (IV, xx, 4).
[41] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 90 (III, xix, 15); Vol. 2, p. 771 (IV, xx, 2).
[42] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 90 (III, xix, 15); Vol. 2, pp. 772–73 (IV, xx, 3).
[43] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 772 (IV, xx, 2).

> heavenly kingdom, and in this mortal and transitory life affords us some taste of the immortal and incorruptible blessedness; but the end of this temporal regime is to foster and maintain the external worship of God, the pure doctrine and religion, to defend the constitution of the church in its entirety, to adapt our conduct to human society, to shape our manners in accordance with civil justice, to create concord among us, to maintain and preserve a common peace and tranquillity. All these things I confess would be superfluous if the kingdom of God, as it now exists within us, extinguishes the present life. But if it is the will of God that we should wander upon earth while aspiring towards our true country, and if such aids are necessary to our journey here; then those who would take them from man deprive him of his humanity.[44]

The values of unity and cohesion, so prominent in Calvin's discussion of the church, were evident also in his conception of the political community. The unity of the political order, however, was not that of the *corpus mysticum.* Political unity would draw sustenance and support from the mystic solidarity of Christians—"Christians are not only a body politic, but they are the mystical and spiritual body of Christ,"[45]—but the more immediate source of cohesion would be in the political society itself.[46] There was a kind of natural unity arising from man's innate instinct towards an ordered life in society, and there was a kind of artificial unity which could be induced by the institutions of society. The full unity of the society was the product of an alliance between nature and art. For the individual member it meant an education in order, that is, the acquisition of a set of civil habits which would simultaneously support civilized life and satisfy one of man's basic instincts.

While civil law and political institutions were two of the main agencies of stability and order, these same ends were also served by the system of vocations. A graduated social hierarchy, clearly defined in terms of offices and obligations, was but the civil counterpart to the divine principle which sustained the universe. Far from being a divisive force, distinctions of status and eminence were not only inevitable, but, in a Christian society, salutary. They had been instituted by God to prevent men from wallowing in "universal confusion." They outfitted the individual with a sort of social map, a sense of direction "that he might not wander about in uncertainty the rest of his days."[47]

Man's education to membership in an ordered community was furthered from still another source. The life of the church was an intensely social one, and in the element of love, which bound the fellowship together, it possessed a powerful cohesive whose influence would carry over to blunt the sharp edges of the social hierarchy. Love became the basic fusing force which blended the private goods of individuals into a common good for the whole society:

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[44] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 772 (IV, xx, 2). I have slightly changed the translation; see the text in *Opera*, Vol. 2, p. 1094. In connection with this point it is interesting to note how Calvin reversed the usual argument and asserted that obedience to human superiors helped to habituate men to obedience to God. *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 433 (II, viii, 35).

[45] Cited in Doumergue, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 45.

[46] Compare Calvin's use of the *corpus mysticum* to that of the fifteenth century writer Sir John Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Anglie*, edited and translated by S. B. Chrimes (Cambridge, 1949), cap. xiii. The whole problem of the influence of the Eucharist on political ideas remains to be explored. Some suggestive points are to be found in two articles by Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "*Pro Patria Mori* in Medieval Political Thought," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 56, pp. 472–92 (April, 1951), and "Mysteries of State: An Absolutist Concept and Its Late Mediaeval Origins," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 48, pp. 65–91 (Jan., 1955). Fundamental for this problem is Henri de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1949).

[47] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, pp. 790–91 (III, x, 6).

> . . . no member [of the human body] has its power for itself, nor applies it to its private use, but transfuses it among its fellow members, receiving no advantage from it but what proceeds from the common convenience of the whole body. So, whatever ability a pious man possesses, he ought to possess it for his brethren, consulting his own private interest in no way inconsistent with a cordial attention to the common edification of the church . . . whatever God has conferred on us, which enables us to assist our neighbor, we are the stewards of it, and must one day render an account of our stewardship.[48]

## IV

Calvin's claim that there was a kind of virtue attainable only in a political order raised still another set of problems. If virtue implied knowledge—and Calvin assumed with the ancients that it did—then was it possible to have political knowledge and, if so, how reliable was it?

Calvin agreed that there was such a form of knowledge. It was located in the province of "terrestrial knowledge" (*l'intelligence des choses terriennes*), a knowledge "which relates entirely to the present life" and "in some sense is confined within the limits of it". The highest type of knowledge was "celestial knowledge" which pertained to "the pure knowledge of God, the method of true righteousness, and the mysteries of the heavenly kingdom."[49] The inferiority of political knowledge was the result partially of its association with lesser objects and partially of its reliance on the imperfect instrument of reason. Reason, like the rest of man's nature, had been ineradicably corrupted by the Fall. There was, however, an important qualification: the corruptive effects of Adam's apostasy were partial, not total. Man's rational understanding had been crippled but not annihilated. "Some sparks continue to shine in the nature of man, even in its corrupt and degenerate state, which prove him to be a rational creature. . . ." And while reason could not lead man to spiritual regeneration or to "spiritual wisdom," it might usefully serve him in political society.[50]

Proof of a natural relation between reason and political life was to be found in man's "instinctive propensity towards civil society." "This," Calvin declared, "is a powerful argument that in the constitution of this life no man is destitute of the light of reason."[51] Man was not rational and therefore social; he was social and therefore rational. More important, Calvin claimed that reason could elicit political truths, an assertion which he supported by the writings of the classical pagan authors. Where Luther had venemously condemned the "harlot reason" and had likened previous political philosophy to an Augean stable awaiting only the cleansing broom of the Wittenberg Hercules, Calvin moved to restore something of the classical relationship between reason and politics and something of the reputation of the classical philosophers: "shall we deny the light of truth to the ancient lawyers, who have delivered such just principles of civil order and polity?"[52] Calvin strongly agreed that natural reason would play men false if they attempted to convert it into a vehicle of spiritual salvation, yet this did not prevent a kind of kinship between the political wisdom in the Christian precepts, such as that contained in the second table of the Decalogue, and the political insights of natural reason. Both types of wisdom had a common origin in the will of God. Thus the principles of reason were not to be viewed as a human invention *ab nihilo* but as deductions from the moral dictates which God had "inscribed" and "engraven on the hearts of all men":

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[48] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 757 (III, vii, 5).

[49] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 294 (II, ii, 13).

[50] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, pp. 295–96 (II, ii, 14–15); pp. 298–99 (II, ii, 17–18); p. 366 (II, v, 19).

[51] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 295 (II, ii, 13).

> Since man is by nature a social animal (*homo animal est natura sociale*), he is also inclined by a natural instinct to cherish and preserve society. Accordingly, we see that there are some general precepts of honesty and civil order impressed on the understanding of all men. For this reason there is no one who does not recognize that all human associations ought to be ruled by laws, and there is no one who does not possess the principle of these laws in his own understanding. For this reason there is a universal agreement among nations and individuals to accept laws, and this is a seed planted in us by nature rather than by a teacher or legislator.[53]

But since this universal moral law of conscience was too dim to illumine men's actions with any consistency, God had supplemented it by the Decalogue, which declared "with greater certainty what in the law of nature was too obscure . . . "[54] When thus reinforced by the Decalogue, the moral law could function as the Christian version of natural equity which was "the same for all mankind." It was to be the informing standard for a rightly-ordered community, "the scope, and rule, and end of all laws."[55]

The qualifications which Calvin attached to the moral law were consistent with his conviction that a perfect knowledge of politics could not be achieved independently of the Christian teaching. Lacking the Christian wisdom, political knowledge possessed only a limited integrity of its own. The insufficiency of political reason in Calvin's system formed a logical parallel to the limited ends pursued by the political order itself. The sights of political society were pitched lower because the virtue at which it aimed was a virtue of the second order. The chief end of man was to know God, and to achieve this end men had to be regenerated—"depart from ourselves" and "lay aside our old mind, and assume a new one." But the task of fashioning the "new man" was not assigned to the political order. Its business was to shape men to the habits of civility and order; it could not cure souls. Just as rational knowledge was lower than celestial knowledge, and just as the ends of civil society were inferior to those of religious society, so civic virtue stood beneath the perfect virtue taught by Christianity.

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[52] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 296 (II, ii, 15).

[53] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 306 (II, ii, 13). The translation has been slightly changed; see the text in *Opera*, Vol. 2, p. 197.

[54] *Inst.*, Vol. 1, p. 397 (II, viii, 1).

[55] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 789 (IV, xx, 16).

But having noted these distinctions in values, it is important not to translate them into antitheses. Although Calvin believed that a Christian foundation was a prerequisite for a well-constituted civil polity, there was no equivocation on his part about the essential value of the polity itself.

## V

The consistency of Calvin's political and ecclesiastical thinking was nowhere more clearly evidenced than in the discussion of the office and duties of the civil magistrate. The same impulse which had dictated Calvin's conception of the pastoral office reappeared in the magistracy. Even the language he used to describe the civil governor—"sacred ministry," "vicar of God," "minister of God"—left the unmistakable impression that Calvin was less concerned to depict a political office as such than to create a political analogue to the pastorate. In both cases there was a single-minded concentration on the impersonal nature of the office, that is, on the institution. In both cases the personality of the occupant was absorbed into the office itself. Both magistrate and pastor were intended to be selfless instruments of a higher purpose and subordinated to a written law. Where the pastor was enjoined to add nothing of himself to the office or to the preaching of the Word, but to be only *"la bouche de Dieu,"* the magistrate too was to be depersonalized, but in relation to the civil law: "the law is a silent magistrate, and a magistrate a speaking law."[56]

The parallel between the two offices was expressed in still another way. Both were enveloped by an impressive *mystique* which aimed not only at discouraging disobedience in the respective societies, but also at awing the office-holder as well. Both of these elements are necessary to an understanding of Calvin's theory of political obedience. The distinctive emphasis in this doctrine lay in its insistence on active, affirmative allegiance to the ruler, and not merely a willingness to obey his commands.[57] The reverence of subjects towards their ruler ought to be rooted in conscience, not fear. At the same time, however, the loyalty of the subjects should be directed at the office rather than at the individual magistrate. The civic commitment was institutional and not personal. At bottom this institutional allegiance ran to the broad purposes of the society, to the civilized ends secured by the political order. Those who weakened the fabric of order were classed as "inhuman monsters," "the enemies of all equity and right, and totally ignorant of humanity."[58]

For his part, the magistrate symbolized, not mere power, but the permanent ends of society. His functions were to preserve order and a "temperate liberty";

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[56] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 787 (IV, xx, 14). The phrase is derived from Cicero, *De Legibus*, III, 1.2 and is related to the classical tradition of the ruler as *lex animata;* see Erwin R. Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship," *Yale Classical Studies*, Vol. 1 (1928), p. 55 ff.

[57] See Mesnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–89; Chenevière, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

[58] *Opera*, Vol. 52, p. 267.

to enforce justice and righteousness; and to promote peace and godliness.[59] He did not stand as the representative of the interests or opinions of particular groups, classes, or localities, but of a set of purposes which he served but had not originated. And since none of these ends were possible without order, the basic task of the magistrate was to insure that this condition prevailed. The pressing importance of order drew from Calvin the admission that even tyrants "retain in their tyranny some kind of just government. There can be no tyranny which does not in some respects assist in consolidating the society of men."[60] The tyrant was connected to the cause of order by his mere possession of power. The price of cohesion and unity was the active exercise of power, and this minimum condition could be fulfilled by a tyrant. "There is much truth in the old saying that it is worse to live under a prince through whose levity everything is lawful, than under a tyrant where there is no liberty at all."[61] Even the lawful ruler must, therefore, assert his power affirmatively; had not Jeremiah urged "execute ye judgment and righteousness"?

While at one level the allegiance relationship depicted by Calvin was essentially political, between ruler and ruled, at another level it transcended the political and implicated both parties in a relationship with God. The ruler was a transient occupant of a divine office, and owed a responsibility to God for the faithful discharge of his trust. On the other side, the subjects were bound to obey the commands of a divinely authorized agent. Allegiance, therefore, was both a political and a religious duty. At the human level it supported the civilized ends of society; at the ultimate level it was a search for a right relationship with God.[62]

In the case of the tyrant the religious element was, in a sense, dominant. He was the agent of God's wrath sent to scourge the community for its sins; his coming ought to provoke a sense of collective guilt among the people, causing them to search their consciences for the sins they had committed.[63] The relationship between citizen and tyrant, then, belonged not to the political but to the "celestial" category, because the concept of sin, which connected tyrant and subject, was not a political conception at all.[64] And despite Calvin's intention of making obedience to tyrants appear more palatable, the effect of his reasoning was to underscore the extraordinary nature of tyranny and to isolate it from the normal political relationships. The tyrant might be elevated to a divine instrument sent "*pour châtier les péchés du peuple*;"[65] yet this very mission made him an essentially apolitical figure. Sin was a theological and not a political relationship.

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[59] *Commentaries on Romans*, p. 481.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 480.

[61] *Commentary on the Book of Psalms*, trans. James Anderson, 5 vols. (Edinburgh, 1845–49), Vol. 3, p. 106; *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 801–2 (IV, xx, 27).

[62] Given the lofty ends served by allegiance—"God had not intended men to live *pêle-mêle*" (*Opera*, Vol. 51, p. 800)—it is not surprising to find Calvin hostile to contract theory. This was not owing to any desire on his part to release rulers from their obligations, but rather to his belief that social duties ought not to be the subject of a crude bartering arrangement. *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 801–802 (IV, xx, 27).

[63] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 805 (IV, xx, 32).

[64] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 790 (IV, xx, 16); p. 798 (IV, xx, 24).

[65] "Catechism of 1537," *Opera*, Vol. 22, p. 74.

This tendency towards placing the tyrant outside the usual political relationships cropped out again when Calvin came to consider the problem of obedience. In obeying the tyrant, the loyal subject was viewed as discharging an obligation to God rather than one deriving from the general ends of society. Obedience, however, was limited by the dictates of conscience, that is, by another extra-political factor. While conscience created a direct relationship between the individual and God, and thereby circumvented the political relationship between subject and ruler, it offered, nevertheless, a powerful threat to the unlimited claims of the tyrant. Conscience was essentially a religious conception and owed its beginnings to religious controversies, but it could be turned to political advantage without straining its fundamental meaning. For, in one sense, conscience was a response to power; it had to do with the individual as the object of compulsion in a governed order. Yet whether the protesting conscience felt imperiled by papal or civil power, it retained a saving relationship with God. In one sense Calvin's "court of conscience" pointed the individual away from the "political"; in another, it was obviously designed for the politically involved citizen. The citizen who, on strictly religious grounds, disobeyed a command which ran contrary to Scripture was, in Calvin's view, not only fulfilling his obligation to God, but also reminding the ruler of the true nature of his office. Calvin's conception of resistance was that of a selfless service designed to preserve the integrity of political institutions from the errors of temporary office-holders.[66]

While there was nothing novel in the proposition that scriptural injunctions prevailed over political commands, Calvin displayed a greater sensitivity than most reformers to the political implications of religious resistance. It was this which eventually led him to formulate a theory of resistance which was political rather than religious in its motivation. He allowed that the estates or specially designated magistrates might "oppose the violence and cruelty of kings." By virtue of their position, these agencies had a positive obligation to protect popular liberties:

> . . . if they connive with kings in the oppression of the humble people, their dissimulation is not free from nefarious perfidy, because they maliciously betray the liberty of the people, while knowing, that by the ordinance of God, they are its protectors.[67]

Near the end of his life Calvin began to veer, hesitatingly to be sure, towards an acceptance of the idea that the coronation oaths and the laws of a country formed a system of agreements which might be defended against an arbitrary ruler:

> . . . certain remedies against tyranny are allowable, for example, when magistrates and estates have been constituted and given the care of the commonwealth: they shall have power to keep the prince to his duty and even to coerce him if he attempt anything unlawful.[68]

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[66] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 805 (IV, xx, 32).
[67] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 804 (IV, xx, 31); *Opera*, Vol. 4, p. 1160.
[68] *Opera*, Vol. 29, pp. 557, 636–37; Chenevière, *op. cit.*, pp. 346–47.

Two aspects of this deserve underlining. First, Calvin's declaration that the estates and inferior magistrates were entrusted with a divine responsibility contrasts with Luther's tendency to elevate rulership above all other offices. And consistent with this had been Luther's strong scepticism concerning the legitimacy of the estates as restraining organs.[69] Calvin, on the other hand, by breaching "the divinity that doth hedge a king," had created a rival agency, armed with the only credentials that most men of the period would respect, a divine ordination. The second important aspect of Calvin's resistance theory was its mention of the strictly political ends served by the organs of resistance: the protection of "the liberty of the people," "the care of the commonwealth." The effect of this was to provide a balancing parallel to the theory of allegiance. For the same reason that men obey authority in order to preserve the civilizing purposes supported by the political order, so the specified organs of the community might have to disobey in order to preserve that order.

While none of these considerations worked to dislodge either the primacy of the religious motive in Calvin's thought or the priority held by spiritual values, they did signify his rediscovery of political complexity. More than any other contemporary reformer, he was supremely sensitive to the plurality of relationships and obligations operating in a political community. Among most of the reformers the general tendency had been to reduce the manifold complexity of politics to a simple connection between ruler and ruled or between both of them and God. Calvin, however, avoided this simple explanation and emphasized instead the triangular relationship of ruler, people, and the law. The connecting link between ruler and citizen was not a direct one, but occurred through the mediating agency of the law.[70] From the standpoint of the ruler this had the effect of adding one more obligatory element to his office: he owed responsibilities to the people, to God, to the law, and to the whole range of purposes proper to a rightly constituted society. The sum total of these obligations formed a premise which made the act of resistance a logical possibility within the Calvinist system and not, as many later commentators would have it, a matter of geographical accident.

## VI

Calvin's conception of the church and of civil society, taken together, marked the Protestant rediscovery of the idea of the institutionalized community. It had been the genius of early sixteenth century Protestantism to create the notion of a cohesive religious association; but the failure to equip the religious fellowship with the necessary institutional structure had threatened the fellowship with dissolution from within and encroachment from without. While there can be no denying that the institutional hostility of the early reformers was nourished by a deep desire to prevent religious feeling from being stifled by ecclesiasticism, they failed to grapple with the fact that, as long as the church was bound to this world, it would have to face the threat of rival institutions powerfully organized. The strength of Calvin's position lay in its realization that the precondition for the survival of the community of believers was a strongly structured church government: a sense of institutions must be combined with a sense of community.

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[69] *Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 51–52.

[70] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, pp. 773, 787 (IV, xx, 3, 14).

Similarly, where the early reformers expressed an indifference to the political order or else viewed it solely as a repressive agency, Calvin reasserted its value and denied that its essence consisted in coercion. In short, Calvin's emphasis on a strong church and on the dignity of political society was designed for a double purpose: to make the church safe in the world and the world safe for the church. In reorienting Protestantism towards the world, Calvin stands as the Protestant counterpart to Aquinas. Like Thomas he labored to reintegrate the political order with the order of grace, but unlike Thomas he had the further task of showing that the church could contribute to the order of civil society without perverting its own nature. The ethos created by the church was to be a *civil*-izing one, one which habituated the liberated Protestant to a life under order and discipline. In Calvin's system the church became the agency for resolving the uneasy tension encouraged by the early Reformation belief that man was a divided being dwelling partly in a society of faith ruled by Christ and partly in civil society ruled by temporal authority. In resolving the bifurcated existence of man, Calvin returned to the substance, but not the form, of the medieval idea that human existence, whether lived at the spiritual or "material" level, was an existence preeminently social and ordered. No abrupt transition separated both aspects of existence, because in both of them man was a creature accustomed to the power and restraints of institutions and to a life of civility.

The result of these labors was not only to impart to Protestantism a depth of political understanding it had previously lacked, but to place the new movement on a more equal footing with the political sophistication of Catholicism. From the time of the first political repercussions of Protestantism, Catholicism had claimed to be more congenial to the requirements of civil society. In one sense this claim was profoundly true. Under the government of the Church the believer had been accustomed to the patterns of "civil" behavior enforced by Church discipline, and was therefore prepared for the life of civil society. Once this is recognized it is easy to see that the emphatic insistence of the early reformers on an almost unqualified obedience to civil rulers was but a crude effort to overcome the political superiority of Catholicism. It was crude because it assumed that the habits of civility could be summed up so easily. Calvin's contribution was to see that the habits of civility needed by the church were also essential to civil life; the essential demands of order were the same for both societies. The interlocking of the religious and civil orders in Calvin's system was simply the fulfillment of two dominant impulses in man, one religious, the other social, and both united by the need for order.

Two elements in the Calvinist conception of order held radical implications for the future. The first was the notion that a society could be at once well-organized, disciplined, and cohesive and yet be without a head. While all Protestants were necessarily anti-monarchical in their belief that a religious society could flourish without a papal monarch, Calvin was unique in being able to describe the institutional substitutes for the pope. The political application of these beliefs awaited the English civil wars of the seventeenth century, but the distaste for secular monarchy was already in evidence in Calvin's own writings.[71]

The other potentially explosive idea lay in Calvin's belief that a community rested on an active membership. The unity which flowed from participation was the Calvinist answer to the papal theory that unity could only be guaranteed by the single will of the pontiff. Moreover, participation was an equalizing conception because the nature of the good at which the society aimed was one intended for all the participants: the body of Christ knew no distinctions in value among the members. Once this concept of participation was given a political twist, it would be but a short step from Geneva to the English Levellers and to Colonel Rainborough's claim that the "poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he . . . . every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government."[72] To view such a step as the radical transformation of essentially religious notions would be to miss the whole meaning of Calvin's system. It was a system which needed no "transforming" in order to bring out a political implication, because the political element had been present from the start. At the very moment that Calvin grasped the importance of order the political theme was incorporated into the main body of writings and reached its fullest expression in the Calvinist conception of the church-society. To the extent that the church was a governing order, fully institutionalized and equipped with power, it possessed many of the qualities of a political society.

If we accept the view that Calvin's notion of the church was in some degree a species of political theory, additional light can be thrown on the relationship between Christianity and the development of Western political thought. One of the most important effects of Christianity had been to discourage the classical quest for an ideal state. To the Christian persuasion the attempt to build an eternal polity, untouched by the corrosions of time, had appeared as an act of *lèse-majesté*, an attempt to emulate the omnipotence of God. A writer like Aquinas, for example, might devote considerable attention to the best form of government, yet this was a far cry from the Platonic vision of a total regeneration of man through political means. The true Christian counterpart to the absolutely best societies projected by Plato and Aristotle was to be found in Augustine's City of God. The ideal society existed beyond and not within history; it was a society transcendental, not empirical. The powerful hold which this idea was to gain over the Western imagination had the effect of etherealizing the old classical idea of the best society into the idea of the kingdom of God.

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[71] *Opera*, Vol. 43, p. 374; and the discussion of John T. McNeill, "The Democratic Element in Calvin's Thought," *Church History*, Vol. 18, pp. 153–71 (Sept., 1949).

[72] A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), *Puritanism and Liberty* (London, 1938), p. 53.

Only occasionally did the older notion reappear in the sublimated form of More's *Utopia* or Campanella's *City of the Sun.*

In Calvin's writings, however, the idea of the best society reemerged, but in a distinctively Christian rather than classical way. The church and the civil society were both viewed as social orders embodying certain values, yet the church was the better society on several counts. Its mission was loftier, its life more social, and its virtues of a higher dignity. The sacramental bond provided a kind of unity which the civil order could never attain: "every one imparts to all in common what he has received from the Lord."[73] In civil society, on the other hand, the necessary precondition was that "men should have peculiar and distinct possessions."[74] The ethical pattern, the *justum regimen*, of the one society was to be sought in Christ, while the other society could never aspire to a good greater than external piety. The one society aimed at salvation and repentance; it was *"un vray ordre"*; the other was concerned only with the public side of man. The one, in short, was the good society, the other a necessary but inferior society.

But while the church stood as the better society in comparison to the state, the church itself was only the best realizable society, not the absolutely best. Above the visible society of believers was the church invisible and eternal, the pure communion of saints. When compared to this society, the visible church was a *"res carnalis"* confined within the limits of time and space. But while the best society could not be realized by men on earth, it was not entirely disconnected from what men could achieve. A rightly ordered church and civil society could follow the same doctrine which inspired the life of the saints; and if their endeavors fell short of the standard of the best society, they might still achieve something of inestimable value, a whispered intimation of immortality.

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[73] *Commentaries on Romans*, p. 459.

[74] *Inst.*, Vol. 2, p. 272 (IV, i, 3).

# CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

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Does conservative political thought have a place in America today? The answer to this question depends upon the general nature of conservatism as an ideology: its distinguishing characteristics, its substance, and the conditions under which it arises. By ideology I mean a system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social group.[1] Interpretations of the role and relevance of conservative thought on the contemporary scene vary greatly. Underlying the debate, however, are three broad and conflicting conceptions of the nature of conservatism as an ideology. This essay deals with the relative merits of these concepts.

## I. THEORIES OF CONSERVATISM

*First*, the *aristocratic* theory defines conservatism as the ideology of a single specific and unique historical movement: the reaction of the feudal-aristocratic-agrarian classes to the French Revolution, liberalism, and the rise of the bourgeoisie at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth century. In Mannheim's words, modern conservatism is "a function of *one particular* historical and sociological situation."[2] Liberalism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie, socialism and Marxism the ideologies of the proletariat, and conservatism the ideology of the aristocracy. Conservatism thus becomes indissolubly associated with feudalism, status, the *ancien régime*, landed interests, medievalism, and nobility; it becomes irreconcilably opposed to the middle class, labor, commercialism, industrialism, democracy, liberalism, and individualism. This concept of conservatism is popular among critics of the "New Conservatism." For, as Louis Hartz has brilliantly demonstrated, the United States lacks a feudal tradition. Hence, the efforts of intellectuals and publicists to propagate conservative ideas in middle-class America must be doomed to failure.

*Second*, the *autonomous* definition of conservatism holds that conservatism is not necessarily connected with the interests of any particular group, nor, indeed, is its appearance dependent upon any specific historical configuration of social forces. Conservatism is an autonomous system of ideas which are generally valid. It is defined in terms of universal values such as justice, order, balance, moderation. Whether or not a particular individual holds these values high depends not on his social affiliations but upon his personal capacity to see their inherent truth and desirability. Conservatism, in this sense, is, as Russell Kirk says, simply a matter of "will and intelligence"; the principles of conservatism "are not confined to the interests of a single class"; conservatives may be drawn from "all classes and occupations. . . ."[3] This theory of conservatism is obviously popular among the "New Conservatives." It implies not only that conservatism is relevant and desirable in contemporary America, but that it is the preferable political philosophy under any historical circumstances.

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[1] This essay deals only with conservative theory. It is not concerned with conservative instincts, attitudes, political parties, or governmental policies. For contrasting views on the meaning of ideology, see Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1949), pp. 49 ff. and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 71 ff.

[2] Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (New York, 1953), pp. 98–99. For contemporary use of the aristocratic definition with respect to the "New Conservatism," see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Conservatism in America: A Liberal Comment," *Confluence*, Vol. 2, pp. 61–71 (December, 1953), and "The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia," *Reporter*, Vol. 12, pp. 9–12 (June 16, 1955); Bernard Crick, "The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, pp. 361–63 (July, 1955); Gordon K. Lewis, "The Metaphysics of Conservatism," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 6, pp. 731–32 (December, 1953).

*Third,* the *situational* definition views conservatism as the ideology arising out of a distinct but recurring type of historical situation in which a fundamental challenge is directed at established institutions and in which the supporters of those institutions employ the conservative ideology in their defense.[4] Thus, conservatism is that system of ideas employed to justify any established social order, no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to its nature or being, no matter from what quarter. The essence of conservatism is the passionate affirmation of the value of existing institutions. This does not mean that conservatism opposes all change. Indeed, in order to preserve the fundamental elements of society, it may be necessary to acquiesce in change on secondary issues. No person can espouse the conservative ideology, however, unless he is fundamentally happy with the established order and committed to its defense against any serious challenge. Conservatism in this sense is possible in the United States today only if there is a basic challenge to existing American institutions which impels their defenders to articulate conservative values.

Now, the question may be legitimately raised: What is gained by arguing over definitions? Are not all definitions essentially arbitrary? How is it possible to demonstrate the superiority of one to another? This argument is valid if no common assumptions exist among the conflicting theories. Such, however, is not the case with the three definitions of conservatism. They differ only with respect to the relation of conservative ideology to the historical process. The aristocratic definition limits conservatism to a particular social class in a particular society. The autonomous definition permits the appearance of conservatism at any stage in history. The situational definition holds that conservatism appears when challenging and defending social groups stand in a particular relation to each other. Yet all three approaches agree fundamentally as to the content of conservatism as an ideology: the substance of the values and ideas in which conservatives believe. Russell Kirk, for instance, criticizes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for identifying conservatism with feudalism, but he agrees substantially with Schlesinger's statement of the essentials of the conservative ideology.[5]

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[3] Russell Kirk, *A Program for Conservatives* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 22, 38–39; Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited* (New York, 1949), p. 9.

[4] See Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1955), p. 9; Francis G. Wilson, "A Theory of Conservatism," this REVIEW, Vol. 35, pp. 39–40 (February, 1941); Raymond English, "Conservatism: The Forbidden Faith," *American Scholar*, Vol. 21, pp. 399–401 (October, 1952); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Conservative vs. Liberal—A Debate," *New York Times Magazine*, March 4, 1956, pp. 11 ff.

All the analysts of conservatism, moreover, unite in identifying Edmund Burke as the conservative archetype and in assuming that the basic elements of his thought are the basic elements of conservatism. These areas of consensus permit a rational evaluation of the three definitions. The historical function of conservatism must be derived from its substance. That theory of conservatism is to be preferred which most adequately and completely explains the manifestations in history of the Burkeian ideology. The thesis of this article is that the situational theory most closely meets these criteria.

## II. IDEATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IDEOLOGIES: THE ABSENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE IDEAL

Among writers espousing all three definitions of conservatism substantial agreement exists that at least the following are major components of the conservative creed—the essential elements of Burke's theory.

(1) Man is basically a religious animal, and religion is the foundation of civil society. A divine sanction infuses the legitimate, existing, social order.

(2) Society is the natural, organic product of slow historical growth. Existing institutions embody the wisdom of previous generations. Right is a function of time. "Prescription," in the words of Burke, "is the most solid of all titles. . . ."

(3) Man is a creature of instinct and emotion as well as reason. Prudence, prejudice, experience, and habit are better guides than reason, logic, abstractions, and metaphysics. Truth exists not in universal propositions but in concrete experiences.

(4) The community is superior to the individual. The rights of men derive from their duties. Evil is rooted in human nature, not in any particular social institutions.

(5) Except in an ultimate moral sense, men are unequal. Social organization is complex and always includes a variety of classes, orders, and groups. Differentiation, hierarchy, and leadership are the inevitable characteristics of any civil society.

(6) A presumption exists "in favour of any settled scheme of government against any untried project. . . ." Man's hopes are high, but his vision is short. Efforts to remedy existing evils usually result in even greater ones.

Assuming these propositions to be a fair summary of representative conservative ideas, what do they suggest as to the relative merit of the aristocratic, autonomous, and situational theories? Nothing in these conservative principles limits them exclusively to the feudal-aristocratic reaction. To be sure, the ideology stresses the inevitability of classes and leadership in society, but it does not particularize any specific form of social organization or source of leadership. Nor is there anything in the ideology which presumes a partiality towards an agrarian society, the feudal system of land tenure, monarchy, or a titled aristocracy. Similarly, the autonomous theory is inadequate because the conservative ideology lacks the broad sweep and catholic appeal of an ideology of universal and permanent relevance. Indeed, conservatism itself stresses the particular nature of truth and warns of the danger of overarching principles. Manifestly, the ideology has little appeal to any one discontented with the status quo. In short, the aristocratic definition fails because no necessary connection exists between aristocracy or feudalism, on the one hand, and conservatism on the other: nonaristocrats can expound conservative ideology; aristocrats can expound nonconservative ideologies.

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[5] See Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 37, and compare Schlesinger's summary of conservative concepts *Confluence*, Vol. 2, pp. 64–65, with Kirk's summary, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 3–10. See also below, note 27.

The autonomous definition fails because the appearance of conservatism in history is not a matter of random chance. The aristocratic definition restricts conservatism to too small a segment of the social process. The autonomous definition frees it too completely from any connection with the social process. The characteristic elements of conservative thought—the "divine tactic" in history; prescription and tradition; the dislike of abstraction and metaphysics; the distrust of individual human reason; the organic conception of society; the stress on the evil in man; the acceptance of social differentiation—all serve the overriding purpose of justifying the established order. The essence of conservatism is the rationalization of existing institutions in terms of history, God, nature, and man.

The usefulness of the conservative ideology in justifying any existing order is manifest from the above summary of Burkeian principles. Nowhere in that summary is there any indication of the character of the institutions which these ideas might be used to defend. In this respect conservatism differs from all other ideologies except radicalism: it lacks what might be termed a substantive ideal. Most ideologies posit some vision as to how political society should be organized. The words "liberalism," "democracy," "communism," "fascism," all convey an intimation as to what should be the distribution of power and other values in society, the relative importance of the state and other social institutions, the relations among economic, political, and military structures, the general system of government and representation, the forms of executive and legislative institutions. But what is the political vision of conservatism? Is it possible to describe a conservative society? On the contrary, the essence of conservatism is that it is literally, in Mühlenfeld's phrase, "*Politik ohne Wunschbilder.*"

It may be argued, for instance, that the Portuguese political system is closer to the authoritarian ideal than the British and American systems, that the British system is closer to the socialist ideal than the Portuguese and American systems, that the American system is closer to the democratic ideal than the British and Portuguese systems, and that all three systems are far from the communist ideal. But which of the three is closest to the conservative ideal? Portugal? Great Britain? The United States? It is impossible to say because no conservative ideal exists to serve as the standard of judgment. No political philosopher has ever described a conservative utopia. In any society, there may be institutions to be conserved, but there are never conservative institutions. The lack of a conservative ideal necessarily vitiates the autonomous definition of conservatism.

The ideals of nonconservative ideologies change from thinker to thinker and generation to generation, but their fundamental characteristic remains the same: the ascription of value to theoretically-defined formulations and the appraisal of existing reality in terms of those formulations. Non-conservative ideologies are thus *ideational* or transcendent in nature, while conservatism is *institutional* or immanent. All the common ideational ideologies of modern western society approach existing institutions with an "ought demand" that the institutions be reshaped to embody the values of the ideology. In this sense all ideational theories involve some degree of radicalism, *i.e.*, criticism of existing institutions. The greater the gap between existing institutional reality and the ideal of the nonconservative ideology, the more radical is the ideology with respect to that reality. Radicalism is thus the opposite of conservatism, and, like conservatism, it denotes an attitude toward institutions rather than a belief in any particular ideals. Conservatism and radicalism derive from orientations toward the process of change rather than toward the purpose and direction of change.

The conservative ideology is the product of intense ideological and social conflict. It appears only when the challengers to the established institutions reject the fundamentals of the ideational theory in terms of which those institutions have been molded and created. If the challengers do not question the basic values of the prevailing philosophy, the controversy between those for and against institutional change is carried on with reference to the commonly accepted ideational philosophy. Each group attempts to show that its policies are more in accord with the common ideals than those of the other group. After the Civil War in America, for instance, the conflict between American Whig and American Democrat was fought, as Hartz has pointed out, within a shared framework of Lockean values. Consensus precluded conservatism.

When the challengers fundamentally disagree with the ideology of the existing society, however, and affirm a basically different set of values, the common framework of discussion is destroyed. The rejection of the prevailing ideology by the challengers compels it to be abandoned by the defenders also. No ideational theory can be used to defend established institutions satisfactorily, even when those institutions in general reflect the values of that ideology. The perfect nature of the ideology's ideal and the imperfect nature and inevitable mutation of the institutions create a gap between the two. The ideal becomes a standard by which to criticize the institutions, much to the embarrassment of those who believe in the ideal and yet still wish to defend the institutions.[6] Eventually the defenders are faced with an unavoidable choice: either they must abandon their ideology in order to defend their institutions and substitute a conservative philosophy for their old ideational theory, or they must adhere to their ideational theory at the risk of further contributing to the downfall of those institutions which largely embody their ideals. The defense of any set of institutions against a fundamental challenge, consequently, must be phrased in terms of the conservative logic, sanctity, and necessity of the institutions *qua* institutions irrespective of the degree to which they correspond to the prescriptions of this or that ideational philosophy.[7]

The challenging social force must present a clear and present danger to the institutions. The mere articulation of a dissident ideology does not produce conservatism until that ideology is embraced by significant social groups. The *philosophes* of the mid-eighteenth century generated no conservative ideology; the events of 1789 and the subsequent years did. Conservatism, in Mannheim's words, "first becomes conscious and reflective when other ways of life and thought appear on the scene, against which it is compelled to take up arms in the ideological struggle."[8] If the defenders of the established order are successful, in due course they gradually cease to articulate their conservative ideology and substitute for it a new version of their old ideational theory. If their defense is unsuccessful, they abandon either their old ideational premises or their new conservative ideology. If they are inclined to be congenital conservatives, they will accept the new order as the inevitable work of destiny. Burke, Bonald, and de Maistre, for instance, all in part believed that the triumph of the French Revolution might be decreed by Providence and that once this became obvious, it would "not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate" to oppose it.[9]

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[6] Hence any theory of natural law as a set of transcendent and universal moral principles is inherently nonconservative. Mannheim, consequently, is quite right in identifying opposition to natural law as a distinguishing characteristic of conservatism, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–19. On Burke's denial of natural law, see Alfred Cobban, *Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1929), pp. 40 ff., 75, and Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 13–14 and 318–19, who makes the point that Burke differed from previous thinkers precisely in that he did not judge the British constitution by a standard transcending it. The efforts of contemporary publicists such as Russell Kirk to appear conservative and yet at the same time to espouse a universal natural law are manifestly inconsistent.

[7] Since conservatism is the ideological justification of established social and political institutions, a conservative defense of sheer chaos or of a society in a continuing state of rapid revolutionary change would be impossible except for an individual so nimble, so cunning, so strong as to be confident of his talent for flourishing as an outlaw. This raises the question as to the chances of conservatism in a modern totalitarian state. If totalitarian society is, as Franz Neumann described Nazi Germany, "a non-state, a chaos, a rule of lawlessness and anarchy," a conservative defense of such a society is impossible. On the other hand, if a totalitarian regime under attack did articulate a theory characterized by a number of conservative elements, this in itself would be supporting evidence that it had "settled down" and was no longer in a state of permanent revolution. The answer to this general question obviously depends upon the nature of totalitarianism rather than on the nature of conservatism. See Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, 1954); Hannah Arendt, "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 15, pp. 303–27 (July, 1953); Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York, 1942); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," this REVIEW, Vol. 50, p. 751 (Sept., 1956).

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

On the other hand, the unsuccessful conservative who remains attached to the ideals of his old ideational philosophy becomes a reactionary, *i.e.*, a critic of existing society who wishes to recreate in the future an ideal which he assumes to have existed in the past. He is a radical. No valid distinction exists between "change backward" and "change forward." Change is change; history neither retreats nor repeats; and all change is away from the status quo. As time passes, the ideal of the reactionary becomes less and less related to any actual society of the past. The past is romanticized, and, in the end, the reactionary comes to support a return to an idealized "Golden Age" which never in fact existed. He becomes indistinguishable from other radicals, and he normally displays all the distinctive characteristics of the radical psychology.

The nature of conservatism as an institutional ideology precludes any permanent and inherent affiliation or opposition between it and any particular ideational ideology. No necessary dichotomy exists, therefore, between conservatism and liberalism. The assumption that such an opposition does exist derives, of course, from the aristocratic theory of conservatism and reflects an overconcern with a single phase of western history at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. The effort to erect this ephemeral relationship into a continuing phenomenon of political history only serves to obscure the fact that in the proper historical circumstances conservatism may well be necessary for the defense of liberal institutions. The true enemy of the conservative is not the liberal but the extreme radical no matter what ideational theory he may espouse. Different radicals advance different panaceas, but they all have the same psychology which conservative thinkers have not been slow to identify. Hooker's sixteenth-century Puritan, Metternich's "presumptuous man," Burke's "metaphysical scribbler," Hawthorne's Hollingsworth, Cortés' "self-worshipping man," Hoffer's twentieth century "true believer," are all one and the same.

The distinction between conservatism and the ideational ideologies has led some nonconservatives to deny any intellectual content to conservatism and has led some conservatives to attack all ideologies. Both the critics and the defenders of conservatism are wrong, however, when they minimize its intellectual significance. Conservatism is the intellectual rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisites of human existence. It has a high and necessary function. It is the rational defense of being against mind, of order against chaos. When the foundations of society are threatened, the conservative ideology re-minds men of the necessity of some institutions and the desirability of the existing ones. All ideologies need not be ideational ideologies. The theory of conservatism is of a different order and purpose than other common political theories, but it is still theory. Conservatism is not just the absence of change. It is the articulate, systematic, theoretical resistance to change.

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[9] See Bonald's famous comment: "Quand Dieu a voulu punir la France, il a fait retirer les Bourbons." "Pensées sur Divers Sujets," *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1817), Vol. 6, 172. Also: Joseph de Maistre, "Considerations sur la France," *Oeuvres* (Bruxelles, 1838), Vol. 7, Ch. 1, 2; and Strauss's discussion of Burke, *op. cit.*, pp. 317–19.

### III. INHERENT AND POSITIONAL IDEOLOGIES: THE ABSENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE TRADITION

Most writers agree, and it is assumed here, that Burke is properly called a conservative. The question, consequently, is: can Burke best be understood as the spokesman for the feudal aristocratic order, the expounder of values and ideals universally valid, or as the defender of established institutions? The aristocratic definition fails to explain Burke because: (1) the English society Burke defended was neither primarily feudal nor exclusively aristocratic; (2) Burke was concerned with the defense of other established societies, notably in India and America; and (3) insofar as Burke had views on the desirable organization of society, he was a liberal, a Whig, and a free trader. The autonomous concept similarly does not offer a complete explanation of Burke because: (1) Burke's political writings and speeches were all directed to immediate problems and needs; (2) he rejected the desirability and the possibility of a moral or political philosophy of universal applicability; and (3) the principal elements of his political thought are relevant chiefly to the limited purpose of justifying established institutions.

On the Continent at the beginning of the nineteenth century Burke's ideas were used to defend aristocracy and feudalism against the rising middle class. The English society and constitution with which Burke was concerned, however, were quite different from those existing across the Channel. The fact that his ideas could be used to justify the established order in both places demonstrates not the similarity of the two orders but the transferability of his philosophy. In a penetrating epigram, Louis Hartz has declared that "In America Burke equalled Locke." This is true enough, but it was equally true in England. Burke defended the English constitution of his day first against the efforts of George III to reassert the influence of the Crown over Parliament and then against the efforts of the democrats to broaden the control of the people over Parliament. He was a conservative because one hundred years after Locke he was still attempting to preserve the institutions of 1689. A devotee of mixed government, he was resolved, he said, "to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no greater."[10] Burke recognized that the people had an important, although limited, role to play in the English system.[11] Accepting aristocracy as an inherent and necessary element of the British constitution, he showed, however, little partiality towards it. A commoner himself, he suffered on more than one occasion from the aristocratic disdain of the great lords who tended to view him as an "Irish adventurer." Like Jefferson and Adams, Burke was a supporter of a natural aristocracy, not an artificial aristocracy.[12]

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[10] "Reflections on the Revolution in France," *Works* (Boston, 1865), Vol. 3, p. 352 (hereafter cited as *Works*).

[11] See *e.g.*, "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents," *Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 436, 440–41, 469, 472–74, 491–93, 508.

The social order which Burke defended was to a large extent commercial, and it was becoming increasingly industrial. The eighteenth century had seen the rise of the Bank of England, the South Sea Bubble, joint stock companies, expanding shipping and trade, the accumulation of commercial fortunes and industrial capital, a rash of industrial inventions, and the steady growth of manufacturing. Commerce was "the dominant factor" in eighteenth-century England.[13] Voltaire's astonishment that the great gentlemen of England were not ashamed of trade was but one indication of the difference between English and continental society. For thirty years before Burke arrived in London in 1750 the promotion of industry had been a primary objective of the English government. By 1790, when according to the aristocratic theory of conservatism Burke was defending the feudal corporate order, the Industrial Revolution in England was already a generation old. Was Burke repelled by the growth of commerce and industry? Did he seek to return to the feudal agrarian order of a previous age? Far from it. For Burke, as Namier declares, "trade was the soul of empire." As early as 1770 Burke stated his position in no uncertain terms: "There is no such thing as the landed interest separate from the trading interest. . . . *Turn your land into trade.*"[14] Is this the advice of a feudal apologist? Six years later Burke praised to the skies "for sagacity and penetration of mind, extent of views, accurate distinction, just and natural connexion and dependence of parts" a book which accurately reflected his own views on economics: *The Wealth of Nations.*[15] In Parliament Burke was consistently for laisser faire; the state should stay out of economic matters; the laws of commerce were the laws of nature; labor itself was an "article of trade." Is it any wonder that Adam Smith, after discussing political economy with Burke, should declare that Burke "was the only man, who, without communication, thought on these topics exactly as he did"?[16] If Burke is an apologist for the feudal corporate order, what becomes of Adam Smith? The plain fact of the matter is that, insofar as he had views on the desirable organization of society, in politics Burke was a liberal and a Whig, the defender of the Lockean constitution; in economics, he was a liberal free trader, his ideas at one with those of Adam Smith. There was little or nothing that was corporate, or feudal, or aristocratic about him at all.

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[12] For Burke's views on aristocracy, see *ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 458; "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," *ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 174–75; "Reflections on the Revolution in France," *ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 297; "Speech on the Second Reading of a Bill for the Repeal of the Marriage Act," *The Works of Edmund Burke* (London, World's Classics), Vol. 3, p. 385; John MacCunn, *The Political Philosophy of Burke* (London, 1913), pp. 157–60, 173 ff., 258–68. On Burke's difficulties with the aristocracy, see John Viscount Morley, *Burke* (London, 1923), pp. 198–208.

[13] L. B. Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London, 1930), pp. 15, 38, 40: "Trade was not despised in eighteenth-century England—it was acknowledged to be the great concern of the nation. . . ." See also W. E. H. Lecky, *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1878), Vol. 1, p. 433: "In very few periods in English political history was the commercial element more conspicuous in administration. . . . The questions which excited most interest were chiefly financial and commercial ones." And J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry* (New York, 1926), pp. 64–65: "In eighteenth-century England, industry seemed the most important thing in the world. All classes put industrial expansion high among the objects of public policy. . . ." On the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England and the prestige of commerce and industry, see also: W. Cunningham, *The Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge, 1908), p. 494; W. T. Selley, *England in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1934), pp. 218–19; Witt Bowden, *The Rise of the Great Manufacturers in England, 1760–1790* (Allentown, 1919), *passim.*

[14] *Cavendish Debates*, Vol. 1, p. 476, quoted in Robert H. Murray, *Edmund Burke: A Biography* (Oxford, 1931), p. 192 (italics added).

While Burke preferred a balanced constitution and a commercial economy, his preference derived not so much from their peculiar virtues as from the fact of their existence. Montesquieu and Adam Smith developed the ideational rationale for the institutions which Burke accepted. Burke's contribution was different. He was concerned not with the substance of institutions but with their preservation. Impartially he defended Whig institutions in England, democratic institutions in America, autocratic institutions in France, and Hindu institutions in India. Indian institutions, he warned, for example, must be based "upon their own principles not upon ours," denouncing those Britishers in India who subverted "the most established rights and the most ancient and most revered institutions of ages and nations."[17] "He changed his front," as Morley remarked in a classic phrase, "but he never changed his ground." Since Morley, scholars have united in clearing Burke of charges of inconsistency. But if Burke was consistent, how can he have been an aristocrat? If his primary concern had been the preservation of the feudal corporate order in Europe, why would he have any concern for America or India? Most conservatives adopt conservative ideas in order to defend one particular established order. In this respect their conservatism is instrumental rather than primary. Burke, however, was the conservative archetype because his impulse was to defend all existing institutions wherever located and however challenged.

Supporters of the aristocratic theory of conservatism argue that modern conservatism originated with the reaction to the French Revolution. They are mistaken. It is possible to identify at least four major manifestations of conservatism in western political history. The first was the response in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the challenge of centralized national authority to medieval political institutions and the challenge of the Reformation to established church-state relationships. On the Continent, for instance, Francis Hotman in his *Franco-Gallia* and Juan de Mariana in his *De Rege et*

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[15] *Annual Register,* 1776, Vol. 19, p. 241.

[16] Robert Bisset, *The Life of Edmund Burke,* 2 vols. 2d ed. (London, 1800), Vol. 2, p. 429.

[17] Quoted in Morley, *Burke,* pp. 190–91, 245, and George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1950, rev. ed)., p. 616.

*Regis Institutione* attempted a conservative defense of the medieval pluralistic order against the growing power of the national monarchs. That Hotman was a Frenchman and a Protestant and Mariana a Spaniard and a Jesuit made little difference. They had similar purposes and similar arguments. Unfortunately for both, however, the historical facts did not entirely support the uses which they made of them, and the trend toward royal power had already undermined most of the significant institutions of the old order. As a result, the argument of the monarchomachs was shifted from a conservative base to an ideational one. It was restated in terms of principle rather than precedent. *Franco-Gallia* was eclipsed by the *Vindiciae*, and Mariana was overshadowed by Suarez.[18]

In England, on the other hand, the existence of a strong national monarchy and of a national church permitted a conservative defense of both. The ideas which on the Continent had been used to defend the estates against royal authority were used in England to defend royal authority against political dissidents and theological radicals. The political thinking of the Tudor apologists —Tyndale, Gardiner, Hooper, and numerous others—was suffused with conservative appeals to order and obedience.[19] Rebellion and anarchy were held out as the worst of evils; disobedience was an effort to break a divinely ordained chain of being. Restated again and again in Tudor literature was Shakespeare's warning: "Take but degree away, untune that string, And, Hark! what discord follows. . . ."

Toward the end of the sixteenth century as the Puritan attack gathered strength and became more extreme—the episcopacy came under sustained criticism in 1570—the need arose for a more thorough conservative defense of the national civil and religious establishment. This need was met by Richard Hooker in his *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* published in 1594. This multivolume work stands as a towering and eloquent statement of the conservative ideology. Here, two hundred years before Burke, was delineated every significant strand of Burkean thought.[20] The substance of their conservatism is virtually identical.

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[18] Some conservative elements persisted in the *Vindiciae*, but they were obscured by the appeal to the social contract and natural law. *Cf.* J. N. Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius* (Cambridge, 1916), pp. 174–79 and Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, pp. 375–77.

[19] See Charles Nevinson (ed.), *Latter Writings of Bishop Hooper* (Cambridge, 1852), esp. "Annotations on Romans XIII," pp. 93–116; Pierre Janelle (ed.), *Obedience in Church and State: Three Political Tracts by Stephen Gardiner* (Cambridge, 1930); Henry Walter (ed.), *Doctrinal Treatises by William Tyndale* (Cambridge, 1848), esp. pp. 173 ff., 195–97, 240 ff.; Christopher Morris, *Political Thought in England, Tyndale to Hooker* (London, 1953), pp. 15, 17, 57, 68–77. One hundred years later Bramhall duplicated those arguments in his controversies with Hobbes. See John Bramhall, *Works* (Oxford, 1844), Vol. 3, "A Fair Warning to take Heed of the Scotch Discipline," and "The Serpent-Salve, or, the Observator's Grounds Discussed," esp. pp. 236, 241, 272, 298, 309, 318; John Bowle, *Hobbes and His Critics* (New York, 1952), pp. 114 ff.; T. S. Eliot, *For Lancelot Andrewes* (Garden City, 1929), pp. 27–46.

[20] For typical conservative expressions in the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, see: Pref., i, 2, iii, 7, iv, 4, vi, 5–6; I, v, 1, x, 4; IV, i, e, iv, 2, xii, 2, xiv, 1–2; V, vii, 3, lxxi, 4; VII, i, 1–2; VIII, ii, 2, 17. On Hooker's conservatism generally, see Sheldon Wolin, "Richard Hooker and English Conservatism," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. VI, pp. 28–47

Yet the institutions they were defending and the challenges to which they were reacting were dissimilar. The Tudor constitution of 1590 differed from the Whig constitution of 1790. The threat to Hooker's institutions came from Puritan sects advocating the complete separation of Church and State, the supremacy of faith over reason, and the authority of scripture against the authority of the church. The Puritans viewed man as depraved and evil; they were spiritualistic, deterministic, anti-intellectual, fundamentalist and pessimistic. The challenge to Burke's institutions, on the other hand, came from democratic groups assured of the efficacy of reason and possessed of an unbounded confidence in human nature and man's capacity for progress. They were everything which the Puritans were not: materialistic, rationalistic, antireligious, optimistic, and libertarian. Yet despite the differences, the similar situations in which Hooker and Burke found themselves led them to expound similar political ideas.

The second great manifestation of conservatism was the response to the French Revolution. That social upheaval, the ideologies it advanced, and the classes it propelled towards power were undoubtedly the greatest threat to existing institutions in the history of western civilization up to that time. Consequently, they produced the greatest outpouring of conservative thought in western history. The conservative response to the Revolution was largely but not exclusively a defense of the feudal, agrarian, aristocratic order against a rising, urban, enlightened middle class. Nonetheless, the Revolution endangered not only feudal aristocratic institutions but all established institutions. In England Burke made a conservative defense of a commercial society and a moderate, liberal constitution. In America, the Federalists—from John Adams through Hamilton to Fisher Ames—expounded conservative ideas to defend a liberal constitution against what they thought to be the threat of a democratic revolution. On the Continent, too, the initial conservative reaction came not from the feudal aristocrats but from thinkers associated with more liberal, commercial, and bureaucratic elements. In Germany, for instance, Brandes, Rehberg, and Möser, representatives of the north German cities where the middle class was strongest, made the first attacks on the Revolution.[21] A few of the continental conservatives, such as Gentz, were liberal in their economics. Even among the spokesmen for the aristocracy, differences existed in the societies which they defended: the France of Bonald and de Maistre, the Prussia of von der Marwitz and Haller, and the Austria of Gentz, Metternich, and

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(March, 1953). On the nature of the Puritan challenge and the origins of Hooker's work, see C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (Cambridge, 1940), *passim,* and E. T. Davies, *The Political Ideas of Richard Hooker* (London, 1946), Ch. 1, 2.

[21] See Reinhold Aris, *History of Political Thought in Germany* (London, 1936), pp. 54–58, 256. Brandes and Rehberg wrote their conservative works before reading Burke. Möser was closer to feudalism, but even he, as Mannheim points out, "Conservative Thought," pp. 144–45, had little use for the nobility, and was primarily concerned with the preservation of the medieval social system as a whole.

Müller did not have identical social structures. Nevertheless, the common strands of conservatism ran through the political ideas of the Reaction thinkers irrespective of the immediate social order which they desired to preserve.

The conservatism of the feudal-aristocratic thinkers of the Reaction was the product of their temporary defensive position rather than of the permanent and inherent nature of their class interests. The fundamental character of those interests did not change in 1789. Yet prior to that year the aristocracy produced no significant conservative thinking. They had no need for it. On the other hand, after the aristocrats were driven from power, they ceased to be conservative without surrendering their aristocratic ideals. In France, in particular, aristocratic thought, once conservative, rapidly became reactionary and eventually became radical. De Maistre had exalted order and stability. In the bourgeois democracy of the Third Republic *L'Action Française* preached violence and the "coup de force." The revolutionaries were on the Right.[22]

The third manifestation of conservatism was the response of the governing classes to the popular lower class demands for a share in the direction of society in the middle years of the nineteenth century. The single most important symbol of this challenge was the cry for the extension of the suffrage. It was a challenge, however, that involved only a partial divergence from accepted values and, consequently, occasioned a weak conservative response. In France, in particular, where the middle classes had to face in two directions, the typical exponents of their viewpoint—Royer-Collard and Guizot, for instance—expounded liberal ideas against the aristocrats and conservative ideas against the masses. In Germany, where a major upheaval had not destroyed the structure of society, Stahl, Ranke, Savigny, and Ludwig von Gerlach articulated a more broadly conceived conservatism emphasizing the organic growth of society. In England, Coleridge and, subsequently, Newman, Maine, and Lecky warned of the dangers of substituting popular rule for class rule. In the United States, the neo-Federalists, Story, Choate, Kent, made a brief conservative defense of a restricted governing class before they were overwhelmed by the Jacksonian tidal wave.

A fourth manifestation of conservatism was the outpouring of political thought produced in the southern United States by the challenge of industrialism, free labor, and abolition in the middle of the nineteenth century. Prior to 1830 southern political thought was shaped largely in the Jeffersonian image. After 1830 southern thinking became increasingly conservative as a result of the increasingly articulate theories of abolition and the rise of northern industry and population. William Lloyd Garrison—the epitome of the radical reformer—founded *The Liberator* in 1831 and in the same year Nat Turner led his slave insurrection. The combination of forces which these events symbolized forced the South on the defensive and led it to abandon its Jeffersonian heritage and develop a conservative apologia in the language of Burke. It was possible to be at once a Jeffersonian and a slaveowner only so long as no one set the Declaration of Independence against slavery. When this happened, the slaveowner had to abandon either his liberalism or his livelihood. Inevitably the ideational philosophy was sacrificed and replaced by a far-reaching conservatism.[23] Just as the rising tide of Puritan radicalism against the Tudor establishment eventually produced Hooker, the rising tide of abolitionist reform eventually produced Calhoun and Fitzhugh. In their writings and in those of the others of the "reactionary enlightenment"—Holmes, Hammond, Hughes, and Harper, in particular—there was "duplicated in every essential aspect the argument of Europe's feudal reaction."[24] All the basic ideas of Burke were reproduced in the treatises and pamphlets with which they came to the defense of their established social order against a threat which was concrete, potent, and eventually successful.

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[22] Joseph C. Murray, "The Political Thought of Joseph de Maistre," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 11, p. 86 (January, 1949); Charles A. Micaud, *The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939* (Durham, 1943), pp. 1–15.

Louis Hartz has suggested that southern conservatism was a "fraud."[25] Starting from the aristocratic conception of conservatism, Hartz argues that there was an inherent conflict in the effort of the southerners to use Burke to defend slavery, on the one hand, and a political tradition containing many elements of liberalism, on the other. Notwithstanding definite inconsistencies in the southern system, however, there was no inconsistency in the South's use of Burke to defend that system. The conservative philosophy was appropriate to the defense of the institutions of Jefferson, the "peculiar institution" of slavery, or any combination of the two. It was no more of a fraud for Calhoun to combine Burke and slavery than it was for Burke himself to combine Burke and laisser faire. Nor does the fact that southern conservative political thought ended with the Civil War prove that the southerners were "false Burkes, halfway Burkes." When the southern social-political system was destroyed, the theory elaborated in its defense necessarily had to die with it. Hartz himself describes southern conservatism as "one of the great and creative episodes in the history of American thought." Could it be this, however, if it were simply a "fraud," an artificial importation without roots in the American situation? Is it not possible to avoid this problem by a more simple explanation of southern conservatism? The southern experience was a clear example of a society shifting from a liberal ideational theory to an uncompromising conservatism as the result of the rise of a fundamental challenge to its existence. Given the change in the southern position, the change in southern thought was both necessary and natural.

The basic inadequacy of the aristocratic theory of conservatism is that it conceives conservatism to be an *inherent* ideology rather than a *positional* ideology. An inherent ideology is the theoretical expression of the interests of a continuing social group. It is derived from the fundamental common characteristics which make the group a group. Consequently, an inherent ideology evolves and changes as the interests and needs of the group change, but, at the same time, it maintains certain essential characteristics reflecting the continuing and inherent identity of the group. True to its essential nature as the ideology of the bourgeois middle class, the liberalism of one generation has differed from and yet grown out of the liberalism of a previous generation. An inherent philosophy may also be differently interpreted and expressed by conflicting subschools existing at the same time. American liberalism has been split between a Whig, "property rights," version, on the one hand, and a popular, "human rights," version, on the other. None the less, American Whig and American democrat both share the essentials of Locke. Marxism, too, has existed in a variety of forms and evolved through a number of phases, all of which, however, have retained the same underlying fundamentals which distinguish Marxism as a theory. It is thus possible to relate the various expressions of an inherent theory to each other, to trace patterns of development and influence, and to identify schisms and subvarieties within the common intellectual tradition. In brief: the substance of an inherent theory evolves and proliferates; and the expressions of the theory are interrelated and interdependent. The theory and its exponents all constitute a *school of thought.*

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[23] For the change in southern thinking about 1830, see William E. Dodd, *The Cotton Kingdom* (New Haven, 1921), pp. 48 ff., and Arthur Y. Lloyd, *The Slavery Controversy* (Chapel Hill, 1939), pp. 119 ff.

[24] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), p. 146.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 147 ff.

"Positional ideology"

Positional ideologies are quite different. They do not reflect the continuing interests and needs of a particular social group. Rather they depend upon the relations existing among groups. A group may espouse one positional ideology when its relations with other groups assume one form and another positional ideology when those relations assume a different form. Positional ideologies reflect the changing external environment of a group rather than its permanent internal characteristics. Inherent ideologies are functions of groups no matter what their positions; positional ideologies are functions of situations no matter what groups occupy those situations.[26] With positional ideologies, it is a question not of "who" but of "where." Thus, the theory of "states' rights" in the United States has been primarily a positional ideology espoused by a succession of different groups whenever their power in the central government vis-à-vis their opponent groups has been less than their power in the states.

If the situational definition of conservatism is correct, conservatism is a positional ideology. Conservatism develops to meet a specific historical need. When the need disappears, the conservative philosophy subsides. In each case, the articulation of conservatism is a response to a specific social situation. The manifestation of conservatism at any one time and place has little connection with its manifestation at any other time and place. Conservatism thus reflects no permanent group interest. Depending upon the existence of a particular relation among groups rather than upon the existence of the groups themselves, it lasts only so long as the relation lasts, not so long as the groups last. And the relation is necessarily ephemeral, seldom continuing more than one generation. Consequently, the conservative ideology is not developed and transmitted with alterations, elaboration, and revision from one age to the next. Nor does it have a set of basic writings to be annotated, interpreted, and argued over by contending sets of disciples. The manifestations of conservatism are simply parallel ideological reactions to similar social situations. The substance of conservatism is essentially static. Conservative thought is repetitive, not evolutionary. Its manifestations are historically isolated and discrete. Thus, paradoxical though it may seem, conservatism, the defender of tradition, is itself without tradition; conservatism, the appeal to history, is without history.

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[26] The significance of positional ideologies has been obscured by the assumption, deriving from Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, that every ideology has a "carrier" in the form of a specific social group or class. The argument here is that ideologies may also have "carriers" in the form of recurring patterns of relations among groups.

The static and repetitious character of conservative thought is reflected in the extent to which conservatism lends itself to itemization. More so than any other political ideology, conservatism can be condensed into a brief catalog of principles or concepts which constitute the conservative catechism common to all conservative thinkers. Both the proponents and critics of conservatism agree that the essence of conservatism can be summed up in a small number of basic ideas. The number of these ideas may vary in the different formulations, but their content is universally the same. Hearnshaw, for instance, lists "twelve principles of conservatism," Kirk "six canons of conservative thought," and Rossiter " 'twenty-one points' of the Conservative tradition."[27]

In part, these brief and similar catalogs of conservative ideas simply reflect the general consensus on the substance of conservatism as an ideology. But, in addition, they reflect the static and limited nature of that ideology. Other ideologies have basic ideas which recur in various manifestations. But these ideas are the starting point, not the sum and substance of the ideology. Individualism is basic to liberalism but the individualism of Locke is quite different from that of Bentham. Class conflict is basic to Marxism, but the class struggle in Kautsky is different from the class struggle in Lenin. Conservatives, however, do not subdivide into schools, nor do they, like liberals and Marxists, engage in fiery arguments over the meaning of their faith. Individual conservative thinkers, of course, may phrase their ideas in slightly different ways and may modify them in the light of their particular ideational leanings. But in general they simply repeat their catechism, and once they have said their catechism, they have said all there is to be said of the substance of conservative thought. A history of liberal or Marxist thought reveals the transmutation of the ideology through different times and circumstances. A history of conservative thinkers, such as Kirk's *Conservative Mind*, necessarily involves the repetition over and over again of the same ideas.

This peculiar character of conservative thought explains one frequently commented upon aspect of conservatism cited by Mannheim: "The careers of most conservatives and reactionaries show revolutionary periods in their youth."[28] Many of the early nineteenth century conservatives—Görres, Gentz, Müller in Germany; Coleridge, Wordsworth, Southey in England—were initially enthusiasts for the French Revolution. The Federalists began as successful revolutionaries, and America's premier conservative, John C. Calhoun, started his career as a fire-eating Jeffersonian nationalist. Why does this pattern exist? Is it not simply because conservatism is not the permanent ideological expression of the needs of any social group? No one is born to conservatism in the way in which a Mill is born to utilitarianism. The impulse to conservatism comes from the social challenge before the theorist, not the intellectual tradition behind him. Men are driven to conservatism by the shock of events, by the horrible feeling that a society or institution which they have approved or taken for granted and with which they have been intimately connected may suddenly cease to exist. The conservative thinkers of one age, consequently, have little influence on those of the next. There are few second generation conservatives. Hooker, for instance, anticipated Burke in all the essentials of conservative philosophy; but Burke's conservatism was derived not from a study of Hooker but from the impact of events about him. Similarly, in France, "Maistre never had a school, so to speak." In the United States, Fitzhugh, the apologist for the South, gained little inspiration from earlier conservative thinkers.[29] Each individual statement of the conservative position, in itself, moreover, tends to be generated by some immediate intellectual challenge. Christopher Morris describes the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* as a "livre de circonstance." The same phrase could apply equally well to the *Elemente der Staatskunst*, the *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, and *A Disquisition on Government.*[30]

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[27] F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *Conservatism in England* (London, 1933), pp. 22 ff.; Kirk, *Conservative Mind*, pp. 7–8; Rossiter, *Conservatism in America*, pp. 61–62; Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," p. 114; Lord Hugh Cecil, *Conservatism* (London, 1937), p. 48; William O. Shanahan, "The Social Outlook of Prussian Conservatism," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 15, pp. 222–25 (April, 1953); R. J. White (ed.), *The Conservative Tradition* (London, 1950), pp. 1–10.

## IV. THE RELEVANCE OF CONSERVATISM

In the light of the above analysis, what role has the conservative ideology in America today? Is the "New Conservatism" really conservative? Does room exist for a more profound and far-reaching exposition of conservative ideas?

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[28] "Conservative Thought," p. 120.

[29] Murray, *Review of Politics*, Vol. 11, p. 86; Arnaud B. Leavelle and Thomas I. Cook, "George Fitzhugh and the Theory of American Conservatism," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 7, pp. 146–47 (May, 1945).

[30] Its lack of both an intellectual tradition and a substantive ideal account for another peculiar aspect of conservatism: the extent to which it has been ignored by political scientists writing on political theory. In the political theory textbooks conservatism rarely, if ever, appears, and when it does it is treated, on the whole, in a very skimpy manner. Similarly, there are no decent histories of conservative thought. The reason for this lies partly in the nature of conservatism and partly in the training of political scientists. The latter learn to analyze historical schools of thoughts, to trace the development of ideas, to identify the influence of one man on another, and to search out the ideological schisms and doctrinal divergencies in a school of thought. They are also taught to dissect the substantive ideals of ideologies in terms of their inherent logic and consistency, the theories of man and nature which they reflect, and the group interests which they rationalize and project. Lacking an intellectual tradition and a substantive ideal, conservatism

Much of the New Conservatism is characterized by at least three deficiencies as a conservative movement. First, many New Conservatives appear uncertain as to what they wish to defend. Some simply continue the old identification of conservatism with business liberalism. Others are radical aristocrats, ill at ease in and disgusted with American society as it exists today. Desiring to import European aristocracy to bourgeois America, they dream of an age of less democracy, less equality, less industrialism, an age in which the elite ruled and the mass knew their place. Their rejection of the existing American political and social system makes it impossible for them to be truly conservative. Russell Kirk's view of contemporary America, for instance, could hardly be more unflattering: "near to suicide," "cheap," "materialistic," "sterile," "standardized."[31] Is this the language of a conservative? Or is it the language of a maligner of existing society? Instead of a vigorous defense of American constitutional democracy, Kirk's books are filled with a strained, sentimental, nostalgic, antiquarian longing for a society which is past. He and his associates are out of tune and out of step in modern America.

Secondly, many New Conservatives are astonishingly vague as to the nature and source of the threat to what they wish to conserve. Historically, conservatism has always been the response to a direct and immediate challenge. Conservatives have not usually been in doubt as to the identity of their opponents. Among the New Conservatives, however, the enemy is seldom brought clearly into focus. To some, the foe is Liberalism, although little agreement exists as to the meaning of this term. To others, it is modernism, totalitarianism, popularism, secularism, or materialism. For some New Conservatives the enemy is irrationalism and to others it is rationalism. This confusion, of course, merely reflects the fact that the economic prosperity and political consensus of American society make any conservatism oriented towards domestic enemies absurdly superfluous. Hooker, Burke, and Calhoun fought real political battles against real political enemies. Lacking any flesh and blood social-political challenge, however, the New Conservatives fashion imaginary threats out of abstract "isms."

A third deficiency of the New Conservatism is the effort to uncover a conservative intellectual tradition in America. Apparently desiring the security of identification with an intellectual movement, the New Conservatives scurry through America's past, resurrecting political and intellectual figures long since forgotten. Few enterprises could be more futile or irrelevant. In *The Conservative Mind*, for instance, Russell Kirk defines a conservative as one

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does not lend itself to fruitful analysis along these lines. Not knowing what questions to ask about conservatism or how to evaluate its significance, political scientists have tended to ignore it.

[31] *Conservative Mind*, pp. 10, 428, and *Program for Conservatives*, *passim*. It is essential to distinguish between those such as Kirk who criticize the institutions *and* the theory of modern liberal democracy and those such as Reinhold Niebuhr who limit their critique to the theory of liberalism while praising the inherent wisdom of its institutions.

who stands by established institutions. Yet in his efforts to find a conservative tradition in America, Kirk classifies as conservative: James Russell Lowell, who was "frightened" by what he saw about him; Brooks Adams, who was "disgusted with American society"; Henry Adams, who has become the classic symbol of frustrated alienation;[32] Irving Babbitt, who fled from America to Buddhism; and Santayana, who fled from America to his Roman cloister. All these men were malcontents, and in many respects they were much more fundamentally malcontent than Debs, Henry George, de Leon, and LaFollette, whom presumably Kirk would never dream of classifying as conservatives. The New Conservatives' search for forebears merely reflects their own uncertainty of purpose, role, and identity. They seek to conserve an intellectual tradition which does not exist rather than institutions which do exist. Were they true conservatives, immediately engaged in the defense of an institution or society against a real and imminent threat, they would have little interest in establishing a conservative pedigree.

The dubious side of the New Conservatism, however, does not exhaust the possibilities of conservatism in America today. Some New Conservatives recognize the essentially situational character of conservative ideology. They realize the sterility of a conservative defense of one segment of American society against another segment. The only threat extensive and deep enough to elicit a conservative response today is the challenge of communism and the Soviet Union to American society as a whole. In this respect, as Max Beloff has pointed out, a marked parallel exists between the position of the South in the 1850s and the position of the United States in the 1950s: both societies challenged by an expanding external order.[33] Just as the South produced a conservative defense in Fitzhugh and Calhoun, it is not unreasonable to expect that America too will have its conservative apologists. The more profound recent writings in a conservative vein, such as those of Niebuhr, were in many respects a direct response to the challenge of foreign totalitarianism. As an island of plenty and freedom in a straitened world, America has much to defend.

American institutions, however, are liberal, popular, and democratic. They can best be defended by those who believe in liberalism, popular control, and democratic government. Just as aristocrats were the conservatives in Prussia in 1820 and slaveowners were the conservatives in the South in 1850, so the liberals must be the conservatives in America today. Historically, American liberals have been idealists, pressing forward toward the goals of greater freedom, social equality, and more meaningful democracy. The articulate exposition of a liberal ideology was necessary to convert others to liberal ideas and to reform existing institutions continuously along liberal lines. Today, however, the greatest need is not so much the creation of more liberal institutions as the successful defense of those which already exist. This defense requires American liberals to lay aside their liberal ideology and to accept the values of conservatism for the duration of the threat. Only by surrendering their liberal ideas for the present can liberals successfully defend their liberal institutions for the future. Liberals should not fear this change. Is a liberal any less liberal because he adjusts his thinking so as to defend most effectively the most liberal institutions in the world? To continue to expound the philosophy of liberalism simply gives the enemy a weapon with which to attack the society of liberalism.[34] The defense of American institutions requires a conscious articulate conservatism which can spring only from liberals deeply concerned with the preservation of those institutions. As Boorstin, Niebuhr, and others have pointed out, the American political genius is manifest not in our ideas but in our institutions. The stimulus to conservatism comes not from the outworn creeds of third-rate thinkers but from the successful performance of first-rate institutions. Current conflict rather than ancient dogma will yield a "New Conservatism" which is truly conservative.

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[32] But see Henry S. Kariel's reinterpretation of him, "The Limits of Social Science: Henry Adams' Quest for Order," in this REVIEW, Vol. 50, p. 1074 (December, 1956).

[33] *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process* (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 5–7.

Conservatism is not, as the aristocratic interpretation argues, the monopoly of one particular class in history. Nor is it, as the autonomous school contends, appropriate in every age and place. It is, instead, relevant in a particular type of historical situation. That is the situation in which American liberalism finds itself today. Until the challenge of communism and the Soviet Union is eliminated or neutralized, a major aim of American liberals must be to preserve what they have created. This is a limited goal but a necessary one. Conservatism does not ask ultimate questions and hence does not give final answers. But it does remind men of the institutional prerequisites of social order. And when these prerequisites are threatened, conservatism is not only appropriate, it is essential. In preserving the achievements of American liberalism, American liberals have no recourse but to turn to conservatism. For them especially, conservative ideology has a place in America today.

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[34] A good example is the common experience of the American in Europe who extols the United States as the land of freedom, equality, and democracy, and then is asked: "What about the Negro in the South?" In reply, the American inevitably stresses the magnitude of the social problems involved, the inevitability of gradualness, the impossibility of altering habits overnight by legislative fiat, and the tensions caused by too rapid social change. In short, he drops the liberal language of equality and freedom and turns to primarily conservative concepts and arguments.

# THE COMING OF AGE OF AMERICA

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The central fact of the twentieth century for America is its involvement with the world, and for a nation bred in the psychic and geographic isolation of a uniform liberal faith this has evoked the dialectic battle of a pair of impulses: the effort to intensify "Americanism," to retreat to the comfortable womb of ancient fetishes, and the effort to transcend it, to move out maturely into a welter of national experiences where the fetishes have lost their magic.[1] It would be comforting if we could say that this battle has been clear cut, that it has been fought out by Good Men and Bad Men, much as the battle between "conservative" and "radical" has been fought out in the nationalist histories of the Progressive scholars. But this has not been true, if only because the issue itself has been hidden from sight and the men who have grappled with it, as in some Hegelian tale, have served purposes beyond their understanding. The struggle against the constraints of "Americanism," that peculiar blend of liberalism and nationalism[2] that only America has produced, has been as confused as the record of the twentieth century itself.

## I

In a sense the whole story can be hung around the fate of the cultural Enlightenment which came to America with the First World War and its aftermath: the rich cosmopolitan outburst over which Mencken presided. Here, clearly, was the opening campaign in the battle against American provincialism, a movement which had as its symbol "America's Coming of Age," the term that Van Wyck Brooks coined shortly before the war. But we cannot say that the young warriors in this movement, memorable as their insights were, had any concept of the emerging pattern of American destiny in terms of which their effort to transcend America now makes such impressive sense. We cannot even say that they had a faith at all in their relevance to American life. Amid the complacent Whiggery of Harding and Coolidge, the one thing of which they were certain was that America could "work" without them, and if anyone had told them that the survival of Main Street itself might in the end be tied up with their yearnings for national maturity, he would have been greeted as a fantastic optimist. They were revolutionaries, but without a sense of class or historic force behind them: *philosophes* without a *bourgeoisie*, Marxists without a proletariat. Their revolt, whether we find it in Mencken or in Lippmann or in Lewis, was a direct and immediate outburst against frustration, a kind of Luddism of the mind, which ended, quite naturally, in the hopelessness of expatriation.

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[1] The theory of American history and politics on which this essay is based is to be found in my *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), especially chs. 10 and 11.

[2] I do not mean here the "liberal nationalism" that we associate with Rousseau and Mazzini, but rather the "nationalistic liberalism" which appears in America by virtue of the pervasive and irrational attachment to classical liberal symbols such as individualism, equality, competition, and opportunity. In a land where these symbols have been challenged historically neither by feudalism nor by socialism they emerge as "The American Way of Life."

When the New Deal came, the Young Intellectuals, as Mencken called them, found hope; but they began to lose their cosmopolitanism. We need not blame anyone for this, since in 1932 it was just as impossible to foresee our current world dilemma as it was in 1925; but there is still a sense in which Mencken died too quickly even in terms of the New Deal era. For the New Deal, by virtue of the historic process which permits the Whig to exploit "Americanism" despite the Progressive contribution to it, was assailed by precisely the *clichés* that Mencken had exposed. Why not make out of Mencken an instrument for belaboring Hoover? Up to a point this is undoubtedly what happened in the minds of many people, creating a bridge between the twenties and the thirties. But it was not the basic technique of Roosevelt, as it has never been the basic technique of American Progressivism. Instead of making an issue out of irrational appeals to the Lockean concept, and possibly educating the country to a higher level of rationality, Roosevelt sidestepped them. He shrugged off Hearst and Dies, went about his pragmatic business, professed his own devotion to the national liberal myth. He was as good an "American" as anyone else: which was actually true. Hence the critical cosmopolitanism of the twenties, instead of shaping the New Deal, was absorbed into the blind and unconscious liberalism of the New Deal itself. Down to the present moment, the Progressive movement has lacked the will and the insight to make a political issue out of the nationalist symbols which are invoked against it.

It was the approach of the Second World War and its Communist aftermath, however, which provided the real test of the critical spirit which mushroomed so vividly in the twenties. Here at last, history had come to the support of the American *philosophes:* Paris, as it were, had come to Washington, and soon the government over which Coolidge had presided would itself be sending Fulbright expatriates to the Left Bank. A social force had appeared to bolster "America's Coming of Age." But how, alas, did most of the American revolutionaries respond to this sudden Marxian gift of an "objective situation"? The answer we know: by ignominious flight. Instead of seizing this opportunity to give their cosmopolitanism a purpose in terms of world insight and domestic liberty, they became terrified of the desecrations they had wrought on the shrine of the liberal tradition. A kind of Galilean expiation, insisting that the sun after all revolved around the American earth, became the order of the day. Who has forgotten the outcry against the "irresponsibles," begun on an abstract plane by MacLeish and completed in full nationalist detail by DeVoto, which was first heard in 1940? Instead of "coming of age," when the test appeared, the American iconoclasts regressed to childhood.

But if national blindness dies hard, so does national energy, and it is a phase of the continuing dialectic in America elicited by the world situation that the critical spirit should now arise again. How far it will go at this stage is hard to say. Yet after McCarthyism and a series of frustrations in world communication, there can be no doubt that we are yearning again to crack the shell of "Americanism": not in the undisciplined fashion of the twenties, but on a higher level of national purpose and need. We are still a long way off, despite the ravages of the recent red-scare, from the day that the Progressive movement dares to make an issue of the liberal symbol. We are still a long way off, despite some deep discontents in our academic life, from the kind of social theory which will define the American experience in terms that are meaningful for those who seek to transcend it. But on this score we ought not to expect everything in a moment. If the world involvement is as permanent as it seems to be, there are likely to be many more chapters, indeed many more disappointments and new beginnings, in the process of "America's coming of age."

## II

For the analyst of the American liberal world, the richness of insight and the poverty of system that he finds in the critical revolt of the twenties is bound to be an exasperating combination. Practically everywhere he turns he finds the most precious ore in American thought, objective perceptions of the national liberal mind, of its totems and its tabus, but when he seeks to gather the ore in his hands, it slips like sand between his fingers. The movement lacks a theory of history, an integrating conception of the American experience. Of course, to the extent that it was a literary adventure pursuing aesthetic goals, we can not judge it by the criteria of historical and political thought. Even in the case of Sinclair Lewis, whose novels are essentially a study of "Americanism," this would be unfair. But writers like Mencken or Lippmann or even Brooks are distinctly open to the charge of superficial analysis and foggy historical discussion; the plea that must be offered in their behalf is not that they did not have these objects in mind, but that the age in which they lived failed to reveal to them with clarity the momentous national issue in which they were involved.

The literary nature of much of the critical cosmopolitanism of the twenties was itself, interestingly enough, rooted in the large logic of a liberal society. Since over our history the responsible political movements of this society have been governed by the Lockean symbol, the protest against the symbol has been able to come only from a source that is articulate but unpolitical. There was no political precedent for Mencken. Even if we go to the politicians crucified by the American liberal myth, the Southern "feudalists" and the modern Marxists, we cannot find a precedent. The Southern reaction before the Civil War was torn by its own allegiance to the liberal idea; and the socialist movement, far from having the courage to assail and expose a liberal tradition which has kept it in the wilderness, has instead done its best to come to terms with it. The truth is, it is in Cooper and James that the ancestry of the twenties lies, in a tenuous tradition of unpolitical literary protest which has never been able to penetrate the essence of the national myth. This is why, when we say that the world involvement has made of that protest a national concern, we are asking for a shift of curious relevance to our intellectual traditions: the infusion, as it were, of literature into politics.

There can be no doubt, also, that the outrageous nature of the Whiggery which followed the First World War had much to do with the undisciplined violence of the revolt against it. Coolidge was the liberal symbol at its height, drained not merely of the need for philosophy but of the need for speech itself. If anyone could evoke the apoplectic sputtering of a Mencken, Coolidge was the man to do it. After the Civil War, when the creed of democratic capitalism was first evolved on a large scale, there had been a messianic touch about Whiggery, an earnest desire to forget Hamilton and to define the promise of Lincoln in terms of the theme of Horatio Alger. Now, however, when office boys were casually buying on margin, that battle was over, and the Republicans, instead of preaching gospel, could preside complacently over it. If there was a quiet revival of higher law in the speeches of Coolidge and Hoover, this was not merely to compensate, as Walter Lippmann said, for the riotous materialism of the nation. It was also to take due account of the divine universalism of the Alger faith.

Here was the upshot of a peculiar democratic situation, but though superficially the critics of the twenties were immersed in this peculiarity, on a deeper level they lacked the equipment to grasp it. Who in the whole history of American thought has had a keener sense for the lingo of American liberalism than Mencken? And yet, when he came to analyzing it fundamentally, he referred to the abstract elitism of Nietzsche, Faguet, and Michels, men who would not have known what to make of "Palmer, Burleson, and Co." Or take Lippmann, who was as much preoccupied with "stereotypes" as Mencken was with "tabus," and who was reacting as profoundly as Mencken against the conformist effect of the propaganda of the First World War. For Lippmann this reaction was evidence of a specific retreat from the idealism of the Progressive era, from the referendum, the recall, and the long ballot. Yet his analysis proceeds on the loftiest plane of social psychology. There is no real distinction, in Lippmann's studies of public opinion, between American opinion and opinion anywhere else in the world.

Nor can we say, for all of their frustration with the philosophic poverty of America, for all of their yearning for what Brooks called the "warfare of ideas," theories "really strong or bold," that these men understood what was involved. Occasionally you will find, as with Mencken, a wistful glance at an "organized minority of aristocrats" who still assail democracy abroad; or as with Lewis in his private notes, a reference to "outcasts" in Europe who limit the tyranny of G. T. Pumphrey, the name originally given to Babbitt. But that the philosophic peace of American history stems from a basic flight from the feudal system of Europe, from the class and social struggles of Europe, is a perception nowhere clearly developed. On the contrary, *clichés* like the frontier and Puritanism are forever being invoked. Whatever reservations one may have concerning De Voto's later attack on the twenties, one can surely sympathize with his anger at the undefined nature of the Puritan stereotype. The result of all this vagueness was that America became, as for Mencken, a quite accidental primitive tribe, where for no substantial reason a meticulous political ritualism replaced "civilized enlightenment."

Hence, too, it was a series of inexplicable inquisitors who appeared to impose the red scare on the nation after the First World War, to rifle the mails, to execute Sacco and Vanzetti, and to throw Scott Nearing out of the University of Pennsylvania. Of course the socialists traced all this to the "capitalists"; no one can forget some of the memorable sketches Dos Passos made in line with their theme. But Mencken was a good deal closer to the truth when, utilizing his elitism, he traced the hysteria to the mind of America as a whole. Mencken's relationship to the socialists will always be revealing, for he defended them passionately in their red scare distress and yet held their doctrines in contempt. This was logical enough, since elitism in a liberal society can easily come to the defense of Marxist noncomformity, being penalized along with it by the nationalist symbol. Nietzsche has peculiar ramifications in a Lockean world. But the socialists themselves were baffled by these ramifications, as Frederick Hoffmann has reminded us in his recent study of the period, and the Progressives were baffled even more. Did Mencken himself, insofar as America went, understand what produced his friends and enemies?

Louis Post has written of the delirium of deportation that swept America in the course of the red scare, which has an inverted relevance to the role of the Young Intellectuals, for they engaged in what might be called an ecstasy of expatriation. Harold Stearns, one of the most ecstatic of them all, has a direct connection to Emma Goldman, for if the latter was thrown out of the country because of the liberal passion, the former fled on his own because of that very fact. Deportation shows us, if we needed to be shown, how keen was the immersion in the norms of Main Street when the isolationist liberalism of Harding replaced the messianic liberalism of Wilson. Granted that Wilson carried forward the national absolute, often with pathetic consequences in the field of foreign policy, still with him some emancipation was possible through the experience of world contact. This possibility disappeared when the trend of isolation got underway. The deportation of radical "aliens," if it was related to the Bolshevik revolution, was also related to that trend. The Young Intellectuals could hardly have challenged the age more arrogantly, more fundamentally than by becoming voluntary deportees.

We cannot dismiss the expatriation of the twenties, as R. P. Blackmur does, as a spurious and artificial thing. It comes too logically as a climax of the whole revolt against nationalism, too transparently as a symbol of cosmopolitan yearnings. And yet it comes also as the final commentary on the chaotic and undisciplined nature of both the revolt and the yearnings. For if the Young Intellectuals embraced the fate of the alien Marxist in America, they did not go abroad as Lenin went to Switzerland. They did not plot a revolution in the image of their dreams. They went in resignation. Mencken, when he refused to go, instead of saying that he wanted to fight the good fight at home, said that he enjoyed the behavior of the American zoo. When he became serious about democracy, all that he could offer as a solution was a vague "self-limiting" principle whose source was never really explained. Actually he said that America was "slipping downhill." Even the constructive solutions of the time, apart of course from those of the socialists, vividly lacked concreteness: Lippmann's idea, for example, of a public opinion that had withdrawn to the sidelines. The movement for America's "coming of age" lacked not only a concept of the past but a concept of the future as well; it was contained in an instant of the emotions. In the struggle to transcend the American liberal tradition it will be remembered more for its energy than for its philosophy.

## III

The collapse of this revolt during the decade of the thirties, culminating in the sad recantations which preceded the Second World War, is a tangled and complex story. In a sense the clue to it lies in the emergence of a concept of "responsibility," not merely in the terms that Archibald MacLeish made famous in 1940, but also in the terms that Roosevelt, implicitly, made famous in 1932. Here the Young Intellectuals paid the first price for the chaos of their iconoclasm, for if the revolt against "Americanism" meant a hopeless flight to Paris, then did not the constructive outlook on life mean submission to "Americanism"? This reasoning which divorced "responsibility" from the struggle for national enlightenment, surely an ironic separation in light of the needs of our own time, was one of the unfortunate consequences of the Menckenesque approach to life. And yet this reasoning did not flourish openly, it was not worked out with righteous vigor, until the armies of Hitler began to march and the Communist menace appeared. During the New Deal era, the idea that "responsibility" involved a surrender to nationalism was scarcely noticed, not only because Roosevelt's traditionalism was buried so much beneath the surface, but also because of the superficial ideological connections between the New Deal and the iconoclasm of the twenties itself.

That America's Liberal Reform, its French Radicalism and its English Liberalism, should appear iconoclastic at all in what was practically the middle of the twentieth century is a remarkable thing. But given the nature of our history, this is the way it did appear, and its enemy was the same old Republicanism, deflated to be sure, which had driven Mencken to his most furious outbursts. Hence the Young Intellectuals who left Paris and came to Washington were able to retain some of their sardonic laughter even in the age of "responsibility"; and if now they only laughed at the Republicans, carefully exempting the Democrats, still enough of the old remained to make the new acceptable. Moreover, on the plane of New Deal scholarship, the earlier concern with the irrational appeal of symbol and myth took deep historic root. If Thurman Arnold's "folklore" was not an extension of Mencken's "shibboleths," it was surely an extension of Lippmann's "stereotypes," although Lippman himself, for other reasons, was beginning to join the Republicans.

Now Roosevelt was a greater figure than Hoover, and the New Deal far better than the Old, but when our iconoclasts stopped criticizing the Democrats they gave up more than they knew. They gave up their grip on the national character of the national experience. They gave up the wisdom they had acquired in Paris, or during their dreams of going there. When they subtly redefined the "coming of age" concept in terms of a readiness to accept the pragmatic innovations of American Liberal Reform, the NRA and the TVA and the ERA, as Henry Wallace did, they betrayed the full meaning of the concept. Moreover, their understanding of their enemies, instead of being improved by this social consciousness, was actually damaged by it; for the irrational appeal of Hoover's cry of "American Individualism" stemmed from a national experience which, alas, Jackson had shared with Daniel Webster. On this count, to be historically accurate, the sad fact is that you cannot criticize the Republicans without criticizing the Democrats too.

But historical accuracy was not a peculiar virtue of the new time. If in the earlier age the Young Intellectuals had lacked a theory of history, now they had one; but it was a theory which buried and obscured the insights so painfully acquired before. It put Paris out of the picture completely. It was either the refurbished theory of Beard, or a blend of that theory with the theory of Marx. Marx, to be sure, reminded one of Paris, but, as he was inevitably interpreted, only to identify America with France, when the insight of the twenties was that the two countries were peculiarly different. To await socialism in America by virtue of the same mechanism which produced it in Europe was surely to miss the nature of American life, the power of the very Lockean stereotypes that the twenties had delighted in lampooning. Insofar as the new Beardism went, this was straight subjectivism, closing down perspectives to a purely internal view of the national experience. We cannot say that it discussed Europe erroneously: it hardly discussed Europe at all.

Why Roosevelt, then, did not confront Hoover with a direct exposure of the irrational genesis of "American Individualism" ought not to be mysterious. He had not been one of Mencken's disciples in the first place: he had nothing to forget. The twenties for him had been the Democratic party of Al Smith and the governorship of New York; and this may be why Mencken hated him so. Actually Mencken's notorious antagonism to the New Deal was by no means a logical continuation of the critical spirit. What bothered him most was the Brain Trust, hardly an object for rationalist censure; and when he ended up as a writer for Hearst, as the darling of deflated Whiggery itself, he certainly was not true to his earlier distaste for the "Hon. Warren Gamaliel Harding." But the fate of Mencken, like that of Lippmann, though interesting enough as biography, is not our real concern. The important thing is that the New Deal sincerely carried forward the tradition of Progressive liberalism.

Hence we cannot accuse Roosevelt of cowardice because he did not make an issue out of that tradition: where insight does not appear, the question of courage does not arise. He pursued the instinctive course: pragmatic action, occasional devotions before the Lockean shrine. Nor did anything serious seem to be lost by this. Martin Dies did not involve the grave threat to freedom and the grave barrier to foreign communication that McCarthy involved in a later time. Indeed the problem of world understanding seemed hardly to be a problem over most of the New Deal era, when much of social thought was heavily isolationist. It was a logical culmination of their peculiar reform premises that men like Stuart Chase and Charles Beard should emerge as isolationists on the eve of the Second World War. The contrast between Wilson and Harding in this respect is not a permanent contrast in American politics, and the isolationist strand of the American liberal tradition, from the time of Jefferson onward, has been one to which the Progressives have amply contributed.

If the New Deal marked a slow retreat to the womb of "Americanism" for the Young Intellectuals, the Second World War and its aftermath marked a swift and frantic fulfillment of the process. The divorce between cosmopolitan enlightenment and social "responsibility," at precisely the moment history should have joined them, became explicit and complete. To be sure, this was not the actual message of MacLeish's attack upon "The Irresponsibles" in 1940: he was asking intellectuals to give up "detachment" and fight for culture much as the Marxist asks them to give it up and fight for revolution. The argument is dubious in both cases, but save for the atmosphere in which MacLeish projected it, there was no reason why it should have involved a surrender to the ancient symbols of nationalism. What the atmosphere was, however, was made abundantly clear by Bernard DeVoto. Shortly thereafter he defined "detachment" to mean detachment not from culture but from America, and angrily assailed the men of the twenties for detaching themselves from the "common experience of Americans." He now cited Brooks with satisfaction, for Brooks had already completed his regression to cultural subjectivism, although DeVoto still flayed him mercilessly, as if no amount of expiation would do, for those earlier days when Brooks had yearned to "come of age." There was much talk of "organic bonds" and "community" and "nature."

Now involved in this violent repudiation of the twenties, reminiscent—were it not for its New World flavor—of the European reaction itself, were certain bread and butter conceptions of strategy. If you criticized the country, how could you expect to fight for it, or expect others to do so? What this reasoning overlooked, of course, is that it is a virtue in a country that it can be criticized and that in politics criticism is the difficult price you pay for progress. Here was the root of another argument, which arose as the issue of Communism replaced the issue of war: that criticism loses allies—when as a matter of fact the very proof of American democracy lies in the presence of criticism, which is something our allies know. What is appalling about these strategic conceptions is their low evaluation of the public to which they are addressed, whether that public consists of younger Americans or Europeans and Asians. Is it reasonable to believe that either of these groups will be taken in by a sudden national keeping mum? Here, surely, is precisely the sort of literary arrogance DeVoto thought he was assailing.

There is a childish economy about these conceptions, however, which is the clue to their real function. In a simple world, and one where men are not suspicious, they might work well enough: it is only in the real world that they do not work. Hence they are not to be judged in terms of strategy but in terms of the flight under pressure to a primitive mechanism of mind. And here we have, of course, the meaning of the whole regression to "Americanism," the whole frantic fleeing to the simple symbols of the national childhood. It is a sad commentary on the bold and heroic effort of the twenties that this should be its end. It is as if we were confronted with one of those violent outbursts of adolescence which culminate in full retreat, the perennial tale of the boy who runs away from home in the morning only to be safely asleep in the same old bed at night. But given the terrifying reality of the Nazi and Communist threats, and the rapidity with which they appeared, surely it would be unreasonable to lose heart because of this. "Coming of age" in the twentieth century is bound to be a difficult process.

## IV

Is it possible for a responsible American political movement to be charged with some of the cosmopolitan fire of the twenties? Is it possible for American social thought to fashion the purposive theory of American culture that was lacking in the twenties?

I am not so sure these are fantastic prospects, if only because without their fulfillment the situation has become increasingly difficult for politicians and thinkers alike. The Progressive tradition took a beating from the national liberal absolute in its most recent phase more severe than any given it in the time of Harding or the time of Roosevelt. Indeed, it cannot even now answer the charge that only the Republicans could have put McCarthy in his place because only they were utterly pure on the count of "Americanism." A party which cannot reply to the argument that only its opponents can liquidate hysteria, because they are the most hysterical, has either to imitate its opponents or to deal frontally with the issue of hysteria itself. Granted that the first alternative is always there, of course, and is always being used, still it is not inconceivable that the time will come when "Americanism" will be hurled with such mighty force at the Progressives that some of them, instead of fleeing it, glossing it over, patting it on the back, will stand up and stare it in the face.

The kind of "detachment" from America that this would involve would be unprecedented, and yet there is an ironic sense in which the mechanism of American politics has always been moving in some such direction. Given the solidary nature of the American liberal world, the historic technique for defeating your opponents is to isolate them somehow from it, to prove that they do not "belong": this is what Jefferson did to Hamilton in "aristocratic" terms, and what Hoover tried to do to Roosevelt in "socialistic" terms. The possibility I suggest is that men confronted with this technique may see through it and make an issue of it, insisting that the American political system ought to be something different from a private club in which a suspected violation of ritual is enough to seal one's fate. Thus the "irresponsible" criticism of Mencken might become an actual political weapon, and the philosophic spirit might begin to temper the symbols of the liberal tradition.

We must not assume, because it is an intellectual matter, that the enterprise in social and historical thought of transcending the national experience will be much easier than this. Rousseau observed that if learned men have few prejudices they cling to these with unusual ardor. The few prejudices which have underlain our study of America have been nationalistic in character, and whatever battles may have taken place in the course of that study, over social history or over the frontier, those prejudices have survived them all. Unconsciously, unwittingly, we have read our cultural isolationism into the study of our culture itself. The effort to break down this isolationism—to relate American history and politics to the Western pattern of which it is a part—is an effort which lies still ahead of us.

And yet, once again, is it not evident that our current situation is leading us inevitably in this direction? If the national perspectives of the past have reflected themselves in our study of America, will not the world perspectives of the present and the future have the same result? It is nothing to be ashamed of, that scholarship derives its inspiration from the hard experiences into which it is thrust: the dream of an "objectivity" beyond this, at least in the social sciences, is a bloodless and inhuman dream. At the same time the case for the wider perspective, whether in politics or in culture, is not in the last analysis a utilitarian one. It is justified in its own right, as the critics of the twenties believed when they yearned to "come of age." For all of their superficiality and immaturity, their pathos and their terror, those critics represent one of the most satisfying evidences of energy in the American tradition of recent years. So long as that energy continues to exist, there is solid ground for hope that American liberalism, instead of closing down its perspectives under the impact of the twentieth century, will open them up to the world.

# COMMUNICATIONS

[Under this heading the REVIEW will on occasion publish comments received on recent articles or other suitable topics. MAN. ED.]

## McCLOSKEY *v.* DIAMOND: A COMMENT

As one who has for some years been trying to establish, both in teaching and research, a *modus vivendi* with American political thought, I was immensely impressed by Professor McCloskey's "American Political Thought and the Study of Politics," in the March issue of this REVIEW. He has stated clearly and without cant what seem to me to be the goals of the teacher in this somewhat neglected field of interest, and his formulation has helped me, for one, to a better appreciation of the intricate relationships between thought and action which characterize the American political tradition. What I have to say here is essentially an elaboration of his position in one specific, but to me important, area.

My one significant criticism of McCloskey's article arises from his apparent acceptance of the view that American political thought is second-rate, an acceptance which seems to me an unnecessary and unwarranted concession to our critics who assert in season and out that since we have produced no Plato or Aristotle, no Hegel or Marx, our tradition is barren of any real thought. Some of my best friends are metaphysicians, but I still insist that we have succumbed too long to their ontological bullying. To say this is not to claim that American political thought is first-rate, or to advocate the anti-metaphysical nihilism of positivism and its derivative cults; it is merely to assert the inadequacy of traditional metaphysical criteria when used to evaluate American political thought—to note that it is possible for a high-level civilization to exist, and with it a significant corpus of political ideas, without producing great philosophical figures. The mere absence of a Plato or a Locke is not sufficient in itself to consign a political tradition to the limbo of mediocrity. The Byzantine Empire, that mysterious entity and great culture which existed but five hundred miles from the primitive feudal institutions to which we devote so much time, never produced a Plato or a St. Thomas—a fact which Steven Runciman suggests was a tribute to the effectiveness of its operational ideas which "worked too well for abstract discussions to be needed."[1]

Byzantium was undeniably a metaphysical failure, but the reason for this appears to be the astounding success of its day to day, century to century, political ideas, *i.e.*, the success of its political thought. Granting the danger of argument by analogy, I would yet urge that the American situation is roughly parallel to that of the Byzantine Empire, though obviously the contents of the two political traditions are radically divergent. Unquestionably we do not rate more than a gentlemanly C— in metaphysics. But the connection between this proposition and one alleging that our political thought is second-rate has nowhere been demonstrated. Only after an identity between first-rate philosophy and first-rate political thought has been established—not assumed *sub silentio*—could this proposition be sustained. One could, indeed, suggest—at least for purpose of argument—that the appearance of great philosophers in a society is an almost certain sign of a failure or crisis in political theory, of the growth of anomie—do not great philosophic owls hoot only at twilight? To quote Runciman again, "it was only in the last years of the Empire, when it was clearly dying, that the theorists arose with schemes to put the world right."[2]

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[1] Steven Runciman, *Byzantine Civilization*, (London, 1933), p. 65.

Professor Diamond's critique of McCloskey comes to mind at this point. Diamond, after some semantic exercise, assaults McCloskey because the latter did not keep mirrors and creators in discrete logical categories. This, while doubtless devastating from the viewpoint of formal logic, strikes me as merely irrelevant, since, as I read his piece, McCloskey was asserting precisely the difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing in American political thinkers between the creative and reflective acts. Put another way, McCloskey was emphasizing the absence of alienation, which might be defined as the *separation* of creative from reflexive processes. Particularly in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, American political thinkers were totally immersed in the day to day life of the body politic and their creativity was a merged coefficient of their reflection.

Diamond's attack wanders off down a dead-end street, I suggest, because he is approaching the American political tradition with the critical apparatus of philosphy. Note again, I am not denying the validity of these metaphysical canons in their proper sphere, but I insist that their role is supplementary at best in the evaluation of political thought. We have been abashed and uneasy in the presence of our philosophical critics to the extent that we have failed to note the trickery involved in their critique of American political thought. They have smote us, in essence, with a self-validating proposition. The syllogism might be set up as follows: 1) great political thought is founded on great metaphysics; 2) the United States has produced no great metaphysicians; *ergo* 3) American political thought is second-rate. American political thought may be second-rate, but a judgment to this effect cannot merely be founded on the foregoing tautology that it has produced no Plato.

Assuming then that the criteria of professional philosophy are inappropriate for evaluating American political thought, what criteria should be applied? Here Diamond has registered a serious complaint against McCloskey. If one does not judge American political thought in terms of philosophical merit, is he not forced into a descriptive nominalism? Into simply asserting that there is, or is not, an intimate connection between ideas and political action? If all we can say is that Calhoun reflected brilliantly the aspirations of the antebellum South or that John Taylor of Caroline was out of step with the emergent nationalism of his time, we might as well shut up shop and go back to teaching American national government.

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[2] *Ibid.*

But are we so circumscribed? I don't believe so, and it seems to me that McCloskey has also implicitly rejected this nominalistic stand. True, an important level of analysis is concerned precisely with the pragmatic question: how well did this idea work? The concern at this point is with the correspondence of any particular body of ideas, *e.g.*, the abolitionist interpretation of due process of law, to the substantive goals of the group holding it, *e.g.*, freedom for the slaves. Similarly, one can examine the success of the cult of Herbert Spencer in supplying a political formula to the emerging "robber barons" or—to avoid antagonizing the younger generation—"industrial statesmen."

However, above and beyond this important level of description, there is a vital area of analysis which is concerned with goals and dreams, with the role that ideals play in the development of American political thought. On this level of ulterior analysis, one of course becomes involved in the innate subjectivism of ethics. Here one asks, for example, did the importance of ending the "Mexicanization" of American politics justify the corruption and boodling involved in the Compromise of 1877? Was there an alternative route to consensus? If one chooses to by-pass such a subjective quagmire as this, he has the option of confronting the spokesmen of any given period with the precepts upon which the Republic was founded: Professor Hartz dealt perceptively in this fashion with the "Reactionary Enlightenment," demonstrating that Calhoun's philosophy was vitiated and aborted by the doctrines of natural right he was incapable of rejecting and powerless to transcend.

This gets the critical observer deep into the greatest mystery of all: what has given to American political thought its architectonic design? In attempting to answer this question, I have—and I take it from McCloskey's acute remarks about federalism, particularly his quotation from Acton, that we are in the same camp—found it necessary to break radically with the standard techniques of political theory. Recognising that this may result in a court-martial, I confess that I have deëmphasized ideas and concentrate almost wholly on institutional development. Rather than starting out with a Geiger counter in search of Thomists, liberals, conservatives, or Gnostics, I spend my time tracing the growth, power, or decline of American institutions, pressure groups among them, and examining the impact of these changes on the content of American political thought. I claim no originality in this; the technique is an old one which reached its peak in the work of Frederic Maitland and John Neville Figgis, and was used with great effectiveness by Sir Lewis Namier and his disciples to examine Eighteenth Century Britain. It seems particularly appropriate to the American scene.

Thus in examining the history of freedom in the United States, I do not begin with the growth of a mustard seed in the colonial period and trace the ever-widening vistas of freedom through the Declaration of Independence and on into the Nineteenth Century. I begin with an Americanization of Figgis' famous dictum that "political liberty is the residuary legatee of ecclesiastical animosities," namely, that American freedom has largely been a by-product of the practical inability of any group successfully to impose its Truth on the nation. Like McCloskey, and in the spirit of Maitland's famous remark that British liberty was an outgrowth of "writs not rights," I emphasize heavily the growth of procedural traditions which act as a cushion against injustice. With one or two exceptions, notably the Pennsylvania Quakers of the colonial period, I have yet in the course of my research to discover any significant American group which was unwilling, *when it had the power*, to deny freedom to its enemies. Respect for the civil liberties of opponents has been scant: if Adams could approve the application of the Sedition Act to Jeffersonian newspapers, Jefferson could casually write Governor Claiborne of the Orleans Territory with respect to the illegal arrest and confinement of Burr and his minions:

> "The Feds, and a little band of Quids, in opposition, will try to make something of the infringement of liberty by the military arrest and deportation of citizens, but if it does not go much beyond [the few leaders], they will be supported by public approbation."[3]

This has a certain contemporary ring—at least for civil libertarians who are constantly being told with respect to violations of constitutional rights that while illegitimate, the baby is very *small.*

The "tradition of liberty" thus breaks down into a study of practice, and of the development of social traditions which drew the sting from intergroup relations. My tentative view is that the very impersonalization of urban industrial society which is so deplored by psychoanalytical and sociological commentators has been a major factor in an increase in freedom for the American nonconformist. However, my views, whether sound or fatuous, are not relevant here. What is relevant is the technique: the close exploration of the nexus between political structure and political thought. Howard Jay Graham has, for example, done a superb job of demonstrating the connection between the demands of railroads and insurance companies for protection from state regulation and the incorporation of Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics* in the Fourteenth Amendment. His research suggests that a major consideration in this process was the legal adolescence of corporation counsel, for most of the leaders of the Bar were in their youth steeped in the higher law, substantive due process tradition of the Abolitionists.[4]

Similarly, a close examination of states' rights breaks down the view that there is a states' rights "tradition" in the European sense, *i.e.*, a group which consistently clings to a body of dogma come hell or high water. We find the emphasis on states' rights as a direct coefficient of the governmental structure. True, one and all look to and quote the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, but a tradition must be built on more than rhetorical plagiarism, and a reading of Henry Adams' magisterial *History of the United States* should destroy once and for all the illusion that the Jeffersonians were principled decentralists.

At this point a critic can legitimately inquire: "So what?" Are teachers of

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[3] Cited by Thomas P. Abernethy, *The Burr Conspiracy*, (New York, 1954), p. 196.

[4] See Howard Jay Graham, "Builded Better than They Knew," *U. of Pittsburgh Law Review*, Vol. 17, p. 537 (1956); and "Our Declaratory Fourteenth Amendment," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 7, p. 3 (1954).

American political thought to abandon the realm of ideas entirely and become structural engineers? Obviously not; I am not suggesting that explorations of the sort I have described are *sufficient* for an evaluation of our political tradition, but rather that they are necessary, absolutely necessary. The achievement of "good" goals must be linked up with the creation or maintenance of effective institutional forms. One can suggest, as James M. Burns does in his fine study of Franklin D. Roosevelt, that the President failed to fulfill the potentialities of "liberal" leadership because he did not create a presidential party in Congress but without a fight left control in the hands of the senior Southern legislators. In short, one can insist on the intimate tie between instruments and goals, though recognizing that the latter are not immanent in the forms but must be arrived at by philosophical processes and imposed upon the tradition from without. He does not go looking for "great" philsophy as the proof of great political thought—he utilizes great philosophical traditions to judge the content of the thought and, hopefully, to alter its direction. A first-rate body of political thought is not, therefore, one which shoots off great metaphysicians like alpha particles; it is one which moves towards first-rate goals.[5]

We terminate this journey staring morosely at the barrier of first principles. Our tradition is not first-rate because it has worked, nor is it second-rate because it has produced no political philosophers of genius. Whether it is good or bad can only be determined in terms of external categories, and our function as teachers and scholars in this field is to dedicate ourselves to the arduous task of refining these analytical criteria. Subjective they may be, yet without them it is impossible to evaluate in an ethically meaningful fashion the merits of American political thought. And no amount of scientific jargon or numerology can exorcise this metaphysical shade. Much as some would like to believe it possible, in ethics and metaphysics the Indian Rope Trick can not be managed: no one can climb up his first premises and then pull them up behind him. Thus, like it or not, we find ourselves projected into the realm of moral speculation, and, while I realize what a sense of unease speculating about the moral order creates in most of us, I suggest that the sooner we confront the problem the better. We can, of course, ignore the issue, but it will not go away. The only thing that will occur is that self-appointed prophets of Truth will continue to fill the vacuum and to usurp the function of judgment in the name of their esoteric cults. The alternatives are clear: we must choose between *gnosis* and the Gnostics.

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[5] Cf. Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic* (New York, 1953), pp. 438–9.

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# BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

## POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF URBANISM*

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It is the contention of this article that political scientists have been slow to study seriously the impact of urbanization on our governmental institutions and political life. While the total literature of municipal government is vast, the significant scholarly literature of urban government is small in amount and limited in coverage.†

Some areas of urban governmental studies have been excluded from the present review. A great body of writing has been produced by legislative committees, citizen groups, governmental research bureaus, commissions, leagues of cities, and municipal agencies. This material is collected by libraries, bureaus of public administration, and private consultants; it has many good uses, but with few exceptions it is applied research as compared with the more basic type of study under discussion here.[1] For the most part, the periodical literature dealing directly with urban governmental problems will not be discussed. The vast preponderance of this is reportorial in nature, appearing in such periodicals as *The National Municipal Review*, *The American City*, and *Public Management.* The professional journals of political science over the past fifty years have published but an insignificant number of studies concerned with urban government, few of them based on original research.[2] The AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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* The author is indebted to Dwight Waldo for comments on the manuscript.

† The first comprehensive bibliography on urban government has been published since the present article was completed: *Metropolitan Communities: A Bibliography* (1957) by the Government Affairs Foundation. It is a substantially complete listing of the types of literature reviewed here, as well as of the kinds specifically excluded, organized under the following headings: Functions and Problems; Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas; Politics in Metropolitan Communities; Social Structure and Process; Population; and The Metropolitan Economy. The paucity of material on urban politics is underlined by the fact that chapter II on metropolitan politics covers only four pages of a total of three hundred twenty-one. The bibliography will prove an exceedingly useful tool for those interested in local affairs.

[1] Allen R. Richards characterizes this literature in "Local Government Research: A Partial Evaluation," 14 *Public Administration Review* 271 (1954).

[2] The *Public Administration Review* contains the greatest number of articles, typically brief, on municipal problems. However, a study of its content, 1940–1952, shows that only 17 of 419 articles were concerned with urban government: Ernest A. Engelbert, "The Content of the *Public Administration Review* 1940–1952," 13 *Public Administration Review* 257 (1953). Dwight Waldo's survey of articles in the general political science journals reveals a declining interest in the local government area between 1925 and 1954: not only a quantitative decline, but also an intellectual stagnation in the field: *Political Science in the United States of America*, UNESCO, Documentation in the Social Sciences (Paris: 1956), p. 79. The following represent a substantial portion of the urban government literature appearing in the professional journals of political science. *The Annals:* "Better City Government," Vol. 199 (Sept. 1938); "Building the Future City," Vol. 242 (Nov.

REVIEW once carried notes on municipal government, but in recent years little interest in the subject has been manifested. Two other portions of the urban government literature are somewhat more important, though neither will be given item by item treatment. The first consists of a number of discussions of municipal government in a particular state,[3] valuable chiefly as factual descriptions of municipal institutions and problems. The second consists of studies, confined to a particular city or metropolitan area, concerned with surveying structure and administrative arrangements.[4] These studies are frequently disappointingly narrow in approach, being directed toward immediate "solutions." The technique is normally to describe existing governmental arrangements,

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1945); this REVIEW: A. Lawrence Lowell, "Expert Administrators in Popular Government," Vol. 7, p. 45 (1913); Lent D. Upson, "The City Manager Plan in Ohio," Vol. 9, p. 496 (1915); Winston W. Crouch, "Initiative and Referendum in Cities," Vol. 37, p. 491 (1943); Arthur W. Bromage, "Running for the City Council," Vol. 43, p. 1235 (1949); *Journal of Politics:* Weldon Cooper, "Trends in Municipal Government in the South," Vol. 10, p. 490 (1948); Dan R. Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in Metropolitanism," Vol. 17, p. 82 (1955); *Public Administration Review:* Sam C. May and Robert E. Ward, "Coordinating Defense Activities in a Metropolitan Region," Vol. 2, p. 104 (Spring 1942); Kenneth P. Vinsel, "Louisville Plans Its Future," Vol. 4, p. 341 (Autumn 1944); Carl J. Friedrich and associates, "Planning for the Greater Boston Metropolitan Area," Vol. 5, p. 113 (Spring 1945); John Bauer, "Metropolitan Utility Supply and Organization," Vol. 5, p. 127 (Spring 1945); Donald E. J. MacNamara, "American Police Administration at Mid-Century," Vol. 10, p. 181 (1950); Rowland Egger, "In One Consent," Vol. 10, p. 262 (1950); W. Darlington Denit, "Boulder City: Government Town Problem," Vol. 12, p. 97 (Spring 1952); Lyman S. Moore, "The City Manager Looks at the Budget," Vol. 12, p. 196 (Summer 1952); Wallace S. Sayre, "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," Vol. 14, p. 253 (Autumn 1954); O. K. Coke and M. D. Tarshes, "Consolidation of City-County Health Functions in San Diego," Vol. 14, p. 170 (Summer 1954); Winston W. Crouch, "Metropolitan Government in Toronto," Vol. 14, p. 85 (Spring 1954); Dan Grant, "Federal-Municipal Relationships and Metropolitan Integration," Vol. 14, p. 259 (Autumn 1954). Leon D. Epstein, "Size of Place and the Division of the Two-Party Vote in Wisconsin," 9 *Western Political Quarterly* 138 (1956).

[3] These include: Benjamin F. Shambaugh, *Municipal Government and Administration in Iowa* (1930); Roscoe C. Martin, *Urban Local Government in Texas* (1936); L. E. Abbott and L. S. Greene, *Municipal Government and Administration in Tennessee* (1939); Millard H. Satterfield and Hugh W. Urban, *Municipal Government and Administration in Mississippi* (1940); Weldon Cooper, *Municipal Government in Alabama* (1940); John C. Bollens and John R. McKinley, *California City Government* (1948); George R. Sherrill, *Municipal Government in South Carolina* (1950); S. H. Friedelbaum, *Municipal Government in New Jersey* (1954).

[4] Some outstanding examples are: Charles E. Merriam, Spencer D. Parratt, and Albert Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (1933); John C. Bollens, *The Problem of Government of the San Francisco Bay Region* (1948); Weldon Cooper, *Metropolitan County: A Survey of Government in the Birmingham Area* (1949); Fulton County Local Government Commission, *Plan of Improvement for the Governments of Atlanta and Fulton County* (1950); Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, *A Future for Nashville* (1952); The Haynes Foundation, *Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration* (16 vols., 1952–1955); Public Administration Service, *The Government of Metropolitan Miami* (1954).

measure them against a set of "principles" or basic considerations, and prescribe a remedy which involves greater integration in one form or another. While useful for comparative purposes, these studies seldom relate the governmental to the social and economic institutions or to the party and group substructure. This is frequently the natural result of sponsorship by the community under study.

For present purposes the literature of urban government, somewhat arbitrarily, has been forced into the following categories: general works including texts, history, municipal reform, law, governmental structure, politics, and management. Within each of these categories the treatment is basically chronological. A final section discusses selected items considered highly relevant to urban government from such fields as sociology, economics, geography, planning, and engineering.

## I

The first general study of American urban institutions is found in James Bryce's *American Commonwealth.* His familiar analysis of municipal government is in the last three chapters of Volume One. At the outset, Bryce linked the urban governmental problem with the even then rapid course of urbanization. He returned his famous indictment, "There is no denying that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States,"[5] listing causes of the failure which have since been widely copied as a basis for prescriptions. It is a mark of Bryce's acute perception that he did not mistake the symptoms for the causes, as some later writers seem to have done. He insisted that municipal government problems could not be thoroughly understood without studying the party system—as he did at length in Volume Two. His picture of urban politics was comprehensive and detailed.

Some three dozen textbooks in municipal government have been issued since. The earlier texts tended to follow the comparative institutions approach, with a large leavening of British and continental material. Somewhat later, there appeared a series of books devoted exclusively to functions or management of municipal government; recent texts deal with both government and administration, with virtually no comparative foreign material. From the very first to the present, the textbooks have been heavily descriptive, emphasizing the formal organization of municipal government, its legal status, powers, and procedures. This type of presentation may not be so desirable as its prevalence suggests. Description was probably appropriate in the period of Goodnow, Rowe, and Fairlie. Later text writers have not exploited the opportunity to develop the dynamic aspects of government in action in either political or administrative directions.

The earliest text was Frank J. Goodnow, *Municipal Problems* (1897), emphasizing the legal framework, politics, and organization, and concluding with a chapter, which some current texts, amazingly, do not contain, called

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[5] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (1891 ed.), Vol. I, p. 608.

"The Metropolitan City." John A. Fairlie's rigorously descriptive *Municipal Administration* (1901) was the first text on administration as distinguished from politics. In 1904, Goodnow produced *City Government in the United States* by adding to his previous work a great body of material on functions and administration. This book is the prototype of the present day municipal government textbook in terms of subject matter and organization. In the concluding chapter, relying in part on the work of Lincoln Steffens and in part on his own extensive research in city-state relationships, he suggested that the fruitful approach to municipal reform lay less with developing new forms of municipal organization than with adjusting city-legislature relationships and the city's position in the structure of party and group politics. The last fifty years have seen a failure to act on this advice.

In 1908, L. S. Rowe published *Problems of City Government*, offering a broad view of urban institutions. In 1909, Goodnow published his third text, *Municipal Government.* To his previous material was added a large amount of comparative information, especially from Britain, France, and Germany. He now placed increased emphasis on the importance of social and economic factors in municipal reform and on the interdependence of private and public life in the city. Goodnow's four major works in municipal government, including the technical study of home rule noted below, represent the most monumental effort to understand urban government in the United States that has been undertaken by a single scholar. It is perhaps a sign of Goodnow's deep understanding of urban government that he was never swayed toward acceptance of the panaceas current during the period. He never approved the idea of taking politics out of government. He never suggested that "ward politics" could be eliminated by eliminating wards. Yet he steadfastly and repeatedly urged the necessity of governmental integration as the road to responsible government.

Other texts vary in content and detail from the works discussed, but for the most part offer various combinations of the same types of treatment. These include Charles Zueblin, *American Municipal Progress* (1902); Charles Beard, *American City Government* (1912); William B. Munro, *Government of American Cities* (1912) and *Municipal Government and Administration* (1923); Chester C. Maxey, *An Outline of Municipal Government* (1924); William Anderson, *American City Government* (1925), revised in 1950 with Edward W. Weidner; Thomas H. Reed, *Municipal Government in the U. S.* (1926); Chester A. Hanford, *Problems in Municipal Government* (1926); Chester C. Maxey, *Urban Democracy* (1929); Austin F. MacDonald, *American City Government and Administration* (1929); Charles M. Kneier, *City Government in the U. S.* (1934); Harold Zink, *Government of Cities in the U. S.* (1939); Stuart MacCorkle, *American Municipal Government and Administration* (1942); Ernst B. Schulz, *American City Government* (1949); Arthur Bromage, *Introduction to Municipal Government and Administration* (1950). Many of the works noted have been revised a number of times. Charles R. Adrian, *Governing Urban America* (1955) is notable not only as the most recent text, but also for drawing on recent research in urban ecology and social psychology. Three recent texts treat local government generally:

Marguerite J. Fisher and Donald G. Bishop, *Municipal and Other Local Governments* (1950); James E. Pate, *Local Government and Administration* (1954); and Harold F. Alderfer, *American Local Government and Administration* (1956).

Despite the considerable volume of writing on urban subjects, no evaluation of the increasing importance of cities in our national life was attempted until the late 1930's. The job was undertaken by the National Resources Committee through its subcommittee on urbanism. The report, *Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy*, was published in 1937. A volume of additional information specifically focused on governmental problems was published two years later. This work, *Urban Government* (1939), is the first part of a two-volume report of the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources Committee. Deeply analytical in nature, it offers recommendations for action. It is pointed toward those aspects of urban government concerning which federal policies seemed appropriate and, as such, is the first thorough treatment of the question of a federal urbanism policy. Part I of this volume, "Development of Urban Government" by Albert Lepawsky, remains the outstanding statement of the status of urban government as a force in our national life.

## II

Neither historians nor political scientists have displayed a great interest in the history of urban governmental institutions. Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Rise of the City: 1878–1898* (1933) is not primarily devoted to city government or even to cities as such, but is a history of the two decades with emphasis on the new forces identified with urbanization. Ernest S. Griffith's major historical work, *Modern Development of City Government* (1927), is a valuable treatment of the history of municipal government generally, rather than in the United States only. Griffith initiated a major study of municipal history in the United States, but completed only the first volume, *History of American City Government: The Colonial Period* (1939). Carl Bridenbaugh has thoroughly and exhaustively covered the same period in *Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America 1625–1742* (1938) and *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America 1743–1776* (1955). Other studies of municipal history are extremely limited in scope. We may hope that three recent historical studies presage a revived interest in this neglected subject: Frank M. Stewart, *A Half Century of Municipal Reform: The History of the National Municipal League* (1950); Frederick Shaw, *The History of the New York City Legislature* (1954); and Nelson M. Blake, *Water for the Cities* (1956).

## III

In the field of municipal public law three writers are outstanding. Goodnow's pioneering volume, *Municipal Home Rule: A Study in Administration* (1895) was not a study in administration as the field is presently conceived, but rather a technical discussion of the powers of cities and their relationship to state authority. Howard Lee McBain's monumental work, *The Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule* (1916), traced the historical development of municipal powers and analyzed the situation in a number of states. In 1918 McBain produced a smaller work on legal trends related to the police power, city planning, public utilities, and industrial promotion, *American City Progress and the Law.* Following the pattern set by Goodnow and McBain, Joseph D. McGoldrick brought the story of home rule up to date in *The Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule 1916–1930* (1933). This series of monographs covers the development of home rule over a period of almost forty years. While this subject is better covered than some other areas of urban government, even McGoldrick's work is becoming outdated in many respects.

Some of the leading commentaries and casebooks on the law of municipal corporations include John F. Dillon, *Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations* (5th ed., 1911); R. W. Cooley, *Handbook of the Law of Municipal Corporations* (1914); C. W. Tooke, *A Selection of Cases on the Law of Municipal Corporations* (1926); Murray Seasongood, *Cases on Municipal Corporations* (1941); Jefferson B. Fordham, *Local Government Law—Text, Cases, and Other Materials* (1949); and Eugene McQuillin, *The Law of Municipal Corporations* (3rd ed., 1949).

## IV

For present purposes it seems appropriate to make a distinction between treatments of municipal "politics" and municipal "reform." The literature of politics here includes accounts and analyses of party, interest group, and machine activity, as well as of political participation, leadership, and power structure. Reform literature includes works written to show what was wrong with cities and how to right it, together with accounts of reform movements. That a reform group is an interest group is not here denied, and the distinction is admittedly fuzzy at the edges.

The literature of urban politics is as vast as it is disappointing. In general, there are two kinds of books. The first includes accounts, *exposés*, and histories of partisan activity in the dozen largest cities of the United States. Many of these confine themselves to a particular boss or machine, while a few discuss and even compare situations in different cities. They were written by men who had an intimate knowledge of their subject, however slanted—by journalists, public officials, party leaders, clergymen, and even bosses.[6] These writings have not been systematically mined by scholars. A few are of special interest. The earliest and undoubtedly the most delightful book is Rufus E. Shapley, *Solid for Mulhooly* (1881), a satire on municipal politics in New York City. Frank R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics* (1923) is a detailed account of how political organizations, i.e., machines, operate. While it is based on experience rather than systematically collected data, and while we do not know how typical it may be of urban politics, it is perhaps the best available account of urban political processes and relationships. In another vein, *Boss Ruef's San Francisco* (1952) by Walton Bean is one of the most recent and carefully documented accounts of a boss and his activities.

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[6] The following are representative of this literature: Henry Champernowne, *The Boss* (1894); Charles H. Parkhurst, *Our Fight With Tammany* (1895); W. T. Stead, *Satan's Invisible World Displayed* (1897); A. H. Lewis, *The Boss* (1903); Alfred Hodder, *A Fight For the City* (1903); W. L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (1905); Henry C. Wright, *Bossism in Cincinnati* (1905); Ben Lindsey and Harvey O'Higgins, *The Beast* (1910); Gustavus Meyers, *The History of Tammany Hall* (1917); D. T. Lynch, *Boss Tweed* (1927); Clement G. Lanni, *Beat 'Em or Join 'Em* (1931); L. Stoddard, *Master of Manhattan* (1931); Emanuel H. Lavine, *Gimme, or How Politicians Get Rich* (1931); Mary Hartley, *James B. Waller: Pioneering in the Wilderness of Politics* (1931); William B. Northrop and John B. Northrop, *The Insolence of Office* (1932); Norman Thomas and Paul Blanshard, *What's the Matter With New York* (1932); Fletcher Dobyns, *The Underworld of American Politics* (1932); W. S. Vare, *My Forty Years in Politics* (1933); M. R.

The outstanding work on urban politics remains, however, that of the muckraker, Lincoln Steffens. His work has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by both friends and detractors. Our understanding of urban politics has hardly progressed beyond the point where Steffens left it. Steffens was neither a reformer nor an exposer of the depravity of bosses and machines. Rather he sought the sources of patterns of political action which violated moral conscience. He did not find the source in the boss or in the machine. On the contrary, he found the bosses to be men of integrity and honesty and could not conceal his admiration for them. He portrayed the dual role of the boss and the machine—guardian of the depressed and distributor of benefits to business enterprises which supported the machine. His mature conclusion, in *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (1931), was that political corruption was based on the tolerance of the citizenry who lived by a double standard. His plea was that people either change things, or become consciously crooked, or, best of all, give up the old ideals and form new ones to fit modern life. He saw that true reform must be political rather than anti-political. Recognizing that urban politics was changing, he foresaw, with remarkable prescience, that the "political" boss would disappear when the "business" boss found himself able to work better alone. His diagram of corruption is virtually identical with the picture described by Frank R. Kent and documented in fragmentary fashion by subsequent scholars. "Police graft" is seen as incidental to the main structure of influence. While later writers have contributed valuable evidence and detail to our understanding of the mechanics of urban politics, they have not materially added to our understanding of the mainsprings of political action in the great metropolitan centers. Steffens saw politics as a legitimate competition of interests in the public arena. He did not think that free men could be "above" politics and yet retain democracy. While his fame as a writer on city politics rests on *The Shame of the Cities* (1904), his best insights are found in his autobiography.

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Werner, *Tammany Hall* (1928); Milton Mackaye, *The Tin Box Parade: A Handbook for Larceny* (1934); William H. Stuart, *The Twenty Incredible Years* (1935); George M. Reynolds, *Machine Politics in New Orleans 1897–1926* (1936); C. W. Van Devander, *The Big Bosses* (1944); Robert S. Allen, *Our Fair City* (1947); E. J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (1947); M. M. Milligan, *Inside Story of the Pendergast Machine* (1948); William Bonelli, *Billion Dollar Blackjack* (1954).

Scholarly works on urban politics, in contrast to journalistic efforts, are very limited in number. Most were published in the 1930's. Charles E. Merriam, *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics* (1929) was based on Merriam's personal experience as a councilman rather than on systematic research. Harold Zink, *City Bosses* (1930) includes biographical and analytical sketches of a number of leading city bosses and correlates this material by comparing all the bosses with respect to selected characteristics. The substance of Harold Gosnell's *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (1935) is suggested by the title. Roy V. Peel, *The Political Clubs of New York City* (1935) is perhaps the most extensive study of urban politics, relying very heavily on field work conducted by a considerable number of investigators. It includes chapters dealing, among others, with the following subjects: party organization; party leadership; club organization; quarters; techniques of association; objectives of clubs; political, social, civic, welfare, educational, and anti-social activities. The period covered is 1927–1932. As a study of pre-New Deal metropolitan politics, this work could serve as a highly valuable base point for new comparative research. Philadelphia politics were studied by two scholars who published their findings in 1935. J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics* is a study of the division leader. It offers conclusions as to the relationship between politics and metropolitan governmental organization. Both Salter's work and that of David H. Kurtzman, *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia*, were based on on-the-spot field work. Kurtzman describes in great detail the techniques for influencing the Philadelphia voter. His work is as intensive as Peel's is extensive. Harold Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (1937) is more analytical in approach than any of the works on urban politics previously cited. Its aim is not to describe machine politics, though it does so thoroughly, but rather to evaluate the effects of the depression on machines. Various changing trends are noted; subsequent experience seems to bear out the accuracy of these perceptions. Had the work been done ten years later it is likely that more pronounced results would have been obtained. Similar studies are now needed to ascertain the impact of war and prosperity on urban politics. The most mature study of a boss and a machine is *The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action* (1940) by Dayton D. McKean.

A few recent research reports by political scientists touch on fields all but preempted by sociologists. *Leadership and Participation in Urban Political Affairs* (1956) and "Political Power Relations in a Mid-West City," 20 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73 (1956) by George Belknap and Ralph Smuckler are first reports on continuing community research conducted at Michigan State University. Panels of politically active and passive persons were interviewed with respect to participation, perceptions of leadership, and power relations. Two reports from the University of Oregon's Community Study Project have been published. Robert E. Agger and Vincent Ostrom discuss "The Political Structure of a Small Community," 20 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 81 (1956); Agger presents a very useful analysis of the power attribution approach to community power structure in "Power Attributions in the Local Community:

Theoretical and Research Considerations," 34 *Social Forces* 322 (1956). *Dixie City: A Portrait of Political Leadership* (1956), by Robert T. Daland, is concerned with power structures, characteristics of leaders, and the interplay of factions over a forty-five year period in a southern city.

## V

Most of the works here designated as the literature of reform were published between 1890 and 1910. Though Alfred R. Conkling called his *City Government in the U. S.* (1894) a "primer" on city government, it is basically a plea for reform along specified lines. William H. Tolman, *Municipal Reform Movements* (1895) is a statement of the strategy appropriate to reform movements. Dorman B. Eaton's textbook, *The Government of Municipalities* (1899), diagnoses municipal ills and writes the prescription. Frank Parsons, *The City for the People* (1901), although not neglecting other panaceas, illustrates the then new emphasis on municipal ownership as a reform measure. Richard T. Ely, in *The Coming City* (1902), gave a critique of the contemporary reform writings. To place his little book in the same category perhaps does it an injustice, since its base is broadly philosophic. Ely's insight is highlighted by a prediction of a degree and kind of urbanization only now in full bloom. Antedating the Staunton prototype by several years, Ely explained the need for what we now call council-manager government.

*The American City: A Problem in Democracy* (1904) by Delos F. Wilcox is one of the more complete considerations of the problems of municipal reform. One of the best known of the reform works is Frederick L. Howe, *The City: The Hope of Democracy* (1906). As its title indicates, the book set something of a new pattern by emphasizing the potentialities rather than the ills of cities. Following Ely, Howe suggested that cities were here to stay; beyond that, that they might one day become the citadels of a democratic society. Horace C. Deming, *The Government of American Cities* (1909) is in the older tradition, concentrating on the analysis of ills with recommendations for action. John J. Hamilton, *The Dethronement of the City Boss* (1910) introduced the commission plan to the literature of reform. Walter T. Arndt, *The Emancipation of the American City* (1917) reflects the earlier reform literature, emphasizing home rule and non-partisanship as promising courses of action. In *City Management: The Cincinnati Experience* (1933), Charles P. Taft recounted the story of reform in a major American city over a period of years. The contemporary assumptions and arguments of the municipal reform movement find expression in Richard S. Childs, *Civic Victories* (1952), a highly interesting account of the short ballot and city manager movements by a leading participant.

## VI

The early interest in municipal organization as such was closely associated with the writings on reform just discussed. Municipal reformers saw in the commission system a form of organization consistent with their short-ballot orientation. Following the rising tide of adoptions, an outpouring of commentary on the plan appeared between about 1911 and 1915. Ernest S. Bradford, *Commission Government in American Cities* (1911) surveyed the first ten years of experience with the plan and concluded that commission government was the organizational form of the future. In the same year Clinton R. Woodruff published *City Government by Commission,* a much more cautious and reliable analysis. Henry Bruere, *New City Government* (1912), based on a survey of ten cities, covered the same ground. Oswald Ryan, *Municipal Freedom: A Study of Commission Government* (1915) concluded that commission government was about to sound the death knell of partisan politics in cities—a major objective of proponents of the plan. The first book-length exposition of the manager plan was Harry A. Toulmin, *The City Manager: A New Profession* (1915).

By 1918, with the appearance of the council-manager alternative, the stage was set for a comparative treatment of the three existing forms of municipal organization. The job was done in that year in two able and much neglected works. *History and Analysis of the Commission and City Manager Plans of Municipal Government in the United States,* by Tso-Shuen Chang, is a well balanced comparison. The crucial point, the extent to which municipal progress after reorganization could be attributed directly to the reorganization itself, was analyzed, almost for the first time. Russell M. Story, in *The American Municipal Executive,* considered executive organization in broader perspective, dealing most intensively with the predominant mayor-council form and including material on both commission and manager government. Between 1918 and 1940 there appeared only two major works. In 1927 Leonard White published *The City Manager,* an excellent statement of the function and office of the manager as a municipal executive, based on what by then was a considerable body of experience. This is still the standard work in this area, despite the many developments since that time. In a still neglected field, Schuyler Wallace published *State Administrative Supervision of Cities in the U. S.* in 1928, a description, much of which is now obsolete, of the existing kinds of state supervision in financial and functional fields.

An extensive study of government in manager cities was projected by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council in 1937. Fifty manager cities were studied in all parts of the country by a large number of political scientists, especially by a team consisting of Harold A. Stone, Kathryn H. Stone, and Don K. Price. The results were published in a series of three works in 1940. In *City Manager Government in the U. S.: A Review After Twenty-Five Years,* these three authors presented their conclusions from the fifty case studies under three major headings: development, administration, and politics, under the manager plan. The same authors presented nine of their eighteen case studies in *City Manager Government in Nine Cities.* Seven of the thirty-two case studies made by others were published in a companion volume, *City Manager Government in Seven Cities,* by Frederick C. Mosher, Arthur Harris, Howard White, John A. Vieg, Landrum R. Bolling, A. George Miller, David G. Monroe, and Harry O'Neal Wilson. While confined to the experience of one state, the recently published *Appointed Executive Local*

*Government: The California Experience* (1952) is a highly significant study, comparing recent trends in executive organization of cities under the chief administrative officer and manager plans.

At a different level are four works on the governmental problems of metropolitan areas. *The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States* (1930), written by Paul Studenski with the collaboration of the Committee on Metropolitan Government of the National Municipal League, is a consideration of possible approaches to the goal of integration of governmental organization in metropolitan areas. It is not a study of how metropolitan areas are governed, but deals with inter-municipal arrangments, annexation and consolidation, city-county separation and consolidation, expansion of county functions, special metropolitan authorities, the borough plan, and the federated city. John A. Rush, *The City-County Consolidated* (1941) is a detailed study of this solution, with material on the historic cases. Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government* (1942) is the most penetrating analysis of metropolitan problems. While two chapters are devoted to the methods of integration, most of the work is concerned with the need for integration and the fiscal, legal, and political factors which condition it. A concluding chapter suggests the strategy and bases for reform. Jones's book is one of the best studies dealing with the relationship between politics and organization in urban government. Betty Tableman, *Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas* (1951) considers the approaches to metropolitan integration pioneered by Studensky and Jones. In Coleman Woodbury (ed.), *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment* (1953), Victor Jones adds to his previous analysis and brings it up to date.

## VII

Works on municipal management as such are relatively few. One reason is the obvious relevance to municipal administration of studies of management generally. Another is that certain professionalized municipal functions have their own well developed bodies of writing, which cannot be covered here, on such fields as public health, social welfare, police, recreation, accounting, and civil engineering. The first texts on municipal administration followed the tradition of Fairlie's pioneer work, *Municipal Administration* (1901), discussed above, laying emphasis on the technical processes incident to specific municipal functions. The series of texts that began in 1916 soon introduced increasing amounts of material on staff activities; the most recent texts give thorough treatment to management as such. These texts include: William B. Munro, *Principles and Methods of Municipal Administration* (1916); Herman G. James, *Municipal Functions* (1917); Lent D. Upson, *Practice of Municipal Administration* (1926); William B. Munro, *Municipal Administration* (1934); Henry M. Hodges, *City Management* (1939); John M. Pfiffner, *Municipal Administration* (1940); T. H. Reed, *Municipal Management* (1941). Probably the most used body of writing on municipal management is the series issued by the International City Managers' Association for the Institute for Training in Municipal Administration, including volumes on the general techniques of management and on fiscal, personnel, planning, public works, recreation, police, welfare, and fire administration.[7] The earliest editions date from 1935; all but one have been subjected to more or less constant revision. Most of these works are the result of the joint effort of several collaborating experts. Unlike most of the writing in public administration, they have a "how to administer" orientation. They offer a combination of theory, perspective, and principle with method, procedure, and schedule. *The City Manager Profession* (1934), by Clarence E. Ridley and Orin F. Nolting, is a valuable survey of the status of the profession. The data it contains have been kept up to date in the periodical literature. Donald Stone, *Management of Municipal Public Works* was published in 1939. The same year *Local Government Debt Administration*, by Carl H. Chatters and A. M. Hillhouse, provided an intensive treatment of the debt problem. Jerome G. Kerwin and Nelson B. Henry, *Schools and City Government* (1938) tentatively questions the validity of the traditional independence of city school systems. Robert Walker, *The Planning Function in Urban Government* (1941, rev. ed. 1950) is highly controversial in professional planning circles. It is not, strictly speaking, a work on administration, but an evaluation of the significance and potentiality of planning in urban government and one of the few outstanding studies of intra-municipal organization. It approaches the neglected subject of the relationships between the city executive and the professions in administration and has inspired a large body of criticism of local planning organization. Another highly significant work, Vincent Ostrom, *Water and Politics* (1953), is in an important sense a study in administrative leadership. A case study of the development of the Los Angeles water supply, it suggests the fruitfulness of the study of municipal functions within their social and governmental context. It is also a demonstration, for urban government, of the utility of the historical approach to administrative studies.

## VIII

Some urban studies primarily concerned with non-governmental matters contain material with which students of urban government should be familiar. A selection from this literature will be noted. For insights into the ways of political participation, power, and leadership beyond those provided by the descriptions of partisan politics reviewed above, political scientists are indebted to anthropologists and urban sociologists. In *Middletown* (1929), a pioneering study of stratification in Muncie, Indiana, Robert and Helen Lynd employed economic criteria for determining the class structure. Several chapters were devoted to community and governmental activities. In a second study of the same community, *Middletown in Transition* (1937), the same authors evaluated change. The failure of the public to understand the actual political system was emphasized. *Deep South* (1941), a study of caste and class in a southern town by three anthropologists, Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, considered governmental control. W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt employed the prestige approach to social stratification in a series of studies of Newburyport, Massachusetts. The first two, *Social Life of a Modern Community* (1941) and *The Status System of a Modern Community* (1942), deal with the relation of status to political organization. Warner used a similar approach in studying an Illinois community in *Democracy in Jonesville* (1949). Status is correlated with Republican and Democratic partisanship. In *Elmtown's Youth* (1949), August Hollingshead considered briefly the exercise of power by various interests. While not concerned primarily with the urban scene, *Class, Status, and Power* (1953), by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset, contains a wealth of relevant material collected from the work of a wide variety of authors.

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[7] These volumes, with the revision dates, are as follows: *Municipal Public Works Administration* (1935, 1941, 1946, 1950); *Municipal Personnel Administration* (1935, 1938, 1942, 1947, 1950); *Municipal Fire Administration* (1936, 1939, 1942, 1946, 1950); *Municipal Finance Administration* (1937, 1941, 1946, 1949); *Municipal Police Administration* (1938, 1943, 1950, 1954).

Some attention has been given to social participation in community affairs, including political participation and behavior, as the following titles indicate: Robert C. Tryon, "Social Areas of the San Francisco Bay Area," and Morris Axelrod, "Urban Structure and Participation," two papers presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Berkeley, December, 1954; Donald W. Olmstead, "Organizational Leadership and Social Structure in a Small City," 19 *American Sociological Review* 273 (1954); John M. Foskett, "Social Structure and Social Participation," 20 *American Sociological Review* 431 (1955); William J. MacKinnon and Richard Centers, "Authoritarianism and Urban Stratification," 61 *American Journal of Sociology* 610 (1956); Basil G. Zimmer, "Farm Background and Urban Participation," 61 *American Journal of Sociology* 470 (1956). A few studies have begun to focus on the making of urban political decisions. Most notable is Edward C. Banfield and Martin Meyerson, *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest* (1955), concerned with decisions on public housing sites in Chicago. Meyerson, a planner, was able to exploit the participant-observer technique, since he was director of planning for the Chicago Housing Authority during the controversy. In *The Talladega Story* (1954), Solon T. Kimball and Marion Pearsall evaluate the experience of this southern city in attempting to solve a series of problems related to public health. The technique employed is described in their "Event Analysis as an Approach to Community Study," 34 *Social Forces* 58 (1955). The unique element in this approach is the direct observation of interrelationships over a period of time, as contrasted with the Warner and Lynd descriptions of a static class situation. Kimball and Pearsall assume the class and status structure and devote research to its functioning with respect to a specific set of issues.

Sociologists have led the way in studies of political leadership and power structures. Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (1953) is a pioneering study of power structure in Atlanta based on attributions of power as suggested by a panel of persons presumed competent to judge. A stimulating review and critique is Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," 14 *Public Administration Review* 205 (1954). Hunter's study, while not entirely clear on this point, seems to picture a generalized power structure. A. Alexander Fanelli, on the other hand, suggests the possibility of specialized power structures in a small Mississippi city in "A Typology of Community Leadership Based on Influence and Interaction Within the Leader Subsystem," 34 *Social Forces* 332 (1956). Roland J. Pellegrin and Charles H. Coates report on power wielded by corporation executives of "Bigtown" in "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," 61 *American Journal of Sociology* 413 (1956). James B. McKee, "Status and Power in the Industrial Community," 58 *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (1953) is a study of power structure in Lorain, Ohio, emphasizing the role of labor.

Studies of metropolitan government by political scientists have been concerned primarily with the description and tailoring of institutions. Directly relevant to the question of feasible metropolitan government is the work of sociologists, ecologists, demographers, and land economists on metropolitan structure. This literature is extensive, rapidly expanding, and specialized. Comments here are confined to selected items deemed most pertinent to governmental structure. *The City* (1925), by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, is a collection of early work on urban ecology, including work first published in 1915. Particularly notable is Burgess's paper developing the concentric circle theory of urban development, "The Growth of the City." In 1933 McKenzie published *The Metropolitan Community*, a monograph for the President's Research Committee on Social Trends: here the structure and development of metropolitan areas are directly related to the governmental problems of metropolitanism. Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure* (1950) carries further the work of Burgess and McKenzie dealing with community structure from both spatial and other points of view. While Hawley accepts the basic validity of the concentric zone theory, he emphasizes the multi-nucleated pattern of the metropolitan area and other influences. Population analysis has recently contributed new insights and raised new questions concerning metropolitanism. In a landmark study by Donald J. Bogue, *The Structure of the Metropolitan Community: A Study of Dominance and Subdominance* (1949), the all-pervading influence of the metropolitan center is evaluated with the help of census data. The entire area of the United States is assigned to sixty-seven "metropolitan regions" with an analysis of population, trade, and service relationships. Further studies of metropolitan structure based on census data, in which Bogue had some part, include: Donald J. Bogue, *Population Growth in Standard Metropolitan Areas 1900–1950* (1953); Evelyn Kitagawa and Donald J. Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing Activity Within Standard Metropolitan Areas* (1955); Raymond P. Cuzzort, *Suburbanization of Service Industries Within Standard Metropolitan Areas* (1955); and Amos H. Hawley, *The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America: Deconcentration Since 1920* (1956).

Economic studies in urban areas are relevant to tax and fiscal policy, urban planning, and many aspects of management. Arthur M. Weimer and Homer Hoyt in *Principles of Urban Real Estate* (1939, rev. ed. 1948) first gave a full statement to economic base theory. Richard B. Andrews has written an exposition and critique of this theory in a series of twelve articles appearing in *Land Economics* from 1953 to 1956. Other economic base studies include: Homer Hoyt, *The Economic Status of the New York Metropolitan Region in 1944* (1944); John W. Alexander, *An Economic Base Study of Madison, Wisconsin* (1953); and Walter Isard, Robert A. Kavesh, and Richard E. Kuenne, "The Economic Base and Structure of the Urban Metropolitan Region," 18 *American Sociological Review* 317 (1953). Other significant studies in urban economics are: Homer Hoyt, *Structure and Growth of the Residential Neighborhood in American Cities* (1939); Richard U. Ratcliff, *Urban Land Economics* (1949); William H. Form, "The Place of Social Structure in the Determination of Land Use: Some Implications for a Theory of Urban Ecology," 32 *Social Forces* 317 (1954). The impact of urban growth has been the subject of numerous studies undertaken by state agricultural colleges with an interest in the consequences of urbanization for rural life. Two recent studies of the impact of industrialization on an area are: Institute for Urban Studies, University of Pennsylvania, *Accelerated Urban Growth in a Metropolitan Fringe Area* (1954) and Charles F. Marsh (ed.), *The Hampton Roads Communities in World War II* (1951). A rare study in urban political geography is Howard J. Nelson, "The Vernon Area, California—A Study of the Political Factor in Urban Geography," 42 *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 177 (1952).

From the considerable literature of urban engineering and planning, a number of works seem particularly significant, especially from the point of view of municipal management. Traffic and transit problems have been analyzed in such studies as: Public Administration Service, *Traffic Engineering Functions and Administration* (1949); Kate K. Liepmann, *The Journey to Work* (1944); Gerald W. Breese, *The Daytime Population of the Central Business District of Chicago With Particular Reference to the Factor of Transportation* (1949); John Bauer and Peter Costello, *Transit Modernization and Street Traffic Control* (1950); Robert B. Mitchell and Chester Rapkind, *Urban Traffic, A Function of Land Use* (1954); and Wilfred Owen, *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem* (1956). The major collection on city planning is the thirteen volumes of the Harvard City Planning Studies, published in the 1930's and 1940's. The volume on *Urban Land Uses* (1954) has recently been revised, with the inclusion of considerable data collected by Harland Bartholomew incidental to his professional planning activity. Perhaps the most useful to political scientists is Volume Thirteen by Alfred Bettman, *City and Regional Planning Papers* (1946). The engineering approach to city planning is expounded in a two-volume work by Harold M. Lewis, *Planning the Modern City* (1949). An architectural approach is Arthur B. Gallion, *The Urban Pattern* (1950). Clarence S. Stein, *Toward New Towns for America* (1951) reviews the American experience with new towns, in which he played such an important part. Two of the most interesting and stimulating works in the urban literature bridge the chasm between the social scientist's interest in cities and that of the architect and artist. Lewis Mumford, *Culture of Cities* (1938) ranges from medieval town planning to the social basis for the new urban order, including a chapter on "The Politics of Regional Development." *The City of Man* (1953), by Christopher Tunnard, is an appeal for a greater aesthetic emphasis in social planning for cities. The most significant recent work on city planning and related problems consists of two volumes, mostly by city planners, published under the editorship of Coleman Woodbury in 1953. *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment* contains essays on goals, design, and strategy for urban improvement and special studies of the relation of urban improvement to industrial location, local government, and the role of the individual. *Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices* explores areas relevant to redevelopment: housing, densities, private covenants, reconditioning, conservation, code enforcement, relocation, and eminent domain.

## IX

Looking over the entire sweep of the last half century, one gets the impression that there are few penetrating studies by political scientists of the significance of urbanism for municipal government. Only here and there do the works cited grapple with basic political forces. Were we to save the work of a dozen from the authors cited and destroy the rest, political science would not be seriously touched. And should we carefully review the dozen names remaining, we should find that at least half belong to substantial living scholars, whose early work put them on the list but who have since shifted to other fields for research and publication.

We note further that the interest in municipal subjects has varied from period to period—and that the last decade has witnessed a real drought in studies of urban subjects. The period 1900 to 1915 seems to have engendered the most intensive effort, while there was another definite upsurge of interest during the 1930's. During the entire period up to 1930 a heavy emphasis was placed on studies of formal institutions and law. A vast outpouring of reform literature appeared from, roughly, 1900 to 1915. Particular interest in governmental structure appeared from about 1911 to 1918 and again in the 1940's to some extent. Politics of the muckraking variety was very prominent from 1890 to 1917, while a more scientific interest in political studies was very pronounced during the 1930's.

The review of the literature of urban government suggests gaps which are essential areas for research toward a fuller understanding of the effect of urbanization on our local institutions. Gaps in the literature may be viewed from the perspective either of the analytical approach and research strategy used or of the substantive area investigated. It is immediately noticeable that the works by political scientists have relied heavily on historical-descriptive types of approach. Only the slightest use has been made of sociological, economic, psychological, or other approaches. Each of these, however, can be expected to yield important results, if one may judge from the literature of these disciplines. Very few of the studies have involved substantial amounts of field work. The majority have relied on documentary material or the field work done in connection with studies of limited scope by legislatures, research bureaus, and other agencies. The cases of group research are virtually exhausted by the studies of Stone, Price, and Stone; the Urbanism Committee report; the Haynes Foundation work on metropolitan Los Angeles; and the Oregon and Michigan State University projects.

Some of the substantive gaps in the literature will be suggested. The urbanism policy of the states is an entirely neglected field, while the urbanism policy of the federal government has received serious attention only by the Urbanism Committee. It is suggestive that, while the *American Political Science Review* carried an article on "Chinese Communist Urban Policy" in 1950,[8] no similar interest in the urban policy of the United States has been manifested. It becomes increasingly clear to those who deal with urban development—planners, housers, developers, engineers, real estate interests, and others—that order must be brought out of the conflicting federal and state statutes and policies which condition the physical development of cities. Political scientists have not recognized this problem. They have shown some interest in state policy respecting the legal and administrative relations of local governments to the state, but the few major studies in this area by Wallace, McBain, and McGoldrick are obsolete or obsolescent. The development of federal and state policy toward the phenomena of metropolitanization is a virtually untouched field, though the nature of the "metropolitan problem" has been well explored by Jones, Tableman, and Studenski. It is almost a shock to realize that while we can turn to revealing analyses of agricultural policy, labor policy, tax policy, or resources policy, we have no exposition of urbanism policy. Yet Charles E. Merriam said in 1941, "The adequate organization of modern metropolitan areas is one of the great unsolved problems of modern politics."[9]

The history of municipal government is a field which has much to offer the student of institutions. A deeper perception of the sources of movements for non-partisan elections, the short ballot, at-large elections of councilmen, municipal debt limits, and other practices can provide insights to help us measure their contemporary validity. The writer has a disquieting feeling that some of these and other remedies have proved worse than the original ailment, poorly adapted to the complex political life of the mid-twentieth century.

The field of urban politics has been investigated only in the most fragmentary way. Virtually all the studies have been made in a minority of the very large urban centers, particularly New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The politics of small cities and suburban areas can not be presumed to follow the pattern of the giants. The question of urban political pressures as an aspect of state politics has been similarly neglected. While there are some good studies of urban politics in large cities during the depression period and considerable material from earlier periods, the analysis is not up to date. We may still wonder just what has happened to the municipal boss. Has he disappeared, as many would argue, or has he merely changed into the clothes of a businessman? Or perhaps he has been multiplied or diluted into some sort of oligarchy. If he has in fact disappeared, what are the new wellsprings of political leadership? There is no adequate study of the urban policy-making process as such, even for an individual city. There is little more than the listing of common types of urban interest groups. The nature of their impact on policy formation is not well understood. The closest approach to studies by political scientists of urban decision-making are a few public administration cases which deal with urban problems.[10]

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[8] H. Arthur Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," 44 this REVIEW 47 (1950).

[9] In the preface to Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government* (1942), p. ix.

Despite a continuing program of professional craftsmanship in the field of governmental organization and charter making, there is not one analytical study of the municipal executive as it appears today. In this case there is no shortage of materials or inadequacy of methodology. Studies of urban governmental structure and organization generally are not adequate. While the movement toward the integration of municipal organization has been reported and evaluated over a considerable period of years, a pronounced countertendency has remained virtually unobserved. This trend might be called the disintegration of municipal organization. It is characterized by a new proliferation of independent and semi-independent municipal boards, corporations, authorities, districts, and agencies which, whether or not they bear a legal relationship to the traditional city governments, carry out an increasing number of municipal-type functions. An increase of more than five hundred per cent in the number of such agencies in one state between 1939 and 1954 has been reported.[11] The forces which give rise to this disintegration seem to involve federal and state policies which require an early analysis.

In view of the continuing vigor of the municipal reform movement and the abundance of the reform literature, it seems appropriate to subject the dogmas of reform to analytical tests. This has not been done. The short ballot, non-partisan municipal elections, at-large election of councilmen, home rule, and other practices have seen extended periods of use. Does home rule prevent sound government in metropolitan areas? Do at-large elections perpetuate class rule in southern cities and squelch minority interests elsewhere? Does non-partisanship prevent informed political action by the citizenry? Isolated instances suggest all these things.

The study of certain problems of municipal management promises to be rewarding. One of the virtually untouched areas is the relationship between the municipal executive and professional groups in administration. Technical and professional groups come to municipal government with different orientations as to their role in administration and policy-making from that of the city manager, administrator, or mayor. Professional lawyers, engineers, comptrollers, city planners, personnel men, educators, and others are not trained with any idea of subordination of their function to that of some overall community objective. Rather they tend to look upon their own particular subject matter as more basic, unique, independent, high level, and important than the "traditional" municipal functions considered as a lump. This suggests the need for intensive studies of the place of each function in the municipal program, the role of experts in each of the functional areas, and the place of manager and expert in the decision-making process. The bearing of schools of professional education and of professional organizations on municipal policy and practice seems highly important and remains unexplored.

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[10] These cases include the following from Harold Stein, *Public Administration and Policy Development* (1952); Herbert Kaufman, "Gotham in the Air Age," and Frank C. Abbott, "The Cambridge City Manager"; separately published cases include Herbert Kaufman, *The New York City Health Centers* (1952); Frank T. Adams, *The Gainesville School Problem* (1953); Chester B. and Valerie A. Earle, *The Promotion of Lem Merrill* (1953); William K. Muir, *Defending "The Hill" Against Metal Houses* (1955); Paul Tillett and Myron Weiner, *The Closing of Newark Airport* (1955).

[11] Robert T. Daland, "The Use of Boards in Municipal Government," 12 *Alabama Municipal Journal* 21 (1955).

These are the gaps that the present survey of the literature seems to reveal. At another level, and in summary, there appear three general deficiencies in the scholarly treatment of urban government. The first is a great lack of comparative studies, particularly in the areas of organization, politics, and administration. There is a need not only for a comparative treatment of American local institutions, but also for a return to the use of foreign comparative material to broaden the perspective of urban political study. Secondly, granted the value of case studies and problem solving approaches, there is a need for the development of more theoretical constructs and ideal types to be used for testing purposes. The "city manager plan" seems to have been overworked, though some critical thinking has appeared in the last few years. Lastly, a hundred thousand experiments in the design and operation of political institutions are currently in progress as our cities, towns, districts, and authorities go about the business of carrying forward our increasingly urbanized society. Urban government is thus a vast untapped reservoir for the study of political theory. While these challenges to research remain, we may be encouraged by the thought that the political sociologists, urban ecologists, planners, and land economists will probably continue to furnish us with fresh material on urban political science.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society.* By Richard A. Preston, Sydney F. Wise, and Herman O. Werner. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Pp. vii, 376. $6.50.)

*Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations.* By Alfred Vagts. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. xv, 547. $8.75.)

*Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History.* By Walter Millis. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1956. Pp. 382. $5.75.)

The American student of international relations, in defining the scope and focus of his subject, tends to be largely influenced not only by what are currently the major problems of United States foreign policy, but also by what he hopes will be accepted as legitimate forms of international behavior. On both counts, therefore, he has long felt entitled either to ignore the institution of war or to analyze it only as something to be done away with. But now that the United States stands as the principal bulwark against Soviet expansion, and military considerations must constitute the daily fare of American statesmen in their approach to foreign policy, the political scientist finds that in order to understand the course and character of international relations, he must learn about warfare, its preparation, conduct, and effects in all their immense and puzzling ramifications. In attempting to do so he can be thankful that, despite his previous preoccupations, a very considerable, diversified, and useful literature has been written on the subject—some of it, daringly enough, by political scientists themselves. True, it is not a literature which has dwelt intensively on any single central issue, developed any elaborate conceptual framework for the guidance of prospective students, or offered even the rudiments of a general theory of war. But this may be all to the good; for the institution is a complex one and the possibility of further insights too great to warrant the imposition of any rigidly pre-determined approach.

If it does nothing else, *Men in Arms*, by Richard A. Preston, Sydney F. Wise, and Herman O. Werner, amply demonstrates this point. An attempt to recount the history of warfare and its interrelationships with Western society, *Men in Arms* has all the virtues and defects of a general survey of what has come to be a rather elaborate field of knowledge. We hardly need to be reminded that warfare has been and remains a recurrent feature of international and domestic societies. We know that there is an interaction between social, political, and economic institutions on the one hand and military organizations and strategy on the other, although we are by no means clear as to how the process operates. The relationships between technology, weapons, and warfare have also undergone intensive examination and are now being demonstrated anew in the efforts of soldiers and civilians to adapt their policies to nuclear warheads and the increasingly complex systems for their delivery. And we are probably well aware that the causes, character, and effects of warfare have been greatly influenced by social, economic, and political as well as technical inventions. But it is worth being reminded of all these relationships and forces in an historical context again, even if *Men in Arms* must do so cursorily, and at times superficially, within the compass of 340 pages. Messrs. Preston, Wise, and Werner may have been too ambitious in their purpose and too general in its execution to have provided a fully satisfactory survey of the field. Nevertheless, for the student with an unsatisfied curiosity about military matters and a healthy skepticism about broad and simplifying historical generalizations, this is as good a book as any of the general type with which to obtain an introductory knowledge of warfare and its sociology.

To move from *Men in Arms* to *Defense and Diplomacy* is to enter an entirely different universe of discourse. Alfred Vagts has already established his reputation as one of our foremost students of military affairs with his studies of warfare and diplomacy, among them, outstandingly, *A History of Militarism.* With *Defense and Diplomacy* he again demonstrates his great competence, for this is not only a very big book: it is a highly original one. Here we are dealing, not with what have come to be almost the *clichés* of military history, but with a very basic and substantial contribution to our understanding of civil-military relations.

Two features of the book deserve particular mention. The first is its use of history. *Defense and Diplomacy* is written in an historical context; the bulk of its material is drawn from the period between 1870 and 1914; and the focus is primarily European. Each of the fourteen chapters, moreover, is chronologically organized; but this is neither diplomatic nor military history in the conventional sense. The approach is functional and is concerned with "a description of the ties between diplomacy and strategy, between diplomats and military men and their offices, their ideas, problems and practices, their unity and disunity." The second feature is the way in which Dr. Vagts describes these ties. What he does, in effect, is to consider the major roles played by the military in the policymaking process and, perhaps even more important, the major preconceptions held by them in the performance of their functions. The result, as Professor William T. R. Fox points out in his foreword, may be the pre-1914 Continental pattern of civil-military relationships rather than the post-1914 Anglo-American constitutional-democratic pattern. One suspects that it may also be pre-nuclear rather than post-nuclear in character; for military and civilian attitudes toward thermonuclear war, whether in the United States or in the Soviet Union, can never be quite the same as they were when conflict involved the use of high explosives. It is even arguable that civilian ignorance, complacency, and parsimony with respect to defense matters are now greater dangers than the traditional bellicosity of the military.

But in all fairness to Dr. Vagts one must say that he has not attempted to be exhaustive in his survey and has scrupulously avoided any sweeping generalizations about the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations. Judgments there are in full measure, on statesmen and soldiers alike, and a few at least of his readers may feel that the animus displayed toward Franklin D. Roosevelt is hardly appropriate. What is more important, however, is that *Defense and Diplomacy* not only affords a unique picture of the structure and content of civil-military relations during a critical period of Western history, but also provides an illuminating new insight into that period, and especially into the causes of the First World War, which is lacking from most of the standard diplomatic accounts. For what we have here, in an atmosphere thick with doubts, suspicions, and historical antagonisms, are the statesmen and soldiers of the five great European powers wrestling with the central problem of the multi-state system—that of national security—and bringing their world down to ruin in the process. Whether, as Dr. Vagts appears to believe, the outcome would have been different had the soldiers been less powerful and pigheaded or more responsible and flexible in their views and plans, must be a matter for speculation. The fact remains that the general staffs, with their fears of annihilation, their swollen security requirements, their faith in the efficacy of force as a means of resolving all disputes, and their promises of swift and painless victory—provided that their mobilization plans were rapidly instituted and faithfully adhered to—imposed terrible limitations upon the statesmen's freedom of maneuver (particularly when, unlike Bismarck, they remained ignorant of military affairs) and created an environment in which war seemed to be the only method left to the great powers of resolving the security dilemma. The object lesson, in other words, is very clear indeed, and no reader can come away from this massive and powerful work without a heightened appreciation of both the problems of civil-military relations and the crucial importance of military considerations in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

There remains the question of meaning for the policymakers of the insights and experiences gained from such works as *Defense and Diplomacy.* How do they apply to the terrible problems faced by the United States today in its efforts to achieve peace, security, and justice? This is not a question to which Dr. Vagts addresses himself, nor is it one with which many military historians are concerned. One can only deplore such restraint and welcome the rare exception of *Arms and Men,* by Walter Millis. "Is it possible," Mr. Millis asks, "by retraversing the history of American military institutions in the light of the newer attitudes, to shed any illumination upon the extraordinarily difficult, the seemingly insoluble, military problems which confront the nation today?" His answer appears to be contained in the penultimate sentences of the book, where he says: "Presumably the human race will in the future, as it has done throughout the past, find means of getting along somehow, probably for the better rather than for the worse. But just how it will do so seems impossible to predict; while the old certainty of military action as the final answer to every problem—a certainty that has remained with us since the dawn of history—seems no longer available."

Such a conclusion may not be of much comfort to the civilian and military policymakers charged with the day-to-day maintenance of national security, but they will not fail to enjoy and gain instruction from the journey between the question and the answer. For Mr. Millis devises his account with the same pace and sparkle that characterized his studies of the Spanish-American and First World Wars. One may quarrel with summary statements such as that President Monroe's "announcement of the famous 'Doctrine,' in 1823, tacitly enlisted the Royal Navy in support of the position thus established." Doubts are also in order as to whether the "atomic stalemate" is quite as firm as Mr. Millis takes it to be, or whether it can be maintained without a greater effort than we are currently underwriting. And a measure of skepticism must be expressed about "the power of the administrative bureaucracy to shield its policies and operations behind the secrecy of military 'security.' " To the despair of President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Wilson, probably never before in the American experience has so much information on military matters been available to the public in the form of newspaper and journal articles, books, and Congressional hearings. Granted the need to guard against the garrison state, to debate more fully and frankly than we have done thus far the main issues of national defense, and, in the light of Dr. Vagts's object lesson, to maintain an enlightened civilian supervision and control of military affairs, the danger that appears to confront us most immediately is not so much a powerful and secretive bureaucracy as it is an intellectual and public leadership which apparently refuses to absorb the lessons that so well inform *Arms and Men.* In the circumstances, it is surely to be hoped that political scientists will emulate the boldness of Mr. Millis and employ their growing knowledge of military affairs not only to assist the policymaker in the solution of the many problems of national security within a free society, but also to break down the massive barrier of public indifference to all the complexities of defense in this dangerous age.

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*Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920. Volume I. Russia Leaves the War.* By GEORGE KENNAN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. 544. $7.50.)

In his preface, Mr. Kennan warns the reader that his narrative "contains little of the broad appraisal of the initial western response to the phenomenon of Communist power in Russia." Apart from a brief summary of the "immediate historical background" and a couple of chapters on such more general subjects as "Allied Deliberations in Paris" and "Wilson and the War Aims," his book consists of a detailed presentation and analysis of the attitudes and activities both of the American representatives in Russia and of the policymakers in Washington.

Personally, I have no quarrel with such an approach to diplomatic history. "Fortunately there is no fixed formula for the writing of history," as Dumas Malone has put it in a recent review of another historical work. Moreover, the implementation of policy is at least just as important as its formulation, and in this field the human element naturally acquires a primary importance. Mr. Kennan is certainly right in his assertion that in order to obtain a "genuine image of the diplomatic process" one has to study in detail "the human texture of which it consists."

This task he has performed in an admirable fashion. His cast of the principal characters includes, as far as the Americans in Russia are concerned, the diplomatic personnel headed by Ambassador David R. Francis, the head of the American Red Cross Commission, William Boyce Thompson, his deputy Raymond Robins, and the two representatives of the Committee on Public Information, Arthur Bullard and Edgar Sisson. On the basis of both published and unpublished material, the author has given us masterly portraits of these men, wonderfully alive and thoroughly convincing. He has painstakingly followed them through their attempts to cope with the extremely difficult and largely unexpected situation created by the Bolshevik conquest of power. With less detail and in somewhat less intimate fashion, he has done the same in the case of the policy-makers in Washington; President Wilson, Secretary Lansing, and the head of the Committee on Public Information, George Creel. Colonel House has remained in the background, and one has the impression that on the whole he was not particularly active as far as the Russian problem was concerned. Throughout, Mr. Kennan has maintained a high degree of objectivity, giving credit where credit is due (note, for example, his considerably more favorable appraisal of Lansing than the one we have been accustomed to), but not sparing criticism when it comes to errors of judgment or faulty tactical moves.

The phases of American-Russian policy covered in this volume include attempts at establishing contact with the new Soviet rulers for the purpose of influencing the course of the Soviet-German armistice and peace negotiations, the problem of recognition (promptly decided in favor of non-recognition, with the decision, however, not being announced at that time), the problem of relations with anti-Bolshevik centers in Russia, and, finally, the discussion of the early Allied plans of intervention in Siberia. The over-all picture is one of considerable confusion. Partly because of the lack of sufficiently full and precise information, but mostly because of the unfamiliar and highly perplexing nature of the Russian events themselves, the American policy as formulated in Washington was lacking both in clarity and consistency. As to its implementation in Russia, the situation was further complicated by such factors as occasional lapses in liaison with Washington, the simultaneous and often contradictory activity of diplomatic and extra-diplomatic agencies, with badly if at all defined competence and authority, and, in some cases, dissension among the individual members of one and the same agency.

And yet, as becomes clear from Mr. Kennan's unusually well told story, no major mistakes were made and no rash and fatal decisions were taken. Faced with an extremely fluid and uncertain situation which made even a short range prognosis hardly possible, the American policy-makers approached the problem in a responsible and cautious fashion. Mr. Kennan's book provides abundant material for the refutation of the myth of America's contemplating and preparing an anti-socialist crusade against revolutionary Russia—if such a refutation is still needed. If anything, the leaders of this country were as yet little aware of the potential international menace of Communism. Their chief concern still was with the immediate war problems. At any rate, those who at that time felt dissatisfied with this "wait and see" American policy towards Russia failed to propose any feasible alternative. The idea of a rapprochement with the Soviet government, which Raymond Robins advanced in an expectation that that would keep Russia in the war, was based on a thoroughly faulty interpretation of Russian realities. Mr. Kennan is right when he says that "nothing in the available record supports such a suggestion in any way." Nor would the recognition of the Soviet government have changed the course of events in Russia in any appreciable measure.

Mr. Kennan's book is both an outstanding literary achievement and a major contribution to the history of Soviet-American relations. One will eagerly await the publication of a sequel to the present volume.

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*An International Economy: Problems and Prospects.* BY GUNNAR MYRDAL. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1956. Pp. xi, 381. $6.50.)

The theme of *An International Economy,* as Gunnar Myrdal himself suggests, is tragic in the classic sense, but the last act remains to be written by events. Whether the non-Soviet world, the hero of this drama, will continue to drift toward disintegration, the victim of its inner conflicts, or will be able, by a supreme endeavor, to realize internationally the old Western ideal of equality of opportunity, no one can tell. The classic ending is probable, but a happier outcome is possible. To strengthen that possibility is the purpose of this powerful, important, and moving book.

It is one of its great merits that it presents the drift toward disintegration in its full complexity as the product rather of the strength than of the weakness of the welfare state and of the ideas underlying it. The advanced Western countries have been remarkably successful in approaching the ideal of equality of opportunity for all their citizens and in giving substance to the idea of the dignity of man. They have achieved national integration, the measure of which can be suggested by their ability to tax well-to-do for the benefit of less well-to-do groups. The price of national integration has been economic nationalism and the fastening of popular loyalties ever more tightly to the national state. Full employment has taken precedence over the maintenance of balance in the international accounts at fixed exchange rates: no country will any longer permit the level of domestic economic activity to be determined by external forces working through the automatic gold standard. The international migration of persons and capital—two strong forces working for international integration before the first World War—has almost ceased, again because national needs have been placed above international. Trade, the remaining force which, according to economic theory, ought to be working toward equilibrium of factor proportions and factor prices, is in fact engendering "a cumulative process away from equilibrium" (p. 225). This is a point to which economists have not given proper attention.

The goal of international integration is, however, more important than ever, and it can not be reached by the (deceptively) easy course of identifying economic nationalism as a demon and exorcising it or by building solidarity on the negative principle of anti-communism. "What is needed is an internationalization of . . . national policy structures themselves, preserving the essential values they represent to the several nations" (p. 50). The case for international integration is basically that "national economic progress and integration can only reach the highest possible levels in a well-integrated world" (p. 44). The case will have to be argued "in positive terms of the wider community of interests and aspirations, not the negative ones of wanting to break up the defenses of national integration" (p. 51).

The second and major part of the book is addressed to problems of economic development, for in Myrdal's view national integration of the underdeveloped countries is a necessary step toward international integration. This is a brilliant piece of work, reflecting a mastery of the burgeoning literature on economic growth, familiarity with the brutal facts of life in the backward areas, and a sympathetic understanding of the attitudes of those who are attempting the almost impossible task of achieving development by persuasion.

The state will everywhere be forced to play a large role in the process of economic growth, and there is much hard, even harsh, advice for those who direct its participation. There are no shortcuts to economic development, and Myrdal is too deeply concerned with the welfare of the largest part of mankind to rouse false hopes of quick and easy solutions to huge problems. Nothing less than the transformation of ancient cultures is involved. Capital accumulation is essential; little, in the best of circumstances, can be obtained from abroad; and the intractable fact is that it can be accumulated at home only by holding consumption below production. The insistent political demand for development, however, is a demand for higher living standards. Here is the dilemma. Taking everything into account, "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion for most of the underdeveloped countries that, looking at the matter objectively, the most probable outcome is failure and consequent social disintegration and political upheavals" (p. 212).

But Gunnar Myrdal is not content to leave the matter with this gloomy prognosis. He analyzes the facts rigorously, not to delineate a familiar trend, but to show how the trend can be changed so as to make the most of our possibilities and to pursue rationally the ideals by which alone our civilization can justify itself to itself. *An International Economy* is a mine of practical proposals for action by governments, international agencies, and private banking and business interests. Some of these proposals, such as his advocacy of "a double standard of morality" in commercial policy, will no doubt provoke outraged protests in certain quarters, but all are cogently argued and worth second thought.

*An International Economy* closes, therefore, not on "a tone of fatalism" but with an appeal to reason and an expression of faith in man's power "to analyze the facts and to establish rationally the practical implications" (p. 335) of his ideals.

The book is clearly written and requires only a passing familiarity with economics to be read with understanding. It is to be hoped that it will have a wide audience and will be studied with special care by those who have responsibilities here and abroad for advancing international cooperation.

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*Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox.* BY JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company. 1956. Pp. xvi, 553. $5.75.)

Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct of the presidency in the eight years before his third inaugural was a fascinating, often baffling, virtuoso performance. The heart of Mr. Burns's engrossing book is an account of that performance. His focus is on the personality in office, with emphasis, especially, upon the second term. As prelude, Roosevelt's whole prior life is surveyed at some length; the aftermath, however, the war presidency, receives but brief and episodic treatment. Burns justifies his shortcutting of Roosevelt at war by pointing to the unavailability, as yet, of requisite research materials. The result is to narrow the book's value as a Roosevelt biography or study of his presidency. And yet the very narrowing helps to enhance the value, and the impact, of what remains. We gain a view of Roosevelt as depression President unshadowed by the spectacle of Roosevelt at war—a view of Roosevelt's troubled second term, no crisis consensus at his back, undimmed by supervening visions of wartime consensus and war leadership. We gain, in short, a sharp reminder of that portion of FDR's long tenure undoubtedly most relevant to an appraisal of the presidency and our politics *since* the war.

Burns calls his work "political biography," by which he means, in his most concrete use of the term, a record and a characterization of the man as politician, the officeholder in office, within the indicated span of time. And as political biographer, in that sense, Burns is brilliantly successful. Everything is here; the fascination, virtuosity, and bafflement of that spectacular performance twenty years ago are all recaptured, rendered manageable, understandable, yet conveyed with remarkable immediacy and excitement. The story is told superbly, and in its telling Burns keeps a tight hold on his subject—and his audience. The man is never subordinated to his times, nor the politician to politics; yet a sense of the times and its politics is always present, continually evoked by a perceptive author who orients his readers without straining their attention.

For Burns, the story's unifying theme is his own search for answers to those questions which face all students of FDR's regime: How could one man be so direct and so devious; one politician so bold and so uncertain; one President so committed and so indifferent; the lion so foxy, the fox so leonine? It cannot be said that Burns really finds conclusive answers to this reader's satisfaction (or, apparently, his own), but the search serves nicely to pull the book together, endowing it with some of the qualities of a good detective story in which readers gain a statement of the problem, lots of evidence, and freedom to improve on the solution if they can.

Were this the sum of Burns's endeavor, one could conclude upon a note of warmest praise. In fact, though, there are two books in this volume: the one already indicated and—interwoven with it—quite another, far less successfully conceived and executed. For Burns does not confine himself to characterization and appraisal of one man's use of office under given circumstances at a given time; he is concerned, besides, to measure the results against an "ideal-type"; to judge Roosevelt's behavior and its consequences by standards independent of a time-bound personality and situation; to answer not alone the question "what made this man what he was?" but "what, in his position, *should* he have been?" FDR held the leader's role in democratic politics: what then are the ideal dimensions of that role; how did he measure up? That is the theme of Burns's "second" book.

Now this is very tricky ground and Burns does not always negotiate it well, which is the sadder since as a (political) biographer he scarcely need have traversed it at all. His ideal-type is dubious: compounded of the findings of selected sociologists, it postulates a leader who can dominate and guide the pressures bearing on him to a degree and for purposes not ascertainably related (so far as this reviewer sees) to what real politicians through our history have managed from the *Presidency*, the only role in which conduct is to be judged. Roosevelt falls considerably short of Burns's ideal, but so, presumably, would Lincoln. Yet what more does one ask—or want—of a mere mortal in *this* office? We are told of the "central findings of social scientists that leadership is . . . rooted in a specific culture" (p. ix). Burns would have done well to keep in mind the common sense corollary that *political* leadership is rooted in specific *institutions*.

Moreover, when it comes to measuring the man by the ideal, one is reminded that biography imposes its own limits. Among other things, Burns notes with evident regret that Roosevelt did not grasp or heed Lord Keynes's advice on how to handle the recession, and that throughout his early years he made no effort to reshape his party so as to enhance support for liberal endeavors in his second term. To Burns, as purveyor of an ideal-type, these instances of inactivity are not merely costly for recovery and reform, they are no less than failures of "creative leadership." And yet one surely can find grounds, historically, for arguing that *no* responsible, democratic politician, however great his intellect and firm his understanding, could have countenanced the altogether revolutionary step of implementing Keynes's advice *in 1937*. Certainly it is questionable, on the historical record, that *any* sane American politician, however sharp his vision, would have moved, quite deliberately, to split his party's leadership in Congress and the states at the flood-tide of personal and party fortunes. (Presidents, perforce, must *govern* day by day and win the *next* election if they can.) What matters is not that Burns's measurements of Roosevelt are arguable, but that the grounds for argument involve far more by way of social, economic, political—and intellectual—*context* than he offers his readers (or demands of himself).

Of course, had Burns turned to explore such things he would have been a poor biographer, which he is not; but, precisely because it is such good biography, his book fails to support his claims as sociologist.

Perhaps, as there are two books in this volume, there are three authors. There is one Burns endowed with a fine feel for democratic politics, instinctively appreciative of that master-politician, FDR. There is a second Burns, himself committed to New Deal objectives, identifying with the New Dealers, yet aware that FDR was not really one of them. And there is a third Burns, student of politics in the Wilsonian tradition, heir to that idealistic strain in our political science that seeks coherence, order, plans, identifying our habitual confusion, discreteness, improvisation, as harbingers of governmental insufficiency. Clearly, these three authors struggled with each other in the making of this volume; for that it is all the better. One concludes, though, that it would have been better still had only authors two and three forborne to shield themselves from author one behind a borrowed barricade of ideal-typical analysis. Out in the open field it could have been a splendid combat.

Richard E. Neustadt.

*Columbia University.*

*The Warfare of Democratic Ideals.* By Francis M. Myers. (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press. 1956. Pp. 261. $3.50.)

*The Ethics of Compromise and the Art of Containment.* By T. V. Smith. (Boston: Starr King Press. 1956. Pp. 117. $2.50.)

Proponents of one or another metaphysical or epistemological doctrine frequently allege that the theories of their philosophical opponents lead to unfortunate results in the field of political theory. One thinks of the debate between Brand Blanshard and Sidney Hook back in the thirties, of John Hallowell's attacks on positivists, and of Hans Kelsen's and Felix Oppenheim's defenses of relativism. Now Francis Myers, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Denver, enters the lists with a book-length discussion, the point of which is to maintain that both empiricism and supernaturalism lead ultimately to antidemocratic conclusions. The instrumentalists alone are on the side of democracy.

Dr. Myers deals in turn with Traditional Empiricism, for which he selects R. B. Perry, E. B. McGilvary, and T. V. Smith as the major representatives, Neo-Thomism, portrayed by Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, Protestant Absolutism, with Josiah Royce and William E. Hocking as examples, and finally Instrumentalism as expounded by John Dewey and Max Otto. In spite of their great differences, the first three groups are alike in separating knowing from valuing. This fatal error leads each inevitably either to the conclusion that "might is right" or to conservatism. Even the latter, according to Myers, is an inadequate philosophy of democracy and, moreover, can be supported only by the dubious assumption of the inevitability of progress.

Although the author states at the outset that his main concern is with "the impact of these philosophies at the street corner" (p. 5), in fact he deals mostly with what he contends is their logical implication, rather than with the political conclusions deduced by the philosophers themselves. In no other way, for instance, would it have been possible to classify Perry (or, for that matter, most of the others) among the authoritarians.

In this reviewer's opinion, no one, including Professor Myers, has succeeded in establishing any *necessary* relationship between metaphysics and political theory. It seems extremely unlikely that such a relationship exists. To touch on just one link in the author's reasoning, surely a belief in the inevitability of progress does not always or of necessity lead to conservatism, as is contended (p. 83). It did not have that effect on Marx; nor, as long as it is not also held that the timing and the instrumentalities are determined in detail, can it be shown that Marx (or any determinist) is logically bound to be a conservative.

In spite of good will, the author does less than justice to almost every one of the philosophers whose work he analyzes in detail. In discussing Hocking (see pp. 174–175), as elsewhere, he fails to realize that an absolutist may distinguish between belief in the existence of truth and belief that governments may be trusted to know and act on the truth in all matters. It is precisely because many absolutists realize how great is the danger of empowering governments, even democratic governments, to enforce their own interpretations of truth that they can and do support liberal restraints on governmental action as vigorously as anyone.

Of the chapters on Instrumentalism, suffice it to say that they seem to be directed at a rather different problem from the rest of the book. While they leave no doubt as to the democratic beliefs of Dewey and Otto, they make no attempt to answer the attacks of those who argue that pragmatism logically undermines the philosophic foundations of democracy.

In *The Ethics of Compromise and the Art of Containment*, T. V. Smith, Professor of Politics, Philosophy, and Poetry, illustrates the appropriateness of his triple title. Occasionally, but no more, his love of words forces an epigram into an enigma. More frequently the phrase that comes to charm stays to enlighten. No fair-minded reader could lay down this little volume feeling that "T. V.'s" impact "at the street corner" could be anything but democratic; nor could he feel that the author's mellow wisdom could properly be termed "conservative." There is no lack of respect for conscience or moral principles in Smith's insistence that effective democratic compromise can be practiced only by those with sufficient modesty to recognize the difference between certitude and certainty. "Nothing is more trigger-happy" than a "hyperthyroid conscience" (p. 85). Lincoln provides the model for this professor, who would show us how to pass "through the valley of sectarianism and beyond the mediocrity of political compromise, into the vast reaches of spirit where compromise is left behind through the gracious practice of the art of containment" (pp. 86–87).

J. ROLAND PENNOCK.

*Swarthmore College.*

*Federalism and Constitutional Change.* By William S. Livingston. (London: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. x, 380. $6.75.)

American experience from the colonial period furnished a substantial basis for early theorizing on federalism, and this country has continued to provide a hospitable environment for writings on the subject. Since 1954, two major volumes have appeared: one by Robert R. Bowie and Carl J. Friedrich (eds.), *Studies in Federalism*, and the second, by Arthur W. MacMahon (ed.), *Federalism Mature and Emergent.* The *Report* in 1955 of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, with the fifteen accompanying special studies, has provided a searching analysis of the chief features of American federalism and of intergovernmental relationships and responsibilities. The 1956 program of the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association included several papers for different round tables which dealt with the theory and practice of federalism. Europe and the Commonwealth countries have duplicated this interest in federalism, as is evidenced by the *Report of the* (Canadian) *Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Rowell-Sirois Report), the several editions of K. C. Wheare's *Federal Government*, as well as other writings. And now William S. Livingston has added a welcome volume to the impressive list of recent contributions in the field.

Maintaining that the approach to federalism has usually been marked by legal formalism, Livingston (taking a position reminiscent of certain writings of Max Hildebert Boehm) argues that federal institutions are essentially a product of social, economic, political, and cultural forces which made necessary the outward form of federalism and that "federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected." If the diversities in a society are grouped along territorial lines, then the expression of these diversities may take the form of federalism. "Federal government," he says, "is a form of political and constitutional organization that unites into a single polity a number of diversified groups or component polities so that the personality and individuality of the component parts are largely preserved while creating in the new totality a separate and distinct political and constitutional unit" (p. 9).

Certain "instrumentalities" are considered to be relevant to the needs of a federal society and may collectively operate to produce a federal government. One of these is the process of amendment. Though recognizing that the informal processes of amendment are significant and that they frequently produce more significant changes than the formal amending process (p. 295), none the less it is the latter to which the author devotes his primary attention. The justification offered is that the formal procedure of amendment is of "greater importance than the informal processes because it constitutes a higher authority to which appeal lies on any question which may arise" (p. 13). I cannot agree with either the argument that the fundamental provision or feature of a Constitution is its process of formal amendment or that it is the amending process that provides the chief distinction between constitutions. And I point to Professor Livingston's concluding chapter as providing some support for my doubts, at least by implication. That the formal amending process is deserving of the attention given it in this scholarly study, however, I am in complete accord.

Following somewhat in the footsteps of Professor Wheare, Livingston devotes his major attention to Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and the United States. In each instance, the author deals with such matters as the development of the amending procedure, the role of the component units, a history and analysis of the various amendments, popular referenda, and criticisms of the amending procedure. The complexities of the Canadian case, coupled with the unique competence of the author to deal with it, have justified the attention and space which have been devoted to Canada. And, indeed, it is not detracting from the excellence of the other case studies to single out Chapter II on "The Amendment of the Canadian Constitution" as the outstanding one in this volume.

Brief attention is devoted in one chapter to the formal amending process in a number of other countries, including the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Germany, and Latin American countries. The justification for dealing with the United Kingdom and certain of these countries is that, while the "constitution is clearly unitary," there are nevertheless many elements of federalism in the society. In such brief treatments, attention could not be given to recent formal constitutional amendments and other changes, such as those in the Union of South Africa after 1953 or in the German Federal Republic after 1950. In the latter case, the past tense might have been used in referring to the original eleven states embraced in the western zones of occupation and some question may be raised about the analogy drawn to "the 'federal execution' of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution" (p. 289).

Professor Livingston has included in several appendices pertinent constitutional provisions and other useful documents, as well as an excellent bibliography. Above all, he has indicated in this volume how justifiably certain of the "instrumentalities" of federalism, when examined with the competence evidenced by the author in this book, can be used as units of comparison in future studies of federal systems.

TAYLOR COLE.

*Duke University.*

*Treasury Control: The Co-ordination of Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain.* BY SAMUEL H. BEER. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 138. $2.40.)

The Cabinet is the keystone of the arch of British government; the Treasury is the keystone of the arch of British administration, and it is even more than that since it is the most powerful supporting beam of the Cabinet system itself.

A study of the British Treasury has been long overdue. The partly historical study by Sir Thomas Heath some three decades ago was a contribution of much value. Yet student after student has passed by this potent institution, important even more for its own place in administrative coordination and political economic techniques than for its auxiliary functions in a political system of democratic and collective responsibility.

We must count ourselves fortunate that so wise and acute a scholar as Professor Beer has broken the ice. I always held my breath lest some aspirant Ph.D. should take too firm a grip on the British Treasury and now am grateful that Professor Beer's luminous study has set us so high a standard that candidates will be abashed and teachers steer them into less ambitious projects.

Professor Beer has, however, in this essay, deliberately limited himself only to the coordination of financial and economic policy in Britain, though Treasury Control, the title of the essay, comprises more than this. He lucidly sketches all the many functions of the Treasury: for example, Establishments, Home Finance, Overseas Finance, so that (also with the aid of a good chart) one may appreciate their relationship.

The coordination of financial and economic policy is dealt with so succinctly and with such an intelligent and imaginative comprehension of the informal as well as the formalized relationships among the officials of the Treasury and the spending departments, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, other ministers, and the Prime Minister, and of all of these to the House of Commons, that it would be futile to try to offer a synopsis. The work is written with great economy of words, with pungency, and with clarity. Does it not tend to support my dictum that administrative coordination begins in college—at any rate, so far as Britain is concerned?

I should like to offer some marginalia. Perhaps rather more should have been made of the contribution of the Central Statistical Office. The debates on the Economic Survey are worth appraisal. I think the titanic work of the Treasury in this age of public investment in the nationalized industries as well as outside them might be given some extra emphasis by a mere history of the statutes that nationalized the industries and mention of the Treasury's connection with the raising of capital for them therein enacted.

This talented study gives a wider texture to the truths on the subject recounted to this reviewer by two eminent persons. One was Sir Edward Bridges. When I asked him what was his greatest official anxiety, he answered: "It is not coordination! We have the machinery and the rules for that. My chief anxiety is that so much business must still come across the desk of myself and my thirty colleagues at the head of the other departments." I suggested: "Is this not a function of number? Say, double the men at the top?" "No! Still too much has been concentrated in the state, to which I must say—and I alone—'Yes' or 'No.'"

The other story was told in Washington, D.C. The American, one-time *attaché* in the United States Embassy in London, said: "The British Civil Service is the paradise of the bureaucracy!" I raised my eyebrows. He answered: "I mean that in Washington, when we at the official level have finally become ulcerated by working out an inter-departmental policy, we submit it to our political superiors, and one of them can, and at least one of them does, flick down our laboriously built house of cards! Not so in Britain! When the ministers have asked for advice, they take it—plus or minus a dollar's worth, but they take it!"

HERMAN FINER.

*University of Chicago.*

*Southeast Asia in Perspective.* By JOHN KERRY KING. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. xx, 309. $5.00.)

The general conclusion which emerges from this thoughtful and soundly based study is that, although the United States has in recent years found itself increasingly deeply involved in the affairs of Southeast Asia, it has not yet been able to master the approaches and techniques which would lead to the successful achievement of its objectives—nor is it wholly sure how those objectives are to be defined. Among other things, "crisis diplomacy," an often unshared concentration on anti-Communism, and the priority given to military considerations have all worked to lessen the effectiveness of American policies and programs in a region which stands precariously on the frontier between the Communist bloc and the free world.

In answer to the somewhat elusive question as to the nature and intensity of America's concern with Southeast Asia, Mr. King suggests that even though American interests in the region, taken separately, are none of them vital to the security of the United States, they take on impressive dimensions when they are combined and placed in the context of the cold war. Indeed, he cites the cold war strategists as predicting that, if Communism were to sweep Southeast Asia, it would blanket the whole of Asia and tip the balance of world power to its side; but he is also concerned to point out that there are various other American interests that are only incidentally related to the cold war and are certainly not to be reckoned in military terms. High among these he would place the success of the democratic experiments on which the Southeast Asian countries have embarked. These brave ventures are threatened by Communism, to be sure, but he rightly emphasizes that they would still rest on very shaky foundations and still capture American interest even if there were no foreign or domestic Communists to tamper with them.

As to the objectives of American policy, Mr. King himself appears to be somewhat in doubt, indicating at one point a more idealistic and at another a more down-to-earth version. In the former vein he sees the basic long-term objective of United States foreign policy as "the growth of a series of independent, prosperous, democratically oriented and reasonably strong states in the area." Fifty pages later, however, he asserts that since 1950 "the basic theme of American objectives" in Southeast Asia has shifted from helping the peoples to achieve their own aspirations, to resisting Communism through military preparations and collective security.

The United States has embarked on its Southeast Asian course hampered by several serious disadvantages. One, which only time can overcome, is an initial lack of acquaintance with the region. Mr. King devotes two key chapters to detailed exposition of the thesis that even in the period from 1945 to 1950 the American connection with Southeast Asia was slight save for the Philippines and involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian tangle, and that it was only in 1950 that the United States plunged in deeply, primarily as a consequence to Mao's triumph in China. In a nicely turned phrase he remarks that when the United States was at this point forced to abandon China as its principal Far Eastern bulwark and turn instead to Japan and Southeast Asia, "only the Philippines and Thailand were reasonably well seasoned by prior experience to withstand the shock of American courtship."

In addition to lack of familiarity, other points of difficulty have been the tendency of Southeast Asians to identify the United States with the colonial powers and the failure to agree on a common version of the threat posed by Communism, which is the central element in the disagreement as to the need for military pacts and measures.

Like many other observers, Mr. King sees postwar Southeast Asia as constituting a power vacuum, although the Southeast Asians presumably appreciate being regarded as a vacuum no more than do the Middle Easterners. The ideal way to fill the vacuum and to safeguard American security would be to have the region transformed into a cohesive group of stable states which, together with India, could serve as centers of dynamic attraction to offset Communist China's magnetism; but the reality, as Mr. King presents it, is that the countries are divided both within and among themselves and that their economic and political progress is slow and uncertain. In the concluding chapters, the author develops his own conceptions as to a more appropriate form and substance for American policy in dealing with the complex situations he has earlier examined.

Since Mr. King's prejudices appear on the whole to coincide with his own, this reviewer is prepared to declare the book essentially sound. If a minor piece of fault-finding may be intruded, it would be to suggest that the author too constantly resorts to the device of listing in one, two, three. . . . order the points which he wants to make on almost every topic.

RUPERT EMERSON.

*Harvard University.*

*The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.* BY V. P. MENON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. 511. $7.00.)

When the Maharajah of Travancore suggested, in a mood of grave pessimism over the future of his State, that he would rather abdicate than act against his convictions, V. P. Menon told His Highness that there were few problems that human ingenuity could not solve. As the reader lays down this absorbing chronicle of the integration of the Indian princely States, he is convinced of the soundness of such a proposition. The annals of political history do not record a problem more complex nor more explosive than that which faced the newly-formed government of India in 1947. With the decision that the 554 Indian States comprising two-fifths of the country would, upon the withdrawal of the British, return to a "state of complete political isolation" and that their Princes would become undisputed masters possessing unrestricted sovereignty (by reason of the "lapse of paramountcy"), India's critics freely predicted that the new government would founder on the problem of the Indian States. As the reader is guided through the maze of negotiations attendant upon the transformation of 554 States into fourteen administrative units and the subsequent laying of the foundation for uniform administrative, financial, and judicial machinery, some of the reasons for the success of this masterful effort suggest themselves: not least is the skill and wisdom of the two men charged with the major responsibility for bringing the princely States into the Union: the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Minister for States, and the States Secretary, V. P. Menon.

The high degree of responsibility with which the Patel Ministry undertook its enormous task is documented by this chronicle. It would, indeed, have been easy enough to have made the position of the rulers intolerable by allowing popular unrest to engulf them. Rejecting this solution (actually mooted at the close of a particularly trying conference with a group of Princes), Menon held that the need of the hour was peace: "If the choice before us was peace with the *status quo* or chaos with merger, I would unhesitatingly vote for the former" (p. 165).

Menon could appreciate "the poignant spectacle of the rulers parting with their proud heritage" (p. 193) and could give credit to those among them who, persuaded by "the logic of events," took the lead in relinquishing their not inconsiderable powers. In a compelling chapter on the "Cost of Integration," he defends the expenditure entailed in the privy purse settlements: "If we expected them to hand over their States unconditionally for ever, we had of course to give them something in return" (p. 477). He also has unstinting praise for the constructive role performed by the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten. If there was a consistent villain in the piece, it was the Political Department, whose British officers appeared to be mostly concerned with safeguarding the prerogatives of the Princes who had been, for the British, the only dependable element in India.

When the task had been completed, Menon reflected on the policy of lapse of paramountcy which he had earlier told Patel was the "greatest disservice the British had done India and the rulers." He concluded that that policy had enabled the Government of India to "write on a clean slate unhampered by any obligations" (p. 485) and, perhaps unwittingly, had promoted the solution of what had seemed an impossible problem.

We may be sure that this work has passed the scrutiny of the Government of India. Undoubtedly episodes have been omitted; one is tempted to read between the judiciously-written lines. But so much is packed into this book that it will long serve as an essential reference for all students of Indian politics and history. The first four chapters trace the constitutional history of princely India up to the 1947 plan for the British transfer of power. Chapter V details the accession of the States to the Union of India on defence, external affairs, and communications. Subsequent chapters treat the consolidation of the individual States on a regional basis, with Junagadh, Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Baroda receiving especial attention. The final five chapters survey administrative, financial, and constitutional changes, analyze the cost of integration, and present the author's personal assessment of the process. A glossary of Indian terms, two appendices, three maps, and numerous illustrations add to the value of the book.

For those who would interpret India's current dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, this work should be required reading. For those who would analyze the more recent reorganization of States, it will provide invaluable background. And for those who despair of India's future unity, it should prove immensely reassuring.

JOAN V. BONDURANT.

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*Germany's Eastern Neighbors: Problems Relating to the Oder-Neisse Line and the Czech Frontier Regions.* BY ELIZABETH WISKEMANN. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. x, 310. $4.80.)

Designed to provide dispassionate information on the causes and consequences of the radical westward shift in Poland's frontier after World War II and of the expulsion of Germans from the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia, this study is a helpful antidote to the output of patriots wielding the footnote in defense of or attack on the *status quo.* The work is in the tradition of similar studies undertaken under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, though it lacks their customary blandness, especially when Miss Wiskemann leaves the fairly safe ground of describing "what has really happened" and ventures into the future. The sponsors and the author seem to have felt that the information offered in the study might become urgently needed because of the possibility that "a benign and yielding Russia" (p. 292) would be willing to withdraw her direct power from eastern Europe and thus remove the major prop from under the present territorial and ethnic arrangement in the area. There are some obvious flaws in this basic assumption: the Soviet Union has been neither strikingly benign nor particularly yielding; and a withdrawal of what the author calls "direct power" from eastern Europe does not necessarily create an entirely new situation for Russia or the countries involved with respect to the German issue. For instance, the agreement between the USSR and the Gomulka regime in Poland is based on a confirmation of the "immutability" of the Oder-Neisse line. Withdrawal from Germany, rather than from Poland or Czechoslovakia, is the issue; and this is unlikely to come from a "benign and yielding" Russia, only from a considerably weakened or adequately compensated one. Then and only then could the issue become operatively important again for the West. On the assumption that frontier issues and ethnic transfers are handled on a rational basis, the decision-makers of the future might accept Miss Wiskemann's findings and recommendations, which with some minor exceptions amount to leaving things pretty much as they have been since Potsdam. The author realizes that the acquisition by the USSR of the northern part of East Prussia, including Koenigsberg, is probably the least justified annexation following World War II but also the one most unequivocally supported by the United States and Great Britain in 1945. It is, in addition, "the most difficult to undo." The Poles, she feels, should not be pressed to return to Germany any territory, especially not Silesia, whose possession would make the Germans dangerously powerful. Nor should Germans in any significant numbers be readmitted to Poland and Czechoslovakia, in view of their past record of disloyalty.

In the process of providing useful and laboriously collected background material, Miss Wiskemann demolishes some of the *clichés* put into circulation by partisan propaganda and readily accepted by cold warriors. One such *cliché* was the view that Germany could not satisfy her food requirements without a return of the territory annexed by Poland. It is true that Germany, and particularly the western portion, depends now to a larger extent than before on grain imports from overseas areas. However, these imports are easily paid for by Germany's expanding industrial exports. *Autarkia* is a mercantilist shibboleth and the ideal of aggressive nations. The lack of self-sufficiency and dependence on overseas imports of food may make Germany "a more reliable neighbor" (p. 177) than the interwar Reich whose economic power over the food-producing countries of eastern and southeastern Europe was a prelude to turning them into satellites. With all this, the author is somewhat vague on the subject of the nutritional position of individual Germans since the end of the war, but this problem has clearly lost most of the urgency it had in the immediate post-surrender era of complete chaos. It certainly is subordinated in the author's thinking to the basic conviction that the West should do nothing to encourage the expansionist tendencies which in the past tended to manifest themselves in Germany with the greatest ease. It is in the interest of Europe as a whole that the living standard of Germany should not be strikingly higher than that of her major eastern neighbors. This is an interesting and legitimate thesis.

SAMUEL L. SHARP.

*The American University.*

*Nationality and Statelessness in International Law.* BY PAUL WEIS. FOREWORD BY HERSCH LAUTERPACHT. PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE LONDON INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. xxviii, 338. $10.10.)

*The Refugee and the World Community.* BY JOHN GEORGE STOESSINGER. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. v, 239. $4.50.)

Dr. Weis's book is the first thorough treatise on the existence and nature of rules of public international law relating to nationality and statelessness. His closely knit argument and careful documentation reflect his legal training and experience. He has been connected with the Office of Legal Adviser of the IRO and is now the Legal Adviser of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Dr. Weis brings out clearly the relationship between nationality and the rights of individuals. Since, as he says, the enactment of the UN Charter means that human rights are no longer solely a matter of domestic concern, efforts to develop the international law relating to nationality can hardly be separated from efforts to secure a guarantee of human rights in international law.

Closely linked to the problem of nationality is that of statelessness. One of the most useful aspects of the book is a survey of recent efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, to regulate the status of stateless persons and to eliminate or reduce statelessness. Dr. Weis offers a valuable clarification of terms by differentiating between "*de facto* unprotected persons" (refugees) and "*de jure* unprotected persons" (stateless persons). To confuse these is to complicate efforts toward international settlement of the refugee problem.

In conclusion, Dr. Weis warns the reader that progress in the development of international law in this field is bound to be slow. His careful, revealing survey could well facilitate such progress.

Mr. Stoessinger deals with a group of "unprotected persons," the refugees, whose human rights are no longer the concern of their countries of origin and who, lacking another nationality, fall into the category of stateless persons. A native of Vienna who served with the IRO in Shanghai until he fled to the United States in 1947, he is a refugee from both Nazi and Communist governments. In his objective study, he examines the reactions of the "world community," through the League of Nations and the UN, to the refugee problem. He succinctly discusses the role of international organization as a "new technique" to deal with an age-old problem, which in the twentieth century has outgrown the facilities of individual states and voluntary associations. He examines the work and results of the various international agencies which have coped with groups of refugees since 1920.

The first part of the book tells the familiar story of the refugee movements during and after World Wars I and II, describes the responses of the League of Nations and the UN, and leads up to the dramatic story of the creation of the IRO in the First General Assembly of the UN in 1946–47. The second part deals with the work of the IRO, a non-permanent intergovernmental agency of eighteen members, the first specialized agency to tackle the refugee problem in its totality. Its amazing achievement was chiefly due to the extraordinary unity of purpose prevailing in its policy and administrative organs, partly because of the absence of the Soviet Union and its satellites and partly because of the objectivity of the IRO's General Council, whose policies were dictated by the need of the refugees; it must also be attributed to the devotion of its 5600 civil servants under the guidance of the Director General.

Mr. Stoessinger believes that the dissolution of the IRO was premature, since "the refugee is evidently a lasting phenomenon." The last part of the book discusses two significant problems. The first is whether it would be better to set up a permanent international organization responsible for all groups or, as the need occurs, to set up temporary regional agencies. While he inclines toward the former, he realizes the obstacles arising from immigration restrictions and the difficulty of getting governmental support. The second is how to coordinate the policies of the international agencies with those of national governments; he finds a model for handling this problem in the leadership given the IRO by the United States and deplores the fact that the United States no longer provides this direction—partly, he thinks, because of domestic political considerations.

The book ends by pointing out that it is the ever-recurrent conflict between political and humanitarian considerations that has caused such fundamentally different approaches to the refugee problem by the League of Nations and the UN. In view of many besetting difficulties, the only future course Mr. Stoessinger can delineate for an international organization is "the transfer of human beings from areas where fundamental human liberties are not yet recognized to those parts of the earth where freedom beckons." Thus "the fundamental problem is not the urgent need for another IRO *per se* but for national policies of openness toward immigration."

LOUISE W. HOLBORN.

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*Il volto sconosciuto dell'Italia: dieci anni di sondaggi DOXA*. BY PIERPAOLO LUZZATTO FEGIZ. (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore. 1956. Pp. xxvii, 1353. $9.60.)

This is the first comprehensive survey of the work of DOXA—the Italian Institute of Public Opinion founded by the author and others in 1946. Under the dynamic and imaginative direction of Professor Fegiz, DOXA has won a fair amount of respectability and acceptance from a society which Fegiz rightly describes as skeptical—even hostile—toward the public opinion survey. The author emphasizes that he and his associates held few illusions about the receptivity of the cultural milieu in which they sought to implant the kind of research techniques pioneered by Elmo Roper and George Gallup. It is a tribute to the author's perserverance and to the frequently excellent results of DOXA surveys that the public opinion poll, like other aspects of American culture, seems to have taken firm hold in Italy.

Data from the most interesting surveys executed over the last decade are reported. The author has arranged his material topically, so that the table of contents becomes a useful index to the kinds of information the volume contains. There is much here that will fascinate the browser, and the specialist on Italy will find himself wanting to consult the entire volume with great care. In it will be found information on the reading, smoking, and eating habits of the Italians; on the character of Italian housing and the preferences of the population regarding heating systems, floor covering, furniture, and electrical appliances; on attitudes toward spectator and participant sports; on whether and why the people are happy or unhappy; on attitudes toward matrimony, divorce, and birth control; on international affairs, politics, education, unemployment, social stratification and mobility, music and the arts, emigration, strikes, the cost of living, the structure of income, and the patterns of saving and investment. In short, this is an immense volume, excellently arranged and packed tight with data that will be of utility to social scientists.

Of particular interest to the political scientists are the sections devoted to "International Affairs" and "The Citizen and the State." In the latter, one will find documentation for the conclusions that a clear majority of Italian women are uninterested in politics and feel that women should not affiliate with political parties, and that the politically uninterested and overwhelmingly uninformed women of the country are largely responsible for the monopoly of political power held by the Christian Democrats since the war. One might say, then, that Italian democracy has depended for survival on the voting behavior of those citizens who, according to democratic theory (or mythology), are least qualified to participate in the democratic process. The author drives home this point when he says that, under a system of universal *male* suffrage, Italy would probably now be governed by the Communists and Nenni Socialists.

Another interesting finding is that Italians are fairly evenly split on the desirability of regional autonomy, with the heaviest incidence of unfavorable attitudes occurring in Sicily and Sardegna, areas popularly identified as strongly separatist in viewpoint. We learn, too, that while attitudes on many political issues correlate significantly with formal ideologies, none of the parties—not even PCI—can claim a monolithic attitude structure for its members. Thus a fifth of Nenni Socialists (and almost as many Republicans!) favor the return of the monarchy; significant numbers of the supporters of the Right strongly favor greater industrialization, nationalization, and so on. In the area of international affairs, Italians, including many Communists, say that they like, admire, and respect the United States more than they do the Russians. However, they also claim to have no illusions about the Marshall Plan, holding in significant numbers that the motivation of the United States in providing aid has been one of self interest (e.g., defense against Communism, search for new markets, imperialism, etc.).

For the survey technician, there is much in the volume that will raise perplexing questions. For example, the author's statement in his introduction, that most of the surveys reported are based on samples ranging from 2,500 to 3,000 respondents, is not accurate. Indeed, most of the samples appear to be of a much smaller magnitude. Moreover, there is no discussion, except in the most general description of the samples as "quota controlled," of the method used in drawing national samples and of the problems involved therein. I mention this because Italian and American statisticians, in developing for Italy the survey method of gauging unemployment used in the United States, have found it necessary to utilize a national sample of some 56,000 families—more than twice the number found to be adequate in the U. S. There are also questions regarding the DOXA method of distributing "Don't Know" responses, as well as indications at many points that the samples may contain built-in middle-class, male biases. A longer, more detailed methodological section by the author, as well as more extended explanatory comments at various points in the volume, would have been useful.

The author, himself, cautions that many of the distributions, involving extremely small cells, are probably unreliable. Nevertheless, the volume provides a wealth of information broken on broad variables that are of interest to the social scientist. In a society inclined to view systematic data-gathering of any variety as the sin of positivism, the Fegiz volume is a refreshing landmark. Social scientists here and abroad will visit it rewardingly for many years.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA.

*Michigan State University.*

*Public Administration and Policy Formation: Studies in Oil, Gas, Banking, River Development, and Corporate Investigation.* EDITED BY EMMETTE S. REDFORD. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1956. Pp. xiv, 310. $5.75.)

Professor Redford has demonstrated the value of a practice that deserves to be more widely followed. He has brought together and published five studies, each based on a dissertation written under his supervision. Each is a study of administration of public economic policy: the "focus of [each author's] analysis was the development of a public program within an administrative agency. . . . He was primarily interested in what the agency did for society and how." The writers were at least as interested in public policy values and results as in administrative structure and procedures.

In York Y. Willbern's valuable study of the Texas Railroad Commission, "the chief agency controlling oil production in the United States" and "perhaps the most powerful state regulatory agency," conventional "principles" of public administration take quite a beating. The commission is an administrative board popularly elected under a long-ballot arrangement. The state's chief executive exercises no control and has little contact with the commission. It has no formal civil service. Its procedures have been not only planless but often aimless: they grew up "in a prolonged fit of absent-mindedness." The regulated interests like the arrangement so well that they speak of it as "self-regulation." Yet Willbern finds that, on the whole, "a remarkably effective mechanism has been developed for discovering and reconciling the views and needs of those within the industry and for carrying them out." He adds, however, "It has perhaps been largely fortuitous that the wider public interest has generally been in the same direction as these views and needs."

Ralph K. Huitt's instructive essay on the Federal Power Commission's regulation of natural gas emphasizes the total social and political complex of the administrative process and the inseparability of the parts. Regulation can not be successful when it deals only with pieces of the problem, in this case transportation and sales. We are given further evidence that in such undertakings the regulated ultimately have more weapons and more staying power than the regulators. Huitt finds a strong record of achievement in the commission's work during the first six years of the New Deal. But the political climate has changed and the pendulum has swung back. Huitt spells out the need for a national fuel policy and more adequate commission powers but is not sanguine about prospects in the foreseeable future.

Guy Fox's thoughtful and illuminating study of the "Supervision of Banking by the Comptroller of the Currency" centers on analysis of administrative organization and procedures. This is the story of our longest experience in national control of a major economic activity: the bureau of the comptroller antedates the ICC by twenty-four years. We get a fascinating picture of federal-state competition and the development and effects of dispersal of federal authority among several agencies. Here, too, the "principles" of public administration are humbled. There have been twenty comptrollers in less than ninety-five years. Examiners have never been in the classified service, although the bureau uses its own informal merit system. The comptroller is virtually autonomous. Located in the Treasury, he reports directly to Congress, not to the department head. Despite all this, Fox finds that the comptrollers have generally been men of high calibre and that, on the whole, a successful job has been done. Here, too, we find a regulatory agency whose activities appear pleasing to its clientele.

Comer Clay gives us an exciting picture of public achievement by the Lower Colorado River Authority, which began operations in 1935. Though it was established by the Texas legislature, most of its early financial support came from the federal government. This public enterprise has been profitable both in the narrow fiscal and in the broad social sense. Clay spells out the social gains in flood control, municipal and industrial water supply, low-cost power, irrigation, and other fields, while giving close attention to administrative structure and management. He feels that the authority can serve as a worthy example for similar projects in other parts of the country. The information deserves wide distribution.

"The Investigatory Function of the Federal Trade Commission, 1933–53," by Hugh M. Hall, Jr., supplements the work of Thomas C. Blaisdell for an earlier period. It mainly summarizes the major investigations of the commission and attempts to estimate their role in policy development. Hall concludes that the FTC's good record in gathering information has not always been matched by constructive policy recommendations or regulatory techniques. It has not rendered extensive aid to the President or the Attorney General.

Each of these studies contains the material for a small book. Each is a real contribution to our knowledge of the natural history and operations of government agencies. The writing is uniformly good, always simple and clear. The totality is a remarkable tribute to a great teacher.

HERMAN M. SOMERS.

*University of California (Berkeley).*

*The Office of Governor in the United States.* BY COLEMAN B. RANSONE, JR. (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 417. $6.00.)

Seeking to present "... a clearer picture of the governor's role in the day-to-day conduct of the business of state government," Professor Ransone relies heavily upon information and impressions gained from his interviews with political sophisticates in twenty-five states and gives a distinctly secondary emphasis to the legal and historical dimensions of his topic. Ransone is appropriately cautious in offering generalizations in the underexplored area of comparative state government and politics, particularly in view of his accurate insistence that ecological factors greatly influence political operations, a position which implies a degree of uniqueness for each state's gubernatorial pattern.

For other reasons, however, doubts remain concerning the validity of some of the generalizations which are advanced. For some states, the office of governor seems to be characterized in terms of information secured about a single administration. The evidential basis frequently shifts from one topic or generalization to the next, and the nature of the change is not always made clear. And there is the constant problem of generalizing about all forty-eight states on the basis of an examination of twenty-five states, eleven of which are southern states. These comments suggest, in short, that for at least some of the topics the study may not be dissecting *the office* of governor in the United States.

It is ironic that Part I (pp. 3–112), entitled "The Character of Gubernatorial Politics," should encompass the most fruitful approach and the least satisfactory sections of the study. Ransone conceives the governorship as preeminently "a political office" and shrewdly judges that "the process by which the governor is nominated and elected . . . [is] the most significant part of the political processes surrounding the governor" (p. 4). But Part I succeeds only in identifying, not exploring, the elements of the gubernatorial selection process deemed most crucial: namely, the primary election and the factional structure of the party. Since Ransone confesses to an "obsession" with the importance of the primary, and since there is a developing literature of disenchantment with the direct primary, his skimpy and superficial treatment of the latter topic is regrettable (pp. 91–92).

The stated purpose of Part I is to provide a "background to the central discussion of the gubernatorial functions" (Preface). In filling in that "background," Ransone concentrates on developing a method of classifying party systems in the states, supplementing it by a discursive descriptive survey of each state's politics which, to this reviewer at least, borders on a surfeit of detail. Inexplicably, the classification scheme so laboriously worked out not only fails to provide the organizational frame for the description and analysis in the rest of the study, but rarely even reappears. The "background," in brief, has become so distant as to lose much of its utility.

The bulk of the study describes the operation of gubernatorial functions in the broad areas of policy formation, public relations, and management—these are admittedly artificial divisions imposed upon a single interrelated process—and discusses problems related thereto. As an adherent of that wing of the "responsible government" camp which views the prospects of party reform as dim, Ransone is committed to the position that strong executive leadership, in combination with a legislature better able to discharge its functions, best fulfills the democratic requirements of vigorous government and accountability to the voters. Forearmed with this knowledge, the reader can predict reasonably well the direction of the author's interpretations and suggested reforms on a host of diverse topics, large and small.

Although the mixture of evidence and logical argumentation varies from topic to topic, students will find portions of this section the most valuable of any in the study. The following far-from-exhaustive list illustrates the wide variety of items considered: formal gubernatorial control of the structure, personnel, and policies of the bureaucracy; the governor's power of veto and of executive amendment; length of gubernatorial term and restrictions on re-election; the device of the cabinet; the executive budget and reporting to the governor by administrative units; the governor's staff; the governor's work load; the merit system; legislative apportionment; procedural reforms and staff aids for the legislature; and a reinvigoration of competitive two-party politics in the majority of states.

Any serious attempt to meet the need for comparative political analysis of state governments must be appreciatively welcomed. Although the imperfections and unevenness of Ransone's study may make the whole of the book less useful than some of its parts, there remains a rich and varied fare which should prove both appealing and nourishing to students of state government, administration, and politics.

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# BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*The Inter-University Case Program Series: No. 29, The Michigan Athletic Awards Rule.* By Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., Helenan Sonnenburg, and George Kentrowitz. *No. 30, The Public Advisory Board and the Tariff Study.* By David S. Brown. *No. 31, The Transfer of the Kansas State Civil Service Department.* By Peter Bart and Milton Cummings, Jr. *No. 32, The Reorganization of the California State Personnel Board.* By Frederick C. Mosher. *No. 33, The Coterminous Boundaries Dispute.* By Edwin A. Read. *No. 34, From Forest to Front Page.* By Roscoe C. Martin. *No. 35, The General Accounting Office: Two Glimpses.* By Gerald G. Schulsinger. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 1956. Pp. 23; 47; 24; xii, 55; 15; viii, 66; ii, 80.)

I read these six latest Cases on the same day so that the impact would be the greater. Not merely did I survive the ordeal, I almost enjoyed it. Taken as a whole, they have been briskly edited, they deal with interesting problems for the student and practitioner of administration, and there are sufficient personalities and living situations to carry one over the heavier parts. Nor did I, as an Englishmen, feel that I was reading about a strange and foreign country. Only in *The Michigan Athletic Awards Rule* (29), did I feel that Englishmen would not behave quite like that. For the rest, the study of the Public Advisory Board (30), of the application of Bowaters for a Certificate of Necessity (34), and the smaller G.A.O. studies (35) had a familiar ring about them.

These six Cases are uneven in both presentation and scope. Professor Roscoe Martin's study (34) is undoubtedly the most readable and the most interesting. In contrast, Mr. Read's account of the settlement of a Canadian local government boundary dispute (33) is slight and the moral obvious; it seems hardly worth the trouble. When I thought back at the end of the day over what I had read, three general impressions remained.

First, the authors did not set out with exactly the same aim, or if they did they diverged from it. All six studies were concerned with the administrative process, but within this very broad scope they seemed to have rather different aims. In Cases 29, 30, and 33, the main emphasis seemed to be on the importance of individuals in the process rather than on the formal process itself. In marked contrast, in Case 32 and to a large extent in Case 34 the emphasis lay on the formal administrative setup or process. Put another way: the former Cases would have been almost as significant if they had been about quite different administrative processes, whilst in the latter two Cases the people concerned could have been left out without seriously weakening the value of the studies. The three G.A.O. studies dealing with the audit of travel reimbursements relied neither on person nor process for their lesson—they were slight but rather revealing administrative anecdotes.

Second, I was led to wonder how far these differences in emphasis were due to differences in the authors. Mr. Brown (30) and Mr. Read (33) were writing from firsthand experience, being leading participants in their Cases. They therefore saw them in terms of particular individuals and personal situations—they were not really concerned with whether the administrative device was the best available nor were they of the standing to make an authoritative evaluation. Professors Mosher (32) and Martin (34), on the other hand, are well known teachers of public administration; they know the theories behind particular practices and are concerned to bring out the administrative lessons. Moreover, they are reporters, not participants. In between come Messrs. Bart and Cummings (31) and Schulsinger (35)—neither participants nor professors—who present the facts effectively but without bringing out as fully the persons or the administrative issues as do the others.

My final reflection concerned the use of these Cases for teaching. Here I must step very cautiously, for I have never used them for this purpose. It is clear, however, that they are good for the good student, even for one working on his own. Not only will he pick up a certain amount of information about this or that organizational pattern, but he will get a feel of the way things work. They are an excellent addition, even corrective, to the textbooks. I suspect the student is likely to be very dependent on his teacher, for few of the Cases give him any guidance, and sometimes they do not give him all the information on which to form a judgment. I found Professor Martin's study the most satisfying, precisely because from time to time he stands back from the process and persons he is reporting and makes some revealing comment: for example, on the role of the technical adviser and on the administrator's problem of knowing how far he must trim a particular decision to get away with it politically. Professor Mosher does a little of this but, considering his great knowledge of this subject, not enough for my liking. I would gladly have sacrificed the photographs of the Personnel Board and of their offices for two pages of guidance on the generalist versus the specialist forms of organization. The other, non-professional authors are less in a position to give theoretical guidance, and perhaps this is why they do not do so. I was left wondering whether it would not be worth while to add to each Case a short, two- or three-page commentary, by someone else where it can not be provided by the author, calling attention to some of the significant points in the Case, or linking the Case to earlier Cases which dealt with or threw light on the same issue. Such a commentary would naturally be more valuable where the main issue turned on process rather than person—but the latter sort are in the long run bound to be less significant, if only because the theme is so limited.—D. N. Chester, *Nuffield College, Oxford.*

*Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints.* By Walter Gellhorn. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 215. $3.75.)

This book consists of three lectures given by Mr. Gellhorn at Louisiana State University in 1956. They are completely successful examples of the non-technical presentation of technical research findings for the purpose of informing the public mind and, in the end, of altering public policy. They represent a high order of intellectual achievement combined with sensitivity to the striking case, the absurd example, and witty, if not always winged, words.

Mr. Gellhorn's lectures are devoted to three related and overlapping ways by which governmental activities are adversely affecting individual freedom in the United States. The first lecture, in many ways the most interesting, considers the manner in which "radicals" and "reactionaries" have switched sides in their evaluation of administrative law making. Old conservative foes of the NLRB have become the staunch friends of judicially unreviewable procedures for determining loyalty-security and for the deportation of "undesirable" aliens. Gellhorn argues that the newer administrative processes bite into personal, rather than economic, matters and are more definitive in their adverse effects upon individual rights. At the same time, they are more open to error and prejudice because they are not based upon discernible accretions of facts or upon any special administrative expertise. Their total impact is to shift administration away "from public service to public suspicion."

The second and third lectures are case applications. One concerns the manifold restraints now imposed upon book reading; the other is devoted to a review of the manner in which proliferating laws of occupational licensing increasingly constrict "the right to make a living." The latter concerns a less highly advertised restraint upon individual liberty and therefore makes the greater impact.

The occupational license is a form of legal monopoly, conferring economic advantage as well as social status upon those licensed. In most cases, procedures allow the licensed group to control itself; as Gellhorn remarks, such laws are induced, not imposed. The variety of occupations covered by municipal ordinances, state laws, or federal statutes is extremely wide and growing rapidly. The social gains of such measures are overwhelmed by their demerits. They drastically decrease the degree of occupational mobility within the economy. (In some states, it is more difficult to become a master plumber than a physician.) They cut down upon business competition. They irrationally establish areas of special privilege and undeserved economic gain. They insinuate irrelevant criteria into licensing qualifications, especially criteria that intrude into areas of individual privacy. (Professional wrestlers and boxers in Indiana must swear that they are not subversive.) The total effect is to subordinate the public interest to the advantage of particular groups.

One may easily quarrel with Mr. Gellhorn about the choice of some of his examples or the weight he gives to certain facts. For example, he at one point hits the reader with the statement that more than a million aliens were removed from the country by administrative procedures in a single recent year. Less than a page later, however, this statistic is corrected by subtracting those who entered the country illegally in the first place, those who voluntarily left (including the great number of seasonal Mexican laborers), and those who violated the conditions upon which they were temporarily admitted. The startling first fact makes the conclusion an anticlimax and less impressive than it ought to be: ". . . at least 2,000 permanent residents are being annually banished from their home country."

But this and other possible minor carpings should not detract from the book's real achievement of dispassionate, learned, and persuasive public education. Nor is it possible to dissent from Mr. Gellhorn's judicious conclusions. The pages of his book "reflect a mounting legislative and administrative insensitivity to the dignity of man as an individual." These developments should not be taken as signs of the imminent collapse of the American democracy. They are "defects, not disasters . . . flaws . . . not failures." The real danger is that democracy will be eroded away as small inroads upon freedom become customary. "Evils must be attacked before they achieve familiarity if toleration of them is to be defeated."—MORTON GRODZINS, *University of Chicago.*

*Intergovernmental Relations at the Grass Roots: A Study of Blue Earth County, Minnesota, to 1946.* BY PAUL N. YLVISAKER. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 186, $3.00.)

In this seventh monograph of a series edited by Professors William Anderson and Edward Weidner, Paul Ylvisaker has reconsidered a study undertaken in the middle 1940's under the sponsorship of the Council on Intergovernmental Relations. Spurred to view his home county in the interest of better government to be achieved by "streamlining" administrative machinery, the author admits that his enchantment with *progress* ebbed measurably as his understanding of the weaknesses of ordinary political flesh matured upon direct contact with that final barricade to which American democracy has been forced by the blighting twins of urbanism and "welfarism"—the rural county.

Included is a survey of the three hundred governmental units operating in the county in 1945. More than half were local agencies with the power to tax; most of the remainder were state appendages; about forty were federal units.

Attention is focused on agriculture, public health, highways, and finance. Apart from the county agent, local government participated little in the administration of agricultural programs. The local administration of federal programs was unitary in organization and uncoordinated in performance. Formal integration was no more evident in public health programs, although the professional ties of public health personnel, the catalytic action of the grant-in-aid and the influence of community leaders suggested to the author a "first principle" of a theory of intergovernmental relations: that, locally, the functional ties among administrators are stronger than the jurisdictional lines dividing them. The relative coordination of the highway program was due to the few agencies involved, the professional bonds of the engineers, and the cement of money grants from state and federal governments.

In analyzing finance Ylvisaker proposes, but admits the difficulties of formulating, a "community budget" to depict the scope and cost of government viewed locally. Blue Earth county, he found, relied on state and federal governments for about one-third of its revenues and received from them direct services costing as much as its own total expenditures.

An interesting feature is a description of community attitudes toward government. The antipathy toward big government, the confidence in local government, the exaltation of individual effort, so much a part of the folklore of midwestern politics, are paradoxical in the face of governmental growth which has not produced a monolithic administrative Leviathan, but has merely compounded the dispersal of responsibility which has been perhaps the most enduring element in our constitutional tradition.

There is no proposal of bold new reform, but a plea for the reorganization of the county as a centralized agency for administration locally, a suggestion that the grant-in-aid is the carrot to move the donkey forward, and a call for new attitudes to be evolved through processes of public education.

This work is a useful compendium of data accumulated only with steady and unceasing toil. One has the feeling, however, that the author used a camera slightly out of focus to catch an enormously detailed picture of the variety and occasional duplication of services in a rural midwestern county. The effect, a proper one no doubt, is to leave the feeling that there is no pattern of intergovernmental relations in Blue Earth county—only a blur. Those readers constrained to set matters right in a tidy bundle will doubtless be irritated by Ylvisaker's unwillingness to cry alarm. Crisis or personal interest may stir acceptance or resistance to particular governmental services and on such occasions individuals will lend support to limited tinkering with the machinery of the service state as they become aware of the incongruities and frustrations of kaleidoscopic federalism. The average man's contracts with government, however, are too secondary and too discontinuous, his span of attention too narrow and too short, in the grim and purposeful business of making daily bread, to sustain the concentrated effort necessary for reform on the grand scale. He is caught up in forces too distant to be either understood or controlled. In such circumstances change can be effected only on pragmatic and tentative terms by those who see the need. Whether these conclusions would be sustained by a study of urban life is a matter beyond the compass of this monograph.—ROBERT J. MORGAN, *University of Nebraska.*

*National Party Platforms, 1840–1956.* COMPILED BY KIRK H. PORTER AND DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1956. Pp. xi, 573. $10.00.)

Party platforms of yesteryear are about as hard to find as misplaced street car transfers. But here they all are for American political parties from 1840 on down. And handsomely compiled too in a handy, though hefty, volume that begins with the lone party platform of the 1840 campaign (Democratic), and ends with the two major and four minor party platforms placed before the voters in the 1956 presidential contest.

This is an important and indispensable reference volume. For some mighty important data for the social scientist is encapsulated in these campaign documents despite our well-known impatience with platform equivocation in national political life. But the user of this volume will lament one feature: it has no index—a much missed tool in this instance.

A word of campaign comment has been inserted for each quadrennial election, but these are very brief and the information they give is not consistently recorded. For example, the note on the 1948 campaign emphasizes that the Democrats and Republicans combined received only 92 per cent of the electoral vote, yet no mention is made of the two-party popular percentage. Elsewhere the note on the 1940 campaign states that the four minor parties received only one-half of one per cent of the total popular vote. The difficulty here, of course, is that the recital of the electoral vote percentages without popular voting data in one campaign and not giving both for another tends to frustrate comparative judgements.

All the same, this is a highly useful volume, painstakingly edited and put together. It is certain to find an affectionate spot on the shelves of all careful students of American parties.—MALCOLM MOOS, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

*Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes: A Study of the 1954 Congressional Election.* BY ANGUS CAMPBELL AND HOMER C. COOPER. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. 1956. Pp. 149.)

The third in a series of voting behavior studies by Angus Campbell and associates. This one was made in the fall of 1954, when it was found possible to include some questions of a political character in a periodic Survey Research Center economic survey. The authors state, "Within this severely limited scope we could not carry forward the study of 'intervening variables' on which our 1952 study had concentrated." They have focused on group differences in voting and in political attitudes.

Four hypotheses are advanced: "Groups having high membership identification and strong group standards in the area of politics will be the most distinctive in their political characteristics." "Groups of high membership identification but without group standards regarding political attitudes or behavior and groups of low membership identification will not be politically distinctive unless there is some outside factor which evokes a common response. . . ." "In groups of high membership identification and strong group standards of political behavior, those members with strongest group identification will be most politically distinctive." "Overlapping group membership will result in either reinforcement or diminution of the partisan characteristics of the original group. . . ."

There is, at least, one surprise in the data on the voting of party identification groups.

Democrats in all population groups voted less than Republicans in the same groups. Democrats also defected more often than Republicans. It, therefore, appears that the "commonly heard hypothesis that the low Democratic turnout in national elections results from the fact that Democrats come disproportionately from the less politicized strata of society" is only a partial explanation. The authors are inclined to think that the relatively low Democratic turnout in all groups and the larger number of Democratic defections was due to the pull of Eisenhower, although he was not on the ballot.

It is conceded by the authors that their data are not sufficient to test their hypotheses fully, but some conclusions are offered. Among them are these: Group differences in attitudes and votes clearly exist. Group differences are greater in votes than in attitudes. Party identification is meaningfully associated with attitudes on issues, etc.

Noteworthy in this study are the carefully stated hypotheses and the attempt to test them, although the test is a limited one. The data reported are interesting in their own right. The report is admirably organized and lucidly presented; the study, within unavoidable limitations, is excellent.—THOMAS A. FLINN, *Oberlin College.*

*Big Money in Little Sums: A Study of Small Contributions in Political Party Fund-Raising.* BY JOHN VAN DOREN. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Institute for Research in Social Science. 1956. Pp. xii, 82.)

A report on the 1952 Democratic Five-Dollar Plan, with a prefatory chapter on "the contribution problem" and a concluding chapter on "the prospect for small contributors." There are numerous details concerning the evolution and operation of the Plan, but the absence of adequate records makes description of even national office activities difficult. Receipts of $218,668 were reported received by the National Fund, but it is estimated that total collections were nearer $600,000, the difference being held back for local use. Despite some conspicuously successful local efforts, the author reaches the conclusion that the Plan failed in terms of its own objective of providing a significant part of Stevenson campaign funds. Failure is attributed to lack of time and other peculiarities of the '52 campaign and to more basic factors cited in the concluding chapter. These same factors lead the author to believe the prospect of seeing campaigns financed by small contributions is poor. Efforts of Democrats in Minnesota, Michigan, and California since 1952 move him to leave the door ajar but not open.

*Speaking of Politics.* BY FRANKLIN C. SALISBURY. (New York: Vantage Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 294. $3.75.)

A book by a former government attorney, now an attorney in Washington. It is not, as one might expect, a collection of personal reminiscences or observations; nor is it concerned with the legal aspects of politics. On the contrary, this book is designed to be a systematic treatment of the language of politics. It is, in fact, the author's definitions of such words as person, group, liberalism, conservatism, state, government, democracy, etc. Many students of politics would disagree with the author's use of these words; to do so is, of course, their privilege so long as they offer their own definitions. The author of this book, however, seems to believe these words have some "real meaning" which he has labored to discover.

*American Local Government and Administration.* BY HAROLD F. ALDERFER. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. xix, 662. $5.90.)

A new text "designed to present a modern and over-all description of the entire field of American local government and administration." Thus, it includes municipal units, counties, townships, and various special units. Early chapters deal with the number of units, historical foundations, and intergovernmental relations. Elections, forms of government, expenditures, revenues, and functions are considered successively. Descriptions of governmental units are placed under these headings as appropriate. Sound. Materials are up-to-date.

*American National Government.* BY HAROLD R. BRUCE. (New York: Henry Holt and Co. Rev. ed., 1957. Pp. xi, 850. $6.50.)

The basic organization of the earlier text is retained. New illustrative material is included, and the sections dealing with parties and interest groups have been expanded.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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### ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

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## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*Target: The World. Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955.* Edited by Evron M. Kirkpatrick. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. xxiv, 362. $5.00.)

This volume is the second in a series of compilations inaugurated by F. Bowen Evans in his *World Wide Communist Propaganda Activities* in 1955. The second installment of this useful enterprise contains considerably more material than the first, although it is neither so compact nor so easy to use. The Kirkpatrick and Evans editions follow the same general pattern of organization. If this series is continued for a number of years, it will become a very important source of information on trends in Soviet propaganda content, organization, and techniques.

Mr. Kirkpatrick indicates in a preface that his book has been made possible only by drawing upon government research on Communist propaganda. He has energetically compiled a vast mass of official material. This is presented in ten chapters, thirty-nine tables, and sixteen illustrations. There is also a brief bibliography and a careful index. The first two chapters deal with the historical record of propaganda as an instrument of the Communist movement. Then come chapters on Communist diplomacy in 1955, propaganda themes, communications media, and international "fronts." The remaining four chapters are devoted to an area analysis of all parts of the world except Canada and the United States, although occasionally reference is made to Communist propaganda activities in those countries also. Even on the basis of authentic official material, it is extremely difficult to deal adequately with such a vast range of topics, and it is no reflection on the author's ability that this volume is much more successful as a reference book than as an interpretative study.

Although Mr. Kirkpatrick comments soundly on the objectives and tactics of Soviet propaganda, he does not achieve so high a level of integration of analysis of strategy, symbols, and media as many students of propaganda might desire. But the descriptive nature of the study and its coverage confer upon it values which might be lost if the material had been processed more elaborately. Despite the fact that the author obviously has designed this book as an instrument of anti-Communist counter-propaganda, he refrains, for the most part, from interpretation going beyond a relatively simple evaluation which would probably be acceptable to most Americans. Unfortunately, the "line" taken in the books edited by Evans and Kirkpatrick is not likely to be very appealing to non-Americans, especially of the "non-Communist left." As a student of Soviet propaganda, who is grateful for the help made available in this book, I should like to suggest that the usefulness of such surveys increases if they are rigorously restricted to careful and systematic assembly of facts and indications of trends. In a work based upon official material, interpretations had better be left to the reader.

This reviewer was particularly pleased with the text and tables on Soviet cultural exchange activity supplied by Kirkpatrick. This, as well as the extensive data on foreign language broadcasting, foreign language publication, etc., is useful to quantitatively inclined communications students. One can be grateful for these data without sharing the impression conveyed by much of the material in this book.—FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN, *Yale University.*

*The Civil Service in Britain and France.* EDITED BY WILLIAM A. ROBSON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. vii, 191. $3.50.)

" . . . The task of civil servants today is not only changing somewhat in character, but is, on the whole, becoming rather more difficult." This statement tells us more about the British civil service than its author (Sir Edward Bridges) intended. That hesitant "somewhat" and that cautious "on the whole" are highly characteristic of the civil service temper. They conjure up again (together with much else in this book) all the things we have come to consider most admirable in British bureaucracy: its remarkable integrity (a generation of unblemished purity between the Francs Case and Crichel Down), its political impartiality (attested to here by no less a man than Lord Attlee), and its ability to sublimate personal opinions outside of the departments. Lord Beveridge once said that the British civil service operates on the basis of a new sort of monastic vow, "poverty, anonymity, and obedience," and many of the essays in this volume bear him out, explicitly and implicitly.

But is this political monkishness really a virtue? In one sense of course it is. The strict "constitutional discipline" of the service has made the adjustment of parliamentary institutions to Big Bureaucracy as smooth as was the earlier adjustment to Mass Democracy. Lord Hewart's prophecy of the New Despotism has turned out as wrong as Bagehot's jeremiad upon the Reform Act of 1867, because he too underestimated the ability of constitutional values to tame objective power. But representative government is not the only political value of the British; they are also committed to the Welfare State. And it is by no means certain that the civil service temper and characteristic civil service processes—recruitment to the upper levels exclusively from liberal arts graduates, Treasury Control, the ubiquitous decision-making by committees— are fully suited to the new functions of the state.

One of the persistent themes of this volume of essays—most of which first appeared in the issue of the *Political Quarterly* celebrating the centenary of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report—is the transformation of state activities since the Report appeared. The modern state has far, far more to do than the state of 1854. It is also engaged in new kinds of activities: the large-scale provision of goods and services to the public and the substitution of public decisions (economic planning decisions for example) for what used to be purely private decisions. Hence also the demands of administration have changed. Coordination has become a very serious problem. Civil servants must acquire considerable scientific and technical expertise. "Efficiency" is replacing "legality," however gradually, as the *ultima ratio* of administration. Public officials have far more scope for independent action, far more direct contact with people, and far more intimate relationships with interest groups. And there have developed, alongside the regular civil service, a bewildering variety of "public services," the place of which in relation to the regular service is by no means clear: autonomous corporations, semi-autonomous boards and "agencies" (like the National Health Service boards and councils) of the central departments.

But while this situation is sketched in this volume, none of its many authors make any concerted attempt to deal with the problems it raises. That is its chief failing, among a great many virtues: its conciseness, its interesting analysis of other changes in the service since 1854 (above all in its social composition), and, not least, the glimpses it gives into the ideas of politicians and civil servants on subjects usually reserved for academics. But precisely because this is not an academic volume, it is regrettable that Professor Robson's essayists addressed themselves to all the conventional subjects of the academic treatments (recruitment, structure, Treasury Control), when they could have given us so much more badly needed information on more pressing questions. Perhaps some day Professor Robson will induce another panel (preferably of new peers and recently retired civil servants) to take an even more modern glance back at the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.

Only two of the fourteen articles in this book deal with France, both superficially. Hence its title, while on the whole accurate, is nevertheless somewhat misleading.—HARRY ECKSTEIN, *Harvard University.*

*Diritto Costituzionale: Quarta Edizione.* BY PAOLO BISCARETTI DI RUFFIA. (Napoli: Casa Editrice Dott. Eugenio Jovene. 1956. Pp. xvii, 630.)

Among the younger European publicists who, after the end of totalitarianism and World War II, have tried to bring back to life the study of constitutionalism within the framework of freedom, the author of this volume occupies a distinguished position. This massive text has been issued in four successive and widely used editions in the course of the past ten years. It bears all the earmarks of careful scholarship. We are grateful to the author for having cast his discussion of the internal constitutional structure of Italy within a broad comparative framework.

The book is written in the classical tradition of jurisprudence and the narrative proceeds on a lofty plane. The effort is always directed at the establishment of the abstract significance of the constitutional norms, in the light of the prevailing views of the more eminent constitutional theoreticians. All too seldom, in cryptical (but most interesting) parenthetical allusions, or in short footnotes, are we told what the constitution means in effect according to those who are entrusted with its application, and what the constitutional practice actually is amidst the tensions and shortcomings of Italian political life. One would welcome a greater infusion of realism into the rather remote and cold landscape that the author so painstakingly paints for us. One would welcome an appraisal of the Italian political climate which, since 1948, has made of the half-completed constitution a frequently disregarded and always secondary factor in the nation's life.

One can not help feeling that European writers on constitutional matters, writing as they do within communities which in effect have not yet accepted the essence of constitutionalism, should take a more benevolent view of the literature of countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States where the spirit of constitutionalism controls to a far greater extent the thoughts of private citizens and the actions of public agencies. Biscaretti tells us that British constitutional writings have an eminently practical outlook, leave out all doctrinal and dogmatic construction, do not try to pigeonhole their institutions within properly contrived schemata on the basis of a severe and scientific logic. He adds that American literature is trying first of all to offer a description of what in effect is happening in the daily life of constitutional bodies. But, he continues, an increasing influence of European, and especially German, dogmatic writing is becoming visible (luckily, or not?).

Probably, American constitutional writers may learn something from their continental brethren. But it would seem at least as essential for continental writers to abandon their ivory towers and come to grips with the political realities of the modern world.—MARIO EINAUDI, *Cornell University.*

*Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland.* BY THEODOR ESCHENBURG. (Stuttgart: Curt E. Schwab Verlag. 1956. Pp. 808. DM 32.50.)

In contrast to the United States and England, Germany has produced no comprehensive realistic presentations of its governmental system and political order. In fact, German scholarship has not got beyond the legal analysis of its state and its constitution. Only in recent years have some isolated monographs been published dealing with some aspects of its political reality. A general survey is still lacking, though the title and bulk of the present volume could lead one to believe that such an important gap has now been closed. Unfortunately, this work of a professor of political science at the University of Tübingen fails to live up to the promise of its title. True, it contains a very readable presentation of the structure and powers of the federal government. Also, the reader learns a few things worth knowing about the operation of the federal organs. Nevertheless, the author produces next to nothing about the social structure and very little, indeed, about the social functions of the polity in West Germany. The real power structure remains in the dark—nor is Germany's "bourgeois cut" made a subject of historical or sociological analysis. Controversial topics such as the tendency towards restoration and renazification are avoided. The names of some Federal Constitutional Court judges do appear—but the reader will search in vain for the name of ex-Nazi Globke, the powerful confidant of Adenauer. The author promises to treat a number of subjects (parties, foreign policy, etc.) in a subsequent volume—yet even the theme of federalism is only touched upon in passing. These omissions are all the less pardonable since Eschenburg devotes the first 300 pages to a general theory of the state, which should have been dealt with in a separate volume. However, in spite of all reservations, the book does have substantial merits. It contains truly informative chapters, such as the one on the Federal Diet. Written in a captivating style, it testifies to a refreshingly anti-totalitarian attitude; yet even this author does not mention the number of Jews murdered by the Nazis. This is the more surprising in view of the clear anti-Nazi spirit of the book and in view of the fact that the much less reliable figure of Russian slave laborers is given. Still, considering that Eschenburg's treatise is the first attempt by a German to discuss the Bonn government in other than legal terms, it is well worth its money.—Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, Berlin.*

*The Future of Customary Law in Africa.* Symposium-Colloque, Amsterdam, 1955. (Leiden: Leiden University Press. 1956. Pp. xvii, 305. 19.75 guilders.)

In 1955 the Afrika-Instituut, Leiden, in cooperation with the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, organized an international Symposium on the future of customary law in Africa. Papers presented by Belgian, British, Dutch, and French colonial officials and specialists in the field of customary law are now published here, together with two papers, written later at the special request of the Symposium, on the Portuguese territories and the Union of South Africa; a brief summary of the discussions and the text of the resolutions are also included. In addition there are bibliographies compiled separately for each of the main groups of territories, including one of work published on the *adat* law of Indonesia.

The sixteen papers making up the Symposium fall into two categories. The first provides certain background information in the form of skeletal accounts of the judicial structure in colonial Africa: these attempt to do little more than list the kinds and classes of court to be found in a particular territory, the constitution, powers, and jurisdiction of Native African or Muslim courts, the machinery of appeal and supervision, and so on. (Some of the relevant legislation has been included for the Belgian and French territories.) The second category tackles more directly the theme of the Symposium and provides a useful survey of the varying extent to which recognition has been accorded to customary law, the limits placed upon its operation by legislation or such concepts as *L'ordre public* or "repugnancy," and the possibilities of voluntary withdrawal by Africans from the application of the customary law. What emerges from all this is that while Native Courts continue to bear the burden of so much of the day-to-day administration of justice, the customary law enforced by these courts is being increasingly whittled away by legislation, administrative action, and decisions of "Colonial" courts, but above all by the changes in the structure of African society itself, which must ultimately be reflected in the legal system.

The Symposium reveals some interesting divergences in approach to the general problem. For example, in the Union of South Africa the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951, marks a move in the direction of "so-called Indirect Rule"; by contrast, in Nigeria, now approaching independence, Mr. Ajayi notices a "welcome trend towards the 'best man' as opposed to the 'traditional man' policy." Similarly, while the Belgian Congo aims deliberately at creating a buffer class (*une bourgeoisie indigène*) which would no longer be subject to customary law, British policy seems to insist that the whole African community should move forward together, so that in some British territories no statutory recognition has yet been given to African Christian or Civil Law marriages.

Most of the papers have been drawn up to satisfy a schema suggested by the organizers of the Symposium. The method facilitates comparison, and makes the volume valuable as a source of reference; but it also makes for tedious reading and tends to cramp the analysis. Thus certain of the contributors rightly link the evolution of customary law with the future development of the courts; but in appraising these possibilities we need, first, some analysis of the judicial process and, second, an understanding of the role of the courts in the wider legal and political systems. In short, one would like to hear less about preserving *l'âme indigène* and see a more explicit recognition of the importance of the political and social fabric (particularly in the areas of European settlement) of which customary law is itself a part and within which it is now evolving. In an interesting paper on the *adat* law in Indonesia, which is included in the Symposium, Professor Korn quotes the remark of an Indonesian member of the Volksraad that ". . . the admiration of *adat* law actually prevailed more among the Netherlanders than among the indigenous population." The remark is worth pondering; similar remarks are likely to be heard increasingly from African leaders.—A. L. EPSTEIN, *Manchester University.*

*Government of Greater European Powers: A Comparative Study of the Governments and Political Culture of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union.* BY HERMAN FINER. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1956. Pp. xii, 931, xciv. $6.95.)

The author has added a traditional country-by-country text to his voluminous output of studies in comparative government. He regards his present approach as less scientific and advanced than his well-known *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* but more suitable for the beginner, who should look at governmental institutions in their interrelatedness and native environment. *Governments of Greater European Powers*, probably the most extensive work of its kind "though already reduced from its original of twice the size," is replete with most valuable material, not only for the beginner but also for the teacher. On every page it mirrors the vast erudition, catholic interests, and strong convictions of its author. Interesting tables, statistics, and groupings of facts interrupt the vigorous, colorful, often ebullient, always highly readable writing. Some generalizations are conventional, others highly provocative. The overall organization of the book is, however, not particularly original. Condensation and, perhaps, hasty editing and proofreading have resulted in a number of irritating mechanical errors. An important addition to the already impressive array of post-war texts in comparative government.

*Planification et croissance économique des démocraties populaires.* BY JAN MARCZEWSKI. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1956. 2 vols. Pp. 572. 1.200 fr.)

The most thorough comparative study of economic growth and planning in post-war Eastern Europe yet attempted. The countries discussed are Soviet-occupied Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The author is an exiled Polish economist, now a professor at the University of Caen and at the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris. The first volume is a historical survey, the second an economic analysis. The whole work represents a valuable compilation of available and pertinent data which should be of great use to students of the Soviet area. Conclusions are restrained and objective.

*Russia without Stalin: The Emerging Pattern.* BY EDWARD CRANKSHAW. (New York: The Viking Press. 1956. Pp. 264. $3.75.)

Interesting impressions of the Soviet Union in 1955 by one of the most brilliant British newspapermen. Even though most of it was written before the Twentieth Party Congress, many of his observations are stimulating and penetrating. Like Crankshaw's earlier books, this book shows him a superb reporter, thoroughly familiar with Russia, but a less reliable interpreter.

*Commentary on the Constitution of India.* Volume 2. BY DURGAS DAS BASU. (Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar & Sons, Ltd. 3rd ed., 1956. Pp. lvi, 847.)

The second volume of the most thorough

and accurate commentary on the Indian constitution. This volume covers Parts VI through XXII, and includes annotations on the important nine Schedules. An appendix reprints the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955. Both volumes are required for a complete, article-by-article analysis of the constitution.

*Jawaharlal Nehru.* By Frank Moraes. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. 511. $6.75.)

Mr. Moraes, editor of *The Times of India*, has written a decidedly political biography of his nation's energetic and controversial premier. His approach to his subject is sympathetic and frankly if not blindly partisan. While Nehru the man emerges only hazily, the history of India's nationalistic struggles and its progress since independence—so much tied to this man's personality and career—are vividly depicted. Mr. Moraes is not particularly worried about his subject's seeming inconsistencies and vagaries. Nehru's central preoccupation is seen as the drive toward creating a modern welfare state by democratic means and without the sacrifice of individual liberty. His occasionally autocratic side is explained as the product not so much of the greed for power as of a great sense of urgency that breaks out in fits of impatience. The author provides a more dispassionate treatment of the touchy issues of neutralism and Kashmir than do many of his fellow members of India's educated elite. Although he writes at formidable and perhaps undue length, he writes with feeling and style.

*The Temper of Peace: Select Documents, 1954–55.* Edited by S. L. Poplai. (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. 96. $1.00.)

A collection of speeches and documents which purports to show the growth of a peaceful method of approaching world problems, both in Asia and in the West. The first part of the book contains a series of speeches by Prime Minister Nehru and joint statements issued by Nehru and heads of several other states; the second part contains a selection of statements by Western leaders which, according to the editor, reflect a similar understanding of the "temper of peace" to that held by Nehru and the Government of India.

*Indian Foreign Policy: In Defense of National Interest.* By Karunakar Gupta. (Calcutta, India: The World Press, Ltd. 1956. Pp. x, 109. 16s. 6d.)

A brief, critical study of Indian foreign policy, giving particular attention to India's relations with China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Commonwealth. There is little that is new in this essay; a great many of the sources are secondary; the author does little more than summarize the views of other observers.

*Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan.* By Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu, and Ardath W. Burks. (Princeton, London, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1956. Pp. xii, 643. $7.00.)

The second edition of a standard work on the governments of China (including the Nationalist regime of Formosa) and Japan. Although the major emphases of the first edition remain unchanged, this "comparative study historically applied" has been updated to take account of recent developments and newer scholarship. Ninety pages of appendices provide a useful array of primary documents.

*A guide to the public records of Southern Rhodesia under the regime of the British South Africa Company, 1890–1923.* By V. W. Hiller, Chief Archivist. (Salisbury: Central African Archives. 1956. Pp. xxxviii, 282.)

In addition to the record of the archival materials in the Central African Archives at Salisbury, arranged by the administrative structure, there are historical notes, pp. 179–236, devoted to the details of organization and function of the various agencies during that period.—J.B.C.

*Récapitulation des périodiques officiels parus en Tunisie de 1881 à 1955.* By Hélène Pilipenko and Jean Rousset de Pina. (Tunis: Bibliothèque Nationale de Tunisie. 1956. Pp. 108.)

For the first time for any country in Africa, there has appeared a check-list of the official publications, carefully arranged according to administrations with notes as to the changes and development of the administrations. The work covers the whole period of the French administration or protectorate in Tunisia to the time of independence, and is arranged primarily according to the Ministries at the time of independence.—J.B.C.

*Composición de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación por partidos políticos y distritos electorales (Cuadros demostrativos) 1912–1943.* BY THE DIVISIÓN ARCHIVO, PUBLICACIONES Y MUSEO OF THE CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NACIÓN. (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación. 1956. Pp. 47.)

The compilation presents the make-up of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies by party and by electoral district for each session, 1912–1943 under the Sáenz Peña electoral law (no. 8,871) previous to the Peron regime.—J.B.C.

*Constitución de la Nación Argentina.* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación. 1956. Pp. 69.)

By a proclamation of April 27, 1956, the Provisional Government of the Argentine Republic reinstated the National Constitution of 1853 with the amendments of 1860, 1866, and 1898; declared in effect the constitutions of the provinces previous to those of the deposed Peron regime; and suspended the constitutions of the provinces of Chaco, La Pampa, and Misiones. The Secretaría del Senado de la Nación has reissued the National Constitution of 1853, as amended in 1860, 1866, and 1898, and has attached the proclamation of April 27, 1956, and the basic directives of December 7, 1955.—J.B.C.

*Portrait of a Statesman: The Personal Life Story of Sir Anthony Eden.* BY DENNIS BARDENS. (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1956. Pp. 326. $6.00.)

This is one of several semi-popular biographies of the former British Prime Minister published within the past year in England. The writer is a competent London newspaperman, who collected his facts almost exclusively from the public record.

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*Washington, D. C.*

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## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

*The Changing Environment of International Relations: Brookings Lectures, 1956.* By Grayson Kirk, Harrison S. Brown, Denis W. Brogan, Edward S. Mason, Harold H. Fisher, and Willard L. Thorp. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1956. Pp. ix, 158. $2.50.)

The six lectures of this series form a slender volume with a large and significant purpose. That purpose is to identify and analyze the problems that will be presented to the makers of American foreign policy by changes likely to take place in the world over the next ten or twenty years. There is here no obsession with developments within the Soviet orbit, but rather a concentration upon problems that would presumably face us had the communist ideology never been heard of. Given this somewhat unreal limitation, the authors have written essays of substance that raise questions of importance.

Grayson Kirk and Denis Brogan give a sobering and often grim picture of the possible consequences of the widespread disparity between our expectations and the world as it is. They conclude their respective essays with the thought that we must discard illusions and face reality. Harrison Brown, relating science and technology to international relations in a fashion that is at once engaging, full of insights, and properly frightening, believes that we may yet pull through if we are willing to look the future squarely in the eye and apply our imagination and genius to the problems that he has so well described. Harold Fisher, focussing on obstacles to Asian co-operation with the West, asserts that we must, and can, increase our understanding of one another. Edward Mason writes, with impressive common sense and a prescience at least partly proved by recent events, of the effects of increasing production on world trade, of trade between communist and non-communist countries, of the problems posed by the major concentration of oil resources in the Middle East. Willard Thorp gives cogent and conservative estimates of America's interest in the raw materials of the East and of the possibilities of radically increasing economic aid to that part of the world. Both Mason and Thorp concentrate on economic problems without losing sight of the interplay of political and economic factors. "We need," Thorp concludes, "to become much more aware of the foreign effects of our domestic behavior."

In reading these essays a single, implicit question emerges: how does one bring men to face the difficulties that are here identified? It is not enough to say "we must"; also required are indications of how it is possible to increase the chances that scholars and statesmen alike will do the things here described as essential to our and the world's future well-being. Of the several things demonstrated by this volume, the most impressive is that it is often somewhat easier to present convincing diagnoses of political and social difficulties than it is to prescribe solutions, or even palliatives, that have some significant chance of actually being applied. This is not to imply that the former undertaking is of less importance. It is rather a way of saying that the lectures have, at least in a general manner, accomplished the purpose of pointing to problems upon which social scientists can profitably concentrate their research over the coming years.—KENNETH N. WALTZ, *Columbia University*.

*Power and the Law: A Study in Peaceful Change, with Special Reference to the British Commonwealth and the United Nations.* BY PETER PRICE. (Geneva: Libraire E. Droz, 1954. Pp. 155.)

It almost goes without saying that Dr. Price's study, carried out under the supervision of Bourquin, Guggenheim, Mantoux, and Rappard at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, constitutes a major contribution to our thought on the central problem of peaceful change, which has, in fact, been somewhat neglected in recent years. The text is very smoothly written and carefully organized; useful appendices are included but no analytical index.

The only general criticism which the present reviewer would have to make relates to the devotion of about one-half of the study to *cases* arising in the British—*sic*—Commonwealth of Nations. Case studies are assuredly useful and interesting, and perhaps not much more could have been said on the general theory of the problem than what was said in the first half of the book, but the survey of the concrete cases does not appear to add very much to what Dr. Price himself had already learned from them.

There would be little or no point in the reviewer's expressing agreement or disagreement with particular doctrines of the author. He certainly does not agree with the treatment of "legal and political disputes," where he remains an unreconstructed legalist. He regards the treatment of *"rebus sic stantibus"* as inadequate. The treatment of Article 19 of the Covenant might be similarly characterized. He has no criticism whatever of Chapter III, "Procedures of Peaceful Change." Perhaps the principal comment to be made on the whole study is that much more space should have been given to the general analysis, even at the expense of sacrificing much of the illustrative material.

There is likewise no point in agreeing or disagreeing with Dr. Price's treatment of concrete cases, even if this reviewer were competent to do so. He certainly disagrees with the treatment of the Kashmir case, especially the term "powerful" in the last paragraph on page 127.

But with these reservations the study can be warmly recommended to all students of international relations and organizations.—PITMAN B. POTTER, *The American University*.

*Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations.* BY LELAND M. GOODRICH. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 1956. Pp. xi, 235. $3.25.)

Professor Goodrich has written a book that is readable, authoritative, and analytical. It originated with a study group organized by the Council on Foreign Relations. As research secretary, Professor Goodrich was able to benefit from the discussions of the group, although the book itself represents the ultimate conclusions of the author.

In many respects *Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations* could be a model for careful research on similar topics. The emphasis is on the interrelation of the Korean policies of the United States and the United Nations. The author points out the difficulties that arise from American efforts to make and execute a policy founded on the world organization. At the same time he gives a realistic account of its capabilities as presently constituted. On the whole, Professor Goodrich is pleased with the Korean record of the United States in the United Nations, especially after the "armed attack" in June, 1950. He does raise the question as to whether the American government made "excessively heavy and unrealistic demands on the Organization" prior to that time. He believes that after the outbreak of hostilities the United States, working with other members of the United Nations, showed that aggression did not pay and, at the same time, succeeded in avoiding a general conflict. There are some, however, who would not agree with him when he states that "if one reflects on the lessons of history, one may discover that the wars which have contributed most to the establishment of conditions of durable peace and security have in fact been those which have been fought for limited objectives and often with indecisive military results."

In terms of time sequence, the book is basically divided between the period from September, 1947, to June, 1950 (three chapters); and that from June, 1950, to June, 1954 (four chapters). During the first period, the United States through the United Nations was seeking chiefly to establish a democratic, unified, and independent Korea, and, during the latter time, primarily to halt Communist expansion south of the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. In his handling in chapter V of the early responses of the United States and United Nations to the Communist aggression in Korea, Professor Goodrich skillfuly portrays the sequence of events. Here were involved Presidential decisions in Washington and United Nations decisions in New York. The correlation as regards Korea and the divergence as regards Taiwan are indicated.

In his research the author is fortunate in having a wealth of primary material that is unclassified and available. In fact, scholars of contemporary international relations are having to depend more and more on United Nations documentation. If they are specialists on the Far East, they are fortunate in having a particular abundance of data published as a result of Congressional hearings. Professor Goodrich in his work does not provide a bibliography or an index, but he does document his study in carefully selected footnotes from authoritative sources. There is an orientation map of Korea and an appendix of documents, largely United Nations resolutions.—Russell H. Fifield, *University of Michigan.*

*American-Asian Tensions.* Edited by Robert Strausz-Hupé, Alvin J. Cottrell, and James E. Dougherty. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. xiii, 239. $3.75.)

The countries with which the United States is considered to have tensions are India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Egypt. Some doubt about categories may be raised. Since the authors define a state of international tension as existing "when two or more nations are striving for incompatible foreign policy objectives over a period of years," it may be doubted that American relations with all or perhaps any of the five countries can be accurately described as tensions. There are points of disagreement, of irritation, of friction, but is there long-standing incompatibility of objectives?

The Philippines, for example? What is there that is serious except the American bases there, and how serious is the difference over them and is it irremediable? The fact is that the Philippines support our foreign policy, if with some reservations and sometimes reluctance in some respects. Egypt? Over the years there has been no important relation at all between the two countries, and what shall one say of American-Egyptian relations between November, 1956, and March, 1957? Would the French describe them as "tension"? Or the British?

Take Japan. Since the surrender in 1945 and the elimination of a Japanese threat to China, the main points of difference have been American bases on Japanese territory; the American injunction against trade with China, the high tariff on Japanese exports to this country, military government in Okinawa. There has been some annoyance in Japan on all these counts and some propaganda, a good deal of it fomented for domestic political purposes or for communist purposes. But none of it goes very deep, none of it need be lasting, none of it threatens relations seriously. As a matter of fact, there never was anything to create real antipathy between Japan and the United States except the conflicting conceptions of the status of China.

Even with Indonesia there is only the question of neutralism, and that has been assuaged somewhat since the United States has become a little less unreconstructed on the subject and no longer seems to be laying down the rule that he who is not my ally is my enemy. Indonesia, it is true, is passionately anti-colonial and applies to all international situations the litmus test of the colonial question, but since Indonesia does not weigh very heavy in the scale of international power, that is not very important now.

On Indian-American relations there is more to be said, and the authors say it with perception and penetration. Here the issue of neutralism does carry more weight and the issue of colonialism even more. The authors dwell effectively on Nehru's almost monomaniac preoccupation with colonialism. There is indeed something of post-puberty self-consciousness in India's attitude to colonialism, something adolescent in its adoption of that as the touchstone in all international situations, something immaturely one-dimensional as an address to perhaps the most complex of human relations —the relations between states and peoples in our time. Nor will many quarrel with the authors' attribution to Mr. Nehru of a double moral standard on that question, especially as applied to the United States and the Soviet Union. They might have gone further and observed that Mr. Nehru's political morality, doubtlessly high, is also doubtlessly flexible.

The last chapter of the book is a very good statement.—NATHANIEL PEFFER, *Columbia University.*

*United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1955.* BY WILLIAM REITZEL, MORTON A. KAPLAN, AND CONSTANCE G. COBLENZ. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1956. Pp. xi, 535. $4.50.)

Not the least of the debts we owe to the Brookings Institution stems from its "Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy." This series has been most useful to those who wished not only recent and authentic information on the subjects treated, but also introduction to the "problem approach" to analysis of issues. Now three members of the Brookings staff have turned from spot problems to a survey and synthesis of the critical first postwar decade of American policy, breaking it down into four major segments: the nation's capabilities and foreign policy goals in 1945, policy from 1946–1950 in important geographical and subject-matter areas, a similar survey for 1950–1955 as our policy was re-directed under the impact of Korea, and, finally, a critical estimate of the present situation.

This is a conscientious overview of the international events, problems, alternatives, and meaning of the ten years, and the task of winnowing out detail and expounding the main theme is well done. Free from the limitations necessarily imposed on the "Major Problems" series, this volume sees the problems whole rather than in smaller segments. Here are carefully balanced discussions of such key events as the Marshall Plan and the Korean "police action," and one will observe that editorial bias does not intrude even in so emotion-laden an issue as the dismissal of General MacArthur. Some readers will decry the paucity of footnote references, but they will find compensation in a lengthy annotated bibliography.

There are also critical points to be made. Without undervaluing the authors' analysis of the political and military policies and problems of the decade, one may still wonder whether the economic side of our foreign policy should be dismissed as summarily as it is. Not that economic matters go unmentioned; Chapter XX deals exclusively with them, and they figure in the plot elsewhere. But still one could read the book carefully and come away with an inadequate comprehension of the American concern in 1945–1955 with tariffs, trade dislocations, dollar gaps, and the like. These deserve more thorough treatment than is here afforded. Scholars whose special interests lie in the Middle East or Latin America will be unhappy at the short shrift given their areas, for the main focus of this book is on the U. S., the U.S.S.R., and Western Europe. The discussion of the Truman Doctrine is useful but gives little indication of its military aspect.

This reviewer is puzzled by one question: what purpose will this book serve? The expert on American foreign policy will not find in it a great deal that is new to him, for in covering a wide area the authors could not hope or be expected to go into all details. But, alternatively, if the volume is directed toward the public or the college student, this reader must confess to grave pessimism as to its reception, for whatever the authors' abilities, and they are obviously real, grace of prose expression eludes them. The style is so uninteresting as to prove a real barrier to the book's general usefulness. —HOLLIS W. BARBER, *Council on Foreign Relations.*

*International Regulation of Economic and Social Questions.* BY PHILIP C. JESSUP, ADOLF LANDE, AND OLIVER LISSITZYN. *International Organization.* BY JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1955. Pp. vi, 173. $1.75.)

We have here something of a symposium on international organization (or organized international cooperation) in general and on certain special aspects thereof. In the first part of this somewhat limited volume are treated the impact of technological change and of changes in international society (emergence of the individual, limitations of sovereign equality, recognition—*sic*—of international organization). The latter part of the book (pp. 85–173) consists of a reprint of an article by Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain on international organization in general, with special emphasis upon certain aspects of the matter: unofficial and official elements, conference and legislation, administration, adjudication, sanctions, and the position of the United States.

The shortcomings of the volume are obvious and not fatal. It is impossible to do very much with such a vast subject as international organization in 173 pages. The authors of the book do not pretend to produce a complete and comprehensive survey and analysis of the subject; hence the justifiably selective character of the offerings of all of the authors concerned, including Professor Chamberlain.

On the other hand, it goes without saying that the treatment of the topics or subtopics selected is of the very highest quality, given the identity of the persons concerned (although this reviewer has not had the pleasure of knowing Dr. Lande). Indeed, it is difficult to discover in these pages many points with which a critical reader could take issue. The discussion of weighted voting (pp. 45–52) seems particularly stimulating. Reference to "recognition" of international organization seems, as already implied, somewhat enigmatical; perhaps this is only a verbal problem. The treatment of interest and regional groups by Professor Chamberlain is also extremely suggestive, if necessarily inconclusive at this point of time. Finally, the treatment of the position of the United States appears to be somewhat technical and conservative, although hardly open to other objection.—PITMAN B. POTTER, *The American University.*

*An Introduction to American Foreign Policy.* BY MARSHALL KNAPPEN. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1956. Pp. xiii, 593. $6.00.)

This text is designed for courses "offered to sophomores as part of a student's training as a citizen." In readable and clear language, the writer discusses American foreign policy primarily as an answer to the challenges of the world situation after the Second World War. He presents a concise picture of the contemporary world and the nature of Soviet "capabilities and intentions," merely touches on American foreign policy traditions, but becomes more informative when describing the constitutional framework, and the roles of the executive branch, of Congress, and of public opinion in foreign policy making. The main and most valuable part of the book contains a vivid discussion of American post-war foreign policy. The book should serve well both as a companion to a lecture course and as background reading for discussions.

*The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914–1917: A Study of Russian Foreign Policy During the First World War.* BY C. JAY SMITH, JR. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1956. Pp. xv, 553. $4.75.)

A competent study of Russian diplomacy during the first World War, based on the documents published by the Soviet government. The work originated in a Harvard Ph.D. thesis. Smith stresses the continuity between Tsarist and Stalinist foreign policy and points out that Russian foreign policies of 1914–1917 became reality between 1941 and 1948.

*The University, the Citizen, and World Affairs.* BY CYRIL O. HOULE AND CHARLES A. NELSON. (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education. 1956. Pp. xv, 179. $3.00.)

This short book is one of a series published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as a result of its program of study of American "Universities and World Affairs." It is based on self-surveys by sixty institutions of higher learning and on a large number of interviews and conferences with University administrators. Dividing the public into three groups—inattentive citizens, attentive citizens, and the actively concerned—the authors advance a "positive program for action" which universities could adopt in educating each of these groups in international affairs.

*From Vienna to Versailles.* BY L. C. B. SEAMAN. (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1956. Pp. viii, 316. $3.50.)

A brief and highly readable re-examination of European history between 1815 and 1920, largely from the point of view of international politics, by a young English historian. Deals lucidly and provocatively with many conventional judgments. May serve as collateral reading in courses on International Politics.

*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955.* (New York: Columbia University Press in Cooperation with the United Nations. 1956. Pp. x, 556. $10.50.)

*Everyman's United Nations, 1945–1955.* BY UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956. Pp. 444. $1.50.)

These two excellent publications are by now indispensable reference books for students, teachers, and scholars alike. *Everyman's United Nations* has become a fuller and better organized volume with every successive edition. The present (fifth) edition represents an impressive survey of the work of the United Nations and the related agencies during the first post-war decade.

The *Yearbook*, while not quite so bulky as its immediate predecessor, follows the same organization and principles of treatment. In the short foreword, Dag Hammarskjold states that the resolution that admitted sixteen new members was, perhaps, the most significant event of the United Nations in 1955.

*Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955.* EDITED BY PAUL E. ZINNER. (New

York: Harper and Brothers. 1956. Pp. xxiv, 487. $6.00.)

This useful volume continues the well known series initiated by the World Peace Foundation and published since 1952 by the Council on Foreign Relations. It also serves as a companion volume to *United States in World Affairs*. About one fourth of the documents relate to the Geneva Conferences, which the editor regards as the most important events of the year.

*Handbook of European Organizations.* By THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. (Strasbourg. 1956. Pp. 172. 300 fr.)

The handbook deals with four principal European organizations: Western European Union, O.E.E.C. with the European Payments Union, Council of Europe, and the European Coal and Steel Community. There are brief appendices on six-power projects, regional groups, and other European organizations.—J.B.C.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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## POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

*Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought 1865–1901.* BY SIDNEY FINE. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1956. Pp. x, 468. $7.50.)

America, though self-conscious enough indeed, has never been a very introspective nation, and one of the plainest signs of this reluctance to know ourselves has been our scholarly neglect of American intellectual history. For a long time the pickings in this field were shockingly scanty when compared, for example, with the analogous output of Great Britain. However, in comparatively recent years a tendency to remedy this deficiency has developed apace, and Professor Fine's book is a significant contribution to the growing body of data on the subject. After a preliminary excursion into pre-Sumter history, the volume deals in systematic fashion with the principal manifestations of the *laissez faire* philosophy in that doctrine's American heyday. Theorists like Amasa Walker and William Graham Sumner, businessmen like Andrew Carnegie, prophets of a businessman's Christianity like Mark Hopkins are lined up to testify that in this period "*laissez faire* was championed in America as it never was before and has never been since" (p. 29). The familiar story of the Supreme Court's crusade under such standards as the due process clause and the doctrine of "limited purpose" is retold, and retold well. Then the author turns to examine the contemporary assault on the Spencerian gospel, and again an impressive array of witnesses is assembled from the ranks of social Christianity, from the academic groves inhabited by the new political economists like Richard Ely, the sociologists like Lester Ward, the political scientists like W. W. Willoughby, and the philosophers like James and Dewey. Such popular reformists as Henry George and H. D. Lloyd are duly considered, and legislative heresies against the anti-statist dogma are honored by a special chapter. All of these presentations, and many more, are lucidly made and backed with a wealth of documentation. The author knows his subject and has lavished upon the task of exposition a scholar's loving care. No one else has covered the subject-matter so thoroughly, and as a guide-book the volume is most valuable.

But the native instinct against self-analysis is hard to down, and traces of it can be found in the author's unwillingness to press his treatment beyond exposition and on into the fields of analysis and evaluation. He argues, for example—and the point is an important one—that *laissez faire* was already losing ground both in practice and in theory in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. But he makes no serious effort to explain what caused this downturn or the upturn that preceded it. What qualities in American character and ideology account for the nation's original receptiveness to Mr. Spencer's revelation, the long, slow growth of a sense of disenchantment (it took at least fifty years), and the final, almost unanimous, repudiation of the doctrine? It is not that Professor Fine says nothing about such matters, but that he might have said so much more. He has chosen to produce what is primarily a record rather than an interpretative study, and his right to make such a scholarly choice cannot be questioned, but neither can it be doubted that the final assessment of his voluminous data remains to be made.—ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, *Harvard University.*

*Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism.* BY BRIAN TIERNEY. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1955. pp. xi, 280. $5.00.)

Heretofore, studies of the conciliar theories have concentrated on the immediate problems raised by the Schism itself, on the development of the conciliar ideas during the Schism, and on the imperial publicists' anticipation of, and influence on, these ideas. Professor Brian Tierney of the Catholic University of America follows through a lead first noted by Gierke, later pursued to greater detail by Arquillière, and only partly exploited by Msgr. Martin, of a potential germinal origin of conciliar supremacy in the text of the *Decretum*, Dist. 40 c. 6, which provided for the exceptional case of deposition of an heretical pope. He widens his exploration of the twelfth-century decretists in the first part of the volume and, in the second, shows how the ambiguities and variant meanings of "*ecclesia*," such as the papal office and curia, the Roman Church, the Universal Church and local churches, and their interrelationship were fecundated by the corporation theories of the thirteenth century, toward the juristic construction of a conciliar doctrine in the fourteenth century, described in the third part. This third part fittingly concludes with a chapter on the dominant figure at the Council of Constance, Cardinal Zabaralla. The author rightly, this reviewer believes, rejects Figgis's thesis that the conciliar movement drew example and vigor from the constitutional developments in the nascent secular governments; and he adds his own penetrating critical appraisal of the much criticized corporation theory of the illustrious Gierke. The supposition of the great influence of the imperial publicists and Joachimite Spirituals is brought up short by the fact that the churchmen turned on all sides to earlier canonical sources rather than to the outsiders, the publicists and heretics, for justification of a practical expedient to resolve the impasse of the Schism.

"The roots of the conciliar tradition lie deeper in the past than has been usually supposed. . . . The Decretist assertions that only the whole Church was unerring in faith, that a Pope could not act against the general well-being of the Church, that, in the last resort, he could be deposed by the Church provided essential ingredients in all later theories of conciliar authority. The elaboration of conciliar theories of church government in their more developed forms was made possible by the assimilation of these rather inchoate ideas of the Decretists into the framework of later corporation theory. . . . The Conciliar Theory, one might say, sprang from the impregnation of Decretist ecclesiology by Decretalist corporation concepts" (p. 245).

The author has made the first and a most distinguished contribution to fill a need too long ignored. This reviewer wishes that he had given more emphasis to the comprehensive reforms called for by the conciliar movement—however marginal this may seem to the limited scope of his study.—JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, S. J., *Fordham University*.

*Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.* BY GEORGE WOODCOCK. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. 291. $5.75.)

Rarely does a book combine so felicitously as this does, high qualities of literary craftsmanship, biographical insight, and political understanding. Proudhon's life unfolds in a fascinating fashion against the events of his time, and the exposition of his ideas is clear, sensitive, and dramatic. Woodcock emphasizes their historical influence rather than their theoretical significance, although the latter is by no means entirely neglected.

Except for Proudhon's views on social change and equilibrium, which are considered in relation to those of Hegel, and scattered references to thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, and Jung, the author confines his appraisal of Proudhon's thought within the framework of a contrast between libertarian and authoritarian socialism. Proudhon's conception of the role of property and contract in society alone invites a wider angle of view. However, Woodcock is thus enabled effectively to present Proudhon's differences from Marx, which throw into high relief his concern for personal independence and his belief in the efficacy of individual effort in society. He does not think that the experience of revolutionary violence is required to transform men into moral and self-determining beings, and he "never subscribes to the positivist idea of man as completely ruled by external social forces" (p. 79). Clearly Proudhon deserves not to be grouped with authoritarians such as Saint-Simon and Comte as a prophet of the "tyranny of progress."

It would seem that Proudhon's theories require a wider setting than the concept of socialism can provide, if they are to be both fairly appraised and accurately located in the stream of Western political reflection. Perhaps nothing more narrow than liberalism will suffice. Certainly, despite his influence on these doctrines, anarchism and syndicalism can not alone contain the implications of his ideas.

Proudhon thinks that "order results from the free activity of all men" (p. 156). Here is an idea that links him with the liberal tradition, and yet he lacks the appreciation of the English idealists for the function government may perform in protecting and sustaining common interests. Why? Woodcock detects a tendency in Proudhon to "see reason as overpowerful" (p. 172), but he also notes his failure to describe precisely the institutions that would achieve his ideals of justice and mutuality. A comparison of Proudhon's thought with that of the idealists, who share his conception of social harmony but not his distrust of the state, might well have been illuminating.

One can wish that the author had attempted a more comprehensive evaluation of Proudhon's ideas, but there can be no doubt that what has been undertaken is done well. Proudhon is finally emerging from the shadow of Marxism and may yet prove to be an important exponent of liberalism.—J. W. CHAPMAN, *Smith College.*

*The Conservative Tradition.* EDITED BY R. J. WHITE. (New York: New York University Press. 1957. Pp. xix, 256. $3.75.)

*The Radical Tradition: 1763–1914.* EDITED BY S. MACCOBY. (New York: New York University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 236. $3.75.)

*The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to Keynes.* EDITED BY ALAN BULLOCK AND MAURICE SHOCK. (New York: New University Press. 1957. Pp. lv, 288. 1957. $4.50.)

The first American editions of three books originally published in England in 1950, 1952, and 1956 respectively. The White and MacCoby volumes were noted in this REVIEW, XLVI (1952), 1205. The recent volume edited by Bullock and Shock sustains the high standard of this very useful series of anthologies. A well-chosen selection of brief quotations, from publicists, economists, philosophers, prime ministers, and a poet, give a composite picture of the liberal tradition in English political thought, defined in terms of basic principles and attitudes rather than of party affiliation. The editors' introduction traces the changing content of English liberalism and insists on its essential continuity.

*The Statecraft of Machiavelli.* BY HERBERT BUTTERFIELD. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. 167. $2.00.)

Except for one paragraph added in the introduction, this American edition of a very useful little book is identical with the English edition published by G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., in 1940 and reviewed in this REVIEW, XXXV (1941), 165 f.

*Intellectuals in Labor Unions: Organizational Pressures on Professional Roles.* BY HAROLD L. WILENSKY. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1956. Pp. x, 336. $6.00.)

This book is identified by the author as a study of the relation of the "man of knowledge" to the "man of power" in the national headquarters of the American trade union. The study is based on questionnaire and interview data derived from 154 staff experts functioning in twenty-eight large unions. In the examination of the interaction between expert and organization, the focus is both upon variables affecting the amount and direction of the expert's influence in the various areas of union decision and upon the "subjective" side involving the expert's conception of his role. A functional typology (The Fact and Figures Man, The Contact Man, The Internal Communications Specialist) and a typology of role orientations are developed in some detail. This is a sophisticated study, in both concept and method, and the questions explored are significant for other large-scale private associations.

*Enciclopedia di scienze politiche, economiche e sociali, Volume 1: Aba-Ben.* (Bologna: Dott. Cesare Zuffi. 1956. Pp. 789.)

The first volume of the first real encyclopedia of the social sciences in Italy, under the chief editorship of Rodolfo Sommaruga, follows somewhat the pattern and format of the great Italian encyclopedia: alphabetically arranged, signed articles, with bibliographies. The articles seem to be of good length.—J.B.C.

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CECELIA M. KENYON
*Smith College*

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JAMES G. MARCH
*Carnegie Institute of Technology*

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# THE IMPROVEMENT OF TEACHING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE IOWA SEMINARS

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Seminars for the improvement of teaching in International Politics were held at the State University of Iowa in the summers of 1955 and 1956 under grants from the Ford Foundation. Each included twelve of the younger professors of the subject, and the Director and Associate Director, meeting for eight weeks. The writer served as Director of both seminars.

Some needs of the professor for the improvement of his teaching are personal or peculiar to local circumstances. Many of them, however, are widely shared and can be served through group planning and effort. The Iowa seminars were concerned with these latter. The conception of the needs and the method employed in serving them may be of general interest, since the method is probably applicable to a number of different subjects and fields.

## The Needs

The Iowa seminars were conducted on the assumption that the greatest need of teachers of International Politics—and the most vital factor in good teaching—is a clear and thorough understanding of the subject matter. The obvious corollary is that many teachers lack such an understanding—and perhaps that no one has yet achieved it. After experience with twenty-four of the more gifted younger professors, the writer remains convinced that the assumption and its corollary were and are valid.

As a subject of a course or a text, International Politics is relatively new, complex, amorphous, and changing. Though considerable progress has been made in defining the subject and the purposes in teaching it, doubt and confusion are still widespread. The writer has examined the relevant texts and a great many outlines of courses on International Politics, for all of those who applied for appointment to the Iowa seminars were asked to submit a copy of the one which they followed. Most of the outlines and some of the texts leave much to be desired in terms of the general conception of the subject and coherence in selecting and organizing its data.

The days are gone when the international field was dominated by diplomatic history or by international law or organization, important as these subjects are. The focus is increasingly on international *politics* as the core subject in the field. But what does, or should, the study of international politics include, and how should the data be organized? It is generally taken to include some diplomatic history, under titles like "The Foreign Policies of the Major Powers." But the rationale of the selection of the time period and specific countries to be covered is usually left in doubt; and no real solution has appeared to the problem of integrating diplomatic history into what is usually presented as a political science course. The course is also generally taken to include some treatment of economic factors in international relations, but again there is the problem of avoiding a capsule treatment of international economic relations and making the topic serve explicitly to promote an understanding of international politics. Most teachers of international politics would grant that social psychology has something to contribute to their subject, but few seem to know what the contributions are; and like as not, if "psychological factors" are included at all, they are conceived solely in terms of ideology and propaganda and not in terms of psychological theories designed to explain individual or official behavior. Courses and texts on international politics also commonly include a treatment of such topics as nationalism, imperialism, the elements of power, the balance of power, diplomacy, and so on. It is unusual, however, when these and other topics are linked together and interrelated in such a way as to reflect a conception of a coherent whole. It is especially unusual when "why" questions, asking about motivations and objectives, are taken up and linked in a reasonably logical fashion with "how" and "what" questions. The nature of ends and the factors leading to the pursuit of them are often ignored; action is described, but the mainsprings of action neglected. The result is that the student is given snatches of this and that, all somehow relevant to international relations, and he is left to do, if he can, what the teacher has failed to do: to fit the bits and pieces together in a meaningful fashion.

The principal need of those teaching international politics, in other words, is for what can be called, in increasing degrees of vagueness, a pattern of organization, a conceptual scheme, or a theory. Too many unrelated or hazily related facts have been poured into the minds of students, with too little effort (or too little success) in fitting the facts together in a meaningful, explanatory framework. Too much of what might be called explanation in detail, presenting a multitude of facts about restricted aspects of the subject, has been illuminated by relatively little of what might be called explanation in principle, with generalizations giving meaning to the details. Too much emphasis has been given to what happens and to the methods or techniques that states employ, and too little to the subjective and objective conditions which influence the development of motivations and purposes and the selection of methods. The subject should be a rounded and integrated whole, providing keys for the understanding of the behavior of any state in its relations with other states.

Along with the problem of developing coherence goes the problem of conceptualization and its clarity. A high proportion of the concepts now employed in the study of international politics are vague or ambiguous. Terms like idealism, realism, national interest, power, balance of power, security, collective security, and imperialism are frequently employed as if they have fairly precise and commonly accepted meanings, whereas in truth they are often given such vague or differing meanings that they lead to confusion in both thought and communication. The situation is made all the worse when, as is all too often the case, those using the concepts are not aware of the vagueness or ambiguity.

To a considerable extent, these needs reflect the state of International Relations as a field of study; it needs clarification and development. At the same time most professors face the personal need to get a grasp, or a better grasp, of already available knowledge. Graduate training is usually rather meager. When graduate students are expected to prepare for examination in, say, five fields and write one or two dissertations, sometimes in no more than three years, their knowledge of each field is bound to be somewhat limited. Further, it is not uncommon for young instructors to find themselves teaching courses in fields to which they gave relatively little emphasis as graduate students. Moreover, they may be so loaded down with teaching and other duties that the process of removing deficiencies in their knowledge takes many years. This says nothing of the needs of those who began teaching International Relations in their middle and later years without ever having had special training in the subject.

Another major need concerns those teachers of international politics who want to do research and writing. It is impossible to say what proportion of the total are in this category, or how intense and determined their desire is. Some demonstrate their interest and ability through publication fairly regularly; it is a fair guess that many others long to do this, but somehow never get it done. The conditions which bring about one result or the other deserve to be explored. What the exploration would reveal can scarcely be predicted, but surely one of the governing conditions is the nature and quality of the graduate training received. It seems safe to assert that many Ph.D.'s emerge from graduate school without quite knowing what research work is and how to do it. This leads to the thought, however embarrassing it may be, that some professors involved in training graduate students do not know either. A frequent failing is a tendency toward purposeless or inevitably fruitless inquiry; i.e., a tendency to select a broad topic for research without formulating specific questions or hypotheses concerning it, or a tendency to pose questions which are unanswerable or hypotheses which are untestable. Deficiencies in research in international politics may well be related to confused and vague conceptions of the subject; when one scarcely knows what the subject is, it is difficult to pose good questions about it. If Ph.D.'s are to be expected to do significant research work, more and better training is needed, and it is unlikely that it can be given entirely at the pre-doctoral level. Post-doctoral research training programs are surely in order.

Professors have more mundane needs as well, mainly for financial support which will permit them to devote a significant period of time exclusively to study and writing. Many, too, are located where intellectual stimulation is minimal, and it is vital to their development that they should be put periodically in an environment where challenge and struggle are the order of the day.

### Meeting the Needs

The Iowa seminars constituted one of the possible lines of attack on these problems and needs. Several salient features of the seminars are worth mentioning.

In the first place, the Fellowships carried stipends which were substantial enough to make it possible for the recipients to devote the eight week period exclusively to the study of international politics. Adequate financing was crucial. The Fellows were all promising young Ph.D.'s who themselves had been teaching in the field of international relations; most of them were assistant professors at their home institutions.

In the second place, group activity was important. Each Fellow would no doubt have gained from eight weeks of study in isolation, but the gains were multiplied by the fact that the Fellows inevitably provided each other a social and intellectual community in which to test and supplement their individual efforts. Group activities included four two-hour meetings each week, committee meetings, and what someone called "floating bull sessions." The members were homogeneous enough in age, interests and intellectual sophistication to provide stimulating companionship, and diverse enough in training and outlook to provide each other with challenge.

In the third place, in addition to bringing the Fellows together, the seminars gave them an opportunity to come into personal contact with some of those in political science and related disciplines whose contributions to the study of international politics have been outstanding. Each year a number of such authorities joined the group for short periods.

The seminars chose projects on which group effort should focus. The first selected for its dominant activity the construction of outlines for the general International Politics course. The second developed outlines on a series of approaches and concepts employed in such courses. Production of the outlines was really not the main object, nor was it the object to bring about agreement on the best solution of any problem. Rather it was to focus study and discussion through which each participant could individually obtain a better grasp of the problems and of alternative ways of handling them.

In addition to developing outlines, there were other projects each summer, including appraisals of textbooks, especially detailed examinations of the course outlines of certain members, and joint discussion of research proposals or activities of individual participants. Further, the members carried on their own personal programs of reading or research, though the announced principle that half of their time should be left free for this purpose was scarcely maintained.

It is not to be expected that a brief seminar would reduce a complex field to order and coherence, or that it would solve all of the subject matter problems of the individuals involved. Certainly, however, the members felt that they had achieved a great deal for themselves through their study and discussions.

Experience with the Iowa seminars was so encouraging that it suggests a wider application of the idea. International Relations courses other than International Politics would provide suitable foci for a series of seminars. Teachers of International Organization would benefit from a summer seminar on the subject, especially if it could be held at or near the United Nations. Seminars focusing on a particular country or area might well enrich teaching in several different courses. Subjects relating to India, for example, are likely to come up in courses on American Diplomacy, International Politics, International Organization, and Comparative Government, yet relatively few of those teaching such courses have much knowledge of India. It is not feasible or desirable to attempt to make them specialists on India by encouraging them to devote a year or more to the subject, but it would be feasible and desirable to give substantial numbers of them an opportunity to gain as much knowledge as can be secured in, say, eight weeks. Seminars designed to provide training in research, more or less similar to those sponsored by the SSRC, would surely serve a worth while purpose. It is for others to suggest applications of the seminar idea outside the field of International Relations.

The thought that a seminar program is a good idea obviously does not bring one into existence. Sponsoring organizations are needed and adequate financing must be obtained. These resources can seldom be supplied by universities in their present condition.

# NEWS AND NOTES

## 1957 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1957–58

The 1957 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held September 5–7, 1957, at the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York City. Professor Austin Ranney, of the Universty of Illinois, is Chairman of the Program Committee, and Professor Ruth Weintraub, of Hunter College, Chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee will propose the following officers for 1957–58: *President-Elect*, Taylor Cole (Duke University); *Vice-Presidents*, Francis O. Wilcox (Department of State), Earl Latham (Amherst College), Cortez A. M. Ewing (University of Oklahoma); *Secretary*, Ruth C. Silva (Pennsylvania State University); *Treasurer*, Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.); *Members of the Council* for two years, Marian D. Irish (Florida State University), Arthur Dugan (University of the South), John Davis (City College of New York), John Masland (Dartmouth College), H. Arthur Steiner (University of California, Los Angeles), Milton R. Merrill (Utah Agricultural College), Ralph K. Huitt (University of Wisconsin), J. Austin Ranney (University of Illinois).

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The third annual Southern California Conference of the American Society for Public Administration was held at the University of California (Los Angeles) on February 21, 1957, in cooperation with the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association. Features of the meeting included a symposium on political and administrative leadership in city government (including mayors, city managers and academic participants); addresses by Robert J. Matteson of the American Society for Public Administration and Lyle Belsley, assistant director, Office of Civil Defense Administration; and four panels on "Evaluation of the Governmental Career Service," "The Nature of Administrative Loyalty," "The Measurement of Administrative Accomplishment," and "Testing for Placement in Public Administration."

A Conference on Americans At Work Abroad, held at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, March 6–8, marked the formal beginning of the two-year research project on the education and training of Americans for public service overseas. This project is being carried on with financial support from the Carnegie Corporation and is under the direction of Harlan Cleveland, dean of the Maxwell School. The three-day conference assembled thirty-five distinguished leaders from many areas concerned with overseas activities, including business, education, medicine and government. William C. Foster, vice president of Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, was the keynote speaker; and Eugene R. Black, president, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, delivered the closing remarks. Immediately after the conference, professor Gerard J. Mangone, associate project director, left for Mexico, where the pilot study to launch the overseas interviewing phase of the project was getting under way. This phase of the study will cover the training and education of approximately 300 Americans working under government and private auspices in other lands. The overseas interviewing has been sub-contracted to Louis Harris and Associates, New York City.

On March 20 and 21, the Borah Foundation for the Outlawry of War held its 10th annual conference devoted to the general theme, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace." The theme for 1957 was "Current Crises and the Price of Peace." The major speakers who were invited to address the University and public were: Thomas B. W. Allen who spoke on "Egypt—Key to Peace in the Near East," Claude A. Buss who spoke on "The Price of Peace: The Challenge to American Diplomacy," and Harrison Salisbury on "The New Soviet Challenge."

The Grinnell Institute of International Affairs held its annual three day conference on April 25–27 on the subject, "The Moral, Cultural, Economic and Political Resources of the United States for International Cooperation." Among the speakers were Theodore Andersson of the Modern Language Association of America, John Stoessinger of Hunter College, Paul Holmer of the University of Minnesota, Eric Kolman of Cornell College and Joseph Dunner who was the moderator of the conference which was co-sponsored by the U. S. Commission for UNESCO and the Iowa Association for the United Nations.

The Missouri Political Science Association was organized on April 5, 1957, in Columbia. Fifteen of Missouri's colleges and universities were represented at the initial meeting of the organization. Officers are David Horton, president; David C. Scott, vice president; and Robert F. Karsch, secretary-treasurer. The first program consisted of a description of the work of the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey by Thomas H. Eliot, Paul G. Steinbicker and John C. Bollens. Purposes of the association include discussion of common problems and encouragement of programs in the field of Missouri government. The association contemplates annual meetings in the fall and a semi-annual *Newsletter*.

The common intellectual and cultural concerns of the North Atlantic community will be studied by 100 leading Americans and Europeans meeting next September in Bruges, Belgium. The 217-year-old University of Pennsylvania and the eight-year-old College of Europe in Bruges will serve as joint sponsors of a conference designed to promote wider understanding of the common cause of the peoples of North America and Western Europe. The conferees will examine not only the forces which serve as potential means of bringing the Atlantic world closer together but also the underlying tensions, both transatlantic and Intra-European, which stand in the way of a greater sense of community. Many of these basic problems were considered in the February report of the Committee of Three Foreign Ministers of NATO on non-military cooperation. The Bruges conference will seek to achieve, through private means, objectives basically similar to those examined in the NATO report. Approximately 25 representatives of the United States and Canada will meet with about 75 Europeans.

The annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science and Public Administration Association was held April 12–13, 1957, with 125 persons in attendance. The principal address, "Recent Developments in Pennsylvania State Administration," was given by Governor George M. Leader. "Problems of Metropolitan Government in Pennsylvania" were discussed by Francis A. Pitkin, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Paul A. Pfretzschner, Lafayette College; Robert Pickup, Pennsylvania Economy League; Stephen B. Sweeney, University of Pennsylvania; and William G. Willis, University of Pittsburgh. Charles F. LeeDecker, Pennsylvania State University, was program committee chairman. At the business session, R. Wallace Brewster, Pennsylvania State University, reported for the Committee on State Interneships, and Willard R. Hancock, superintendent of schools, Yeadon, for the Committee on Social Studies in the State Teachers' Colleges. Officers elected were Robert P. Wray, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, chairman; Harry P. Griffiths, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, secretary treasurer; George S. Blair, University of Pennsylvania, and John H. Vanderzell, Franklin and Marshall College, Executive Council. The other Council members are Harry K. Butcher, Committee of Seventy, Philadelphia; William G. Willis, Hugo V. Mailey, Wilkes College; and M. Nelson McGeary, Pennsylvania State University. Roger H. Wells, Bryn Mawr College, is president of the Association and John H. Ferguson, secretary of administration, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is vice-president.

The Western Political Science Association held its 11th annual meeting on the campus of the University of California (Los Angeles), February 22–23, 1957. This meeting was held in cooperation with the Southern California Conference of the American Society for Public

Administration. Nine round tables were conducted on the following subjects: Political Theory, Metropolitan Areas, International Relations, The 1956 Campaign in the West, State Government, Communism, Natural Resources Policy, Comparative Government and Public Law.

Retiring president Russell H. Fitzgibbon delivered the presidential address at the dinner meeting of February 22, 1957. The address was entitled, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America."

The first Western Political Science Association Award of $250.00 was awarded to Phillip O. Foss, University of Oregon, for his unpublished dissertation, *Politics and Grass*.

The following officers were elected: Howard McMurray, New Mexico, president; George Shipman, Washington, vice-president; Robert Horn, Stanford; Donn Driggs, Nevada; Vincent Ostrom, Oregon, executive councillors. Continuing in office are R. A. Gomez, Arizona, secretary-treasurer; and Bernard Borning, Idaho; Frank Jonas, Utah; and Ross R. Rice, Arizona State, councillors. Retiring president Fitzgibbon now serves one year as councillor *ex officio*.

The next annual meeting will be held at Arizona State College at Tempe at a time to be determined by the Executive Council.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

Hurst R. Anderson, president of the American University has announced the establishment of the school of government and public administration, effective June 1, 1957. Dr. Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, chairman of the department of government and public administration, has been appointed dean of the school.

A new periodical, *Background of World Politics*, has begun publication at Wayne State University. It is a digest of military, scientific, economic and social developments bearing on world politics, intended for those who teach, write, or think about world politics. It will be published bimonthly. Its editor is Henry C. Bush. The following are editorial associates, each covering a sector related to world politics: William C. Ellet (the physical sciences), Edwin J. Forsythe (economics), Manuel R. Garcia-Mora (law), Edward J. Heubel (history), W. W. Kaempfer (public administration), Clifford P. Ketzel (geography), Samuel Krislov (public opinion and communications), Nicholas Masters (labor), William R. Monat (social psychology), Gay Obern (international administration), Palmer C. Pilcher (management and industrial technology), Forrest C. Pogue (military matters), and Fred A. Sondermann (sociology).

Benjamin Fletcher Wright, president of Smith College, gave the Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on The Constitution of the United States at Boston University, April 10–12.

The British Association for American Studies is undertaking a survey of sources, both printed and manuscript, for American studies in the United Kingdom. The project is made possible by a grant from the United States Information Service in the United Kingdom. The goal is a reference work which will be a definitive guide to the location and general nature of all possible source and research materials connected with the politics, history, economics and literature of the United States and British material that bears on them. It would help the completeness and accuracy of the survey if American scholars who have worked in British libraries and archives and know of previously uncatalogued or dormant material relevant to American government and politics would kindly write to the director, Mr. H. L. Beales, or to the assistant director, Mr. B. R. Crick, Survey of Sources for American Studies in the United Kingdom, c/o Institute for Historical Research, University of London, London W. C. 1.

The third Louis Kuhn Benjamin Foreign Service Seminar was held under the auspices of the political science department of the University of Cincinnati on March 22–23. The speakers at the three sessions were: Ernest K. Lindley, chief of the Washington Bureau of *Newsweek*; Harlan Cleveland, dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University; Henry W. Wiens, chief, Near East Division, I.C.A.; and Norman K. Pratt, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State. The substantive topic discussed was the Middle Eastern policy of the United States.

The journal, *The Federal Accountant*, will be published in cooperation with the Graduate

School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University commencing with the April, 1957 issue. David A. Thomas of this school, together with Messrs. H. Edward Breen and Herschel C. Walling, representing the Federal Government Accountants Association which has sponsored the journal alone for some years, will serve as editors.

The Interdepartmental Seminar on Pacific Islands Research at the University of Hawaii, in which members of the department of government participate, has prepared a "Bibliography of Sources on Personality and Culture of the Pacific Region." This bibliography contains 537 items. A number of copies are available for distribution gratis. Persons interested should request copies from the department of anthropology at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu 14, Hawaii.

The department of social sciences of the University of Idaho has initiated a program in the field of community service and adult education throughout the state of Idaho assisted by a grant from the Borah Foundation for the Outlawry of War and supported by the Foreign Policy Association, Inc. Paul E. Johnston, assistant professor of political science, executive secretary, Borah Foundation has traveled throughout the State encouraging communities to organize discussion groups devoted to the consideration of public affairs, particularly American foreign policy.

The Brookings Institution announces the award of six research fellowships in economics and governmental studies, for the academic year, 1957–58. The fellows were chosen competitively from a list of candidates nominated by the graduate faculties of leading universities. The 1957 Brookings fellows in government are: J. Stefan Dupré, Harvard University; David R. Manwaring, the University of Wisconsin; and Walter F. Murphy, the University of Chicago.

Michigan State University has received a grant of $280,400 from the Carnegie Corporation to carry on a program of research. Edward W. Weidner has been appointed director of the Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, which will undertake a two and one-half year study on the impact of the overseas programs of American universities abroad and the impact of these programs on universities here at home.

The University of Illinois served as host institution for the Mid-American Assembly on United States Representation Abroad, held at Hotel Moraine-on-the-Lake, Highland Park, Illinois, January 10–13, 1957. The Assembly was jointly sponsored by the American Assembly, Columbia University, and the Universities of Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan. James R. Donoghue, J. N. Nolte, Russell Fifield and Royden Dangerfield were members of the Inter-University Committee. Royden Dangerfield served as director and Robert E. Scott as executive secretary of the Assembly.

An Institute of German Affairs has been established at Marquette University to stimulate research on Germany and Austria. Dr. Eric Waldman, of Marquette's political science department, was appointed director.

The ICA contract between the University of Minnesota and Seoul National University has been expanded to include the field of public administration for a three-year period. George Warp, associate director of the Public Administration Center at Minnesota, will direct the project. He is spending the month of April in Seoul to make plans for the program, which will involve pre-service and in-service training, research, and library development. It is expected that four or five American faculty members will be assigned to Korea and a larger number of Korean staff will study at the University of Minnesota.

At a joint APSA-NCSS Section at the annual meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies, November 23, at Cleveland, Maurice Klain of Western Reserve spoke on "Presidential Politics—1956 and Beyond."

The seventh issue of the *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs* has just been brought out by the New York University Press. Professors Richard N. Swift and Clyde Eagleton are co-editors.

The formation of a new government department has been announced by President Carl S. Ell of Northeastern University (Boston, Mass.). Named to head the new department is Robert G. Wilfong, associate professor of government. Members of the government department include David W. Barkley, Edmund W. Fenn and Norman S. Greenwald.

As a part of the commemorative activities celebrating its 20th anniversary, the Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania, has conducted two one-day workshops and a two-day conference on government of metropolitan areas. The first workshop, conducted December 4, 1956, was devoted to "The Formulation of Metropolitan Area Study Objectives" with basic working papers prepared by George S. Blair and James G. Coke of the Institute staff. The second workshop, held January 15, 1957, concerned "The Methodology for Achieving Metropolitan Study Objectives" with basic papers prepared by George S. Blair, James G. Coke, Henry Harral and Morton Lustig, all of the Institute staff. Luther Gulick, president, Institute of Public Administration, New York, was chairman of both workshops, with the following persons serving as workshop Consultants: John Bebout, assistant director, National Municipal League; John Bollens, executive officer and director of research, Metropolitan St. Louis Survey; Thomas H. Eliot, co-director, Metropolitan St. Louis Survey; Britton Harris, director, Philadelphia Metropolitan Area Industrial Land Facilities Project; and Raymond Vernon, director, New York Metropolitan Region Study.

The Executive Committee and a round table group of the International Political Science Association will meet at the University of Pittsburgh, September 8–14. James K. Pollock of the University of Michigan is chairman for the current three year term. Edward H. Litchfield, chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh, is a member of the Executive Committee. The topic for the round table discussion will be "Pressure Groups." The Ford Foundation and the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation have granted financial support. Local arrangements in Pittsburgh will be handled by a committee composed of Herbert A. Simon of Carnegie Institute of Technology, Dean Stanton C. Crawford and Alan C. Rankin of the University of Pittsburgh, and Channing Liem of Chatham College. Albert B. Martin of the University of Pittsburgh will act as chairman.

A new journal, *Victorian Studies*, is being published and edited at Indiana University by Philip Appleman, William Madden and Michael Wolff. It is a quarterly journal devoted to the examination of Victorian culture, and designed to work toward a deliberate coordination of the various academic disciplines.

The University of Virginia library has received a collection of 363 books on Ceylon and a gift of money for additions to the collection from United States ambassador to Ceylon, Philip K. Crowe, a graduate of the university. The collection is a general one with volumes about political, social, economic, religious and cultural aspects of ancient and modern Ceylon. A large number of rare books, with publication dates ranging from 1681 to the present, is included, with volumes published in the 19th Century predominating in this group. During his visit to the university, January 11–13, Ambassador Crowe gave a lecture on "Ceylon's Role in World Affairs."

An intensive, nationwide effort to combat the mounting shortage of teachers in the nation's colleges has been inaugurated with the announcement by the Ford Foundation of a $25 million appropriation for a large-scale extension and development of the National Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Program.

The Foundation's action will support a broad program to attract able college students into the academic profession and will provide graduate fellowships to potential college teachers at the rate of 1,000 a year for the next five years.

Individual awards, which will be applied to tuition and living expenses for the first year of graduate study, are expected to average $2,200 and will require approximately $11 million of the total appropriation. Another $10 million will go to universities for aid to graduate students beyond the first year. A nationwide recruiting program will absorb about $2.8 million, and administrative expenses over the five-year period are expected to be $1 million.

Out of the total funds appropriated, $200,000 will be made available to the Association of American Universities and its affiliate, the Association of Graduate Schools, to provide for an immediate increase of 100 Woodrow Wilson fellowships for the fall of 1957—a fifty per cent rise over the 200 awarded this spring. The $200,000 will be paid to the University of Michigan as fiscal agent. The present national headquarters of the organization are in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Spencer Albright, University of Richmond, will teach in the summer school at Emory University.

William Anderson of the University of Minnesota, following his retirement from teaching in June, 1957, plans to devote his time and efforts to a comprehensive study of The History, Theory, and Practice of the Study of Politics. To assist him in this project he has received a three year grant from the Ford Foundation.

Under the heading "the study of politics" he means to include every significant attempt, and especially every organized one, to advance human knowledge in the field.

The historical account will be undertaken first. Although Professor Anderson has for a number of years been developing the history of the subject in connection with his Scope and Methods course, and has accumulated a considerable body of historical materials, he is conscious of some serious gaps in the records he has. He feels that many items that others might consider important for his purposes may have escaped him. This may be especially true in the medieval period. Furthermore, there probably are unpublished items like masters' and doctors' theses that are not always catalogued, and are not caught up in standard guides and indexes, and of which he is, therefore, not aware.

He would, therefore, be happy to learn from anyone about any pertinent materials that might help him to round out the historical survey, from ancient times to the present. He would be especially glad to learn about other scholars, here or abroad, who may be working in any part of the field. Correspondence is invited. Address him at the Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14, Minn.

Paul H. Appleby was the recipient of the L.L.D. degree at Syracuse University on March 8.

Charles P. Beall, assistant professor of political science at the University of Wyoming, has been elected to the Laramie city council.

Paul L. Beckett of the State College of Washington will be on leave during the spring semester of 1956–57 and will be serving as public administration consultant to the Planning Board of the Government of Pakistan in connection with Harvard University's Pakistan Planning Board Project. This project, which has been underway for about two years, is administered by the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration and financed by the Ford Foundation.

George Belknap of the University of California (Berkeley) has been awarded a research grant by the Social Science Research Council.

George Bruntz of San Jose State College will be on sabbatical leave during the fall semester, 1957.

Franklin L. Burdette, professor and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, was the guest of the government of Iraq in Baghdad and other centers, March 23 to April 1, for the inauguration of projects of the Development Board. He was also an official observer at the first meeting of the Scientific Council of the Baghdad Pact on March 31.

Edward Hallett Carr, one-time Woodrow Wilson professor of international politics, University College of Wales, formerly of the British Foreign Service and editor of *The Times* (London), author on international politics and the Soviet Union, currently visiting professor at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, delivered the annual Pi Sigma Alpha Lecture at the University of Utah on April 16, 1957.

H. Paul Castleberry will be acting chairman of the department of political science at the State College of Washington during Paul L. Beckett's leave of absence, which will extend from February 1, 1957 to September 16, 1957.

George Catlin, Bronman professor of political science, McGill University, delivered the Weil Lectures at the University of North Carolina, April 4–6. (Those who have delivered these lectures in the past include Presidents Taft and Truman, Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Professors Laski, Beard and MacIver.) Professor Catlin has been elected a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.

James B. Christoph of Ohio State University has been awarded a post-doctorate fellowship for research in England next year.

Winston W. Crouch, of the University of California (Los Angeles), is serving as a member of the Citizens' Legislative Advisory Commission.

Robert A. Dahl, Eugene Meyer professor of political science at Yale University, has been appointed research professor of political science at Yale University for the year 1957–58, under a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Conley H. Dillon of Marshall College will teach at the University of Miami the second summer term.

Clyde Eagleton of New York University will serve as visiting professor at the University of Washington during the spring quarter.

Samuel J. Eldersveld of the University of Michigan has been elected the first Democratic mayor of Ann Arbor since 1931.

Ernest A. Engelbert, University of California (Los Angeles), is spending the spring semester, 1957, on a one-half time research leave as director of a research project, "Impact of Urbanization upon Land and Water Use," supported by a grant from "Resources for the Future, Inc.," an affiliate of the Ford Foundation. He is also serving as secretary to the Citizens' Legislative Advisory Commission under appointment of the Joint Committee on Legislative Procedure of the California Legislature.

Raymond English, Kenyon College, has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He will be in England from May, 1957, to January, 1958.

James W. Fesler of Yale University will be on sabbatical leave during 1957–58 and will undertake a study of comparative field administration under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

Herman Finer will be a member of the Columbia University Summer Session staff.

Michael J. Flack, formerly assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, has received a Cabot Fellowship and is spending the year doing research at the Library of Congress.

Robert J. Harris of Vanderbilt University will spend the academic year 1957–58 as a visiting professor at Columbia University.

Kenneth C. Hechler, associate director of the Washington office of the American Political Science Association, will teach second semester at Marshall College.

Paul M. Herzog is serving as acting dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration between January and June, 1957, while Edward S. Mason is in Asia.

John Perry Horlacher, chairman of the political science department, University of Pennsylvania, was appointed chairman of an industry committee under the Fair Labor Standards Act for the purpose of establishing minimum wage rates in three Puerto Rican industries. He spent most of April in Puerto Rico on this assignment.

Professors Charles Hyneman of the University of Indiana, Arthur Holcombe of Harvard University, Fritz Morstein Marx of the Bureau of the Budget, and Victor Jones of the University of California spent two weeks during the spring quarter at the University of Washington, serving as lecturers and consultants in their various areas.

Philip E. Jacob, professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, has been on a year's leave making a study for the Hazen Foundation. The study reviews the major inquiries concerning college educational influences conducted over the last 20 years. A summary of his findings was presented by Dr. Jacob before the National Conference on Higher Education in Chicago, March, 1957.

Claudius O. Johnson has returned to the State College of Washington from a semester spent as visiting professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley, California.

Donald Bruce Johnson was released from teaching duties and granted a research professorship during the spring semester at the State University of Iowa.

John P. Kenny, associate professor of public administration at the University of Southern California, was elected president of the Society for the Advancement of Criminology at the annual conference in Fresno, California. He conducted a series of courses in law enforcement for enforcement officers of the Puerto Rico Treasury Department in San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 8–27.

Joseph B. Kingsbury, professor of government at Indiana University, has returned to the campus from Bangkok, Thailand, where he served as visiting professor at the Institute of Public Administration, which is jointly administered by Indiana University and Thammasat University in Bangkok.

Otto Kirchheimer will be on leave from the graduate faculty of political and social science of the New School for Social Research on a Rockefeller Fellowship during the academic year 1957–58.

W. C. B. Lambert of the University of Arkansas will assist in the summer workshop on Soviet-American Relations, the first summer term at Marshall College.

Walter H. C. Laves, chairman of the department of government at Indiana University, and Lynton K. Caldwell, coordinator of the Thailand Public Administration Project at Indiana University, spent the month of January in Bangkok surveying the progress of the Public Administration Institute at Thammasat University, which is being developed in cooperation with Indiana University under an ICA contract. They also developed plans for the extension of the program. Mr. Laves attended the three centennial celebrations of the Universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay in India as a representative of the American Council on Education, Indiana University and the American Council of Learned Societies. While in Bombay, Mr. Laves gave a lecture before the Indian Institute of Public Administration.

On his return trip to the United States, Mr. Caldwell visited the Institutes of Public Administration at Saigon and Canberra to compare their experience with that of the Institute at Thammasat University.

Carl Leiden, associate professor of political science at Marshall College, will be on leave for the second semester and summer to teach at the University of California at Berkeley.

George Liska, formerly teaching fellow in government at Harvard University, is serving during the academic year 1956–1957 as acting assistant professor in political science at the University of Washington.

Richard P. Longaker has been awarded a grant by the Fund for the Republic. Presently the acting chairman of the department of political science at Kenyon College, he will be on leave from February to September, 1958.

Herbert McClosky, associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, has been awarded a grant by the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council.

Linden A. Mander of the University of Washington is serving as a visiting professor at Stanford University.

Harvey C. Mansfield, professor of political science at Ohio State University, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at Yale University for the year 1957–58.

John Brown Mason has been granted a leave of absence from Georgetown University to serve as Chester W. Nimitz professor of international relations at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, during the academic year 1957–58.

Rita W. Nealon, associate professor of government at New York University, will be on sabbatical leave during the 1957–58 academic year.

Robert G. Neumann, University of California (Los Angeles), spent six weeks during January-February, 1957, on a tour of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as a guest of the governments concerned. Dr. Neumann resumed his duties at Los Angeles in mid-February.

Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan University has been appointed visiting professor at Columbia University for the academic year 1957–58, to give a course in international politics.

Tom Page of the University of Illinois has been granted leave of absence during the second semester of 1957–58.

Jack W. Peltason has been granted leave from the University of Illinois and has been awarded a research grant by the Social Science Research Council.

Ira Polley, who served as visiting associate professor of political science and acting associate director of the Public Administration Center at the University of Minnesota in 1956–57, is presently employed as budget examiner for higher education in the Michigan Department of Administration.

Richard Rank, assistant foreign law librarian at the Los Angeles County Law Library, has been appointed librarian for the international legal studies project at the University of Istanbul, Turkey. The assignment is for 14 months, during which Dr. Rank will establish and organize an international legal studies center at the University of Istanbul under a cooperative Turkish-American program in which the Universities of Michigan and Istanbul, and Columbia University participate.

Austin Ranney of the University of Illinois has been granted leave of absence the first semester of 1957–58.

Emmette S. Redford of the University of Texas will be a member of the Columbia University summer session staff.

Henry Reining, Jr., dean of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, was elected president of the American Society for Public Administration at the annual conference in Chicago in March, 1957. He attended a four day seminar on civil service in Guatemala where he addressed the combined sessions on "Human Relations and the Civil Service."

Harry Reynolds, visiting assistant professor of the school of public administration, University of Southern California, is cooperating with the Los Angeles Office of the U. S. Civil Service Commission in conducting a Federal Intern Program with 21 participating federal employees. The program is running concurrently with the spring semester, 1957.

C. H. Richards of Wake Forest College will be visiting professor at Marshall College for the summer term.

J. William Robinson, department of political science and international relations, Whittier College, will spend the summer in research at the United Nations in New York.

John A. Schutz, department of political science and international relations, Whittier College, will spend this summer on a research project in England.

Robert E. Scott of the University of Illinois has been granted leave of absence for the second semester of 1957–58. He will be working in Peru, participating in a program of field studies of political groups for the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.

Dwight J. Simpson, assistant professor of government at Williams College, has received a fellowship from the Ford Foundation for Middle Eastern Studies. He will be on leave during 1957–58 and will be affiliated with the University of Istanbul.

J. Ben Stalvey of the University of Miami taught at Marshall College the second term.

Paul D. Stewart of Marshall College will be visiting professor at Emory University for both summer sessions in 1957.

Ward Stewart, who is Assistant Commissioner of Education in the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has been designated as the Commissioner's Representative to President Eisenhower's Committee on Education Beyond the High School. Dr. Stewart was recently elected president of the District of Columbia Political Science Association for 1957.

Ralph A. Straetz, associate professor of political science at Miami University, has been appointed visiting associate professor of government, University College of Arts and Science, New York University, for the academic year 1957–58. He will also be teaching at the summer session of the Smith College School for Social Work.

Carl B. Swisher, of John Hopkins University, gave the James Stokes Lectures on Politics at New York University.

Cecil Van Crabb, assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, has been granted a faculty fellowship for the academic year 1957–58.

Myron Weiner, assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, will be in India from June, 1957, to March 1958, under a grant from the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. He will be studying interest groups in modern Indian politics.

J. D. Williams, assistant professor of political science at the University of Utah, attended the second NATO parliamentary conference in Paris, France, last November. Dr. Williams joined the staff of the House of Representatives delegation under appointment from Congressman Wayne L. Hays (D., Ohio).

Paul Willis, assistant professor of government at Indiana University, has returned to the campus after a leave of absence during which time he served as administrative assistant to the chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Glen G. Wiltsey, chairman of the department of government at the University of Rochester, has been appointed to the R. T. French Exchange Professorship at Hull University in England for the academic year 1957–58.

Francis Dunham Wormuth of the University of Utah will be visiting professor at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, New York, during the academic year 1957–58.

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Minoo Adenwalla has joined the political science faculty at Kenyon College.

Myer Alpert has been promoted to assistant director of operations research of Slick Airways, Inc. and has been named acting-director of its operations research department.

David E. Apter has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Ivan Asay has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as lecturer in research administration.

Frederick C. Barghoorn has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at Yale University.

Robert Baum has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in African Governments in the school of government and public administration at the American University.

William T. Bluhm, previously in the department of political science at Brown University, has accepted appointment as assistant professor of government at the University of Rochester, beginning September 1957.

Norman Blume has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Toledo.

Kathleen R. Bott was appointed an instructor in political science at Vassar College in February, 1957.

J. Cudd Brown has resigned from the department of political science at the University of Oregon to accept appointment as assistant professor of political science at San Francisco State College.

Richard G. Brown has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor in comparative government in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Geoffrey Carnog of the University of Minnesota has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at Michigan State University beginning Fall of 1957.

Joseph Y. Chennault has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as lecturer in police administration.

Harlan Cleveland was inaugurated on March 8 as dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

William L. Day resigned as executive assistant to State Auditor Lloyd Morey, Springfield, Illinois in January to take a position as consultant with the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce.

Karl W. Deutsch has been appointed professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in addition to continuing as professor of history and political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Robert G. Dixon, Jr., has resigned as associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland to accept appointment as associate professor in the Law School, George Washington University.

George Bell Dyer has been appointed lecturer in political science at Yale University for the year 1957–58.

Carol M. Edler has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Wisconsin.

William H. Eells of Ohio Wesleyan University was named by Governor C. William O'Neill of Ohio as an administrative aide starting March 1. Among Eells' duties are to serve as executive secretary of the Governor's Council On Atomic Energy, and director of public relations for the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation.

Hugh L. Elsbree of the Library of Congress has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Wayne State University effective April 1.

Rowland Egger has been appointed chairman of the department of political science, University of Virginia. He continues as director of the Woodrow Wilson department of foreign affairs.

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., formerly of Amherst College, has accepted a position as assistant professor of government at the University of Rochester beginning September 1957.

Thomas M. Franck, assistant professor of law, University of Nebraska, has been appointed associate professor of international law at New York University to succeed Clyde Eagleton who retired in February.

Samuel K. Gove has become executive assistant to the State Auditor, State of Illinois.

Ernest Griffith, director of legislative reference service of the Library of Congress has been appointed dean of American University's school of international service.

Morton Grodzins, professor and chairman of the department of political science of the University of Chicago, has been appointed Chicago's first Ford Research professor in governmental affairs.

Raymond H. Gusteson has been appointed chairman of the department of government at Ohio University.

A Chester Hanford, professor of government Harvard University, will retire this summer.

Hanford served as dean of Harvard College for twenty years from 1927 to 1947, longer than any other person in Harvard history. He has been with the University since 1915, teaching government before becoming dean.

In his 42 years at Harvard, Hanford helped initiate many important reforms, including the House system, the National Scholarship Program, the tutoring and the beginning of General Education.

When Hanford retired from the dean's office, Paul H. Buck, then provost of the University, remarked, "Above all, he will be remembered as a humane counselor of youth—a man who gave understanding and endless hours to multifold problems of individual students."

Royce Hanson has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as instructor in government.

Samuel Hendel and Norman J. Powell of the department of government at the City College of New York have been promoted to the rank of professor. During the academic year 1956–57 Professor Powell has been serving the Board of Higher Education as consultant on personnel.

Oliver W. Holmes has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in records management in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Thomas Hovet, Jr., formerly of Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, has been appointed assistant professor of government at New York University.

Stanley L. Johnson, director of the civic center division of the school of public administration of the University of Southern California, has resigned to accept the position of executive secretary of the Los Angeles Bar Association. He begins his duties on May 1, 1957.

Marc Karson, formerly of Washburn University, is now associate professor of government at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois.

C. Mansel Keene has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as lecturer in personnel administration.

John Kieffer has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in comparative government in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Louis W. Koenig of New York University has been promoted to professor of political science.

Walter Kurylo has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as lecturer in public budgeting.

Robert E. Lane has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Yale University.

Robert S. Lorch has joined the staff of the social sciences department at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Mr. Lorch is finishing the work for his doctor's degree at the University of Wisconsin.

Conrad McBride has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Colorado. His duties also include part-time work with the bureau of state and community service at the same institution.

John P. McCarthy, formerly of Purdue University Center, Fort Wayne Indiana, has been appointed assistant professor of politics at the Catholic University of America.

Joseph D. McGoldrick of Brooklyn, former Comptroller of the City of New York and New York State Rent Administrator, has been appointed chairman of the department of political science and full professor at Queens College by the Board of Higher Education as of May 1, 1957.

Gerard Mangone has been appointed associate professor at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, where during the coming year he will participate in a research project on the education and training of Americans for public service overseas.

Seymour Z. Mann has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Harpur College.

Curtis Martin of the University of Colorado was elected chairman of the division of political science upon the completion of a two-year term as chairman of the department of social sciences at the same institution.

Roger H. Marz, a doctoral candidate at Michigan State University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Wayne State University.

John Brown Mason, visiting professor of the department of political science of the University of Florida, has been appointed professor of government at Georgetown University.

Ernest G. Miller, formerly of Princeton University, has been appointed instructor at Dartmouth College.

Emmet V. Mittlebeeler has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in government and public administration in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Steven Muller has joined the department of political science at Haverford College as assistant professor of political science.

Frank Munger has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of political science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.

Fred Warner Neal has resigned his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado to accept a position as associate professor of journalism at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Louise Overacker will retire from her position in the department of political science at Wellesley College in June, 1957.

L. Vincent Padgett of Texas Technological College has been appointed assistant professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Anthony Pearce, of the University of California, has been appointed as an instructor in political science and in the humanities program at San José College.

Howard R. Penniman has resigned as division chief of the United States Information Agency to become professor of American government at Georgetown University.

Charles A. Phillips has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in public management in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Paul Piccard, who was visiting lecturer in the department of political science at the Florida State University 1955–56, is now field representative and research associate, Florida Citizens Tax Council.

Palmer C. Pilcher of the department of political science, Wayne State University, has been appointed to the position of administrative officer of the graduate school at Wayne State University.

Frank A. Pinner has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Michigan State University.

S. J. Pomrenze has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in records administration in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Robert V. Presthus has been promoted to professor of public administration in the graduate school of business and public administration at Cornell University, and has assumed the editorship of *The Administrative Science Quarterly*, a journal devoted to increasing the understanding of administration through empirical research and theoretical analysis.

Eugene Price, who is currently completing his PhD dissertation at the University of California, has been appointed instructor in political science at San Jose State College beginning with the fall term.

Coleman B. Ransone, formerly of the University of Alabama, has been appointed professor of government at the College of William and Mary where he will conduct a program of teaching and research in the field of public administration.

Merton L. Reichler, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, has received an appointment as assistant professor at Wellesley College.

Edward J. Rozek was appointed assistant professor at the University of Colorado effective with the fall semester, 1956.

Howard Scarrow of Duke University has been appointed assistant professor at Michigan State University in the department of political science effective Fall, 1957.

Richard F. Schier has been promoted to associate professor in the government department of Franklin and Marshall College.

Robert G. Scigliano has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Michigan State University.

Harry M. Scoble, Jr. has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Ralph Smuckler, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University has been appointed assistant dean of the international programs at that institution.

Edmund E. Spellacy, of the department of government at the University of Hawaii, has been named dean of the college of general studies at that university.

T. Noel Stern left his position as director of the Fondation des Etats-Unis (United Nations House) last July, to become a Public Administration Training Officer with the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. He is serving as acting chief of the U.N. Mission to Addis Ababa, and has helped establish an Imperial Ethiopian Institute of Public Administration at the University of Addis Ababa, with the personal support of His Imperial Majesty, Hailie Selassie I.

Joseph Tanenhaus, assistant professor of political science at New York University, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Karl Trever has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as lecturer in archives administration.

Henry A. Turner has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara College. He served as visiting professor of political science at the University of Nebraska during the 1956 summer session.

Charles A. Ullmann has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor in public administration in the school of government and public administration at The American University.

Paul van der Veur has joined the government department of the University of Hawaii as assistant professor of government, previously serving as co-director of the Indonesia research project at Yale University.

John Vanderzell has been promoted to associate professor in the government department of Franklin and Marshall College.

Carlo Valentino and George D. Wendel have been appointed to the staff of the government department of St. Louis University as instructors in government.

Richard W. Van Wagenen will resign his position as director of The Center for Research on World Political Institutions at Princeton University to become dean of the graduate school and professor of international relations and organization at The American University.

Paul P. Van Riper of the graduate school of business and public administration at Cornell University has received an appointment as full professor of public administration in this school, effective July 1, 1957. Mr. Van Riper has been designated director of the doctoral program at the school.

Ralph M. Wade has been promoted to a full professorship in political science at the University of Wyoming.

Maurice Waters, formerly of the Green Bay extension division of the University of Wisconsin, has become an instructor in the department of political science at Wayne State University.

Ellsworth E. Weaver of the department of political science, University of Utah, and business manager of the *Western Political Quarterly*, has been promoted to full professor.

H. Bradford Westerfield, assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Yale University.

Howard B. White of the graduate faculty of political and social science of the New School for Social Research, New York, has been advanced to the rank of full professor.

Robert F. Wilcox has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Sidney Wise has been promoted to associate professor in the government department of Franklin and Marshall College.

Teh-yao Wu, dean of the college of arts, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan, was recently awarded a chair in social science by the Princeton-in-Asia Foundation.

# IN MEMORIAM

Frederick Morgan Davenport—The ninety years enjoyed by Frederick Morgan Davenport were productively filled with a broad and rich variety of public services. His life span included a unique and varied array of separate yet intermingled careers all of which contributed to the advancement of the American public service. As a preparatory school teacher, as a university professor, and even as a minister of the gospel he offered to young people the challenge of public affairs. In this teaching he displayed the rare ability to blend the realities of governmental problems with the highest ethical and moral standards.

This career of teaching was supplemented through active participation in the activities of governmental bodies. He served in the interest of better state government in the State Senate at Albany and he actively campaigned for high office in New York State. He contributed substantial leadership in the financial reorganization of the State and in the initiation of forward-looking legislative programs. But even more important, he became a vigorous and effective adviser to State leaders who subsequently advanced to key roles on the national scene.

He followed these leaders to Washington when he was elected to Congress. There he served actively and with distinction for a period of eight years. He once again offered his talents in the taxation field through his membership on the House Ways and Means Committee.

Following this tour in Congress he became deeply interested in the growing need of the federal government for talented men and women who would contribute a productive career in the public interest. He gave this problem sustained study and founded and for fifteen years directed the National Institute of Public Affairs which brought to Washington highly selected graduate students from colleges and universities and gave them a year of training and apprenticeship in federal administrative posts. The success of this program is evidenced by its general emulation on the part of the federal departments and agencies at the present time.

But he served yet another career: that of a federal executive. He was appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt to organize and head the first Federal Personnel Council, a co-ordinating group designed to promote through cooperative action the constructive development of personnel administration in the federal service. Although he was seventy-three when appointed he provided strong and positive leadership for the Council for a period of fourteen years, retiring in 1953 when the function of the Council became a regular continuing part of the Civil Service Commission.

During the course of these many careers he found time to contribute his guidance and wisdom to many activities relating to the public service. He was proud of his part in the development and stature of the School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He participated actively in the educational and administrative affairs of his alma mater, Wesleyan University.

Even with all these dedicated activities he offered his personal counsel to many individuals intent upon a career in the public service. He left an indelible imprint of his wisdom and integrity on the character of countless men and women with whom he was associated throughout his long life.

The words of an editorial in the December 28, 1956, issue of the Washington *Post* eloquently pay tribute to his great contribution:

> "Dr. Davenport brought to the field of government personnel management a rich experience in political life and a warm interest in helping young people along in life. He was a man of extraordinary gentleness and patience, tolerant of frailties in others despite his own exalted rectitude, and respectful of views that differed from his own. Yet he was a man of formidable strength, tenacity, and incisiveness, moving with a kind of single-minded devotion toward the goals he set for himself. Presidents of varying political persuasion have counted him as friend and adviser, and several generations of public employees have thought of him as kind of patron saint. The American people owe him an immeasurable debt of gratitude for lifting the civil service to a level commensurate with the needs of a great democracy."—*John W. Macy, Jr.*, Executive Director, U. S. Civil Service Commission.

Vernon L. Fluharty, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, died unexpectedly on January 6, 1957. He had spent ten years in the United States Foreign Service before coming to the University of Pittsburgh in 1954.

O. Garfield Jones, professor emeritus of political science and former department head at the University of Toledo, died in Stuart, Florida, on February 19, 1957. He was 72. Prior to his retirement in the spring of 1955, Dr. Jones had taught political science at the University for 36 years.

Arnold Miles, for the past 15 years a leader in improving federal government organization and administration, died April 19, 1957. following surgery for lung cancer at George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D. C. His age was 48 years.

At the time of his death Mr. Miles headed the Government Organization Branch of the United States Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President.

Born in New York City, May 25, 1908, he resided during his youth at Columbus, Ohio, graduating from Ohio State University in 1927, and receiving a Master of Science degree from Syracuse University in 1929.

During the following seven years he was engaged in governmental research with the St. Louis Bureau of Municipal Research, the Institute of Public Administration in New York City, and the Public Administration Service, Chicago.

In 1936 he was appointed Assistant Director of the American Municipal Association, Chicago. There he played a significant role in the formative periods of numerous state associations of city governments.

Mr. Miles in 1941 came to Washington to serve with the Division of Defense Housing Coordination, and later that year joined the Bureau of the Budget.

Early in World War II he was an active participant in the studies leading up to the 1942 reorganization of the War Department. In 1945 he became head of the Government Organization Branch of the Bureau of the Budget. He assisted in developing the post-war plans for the creation of the Department of Defense and the unification of the armed services. He furnished much valuable advice and assistance on Federal organization to the first Hoover Commission in 1947 to 1949. He had continued active participation in the study and development of reorganization actions in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, serving as a staff adviser to the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization and the Committee on Department of Defense Organization, both chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller.

For the past several years Mr. Miles was an adjunct professor of public administration at American University.

Oscar Jászi, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Oberlin College, died on February 13, 1957 at the age of 81.

When Oscar Jászi joined the faculty of Oberlin College in 1925, he had a distinguished reputation as an Hungarian scholar and statesman. He had been one of the founders of the Hungarian Sociological Society and for almost twenty years editor of the monthly review, *Twentieth Century* (Huszadik Század). He had taught at the Universities of Kolozsvár and Budapest. He had published many books and articles. He had been a bold advocate of political and economic changes in the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; as Minister of Nationalities in the liberal Károlyi government of 1918, he had worked for a democratic federal solution of the problem of national minorities and for basic agrarian reforms.

Exiled from his native land by the Communists and by the reactionary Horthy regime, he was among the earliest of the group of post-World War I *émigrés* who have enriched American understanding of the complexities of European and international politics. His best known book, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, was followed by a stream of articles in *Foreign Affairs*, *The Journal of Central European Affairs*, and in other scholarly journals, dealing with the explosive issues of Danubia and with the problems of effective international organization.

Oscar Jászi was a brilliant and influential teacher. In the 1920's, he was a pioneer in relating the study of comparative government to sociological analysis and to consideration of the international equilibrium of states. In dealing with international affairs, he combined a realistic skepticism about quick and easy cures with a deep faith in traditional liberal values. His forceful character, his pungent humor, and his urbane courtesy won the affection of his students; the scholarly substance of his teaching assured their immediate interest and their lasting respect.

When he retired in 1942 a group of Oscar Jászi's Oberlin colleagues and many of his former students contributed to the establishment of the Jászi Lectureship in his honor, and Oberlin College acknowledged his distinguished service in 1953 when it conferred on him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.—*G. L. Lanyi and J. D. Lewis.*

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

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